

**The Joul.
of Religion**

**Vol. 12
1932**

**Lib. G. K. V.
Hardwar**

110531

[illegible]

Date of submission

The JOURNAL OF RELIGION

Volume XII

JANUARY 1932

Number 1

Christianity and Idealism

By Karl Bornhausen

The Growth of the Hebrew Idea of God

By J. M. Powis Smith

The Meaning of the First Beatitude

By Vittorio Macchioro

Does Japan Need Religion?

By Riichiro Hoashi

Energy the Soul of Matter

By Oliver L. Reiser

Religion and Truth

By Gertrude C. Bussey

"Liberal" Bibliolatry

By George P. Hedley

Reactions of Ex-Ministers toward the Ministry

By H. G. Duncan

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U.S.A.

THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

Volume XII

JANUARY 1932

Number 1

Issued by the

DIVINITY FACULTY AND CONFERENCE OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

Editor

The *Journal of Religion* is published quarterly by the University of Chicago at the University of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, in the months of January, April, July, and October. ¶The subscription price is \$4.00 per year; the price of single copies is \$1.25. ¶Postage is prepaid by the publishers on all orders from the United States, Mexico, Cuba, Porto Rico, Panama Canal Zone, Republic of Panama, Dominican Republic, Canary Islands, El Salvador, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Hayti, Uruguay, Paraguay, Hawaiian Islands, Philippine Islands, Guam, Samoan Islands, Balearic Islands, Spain, and Venezuela. ¶Postage is charged extra as follows: for Canada and Newfoundland, 25 cents on annual subscriptions (total \$4.25), on single copies, 6 cents (total \$1.31); for all other countries in the Postal Union, 35 cents on annual subscriptions (total \$4.35), on single copies 6 cents (total \$1.31). ¶Patrons are requested to make all remittances payable to the University of Chicago Press in postal or express money orders or bank drafts.

The following are authorized agents:

For the British Empire, except North America, India, and Australasia: THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, Fetter Lane, London, E.C. 4, England. Yearly subscriptions, including postage 19s. 6d. each, single copies 6s. 4d. each.

For Japan: THE MARUZEN COMPANY, LTD., Tokyo.

Claims for missing numbers should be made within the month following the regular month of publication. The publishers expect to supply missing numbers free only when losses have been sustained in transit and when the reserve stock will permit.

Business correspondence should be addressed to The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill.

Communications for the editor and manuscripts should be addressed to the Editor of THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION, The University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

The articles in this journal are indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals*, New York, N.Y.

Applications for permission to quote from this journal should be addressed to The University of Chicago Press, and will be freely granted.

Entered as second-class matter, February 2, 1928 at the post-office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on July 15, 1918.

[PRINTED
IN U.S.A.]

THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

Vol. XII

CONTENTS FOR JANUARY 1932

No. .

CHRISTIANITY AND IDEALISM	I
By KARL BORNHAUSEN, Breslau, Germany	
THE GROWTH OF THE HEBREW IDEA OF GOD	24
By J. M. POWIS SMITH, University of Chicago	
THE MEANING OF THE FIRST BEATITUDE	40
By VITTORIO MACCHIORO, University of Naples	
DOES JAPAN NEED RELIGION?	50
By RIICHIRO HOASHI, Waseda University	
ENERGY THE SOUL OF MATTER	61
By OLIVER L. REISER, University of Pittsburgh	
RELIGION AND TRUTH	80
By GERTRUDE C. BUSSEY, Goucher College	
"LIBERAL" BIBLIOLATRY	94
By GEORGE P. HEDLEY, Pacific School of Religion	
REACTIONS OF EX-MINISTERS TOWARD THE MINISTRY	100
By H. G. DUNCAN, University of New Hampshire	
CRITICAL REVIEWS	
THE EARLY INHABITANTS OF MESOPOTAMIA	116
By EDWARD CHERA, University of Chicago	
EARLY ISRAEL	117
By W. C. GRAHAM, University of Chicago	
BABYLONIAN ARAMAIC EXPLAINED IN HEBREW	118
By SOLOMON B. FREEHOF, Chicago, Illinois	
JESUS AND THE OLD TESTAMENT	119
By WILLIAM C. GRAHAM, University of Chicago	
JEWISH MODERNISM	120
By A. EUSTACE HAYDON, University of Chicago	
ALLEGED SUPPLEMENTARY GOSPELS	122
By ERNEST W. PARSONS, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School	
THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL	123
By ERNEST W. PARSONS, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School	
A STUDY OF CALVIN'S ETHICS	124
By JOHN T. MCNEILL, University of Chicago	
THE CZECHOSLOVAK CHURCH	126
By MATTHEW SPINKA, Chicago Theological Seminary	
A HISTORY OF ENTHUSIASM	126
By MERRILL E. GADDIS, Central College, Fayette, Missouri	
NEWMAN AND MODERN CHRISTIANITY	127
By PERCY V. NORWOOD, Western Theological Seminary	
THE VIRGINIA REVIVAL	128
By WILLIAM WARREN SWEET, University of Chicago	

[Contents continued on following page]

THEISM EXPLAINED	130
By WILLIAM WARREN SWEET, University of Chicago	
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE	131
By ROY WOOD SELLARS, University of Michigan	
SYSTEMATIC CHRISTIAN ETHICS	132
By EDWIN EWART AUBREY, University of Chicago	
DEITY DISCLOSED	134
By HENRY B. ROBINS, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School	
REASON, FAITH, AND ETHICS	135
By EDWIN EWART AUBREY, University of Chicago	
AUTHORITY IN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL EXPERIENCE	137
By D. A. MCGREGOR, Western Theological Seminary	
RELIGION AND PRESENT POSSIBILITY	138
By NELSON PAXSON HORN, Iowa State College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts	
BARTH EXPOUNDED	140
By J. S. BIXLER, Smith College	
THE THEOLOGY OF PERSONALISM	141
By HARRISON S. ELLIOTT, Union Theological Seminary	
FOUND BEFORE THE SEARCH	143
By EDWIN EWART AUBREY, University of Chicago	
EXPERIMENTALISM IN EDUCATION	145
By WILLIAM CLAYTON BOWER, University of Chicago	
THE STUDENT AND RELIGION	146
By HARRISON S. ELLIOTT, Union Theological Seminary	
RECENT BOOKS	148

BOOKS REVIEWED IN THIS NUMBER

<i>Atkins, Life of Cardinal Newman</i>	128
<i>Charters, The College Student Thinking It Through</i>	146
<i>Childs, Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism</i>	145
<i>Cole, History of Fundamentalism</i>	130
<i>Foster, Friedrich Nietzsche</i>	131
<i>Garvie, The Christian Ideal for Human Society</i>	132
<i>Gewehr, The Great Awakening in Virginia, 1740-1790</i>	128
<i>Goodspeed, Strange New Gospels</i>	122
<i>Gore, The Philosophy of the Good Life</i>	135
<i>Harkness, John Calvin—The Man and His Ethics</i>	124
<i>Hník, Za lepší církví</i>	126
<i>Hoyle, The Teaching of Karl Barth</i>	140
<i>Lee, The Historical Backgrounds of Early Methodist Enthusiasm</i>	126
<i>Levias, A Grammar of Babylonian Aramaic</i>	118
<i>Lods, Israel—des origines au milieu du VIII^e siècle</i>	117
<i>Lyman, The Fourth Gospel and the Life of To-Day</i>	123
<i>Matthews, God in Christian Experience</i>	143
<i>Meinhold, Das Alte Testament und evangelisches Christentum</i>	119
<i>Silver, Religion in a Changing World</i>	120
<i>Speiser, Mesopotamian Origins. The Basic Population of the Near East</i>	116
<i>Strachan, The Authority of Christian Experience</i>	137
<i>Turner, The Revelation of Deity</i>	134
<i>Vaughan, The Significance of Personality</i>	141
<i>Wieman, The Issues of Life</i>	138

JESUS THROUGH THE CENTURIES

By SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

Published
January 26
\$3.00

"Who do men say that I am?" This is a study of the varying answers to that question since it was first propounded more than nineteen hundred years ago—Jesus, the Triumphant Martyr, the New Messiah, the Incarnate God, the Catholic Savior, the Protestant Christ, the metaphysical interpretation. It might, indeed, have been titled, *"What the Christians Have Done to Jesus since the Crucifixion."*

Other books in the trilogy are

Jesus: A New Biography
The Historicity of Jesus

Each, \$3.00

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

the AMERICAN Bible

has a **new beauty**—"a surprising new charm a fresher, lighter grace."

the AMERICAN Bible

will give you a **new understanding**—it conveys "both the thought and the mood which the original conveyed to its first readers."

the AMERICAN Bible

will give you **new enjoyment**—"It is a joy and an enlightenment to the discriminating reader."

the AMERICAN Bible

is translated by J. M. P. Smith and E. J. Goodspeed—2,060 pages for only \$3.50 in cloth; \$5.00 in leather.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

THE book

by

J. M. POWIS SMITH

THE ORIGIN *and* HISTORY OF HEBREW LAW

\$3.00

The history of Hebrew law is traced from its beginning in the Decalogue to its close in the Priestly Codes, relating each code to the times in which it was written. A comparison is made of Hebrew codes with the Hittite, Assyrian, and Babylonian codes. Much of this material is here made available in English for the first time.

—the culmination of thirty years' study by this distinguished scholar of Hebraic language and literature.

THE UNIVERSITY
OF CHICAGO PRESS

Was the Fourth Gospel written in Jesus' own language? Is our Greek gospel a translation from an Aramaic original? Or did its author think in Aramaic while writing in Greek?

THE GREEK OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL

By ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL

\$2.00

Dr. Colwell compares the alleged Aramaic constructions in John with the contemporary, non-literary Greek of the *Discourses* of Epictetus and the papyri, and shows that practically all the Semitic constructions have parallels in classical or Hellenistic Greek. His conclusion is that the theory of a Semitic original is fundamentally erroneous.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

Volume XII

JANUARY 1932

Number 1

CHRISTIANITY AND IDEALISM

KARL BORNHAUSEN
Breslau, Germany

FOR many years the discussion of Christianity and idealism remained an entirely barren and uncertain controversy about concepts. Now gradually we are beginning to perceive that these two great phenomena of the occidental consciousness are not philosophical theories but are historical displays of spiritual energy, whose course in the evolution of European life has to be traced and recorded. Only thus can the way be prepared for a correct opinion regarding the significance of these two groups of ideas. But even then our interpretation can succeed only when historical and philosophical examination starts with their primal origins, which by no means coincide with the beginnings of our culture. The latter, in which the Nordic mind in later antiquity integrates itself into an original organism, falls in a period much later than Christianity, idealism, and their related ideas. For this reason the question concerning religion and culture should not be confused with the much more concrete historical and philosophical consideration of Christianity and idealism.

Only in the fertile valley of historical experience can one cultivate the soil from which springs the knowledge of mysterious, vital, spiritual accomplishments. They can be comprehended as creative ideas, guides, and forces of growth; they effect in the Old World that change whose fifteen hundredth anniversary we reverently commemorate on the year of the death of the great

J. M. POW

2

THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

Augustine. For in Augustine the final union between Christianity and idealism is achieved on the boundary between Orient and Occident, antiquity and new age.

IDEAS

Parseeism as an ethical religion, which creates culture out of nature, is according to our present knowledge the oldest effective idealistic force in the religion of Europe. Out of an ancient Iranian pastoral religion, which already brings forth unique ethical energy as cow-worship, Zoroaster constructs the religion of Ahura Mazda, the "Lord of Wisdom." This religion reaches its consummation in a kingdom of God, which constitutes the activity of the pure good powers of life here on earth and permeates the entire world of nature and spirit. For this reason the attributes of purity and righteousness are ascribed to the divinity, and both qualities are conceived of in a strictly ethical manner. This ethical conception of God is made man-like in the late Avesta by the introduction of the god Mithra, who in the ancient Occident becomes the highest Persian god. He is a god of soldiers, and his name signifies "faithfulness," "oath." This god is regarded as the sun, since it is the symbol of purity, righteousness, and dependability. When God, according to the sermon on the mount, lets his sun shine upon the good and the bad, this parable must be taken as an analogy to the current widespread ethical Mithraic religion, the adherents of which expected, from their god, victory, well-being, power, good praise, and grace. "No man can think in this world such evil thoughts, speak such evil words, do such evil deeds that Mithra can not think, speak and do in his heaven just as beautiful things."

Was t
Jesus'
gospel
maic
think
in Gre
Dr. Co
constru
porary
courses
shows
structi
Hellen
the the
menta

TH

These high moral ideas remain united in the Persian world of faith with a strong natural sobriety, a rationalism which reflects the industry of an agricultural people close to mother-earth. The respect for motherhood, for the multiplication of life is retained and becomes the source of the ethical national

CHRISTIANITY AND IDEALISM

3

religion. The cow is the symbol of this ethical faithfulness on the earth, which not until later is transferred to the woman Demeter, the Great Mother. Only farther west, on the coast of Asia Minor, is this religion perverted into the erotic worship of Cybele-Attis. Out of Persia's religion came the cow-ethics as humanitarian idealism.

There have been attempts to divide the early history of the East, even indeed of mankind, into a cow-period and into a horse-period, and to give to the Indo-Europeans (Aryans) the credit for the higher horse-culture in the Mediterranean world. But the student of the history of religions cannot accept this too simple grouping. He sees the religion of Persia transform itself from the ethically elevated cow-worship to the just as necessarily ethical bull-worship. The bull is the animal of Mithra; its blood, its seed, is the salvation of the earth which is thirsting in the heat of the sun; it is also the baptism of salvation for man. This faith in blood penetrated from Persia into occidental religion and could not be banished in spite of all the protest of the Hebrew prophets. Religious idealism, which endeavors to make the blood as the most vital element in nature effective for the liberation of the souls of men, preserves in this connection nothing of the primitive meaning of sacrifice. For it is the god himself, who as bull, as passover lamb, gives his blood for his faithful followers in order that they might enter into his divine kingdom. The popular characterization of the redeemed individual in pietistic circles as one washed in the blood of the lamb is an idea which the Persian religion originally elevated from the barbaric custom of sacrifice to an ethical concept of culture.

Thus Parseeism, in its various religious levels up to the Roman cultural epoch, is to be characterized as a moral idealism whose power has greatly influenced the surrounding world of religion—Babylonia, Palestine, Egypt, and Greece. The religion of ancient Israel springs out of conditions similar to those out of which the ethical religion of Persia arose. A nomadic people of

shepherds under a great leader settles down on a fertile soil and transforms its polytheism into monolatry. The law of the first tablet, as it is known under the name of Moses, bears witness to this transformation of religion; Yahwe is designated as the national god. This god has liberated the people from servitude and nomadic life and has given them a new land; from now on he is a judge of the people, rewards the good and punishes the evil. For this reason God is the leader in Israel. With forceful emphasis it is said that God is the Lord beside whom no other god may be worshiped. And so strong is the conception of individuality in the Mosaic religion that every image and likeness of God is regarded as false, immoral, and impious. Thus the question whether God is an idea or a person is settled at the outset in the religion of the Old Testament in a vigorously rationalistic manner, so that prophetism with its moral demands now and then appears to approach the God-idea. But in the pre-exilic faith these generalizations about God are also suppressed as a result of the actual critical danger faced by the people. No idea can save Israel, but only the personal God.

The moral idea of religion about the righteous and wise God, who punishes sinners and rewards the good, is founded in pre-exilic prophecy. But it was changed by the exile and the historical necessity of the people. However, the liberation of the people by the Persian king Cyrus must have strengthened the Persian idea of religion in later Judaism. It is significant that we see the religious idea of wisdom in later Judaistic faith take its place beside the one God. And in the post-Christian wisdom of the synagogue God becomes more and more the idea of the morally good.

Post-exilic prophecy, on the other hand, has learned a different lesson from the historical destiny of God's people. It is not the problem of the Book of Job that prevails after the Hebrews experience the paradoxical fate. A new type of reverence for God pervades the prophecy of Deutero-Isaiah. "For as the heavens are higher than the earth so are my ways higher than

your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts. For as the rain cometh down and the snow from heaven, and returneth not thither, but watereth the earth, and maketh it bring forth and bud, and giveth seed to the sower and bread to the eater; so shall my word be that goeth forth out of my mouth!" (Isa. 55:9-11). The spiritual communion with the word of Mithra and the Persian religion of nature morality, which comprehends the superrational quality of the divinity in the moral idea, is evident. And yet there is more here. For the power of the personal God is beyond good and evil; it transcends all moral law, even purity and righteousness. For it is creation. The paradox of nature, for this reason, becomes in prophetism a simile of divinity. The "demony" of divinity reveals itself as its personal characteristic; it is angry and gracious, contradicts all reason and all human ways of thinking, it slays the good and spares the evil-doer. The human understanding of the prophet has only one criterion left, that is omnipotence.

Thus the religion of ancient Israel reacts to the revelation of God with an idea which is not moral but merely pious. But the synagogue, representing the living religion of Judaism up to our time, has seen the matter correctly when it speaks of a God-idea in its theology. It is a dogma for it, that God awakens the God-idea in human thinking. For this reason the reality of God is first associated in this religion with human idealism. This connection between faith in God and idealism up to the present time is most distinct in European faith and is predominant among thinking men. It now finds its present culminating expression in the philosophy of religion of Hermann Cohen, who was the thinker and high priest of idealistic prophetism. Over against him, however, the old synagogue retains in full vigor its faith in the personality of God and conserves therein the seriousness and kindness of God in the same manner as formerly Jesus in Judaistic piety had received the doctrine of God as father. And ever and again also in our Christian faith the "demony" of the love of God recurs as the last Isaiah expresses it in these

words: "As one whom his mother comforteth, so will I comfort you" (Isa. 66:13). Such a strong personal faith even Jesus could not surpass and has accepted it reverently and gratefully.

To the moral ideas of Persia and the God-person of ancient Israel must be added, as the last element of religion, the education of Hellenism, which precedes Christianity. This is the last heritage which irresistibly produced effects in the soul of Europe: the pedagogy of antiquity, as it originated in Greece and was expanded in Rome. What the Greek called *paideia* was in Rome *humanitas*. This is interpreted by Cicero to mean that not the *civis romanus*, the national citizen, is the goal and purpose of education but that the free virtues of valor, righteousness, restraint, *pietas*, help man to transcend the limits of his occidental historical condition. Plato had suggested these goals in that he assimilated *paideia* to *paidia*, play or game. And Schiller has transplanted this important idea into humanity: man is only then truly man when he plays. For this reason the goal of education is made to be the liberation from the fetters of nature. The proper meaning of education is not to make man a minor but to free him from the law of tutelage so that he may learn to rise above it and fulfil it voluntarily, in play, as it were. And just as the apostle Paul leads men out of the bondage of the law to the freedom of the sons of God, so Plato brings *paideia* and *religio* together through *philia*, friendship, love, to *genesis eis ousian*. Thus what the Greeks and Israelites have in mind is an education toward culture and religion, and in this success is achieved, not through our effort, but is given to us as a present. However, the recipient must become worthy of it by proper education. For Plato this education is by friendship and for Paul by brotherhood.

The idea of Jesus that man must become a son in the kingdom of God, and the act of Jesus in founding a fellowship of disciples and followers proves that he also recognized regeneration through self-training in the fellowship of love. Christianity has absorbed the idealism of the Greeks and the faith in humanity

CHRISTIANITY AND IDEALISM

7

of the Romans and transformed them into the religion of Europe.

LEADERS

The idealism which we find in Christianity is so powerful that it predominates in two of the three leaders. Plato is a pure idealist and teaches education as a means toward salvation; Paul is the heir of this idealism in that he idealizes the cross; he teaches salvation in the manner of education. Only Jesus rises above this succession of ideas in the midst of which he stands. He is at the same time savior and teacher, in consequence of the uniquely spiritual character of his life.

PLATO: TRAINING FOR SALVATION

In the dialogue *Protagoras* Socrates, according to Plato, raises the question of the teachableness of virtue. Indeed, this question is put to humanity by the Deity. The teachableness of religion is for us also the ever new question. We all know that trust in God cannot be taught; this we have inherited from the Greeks. And we realize that religion is transmitted from generation to generation through doctrines and instruction. But this inheritance is not a theory but a continuous vital action of the moral and pious man in a historical continuity. This fact Plato has experienced in Socrates, and for this reason Socrates, who is present in almost all dialogues, becomes Plato's teacher in religion and morality. It was not Socrates' keen mind and his virtue which induced Plato to submit to him but it was the overpowering impression which Plato received from Socrates' life. And it is for this reason that he loved his teacher so much that he constantly had to speak only of him.

This is the platonic idea of Socrates. It designates a living person replete with educational and liberating effect for the future. In his *Euthyphron* Plato places Socrates in opposition to the theologian, who repudiates all education and humanity. And in contrast to this petrified religion of Euthyphron he places the figure of this simple wise man of Athens who wishes only

to be the servant of God in the cause of goodness on earth. Socrates succeeds in his attempt to realize this good in himself and others. He is killed because of his training for salvation. But his education of mankind had formed its prophets in history, for it was an education for faith.

The realization of this tutor in the spiritual history was made possible by the fact that for Plato the person and the idea were identical in Socrates. A mere philosopher could never bring about such a union, for the person and the spiritual figure remain as separate as earth and sky. In religion, however, we find that an idea exists only through and in man, and man is only a person when he is changed into the original idea he has of himself. Schiller does not preach a dualism in his poem "Ideal and Life," but has emphasized the profound union of the two in the redemption of Hercules. And it is for this reason that this poem is the most sublime description of an education toward salvation.

For this reason one is also mistaken if one believes that Christianity has rendered the Greek way of education obsolete or false. On the contrary, the author of the Johannine literature has subjected himself to the pedagogical thinking of the Greeks which at that time was already four hundred years old. He recognized the connection between education, reason, and the individual. And by means of the concept "the Word became flesh" he produced a new union between education and salvation. Above all one must emphasize the social idea in Greek education. Plato's doctrine of the state is not a utopia but the union of religion and culture as a common popular possession. This was to be the national religion of the Greeks—a grand idea!

JESUS

Out of an unimportant and insignificant environment Jesus as a leader rises to an inconceivable greatness and efficiency for posterity. Just these facts suggest that he is not the product of his immediate and contemporary environment, which also could

not endure him. The Jewish scholar, Professor J. Klausner, in Jerusalem, has recently published a book about Jesus of Nazareth in which Klausner, in accordance with traditional exclusiveness of Judaism, seeks to find the essential characteristics of Jesus in the religion of the synagogue. The fact that Christianity has for nearly 2,000 years uncritically accepted this view is a sign of the paramount Jewish philosophy of history which dominates the entire New Testament conception of Jesus. This view of history stood in sharp contrast to Hellenism and has either eradicated all traits of ancient culture in Jesus or interpreted them in Jewish fashion.

In spite of this tendency the traditional picture of Jesus' life reveals that he constantly opposed the later Jewish conception of faith and morality. It is true he did not enjoy a higher education and probably could not understand the Greek language, and yet, in spite of this, that achievement of classical antiquity, spiritual freedom, which had fallen into decay in Hellenism and under Roman culture, came to life again in him.

The Greek word "autonomy" correctly describes Jesus' self-consciousness. Critical theology has attempted to separate Jesus from his environment by the conception of his messianic self-consciousness. That Jesus aroused the impression of aloofness and authority among his contemporaries seems undeniable. Peter's confession, "Thou art the Messiah" (Mark 8:29) is to be interpreted as a recognition of the autonomy of Jesus, which is most evident in his own designation of himself as the Son of Man. In this designation of the prophet Daniel one finds, in addition to the faith of ancient Israel, also Parseism and Hellenism. The spiritual culture of the Orient which is a product of thousands of streams of culture influenced Jesus through Daniel, since he manifestly loved this prophet, not because of the apocalypse, but, on the contrary, because of its rich, adaptable, and comprehensive spiritual culture.

This singular consciousness of autonomy Jesus relates to God in that he calls himself "son." In his book *The Idea of the Holy*

R. Otto has speculated whether Jesus was *a* son of God or *the* son of God. But this question is out of place in the history of religion. In consequence of his conception of autonomy Jesus believed himself linked to God as his son. It is a designation of duty, not of right; therefore the article is meaningless. In the same manner heteronomy is also not produced by the fact that the father has greater authority than the son. It is illogical, unethical, impious, to regard God as heteronomous for man. The law of God is truly autonomous human law. Kant justly finds heteronomy only in nature and human selfishness.

This autonomy of Jesus is interpreted by each evangelist in his own way. Matthew colors it as messianic in the Old Testament sense; Mark has a tendency toward a humanistic interpretation, but exercises self-restraint. Luke has a strong Greek colonial attitude. John goes so far as to inject the entire Greek mysticism into the personality of the divine autonomous Christ. This neo-Platonic turn goes beyond all historical probability, yet it shows that one believed Jesus capable of such platonic personalism. For Luke the autonomy of Jesus possesses such vividness in the tradition that he ascribes these words to him: "Ye hypocrites, ye know how to interpret the face of the earth and the heaven; but how is it that ye know not how to interpret this time? And why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?" (12:56-57). This is Jesus' appeal to the autonomous conscience, an appeal which we can attribute to him four hundred years after Socrates. The mildness of Greek education has disappeared, and there appears the harsh demand for the freedom of the moral will as an obligation.

That Jesus united this autonomous obligation of duty with an overpowering joy of life is entirely contrary to Judaism. A dead legality had lost all naturalness and saw an evil in every sensual pleasure. Roman ethics had also been transformed by stoic philosophy into an ascetic conception of life in a declining period of history. The wise man despises the world and turns his back upon it. Although Christian morality later entered

CHRISTIANITY AND IDEALISM

11

into a close alliance with this stoic conception of life, one cannot find any evidence of this in Jesus.

Jesus felt a ready and genuine sympathy with nature. We find in him a singular harmony with the plant and animal kingdom, an attitude which displays itself again in Europe in his disciple, St. Francis of Assisi. This original charm and dignity was incomprehensible for the artificial culture of the time of the Roman emperors. Jesus is magnificently charming when he receives children and sets them up as examples of simplicity, and praises as blessed their life of absolute dependence. His dignity, however, shines forth when he abolishes the sanctity of the Sabbath, revives on the other hand the sanctity of the temple; breaks through the old empty forms and establishes new values. In doing this Jesus certainly also creates aesthetic values as a consequence of his sensitiveness for the pious life expressed in that meaningful language of the parable, which establishes the bond with nature only more firmly when it gives freedom to the spirit by the use of pictures. Noble simplicity and quiet dignity emanate from his words and permit the human soul to manifest itself as a unity. The evangelist John has again spiritualized best this appearance of Jesus within the world of sense in the words of Peter: "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life" (John 6:68). Even today mankind can find no personality so significant as Jesus in helping man to appreciate the joyousness of living.

The mind of Jesus spends and fulfils itself in the disposition toward brotherly love, which gives itself full of the power of nature. Jesus was teacher and educator. He exercised both functions. He proclaimed a message and trained a circle of disciples. And both activities were carried on in a way quite different from that current in Jewish teaching and Greek education. Jesus had no ready-made theory concerning man; he regarded him as neither good, as did the Greeks, nor evil, as did the Israelites. He viewed every man according to the individual condition of his body and soul, and had patience sufficient to

discover his misery. In his education Jesus was not concerned with guilt and punishment but with misfortune and its alleviation. He was not interested in ethics and pedagogies but in a new creation, a regeneration resulting from the kindliness of brotherly love. Thus he is called Savior for us.

He taught Christianity by means of two parables, the good Samaritan and the prodigal son. He freed us from all fear of life by two deeds, his prayer to God the father and his fellowship in the Last Supper. Nothing else is necessary. Mankind needs nothing more in order to obtain eternal life through Jesus Christ.

These ideas and deeds of Jesus are not idealism, but they are possible and conceivable only in an atmosphere permeated by full spiritual freedom and longing. It is foolishness to call Jesus an idealist, but that all his teachings, his life, his pedagogy, presuppose an idealistic conception is self-evident. It is also foolish to maintain that a materialist can equally well be a follower of Jesus. This is impossible; and in this connection one should not speak of realism, for this is a philosophical theory¹ which among present-day theologians is in reality identical with idealism. Idealism and realism, as well as all other isms, find no place with Jesus. But that he is the educator and savior of mankind is a historical fact which is only possible through the faith of Christians in the victory of the world-conquering spirit. The Christian Pentecost either has an idealistic meaning or none at all.

PAUL: SALVATION AS EDUCATION

When the first great disciple of Jesus again and again repeats that to the Jews he is a Jew and to the Greeks he is a Greek, we find in this an acknowledgment of the fact that he shares in both of these cultures, the Hebrew and the Hellenic. But in reality this duality is much too simple. The beginning of the Christian era presents a great mixture of cultural and religious ideas from

¹ Therefore some of the papers collected in the volume *Religious Realism* by D. C. Macintosh (New York: Macmillan, 1931), have their merits for philosophical understanding.

the whole of antiquity, in which only the contrast between the Jewish religion and the confusion of ancient religion and philosophy was keenly felt by contemporaries. For this reason the Jewish elements in Paul were much more stressed by posterity than the Hellenistic elements in his thinking.

In spite of this, ancient Christianity was fully aware of the singular individuality of Paul and emphasized his relationship to Hellenism. This is evidenced not only by his use of the Greek language in his letters. Also in matters of content and form Paul showed himself to be a disciple of Greek philosophical training, a philosopher of the platonic academy, a peripatetic of the stoic-cynic variety, who mastered the dialectic method and the skill of the diatribe and made use of it in delivering his own teachings. In the second century this actual historical background was so impressive at Rome that it reproduced the apostle in the typical external appearance of the cynic philosopher. Negligent dress, a long beard of unkempt waving hair, shows his unmindfulness of the external world; all strength is concentrated in the content of his mighty skull. Dürer, still, has represented the prince of Christian thinking thus in his painting of the apostle at Munich. And undoubtedly there is in this tradition about the philosophic teacher Paul more historical truth than in the portraiture of the Acts of Thecla.

At the time of Paul platonic idealism was so extensively a possession of common knowledge in education that there was no need to study platonic writings in order to become familiar with it. That Paul mastered the transcendental symbolism of this philosophy is evidenced by numerous passages in his letters. The most convincing passage is perhaps I Cor. 13:12 where in a philosophic composition he makes use of the platonic parable of the cave taken from Plato's treatise on the State and employs the central imagery of Plato's doctrine of ideas to explain the immanence and transcendence of knowledge.

But it has been maintained that such passages are not applications of Greek philosophy on the part of Paul but only mere

mysticism and ancient gnosis to which the psychopathic apostle unfortunately was inclined. This is not only a very poor plea but is also false. Mysticism and mysteries at the end of antiquity were of such spiritual power that no teacher or educator could get away from their mood or their symbolism. But this mood and allegory are far removed from mystical and gnostic philosophy. Just as the eschatological and apocalyptic moods of Jesus or Paul are slight if any proof that they shared the pessimistic philosophy of the Jews, so Paul's mystery ideas no more confine him to the mysticism of late antiquity or to the mystery religions. Paul as a philosopher is rather a representative of the idealistic thinking of late antiquity. And his participation in this highly important philosophy enabled him to develop the experience of his faith into a theology, which transmutes salvation by a historic person into an education toward salvation in future history.

Paul's theology is an idealistic philosophy of history. It is historical reflection in so far as it comprehends Jesus' death on the cross as the turning-point in history; it is idealism inasmuch as it shapes the cross into an idea. And out of his most inward religious vision Paul expanded this idea into such a richness of spiritual history and imagery that Christianity up to the present is still bound by this symbolism. That these ideas retained such great power lies in the fact that they are never mere speculation, but that moral sentiments, directions of will and acts, are everywhere evident in Paul. Thus the theology of the cross does not rest in mysticism and speculation but proceeds to the most effective activity in Christian faith and accomplishments. The personal fate of Paul, who knows himself to be on the cross with Jesus, who bears the cross, who loves the cross, who dies for the cross, becomes the victorious power of Christian missions and of the propagation of the faith. The cross is the obligation to brotherly love, the sign of faithfulness, the symbol of fellowship, the bloody sacrifice, the eternal salvation. Thus the victory of salvation absorbs in itself all the death of this world. The bur-

den of the historic cross gives to the children of God freedom from and victory over history.

The metaphysics of this faith on the cross was confirmed after centuries in a most noteworthy historical decision, in the victory of Constantine over Maxentius in 312. One can be certain that the cross on their shields was for Constantine and his soldiers nothing more than a fetish. Only dire need induced Constantine to try Christianity once. But the fact that the Christianity of the period after Diocletian, a much decayed and stunted faith, triumphed over antiquity and Europe attests the historic power of faith in the cross which Paul received from Jesus Christ. The cross is not a mere idea, but, combined with the reality of Jesus and Paul, it is the true and genuine religion. Since it is bound up with the good and evil deeds of men, it indicates and consummates the will of God in history.

The opening of the West was an act in the life of Paul contrary to his will. To be sure, that he recognized the responsibility of Christianity toward the Occident is revealed by the letter to the Romans; otherwise he would not have written this charter for Europe. But as an oriental Jew he felt himself dedicated to the East and limited by the Aegean Sea. The dream at Troas, in which a Macedonian called for help, is local in character (Acts 16:9). The political necessity to defend himself before the emperor at Rome gave him world-significance. This journey is described in the last two chapters of Acts as if a continuous divine guidance had led Paul to the West irrespective of his will, his expressed intention, and his plan of work. With good reason this irrational historical report of the New Testament concludes with this miracle. Paul's journey takes on extraordinary significance when later art so fondly represents such events that an angel hovers over God's messenger and executes the deeds of power. On the boundary between East and West, on the island of Malta, occurs the symbolic event, when the sting of the adder leaves the apostle unharmed, and in this Paul is represented as Asklepios, the most highly venerated god of

late antiquity. But now he has the Orient behind him, conquered. Unpretentious human feet lead him in tiresome marches over the Appian Way from Puteoli to Rome. Alexander the Great at the head of a glorious army conquered the Orient. A political prisoner, who twenty miles from Rome meets at the Three Taverns a group of insignificant adherents, conquers the West. We do not know what the apostle and his new friends discussed on that journey to Rome. The sound of the wanderers' steps dies away in the metropolis as do their words; and yet we know that this meeting, in which the apostle crossed the boundaries between East and West and abolished the human barriers between himself and his new brethren, was of historic significance for the rise of the Christian world. Three hundred years later the boundaries of the Roman Empire break through this power, and Augustine founds the new empire of spirits, the divine state. Certainly Europe has not attained these mighty aims and limits set by God, but we see how history itself forces its steps back on the right path, though men may wander ever so often off the road. Paul inaugurates the unknown history of God and Jesus Christ westward.

FORCES

The foundation of types of Christian faith begins shortly after the death of Christ. One group of the Lord's disciples, waiting in Jerusalem for his Parousia, gathers about Peter and James, the brother of Jesus. Thus the members of Jesus' family, his kinsmen in the flesh, played a part in the perpetuation of Jesus' memory although during his lifetime they opposed him. But the congeniality of Jesus and his friend Peter seems to have exerted an even stronger subsequent influence.

PETRINISM

We assume that Peter was older in years than Jesus, and yet a pathetic dependence of the older man upon the younger is noticeable. Peter was able by an inward sense to perceive the mission of Jesus. Perhaps, under the influence of Jesus, he often

took words out of the sense and the heart of the master which Jesus neither wished nor dared to speak. And the observant love of his friend let Jesus forget all the weakness of Peter's character, his insufficiency of conduct and judgment at the decisive moment. Peter was great only under the eye of the Lord; but fell away withered when the sun set. But the sun rises again. Paul was the new light under which Peter could not grow. And the sharp contrast between the disciple who loved the historic Lord, and the one who loved the crucified One had to come, and the contraries cross each other. Paul who created the theology of the cross remains a distinct personality; Peter who holds fast to the historic Jesus becomes himself an idea. Peter sinks into almost complete oblivion; only the fact of his fidelity, of his conservatism, remains; traditional in faith and practice, he certainly lived in Palestine, in Jerusalem. But thus he becomes identified with the idea of conservatism and tradition. Not only the progressive Paul, but also the conservative Peter, with his personal knowledge of Jesus, is supposed to have come to Rome and to have held there the office of bishop for twenty-five years. Neither historical nor philosophical possibility underlies this legend. But religion needs this idea of tradition and creates it for itself without any consideration of history. Thus Peter, who knows the historic Jesus, must found the unhistoric Christianity of ideas embodied in Catholic dogma. Paul, on the other hand, who did not know the historic Lord, inaugurates the truly historic Christianity which, up to the present, in its historical nature and development remains linked with the personality of Paul.

Thus Petrine Christianity stands for the religious idea, and one can discover all the merits of this Christianity from Catholic piety. For the personality of Peter, which historically portrayed was certainly not always a happy one in itself or in its conduct, has never burdened Catholic piety. Since one obviously knew very little of this man, not even his external appearance, graphic art with great ease transforms him into a typical figure. He is

the old fisherman who sits on the shore while the ship of the church with Paul at the helm moves out to sea. Of course this representation is obviously an Odysseus fragment. Yet Christianity laid hold on history in the figure of the helmsman Paul. He had journeyed by sea to Rome. In Peter on the shore it grasped only a symbol. It has done better in regarding him as a shepherd who as an old man protects and nourishes the life of the young. Perhaps it is not so erroneous for Roman scholarship to tend to recognize Peter in the many shepherds of the sarcophagi; although this is not the Peter of history but the ideal Peter. It was wise and correct, perhaps, one hundred years later, to adopt the idea of the shepherd's faithfulness for the guidance of this Roman church. The Christianity of Rome, the monarchic papal Rome with its compelling spiritual power, is a product of this idea. For this one does not need a grave with the remains of Peter, nor any historical evidence. When one needs letters of Peter, one simulates them a hundred years later. All of this is produced by the faith in the idea. Catholicism achieved this religion of the idea. It created a mother-goddess for itself out of the Virgin Mary, in defiance of all history, and transformed Jesus into a God in the second generation, even though Mary and the Holy Spirit are practically the divine pair in the primitive period. Nothing paradoxical or contradictory prevented this Christian faith from accomplishing its perversion of history and transmuting the historic death on the cross into an idea of sacrifice, even to the extent of using the idea of transubstantiation—the transmutation of matter into force or spirit.

Thus the historic thought of Peter expressed in his confession about Jesus—"Thou art the Lord"—passed over into the idea of sovereignty and came to terms in Rome with the ancient Roman Empire as it passed away. Catholic faith is the proper continuation of the ancient religion of ideas which is symbolized in Petrinism.

For this reason the idea is primary in the history of the papacy. Of course the papal idea, like every other idea, can become an object of

CHRISTIANITY AND IDEALISM

19

historic consideration only when in the Roman Church and in her leaders it has created a body for itself. The idea of the papacy as an inner experience and a religious confession transcends history because it is for believers an eternally unchangeable truth, consequently without development, and the speculative question also concerning the truth-content of this idea is super-historical.²

This imperialistic idea was no longer concerned with the historic-moral religion which Jesus had preached and founded. Petrinism transcends good and evil. It could transform the emperor Constantine, one of the most fatal spectacles of Christian faith, into a great man and saint, because he was willing to support, out of pure superstition, Christian priestly rule. It could make his mother, who without doubt was only a concubine of Constantius Chlorus and one of the vilest of such women in the immorality of late antiquity, into Saint Helene just because she had built the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. This woman, because of her sins, had every reason to venerate the pure mother of God, Mary, as the "Theotokos" and to support her own historic wickedness on the idea of Mary. Indeed, ideas heal everything: the idea of resurrection transports the Christian into the other world; the idea of baptism washes his sins away; the idea of the Holy Lord's Supper gives health; the idea of extreme unction leads into heaven. It is easy to live in an idea-religion. Herein lies the power of Roman Catholicism in our day. But on this point in European thinking one should be clear—if Christianity finds itself at all in accord with ancient idealism, then it is certainly most strongly in accord with Petrinism.

PAULINISM

How much more difficult, how much more mysterious, is the other doctrine of faith which is linked with the person and teaching of Paul. Certainly it is burdened with all human frailties which belong to any leader, with his mistakes and passions, with his bodily ills and opinions limited by his time. But it also

² Erich Caspar, *Die Geschichte des Papsttums von den Anfängen bis zur Höhe der Weltherrschaft*, Bd. I (Tübingen, 1930), Preface.

carries with it the genuine aroma of real history which gradually presses onward and upward through sin and suffering. In the activity of Paul there are found already symbolically all the fortunate and evil consequences that have followed for the Occident. Every success of Paulinism, true and false, is touched by his mighty personality. There is ample reason for Luther's magnificent creative power to unite with this gifted leader in order to find through him Jesus and his salvation. We know that Luther found in the doctrine of justification expressed in the letter to the Romans not a saving idea but the saving God himself, who manifested himself in the historical Paul and his successors. As a true German, Luther seeks historic reality; he feels that this does not dwell in the fantastic legends of Petrinism. But he finds it in the spiritual fate of Paul, whose thinking reveals the irrational reality of the life of Jesus. Paul himself lived as if Christ only lived in him. The founding of the churches and the journey to Rome are irrational occurrences accomplished by the impelling spirit of Christ. Paul's course of life is distinguished from the Peter-idea through the fact that within the sphere of history Jesus becomes the leader of world-religion in the Pauline formation of history.

Although Paulinism is connected with the Greek and the Jewish philosophy and appears to establish a religion of ideas through the preaching about the cross, yet it has never become idealism, but through the cross has remained rooted in living religion and its history. Paulinism, therefore, conceived not in a dogmatic but in a religious sense, is evangelical.

JOHANNISM

The religion of Jesus has also found expression in a consciously philosophical type of religion which without doubt can be regarded as idealistic. The Johannine theology is a philosophy of religion which applies the ancient deification of heroes to the historic Jesus and constructs by means of the mystic union between God and man, expressed in the love between father and

son, and by means of the Logos and gnosis, a mysteriously ingenious theory of religion filled with irrational values and truths. This teaching is monotonous in its grandeur; it is immobile in spite of all its glittering brilliancy. Keen reason, speculative practice, and the mystic vision of many centuries have met to create a Christian philosophy around Jesus, which as such can never again be attained. The philosopher John stands historically close enough to Jesus to comprehend his reality and to recognize his personality. But he is already far enough removed to be able to associate with him the God-idea as a hypostasis. Thus there arises an ideal story of Christ which to be sure is historical and yet at the same time transcends history. The creation of the Gospel of John is an unrecoverable phenomenon.

Johannism, although well grounded in philosophy, has had the profoundest emotional influence upon Christian Europe. While it is the religion of the prudent and wise, of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, it is also the religion of the North African slave or the illiterate Russian. The conception of the love of God becomes in Johannism a territory which reaches from the "intellectual love of God" of Spinoza and the platonic Eros of Goethe to Paul Gerhart's "O Haupt voll Blut und Wunden," and to the death-cry of a Christian soldier: "Come, Lord Jesus." Never has the kingdom of the Lord appeared as comprehensively as in Johannine faith. Luther and Francis of Assisi, Erasmus and Pascal, live on in its shadow. And the sun Jesus, the eternal light, which the philosopher John snatched from the altars of Persia, as earlier Prometheus snatched fire from heaven, shines with undiminished power upon this spiritual kingdom of love. Here within Christendom one sees that, from the beginning, idealism can become a religion in Christian belief and has become such in powerful fashion in Johannism. All the defects of rationalism and philosophy inhere in it; yet in spite of this, it is the dearest form of the faith of European Christians. Abundantly and fundamentally throughout eighteen centuries it has presented and insured deliverance through

the Lord and Savior. We bow before the great thinker of ancient times, who is full of enthusiasm for love, and who did not know how better to honor his Lord than by heaping upon his head all the crown of art, science, and philosophy from ancient and remote antiquity, and enveloping him with the royal mantle of platonic idealism. For truly even the Christ-idea of the gospel is also one of the means by which the Lord of history perfects his work of creation for mankind.

THE EUROPEAN PERIOD

The power of the Johannine theology lay in the idealistic conception that the spirit accomplishes everything. Spirit becomes flesh and takes on human shape, and it operates in this terrestrial form in order to return pure again into the kingdom of spirits after its debasement. This Christian idealism of the Orient was too free and daring for the Occident. A Christendom that was far from being ideal and idealistic demanded rigid discipline. And the ethical jurisprudence of North Africa created the organization of the church to serve the spirit of Christianity. Nevertheless one understands that in Tertullian's and Cyprian's idea of the church and in Augustine's divine state there still dwells the Holy Spirit of martyrdom and of sacrifice. The passion of the Berber people is linked up with the Christian idea of love and the Christian communion, the church, is expanded into a temple of God. But in Europe, which received its idea of the church from Rome, the church was no longer regarded experientially but was a mere idea. As an educational institution for the advancement of culture the church proved effective in the medieval period and up to the seventeenth century. Her assertion, however, that within her institution she perpetuates an other-worldliness, a holiness from God and Jesus Christ, was a fiction which became a fixed idea in the evangelical church. The present-day churches suffer from a false idealism. They see very clearly the shortcomings of the idealistic world-view but they do not perceive that they themselves are victims of secular and

worldly influence through their attachment to an erroneous and un-Christian institutional idealism. Europe's Christian faith groans under the idea of the church; the idealistic notion of the hierarchy in any denomination is dangerous for Christianity. On the other hand, faith need not be afraid of the idealism which knows the Logos to be living now and forever in the historic reality of Jesus Christ. Faith need not fear this genuine thought of the divine humanity but may expect therefrom great things.

THE GROWTH OF THE HEBREW IDEA OF GOD

J. M. POWIS SMITH
University of Chicago

THERE is today great uncertainty and indefiniteness about the idea of God. Our knowledge of the universe today is so much more comprehensive than was the knowledge of our ancestors that the ideas of God they based upon their limited range of information are by no means adequate to explain the universe as we know it.

My purpose here is to sketch the growth of the idea of God among the Hebrews of the Old Testament period. When they entered Palestine they came in as nomads from the desert. Their God was a god of the nomads. They credited him with the ability to care for them as nomads, to fight their battles, and to protect their flocks and herds. They recognized their obligations to their fellow-clansmen, but toward nations alien to them they felt no responsibility. This state of mind was reflected in their ideas of God. They kept Yahweh for themselves alone and regarded themselves as his chosen people. Other nations were under the control of other gods. There were as many gods as there were separate nations. One of the most convincing proofs that the Hebrews shared this general Semitic view of the scope of the activity of their god is the statement made by David when fleeing from Saul and on the verge of crossing over into Philistine territory; chiding Saul for his hostility toward him, he says, "If Yahweh has stirred you up against me, let him be appeased by an offering; but if they be the sons of men, cursed be they before Yahweh, for they have driven me out today, so that I have no share in the inheritance of Yahweh, saying, 'Go serve other gods.' Now, therefore, may my blood not fall to the earth away from the presence of Yahweh, for the

King of Israel has come forth to seek my life, as one hunts a partridge in the mountains." Note the expressions "Go serve other gods" and "away from the presence of Yahweh," both of which imply a spatial limitation of Yahweh's presence and power.

It is significant that this episode belonged in the closing days of the reign of King Saul, that is to say somewhere around 1015 B.C. and after the Hebrews had been in Palestine at least two hundred years. It is noteworthy, too, that Yahweh is deemed capable of making trouble and of being bought off by a sacrifice.

The entry into Palestine marked a great change in the Hebrew idea of God. When the Hebrews entered Palestine they thought of Yahweh in terms of the nomadic life which they had been living for generations.

In the J document Yahweh is represented as eating, talking face to face with men (Gen. 1:28-30), and the like. In the garden of Eden story Yahweh tells Adam personally that he may eat of the various trees in the garden, but that he may not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, lest he die (Gen. 2:17). Yahweh also performs a surgical operation upon Adam and makes Eve with his own hands (Gen. 2:22 f.). He also takes his daily walk in the garden in the cool of the evening (Gen. 3:8), and has to call for Adam in order to find him and talk to him (Gen. 3:9). He talks freely with Adam and Eve (Gen. 3:9-13) and the serpent (Gen. 3:14, 15). He turns tailor and makes skin tunics for Adam and Eve (Gen. 3:21). He creates man without any suspicion of the kind of life he is going to live and when he discovers what a sinful race humanity is he sends a flood upon the earth to wipe the race out of existence, with the exception of Noah and his family (Gen. 6:5-8:17). When the flood has subsided and man offers a burnt offering to Yahweh upon the dry land, Yahweh smells the soothing odor of the sacrifice and is so pleased and grateful that he makes a promise that never again shall there be such a destruction of

life as the flood involved (Gen. 8:20-22). The human race, however, made such progress that Yahweh was afraid of what they might do, so he sent confusion into their speech and scattered them all over the face of the earth (Gen. 11:1-9).

When Abraham went down to Egypt and arranged with Sarah his wife that she should declare herself to be his sister in order that his own life might not be imperiled because of her beauty, the scheme worked well. But when Sarah was taken over into the Pharaoh's harem, "Yahweh struck Pharaoh and his household with severe diseases because of Abram's wife Sarah" (Gen. 12:10-19). The unethical character of this situation is manifest; Abram lies through his wife; the Pharaoh in utter ignorance of the true situation takes Sarah for himself; then Yahweh, who presumably is regarded as knowing the real facts, sends severe diseases upon Pharaoh and his household. When Moses, with his wife and son, was on his way to Egypt to fulfil his commission, "at a camping-place in the course of the journey Yahweh encountered him, and tried to kill him. So Zipporah took a flint and cutting off her son's foreskin, she touched his (i.e., Moses') person with it, saying, 'You are my bridegroom in blood.' Then he let him alone" (Exod. 4:24-26). This is a most primitive story and embodies an extremely primitive idea of deity. These facts are proof enough of the limitation of J's conception of God. He is God of Israel and favors her at the expense of foreign peoples. He is thought of in the most highly anthropomorphic fashion. His morals are on a distinctly human plane and judged by present-day ideals are much below par.

Passing over into the E document's traditions, which are generally supposed to be a half-century or so later than those of J, we may expect to find no great advance in the standards of E as compared with those of J. One marked difference between the two sources is in the fact that E does not permit Yahweh to appear unto men in physical form and to talk with them as he does right along in J. Yahweh's revelations in E are always

communicated in the form of visions or dreams or through angels. But yet God is represented as tempting Abraham's loyalty by ordering him to sacrifice his dearly-beloved Isaac upon an altar (Gen. 22:11-14). This story, of course, was told in order to impress upon the Jews, on the one hand, the idea that Yahweh did not in reality wish for human sacrifices and, on the other, the fact that Abraham's obedience to Yahweh was absolute and unquestioning. Yet another extraordinary story is told by E. Jacob wrestled with an unknown man all night, coming out of the struggle with his thigh out of joint; the "unknown man" turned out to be God himself. Therefore Jacob named the spot "Peniel" saying, "I have seen God face to face and yet my life has been spared" (Gen. 32:25-30). It has been suggested that this episode originally involved an attack upon Jacob by a demon. It is true that in I Sam. 28:13, the word **אלהים**, ordinarily used for God, denotes the spirit of the dead Samuel, but the whole spirit and language of the passage as it now stands, whatever may have been its original sense, clearly imply that God himself wrestled with Jacob. This is very similar to the experience of Hagar as recorded in the J document (Gen. 16:13 f.). After the theophany which she has undergone she says, "Have I really seen God and am still living after my vision?" This and Jacob's experience are in striking contrast with the attitude of Moses at Sinai, when Yahweh held an interview with Moses during which Moses did not dare to look into the face of Yahweh; so "he hid his face; for he was afraid to look at God" (Exod. 3:5). E's God was likewise subject to changing moods. When Yahweh commissioned Moses to return to Egypt and demand the release of the Jews from captivity, and Moses excused himself on the ground that he was no speaker, "the anger of Yahweh blazed against Moses" (Exod. 4:14).

The low ethical plane upon which the story of the plagues in Egypt is laid is shared by both J and E. Several times in this experience the Pharaoh, in the midst of a plague, promises that he will let Israel go; but after Moses has stopped the plague and

things have again become normal, Pharaoh changes his mind and refuses to keep his promise. This is all because Yahweh has hardened Pharaoh's heart (Exod. 7:3; 9:12, 35; 10:20, 27; 11:10; etc.). With like unfairness Yahweh is represented as having created a favorable and friendly attitude on the part of the Egyptians toward the Israelites on the eve of their departure from Egypt so that the Israelites were loaded with gifts by the Egyptians and carried these gifts off with them into the desert (Exod. 12:35 f.). This was equivalent to divinely arranged theft.

I have probably cited enough incidents already to demonstrate the low ethical level of the early Hebrew idea of God, to show its intensely anthropomorphic character, and to prove its strongly nationalistic and partisan nature. Let me now pass on to the first few centuries after they settled in Palestine, say, roughly speaking, from the fifteenth century B.C. to the twelfth century B.C.

The settlement in Canaan was a gradual movement, lasting over a fairly long period. The first settlers are probably to be identified in part at least with the Habiri of the Tel-el-Amarna letters, who entered the north of Palestine somewhere in the fifteenth century; and the latest immigrants probably came in from the Negeb and settled down in the south at a later period. Both groups alike found themselves amid wholly new conditions upon their settlement in Canaan. Prior to their entrance they had lived a nomadic life, wandering about in the desert from one place to another and fighting with hostile groups of other nomads over the possession of wells and oases. The life of the nomad was simple in the highest degree. The groups were relatively small and were more like families than nations. Conditions in nomadic life were such as that only very small groups of people could live together. Consequently, the relationships between families and individuals were very close, and in some cases intimate. Thus the group life was ordered upon a relatively high scale, judged by the standards of the age in general.

But the attitude of these small groups toward the outside non-Hebraic world was hostile and suspicious. With the entry into Palestine the whole order of life was changed. The people were no longer grouped in such small units. Palestine being the connecting bridge between Asia and Africa, the Hebrews were brought into contact with a constant stream of travelers between the two great areas. Thus they were in a continuous process of educational experience. Their world was enlarged beyond all their previous powers of imagination. This, of course, directly affected their idea of God.

Now that they were in Palestine, they entered upon a new type of existence. They exchanged the nomad's life for the life of the farmer. They had known little or nothing of this type of life before entering Palestine, and now they had to begin a new kind of existence. They had to have teachers of the new way of living. The only source of instruction available to them was to be found among the Canaanites themselves. But the Canaanites could teach agriculture only by the way in which they themselves practiced it; and with them the ideas of religion and the practice of agriculture were indissolubly bound together. They could not teach farming apart from their religious practices which were so closely associated with it. The dominant element in the religion of Canaan was the fertility cult which was a vital part of Baalism. The Hebrews, therefore, in learning from the Canaanites how to farm were brought face to face with Baalism in its most seductive form. At once there arose a conflict between Yahwism and Baalism which continued for more than a couple of hundred years and left its mark upon Yahwism. This was the kind of conflict in which the prophets were engaged in the early centuries. Yahweh was in great danger of being ignored and forgotten, for he was not credited with any knowledge of agricultural life, having always been associated heretofore with nomadic life and customs. Now that his people had moved into a new kind of world and had to learn a new type of daily labor, they naturally were strongly inclined to seek the

local gods who had long been associated with agricultural activities. The temptation to adopt this mode of religious procedure was very strong, for the cultus of Baalism and the fertility cult were very sensual and made a powerful appeal to the sensual appetites of the Hebrews. The prophets were the chief factor in saving Yahwism from extinction. Their continued appeal to their countrymen was to the effect that they must be loyal to Yahweh their own God, and refrain from indulging in the worship of other gods. Along with this they insisted upon the practice of social justice, an idea that they had brought in with them from the desert, but which found many new ways of application in the agricultural and commercial life of Canaan.

The result of this long-drawn-out conflict in the realm of the idea of God was that finally Yahweh came to be credited with a great expansion of his powers. He gradually displaced Baalism and the fertility cult, and was regarded as the giver of crops and the God of the entire agricultural life with all its complicated and complex operations.

Another element that entered into the growth of the God-idea in Israel was the location of the new home into which they had entered. Palestine was very strategically located. It lay on the highway of the nations. Practically all the traffic of the ancient world passed through Palestine. To the north and east of Palestine lay the territory of Babylonia and Assyria, Persia, the Hittites, Syria, Moab, and Ammon; and to the south of it lay Egypt and Ethiopia. Palestine was the bridge connecting these two great areas. Sometimes the leadership of the ancient world lay in the east or northeast; at other times it lay in the south. The armies of the rival powers marched back and forth across this connecting bridge and the international commerce of that era took the same route. The travel of that age was not by means of express trains or aeroplanes, but on foot, or on the backs of camels; and what now takes but a few hours, then required days and weeks of time. Such traffic could not have passed continually over this bridge without exercising some

educational influence upon the population dwelling thereon. It enlarged their knowledge of the scope and extent of the world in which they lived and it brought in conflicting ideas of God and of religion, from which they could not fail to learn something.

Another element that must have deeply affected their idea of God was the fact that in 933 B.C. the Northern Kingdom revolted from Rehoboam and became a separate kingdom. But while Northern Israel rebelled against Rehoboam it remained loyal to Yahweh. There were now two separate kingdoms both serving the same god. Not only so, but much of the time they were at war one with the other and were calling upon the same god for help. This is a difficult situation even when the entire civilized world recognizes but one, only God; but when each nation has its own exclusive god and two of them select the same god as their patron, it is still more difficult and puzzling, if they become enemies and meet each other upon the field of battle. This was the situation in Israel and Judah for several generations. This must have influenced the development of the God-idea in Palestine very much indeed. If Yahweh could control the affairs of two hostile nations why could he not be thought of as exercising authority over an indefinite number?

As a matter of fact, the prophets long before the exile did think of Yahweh as using the great nations of that day, namely, Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, and the Hittites, as his agents in punishing the Hebrews for their sins. Thus they were able to explain the defeats of Israel at the hands of their foes. These defeats were not evidences of the superior power of the pagan gods as compared with Yahweh, but were chastisements for sin inflicted upon Israel by order of Yahweh. This implies that Yahweh was looked upon as having power to do as he pleased with the kingdoms of the world, at least when the interests and welfare of his own chosen people were at stake.

It was but a short step from this point of view to the conviction that Yahweh was the God of all nations and the only God.

This step was taken when the Exile fell upon Judah. A considerable proportion of the Jewish population was transported to Babylonia. They continued to worship Yahweh there. This spatial spread of the area in which Yahweh was recognized as supreme made its contribution to Hebrew monotheism. The tragic circumstances of the fall of Jerusalem and the captivity and the return from exile also contributed greatly toward the monotheistic point of view. The old idea that Yahweh controlled the movements of the nations so far as they affected Israel still continued. This explained the Exile; and the succeeding downfall of Babylonia at the hands of Cyrus of Persia and his generous attitude toward the Jews were looked upon as direct contributions of Yahweh to the welfare of the Jews. In connection with the movement of return to Judah we find the writer of Isaiah, chapters 40-55, frequently referring to Yahweh in such a way as to show that he thought of him as the only and omnipotent God. Witness these words from Isaiah, chapter 40, verses 12-17:

Who has measured the waters in the hollow of his hand,
 And ruled off the heavens with a span?
 Who has held the dust of the earth in a peck,
 And weighed the mountains with a balance,
 And the hills in scales?
 Who has directed the mind of the LORD,
 And instructed him as his counselor?
 With whom took he counsel for his enlightenment,
 And who taught him the right path?
 Who taught him true knowledge,
 And showed him the way of intelligence?
 Lo! the nations are like a drop from a bucket,
 Like fine dust in the scales are they counted.
 Lo! the coast-lands weigh no more than a grain;
 And Lebanon is not enough as fuel for sacrifice,
 Nor are its beasts enough for burnt-offering.
 All the nations are as nothing before him,
 Blank ciphers he counts them.

GROWTH OF THE HEBREW IDEA OF GOD

33

Let us add to this one more passage, namely Isaiah 41:1-4:

Listen to me in silence, you coast-lands,
 And let the nations await my argument;
 Then let them approach, then let them speak,
 And together let us draw near for judgment!
 Who has roused one from the east,
 Whom victory meets at every step—
 Giving up nations before him,
 And bringing down kings?
 His sword makes them like dust,
 Like driven stubble his bow;
 He pursues them, and passes on safely,
 By paths his feet have not trodden.
 Who has wrought and done this?
 He who called the generations of men from the beginning—
 I, the LORD, who am the first,
 And am also with the last.

Alongside of this sort of thing we may place the passages in the Book of Isaiah in which idolatry is ridiculed and denounced, namely, Isaiah 40:18, 19; 41:6, 7; 40:20; 41:21-24; and 43:8-13.

From this point on the development of the idea of God followed different lines. It was no longer a question as to the scope or extent of Yahweh's powers, but rather as to the character and quality of his deeds. It had long been a deep-rooted conviction that prosperity was God's reward to the pious and that adversity was his punishment of the wicked. How easy and simple it would be if we could always determine a man's character by the size of his salary or the amount of his credit at the bank! This conception was not uprooted easily. Indeed, the average man interested in piety seems still to think that there is some vital connection between prosperity and piety. But in the post-Exilic age the problem was acute in Israel. The history of Judaism did not support the doctrine; for though Israel may have fallen short of the divine ideal, yet those who triumphed over her were nations that fell far below Israel in their spiritual and ethical attainments.

This was a problem that was very keenly realized by the Jews. It is first treated by the author of Deutero-Isaiah, namely, Isaiah, chapters 40-55. He discusses it in his poems on the Servant of Yahweh, that is, Isaiah 42:1-4; 49:1-6; 50:4-9; and 52:13-53:12. The solution of the problem which he presents is a solution of the problem of suffering that has found much approval in the Christian church at various periods; but is not so popular today as it once was. He makes the Servant representative of the people of Israel as a whole and through him explains the long history of Israel's sufferings as due to their vicarious nature. Israel, according to him, has been suffering not for its own sins, but to expiate the sins of the nations; and in return for this service to mankind Israel shall in due time receive her full reward in the way of political and economic prosperity and power. That one of the prophets who had laid such stress as the school of the prophets had upon the quality of justice in God's administration of the world should represent Yahweh as treating Israel in such an unjust way is very strange indeed. That the theory of vicarious suffering did not find general approval among Jewish thinkers is quite evident, for so far as I know no Jewish writer followed up this line of thought. The fifty-third chapter of Isaiah is unique in Jewish literature. Christian theologians have interpreted it as foretelling the sufferings of Jesus and on the basis of it have formulated the theory of Christ's vicarious suffering for the sins of all mankind. The exegetical basis of this theory is all wrong, and the ethical basis of it reflects very unfavorably upon the moral ideas of God himself.

A second attempt to seek an explanation of the problem of suffering is presented in that great masterpiece of Hebrew literature, the Book of Job. Here the problem is presented in its individualistic aspect, and not as a nationalistic problem as in Deutero-Isaiah, but as a universal problem affecting mankind in general. The hero of the story, Job himself, is placed in the land of Uz, a region which nobody thus far has been able to

locate. Furthermore, there is nothing about Job's personality or his line of thought that definitely marks him as a Jew. He might belong to any nationality. His problem, therefore, though a personal one, might belong to any individual the world around. It is the world-wide problem of personal suffering. The underlying cause of it is presented in the prologue to the Book of Job. It is all due to the Satan, who doubts the sincerity of Job's devotion to Yahweh and seeks to demonstrate to Yahweh the fact that Job's religion will not bear the strain of intense suffering. Yahweh gives the Satan permission to go the limit in persecuting Job, but to stop short of taking Job's life.

All this is unknown to Job, and when one misfortune after another has befallen him he finally breaks out in a protest against the fact that he ever came to birth. Then three of his old friends from various parts of the oriental world come to console him. These friends represent the various traditional attitudes toward the fact of suffering. The argument is presented in a series of three cycles, making a total of eighteen speeches in all. In each of the three cycles the three friends each make a speech and Job replies to each one of them in turn.

It is out of the question to follow the course of the debate in detail here. We must be satisfied to summarize the result of the debate. The traditional viewpoint presented by the friends is shattered to atoms by the facts presented by Job; and the thing is carried so far by Job that the justice of God is called in question. But Job has no solution of the problem to present; he can but express his dissatisfaction with all the existing theories. Yet notwithstanding all this obscurity Job still holds fast to his belief in God.

The debate is brought to an end by an address from God himself to Job. In this address the omnipotence and omniscience of God are presented so effectively that Job is overwhelmed and expresses his regret that he has been discussing a problem far beyond his range of understanding. The outcome of the Book of Job's contribution to the problem of suffering is

therefore purely negative. It demonstrates that the traditional theory that piety brings prosperity is not in accord with facts, but it has no new theory to put in its place. It is an insoluble problem and we must be content to leave it in the hands of God, who is inconceivably great and wise beyond all possibility of our comprehension.

The latest bit of literature in the Old Testament that in any way reflects a change in the idea of God is the Book of Ecclesiastes. This was probably written about 200 B.C., just before the Maccabaeen uprising. It is a composite work, representing the product of at least three minds. One of these belonged to a Pharisaic sort of person who sought to counteract the effect of the original writer by adding here and there throughout the treatise passages of a traditional and dogmatic character, in direct conflict with the thought of the original document. The second type of material added to the original treatise was the work of a traditional sage or wise man to whom most of the proverb-like utterances in the book must be assigned. The original author was a free thinker who had evidently been led by the course of circumstances to call in question most of the accepted theological and ethical doctrines of his time. He had evidently read widely in Greek philosophy and had been strongly influenced thereby.

Koheleth, as this unknown writer is called, still held on firmly to his belief in God. He regards God as the creator of the universe and all that is therein. But, regarding the efforts of mankind in general, he is a pessimist of the pessimists. There is nothing worth while under the sun. He reviews the various activities to which men give themselves and in each case his conclusion is the same:

Futility of futility, says Koheleth,
Futility of futilities, all is futility!

This is the opening sentence of his treatise and it strikes the keynote of the whole work. The words "futile" and "futility" are used by Koheleth a total of seventy-four times. He not only

begins his work with the comprehensive but appalling phrase "Futility of futilities, all is futility," but he closes it with precisely the same words. Apparently he never stopped to think how this conclusion, if true, would affect his idea of God. That an all-wise God should have created this marvelous world and have put it into the hands of a people whose toil is futile and of no avail is unthinkable. It is rather to be concluded that the inanimate world being so wonderful, the animate beings who are given their home thereon must be even more so, and a survey of the progress of civilization would seem to sustain that conclusion.

But Koheleth is convinced of the correctness of his conclusion; and his resultant counsel to the sons of men is to that effect. "There is nothing good for a man but that he eat and drink and find satisfaction in his work. This too have I seen, that it is from the hand of God. For who can eat and who can enjoy apart from him?" (2:24 f.). And again, "If any man eats and drinks and enjoys himself in all his work, it is a gift from God" (3:13). And still again, "So, the good which I see to be worth while is that one should eat and drink and get enjoyment out of all his toil at which he toils under the sun during the course of his life which God grants to him; for that is his portion." (5:17).

To us practical Americans it may seem strange that a man should be expected to get joy out of his work after being told over and over again that nothing that he may do has any value. "For what does a man get for all his toil and the striving of his mind wherewith he has toiled under the sun? For all his days are sorrowful and his task is full of trouble, and at night his mind finds no rest. This too is futility" (2:22 f.). And regarding the labors of scholars Koheleth formulates the conclusion (Eccles. 1:18) that

More wisdom is more worry
And increase of knowledge is increase of sorrow.

This pessimistic note apparently was not well received by Judaism as a whole; at least it is not followed up by any similar writing in the Biblical period. It is noteworthy that relatively little progress in the growth of the idea of God was made by the Jews in the post-Exilic period. The great advance step in outlining the idea was taken at the time of the Exile as we have already seen, and after the Exile subordinate problems occupied Jewish attention. Of course, the more Judaism saw of the world at large and the more contacts the Jews had with other nations, the more would they unconsciously read into their idea of God, making it more comprehensive and detailed as the generations passed. But the individual steps of that process are not recorded in historical records.

The history of the Hebrew idea of God is a continuous series of adjustments and readjustments to the changing historical situation in which the Jews found themselves. They recognized facts and constantly enlarged their theological views to fit the facts. This is exactly what religion is in need of doing in this present age. We have seen a wonderful transformation of our world-view in the last half-century. The scientific mind has been responsible for this. The supernatural has been compelled to yield its place to the natural. The telescope has enlarged our range of vision; the scientific man's photographs of distant stars and galaxies of stars have opened up new worlds to us and enlarged the universe almost inconceivably. Michelson has told us the exact rate of the speed of light, that is, 186,284 miles per second. The astronomer now talks in terms of light-hours, yea, even light-years. The light-hour represents a distance of 670,622,400 miles. What distance a beam of light would travel in a year I must leave the mathematicians. The microscope of the physicists and the chemists has given us a new insight into the nature and structure of matter. The atom has given place to the molecule and the molecule to the electron; and these electrons circle around a center just as regularly as the earth encircles the sun.

GROWTH OF THE HEBREW IDEA OF GOD

39

In a universe so vast and so methodically constructed there must be a directing and controlling Intelligence. It is inconceivable that so vast and so complex a machine should have come into existence and should have continued to operate throughout the centuries apart from some guiding intelligent force. The universe is not a mere thing of chance or the result of an accident. There is intelligence either within it or without it, and that Intelligence we call God.

If the law of cause and effect holds good throughout the moral and spiritual world even as it does throughout the physical universe then this controlling Intelligence is of ethical character. Otherwise, the ethical ideals of mankind would be inexplicable.

But the future only will reveal to man what the divine Intelligence really is. We can at present only guess at it. We have been at least eight thousand years, and probably longer, in arriving at our present stage of knowledge. Hence we have no right to think that we know as yet all that is to be known or that the remaining elements of knowledge at present hidden will be revealed to us overnight. It is more likely that we shall go on for centuries yet to come, ever increasing our knowledge and ever gaining a clearer understanding of God, who

Is nearer to us than breathing
Closer than hands and feet.

THE MEANING OF THE FIRST BEATITUDE

VITTORIO MACCHIORO

University of Naples

THIS paper is an inquiry into the meaning of the word *πτωχός* contained in the text of the first beatitude; we will see that the meaning of the whole sentence depends upon the significance of this word. It seems to me worth while to work out by a purely philological method the original meaning of this word, and consequently of the whole sentence; for Christian tradition is very far from unanimity as to the meaning of the first beatitude notwithstanding its enormous importance for Christian religious life.

The text is well known: Matt. 5:3: Μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοὶ τῷ πνεύματι, ὅτι αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν; Luke 6:20: Μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοί, ὅτι ὑμέτερα ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ.

As said above, there is no fixed tradition as to the meaning of these words. In early Christianity we find at least three different explanations. The first one points to a material poverty, with no spiritual implication except that poverty must have been chosen quite freely and that for this reason it deserves a reward, which is beatitude. That is the notion of Basil the Great,¹ John Chrysostomus,² Gregory of Nyssa,³ St. Jerome,⁴ and the author of the Pseudo-Clementine *Recognitiones*.⁵ Other fathers of the church point to a kind of intellectual poverty, which consists in thinking of one's self as a person destitute of veritable

¹ Basilius Magnus, *Homilia in Psalmum*, XXXIII, 5 (Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, Vol. XXIX, col. 362); *Regulae brevius tractatae*, *Interrogatio*, Vol. CCV (Migne, *PG*, Vol. XXXI, col. 1218).

² Johannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum Homilia*, Vol. XV (Migne, *PG*, Vol. LVII, col. 224).

³ Gregorius Nyssenus, *De beatitudinibus*, Vol. I (Migne, *PG*, Vol. XLIV, col. 1208).

⁴ Eusebius Hieronymus, *Commentarium in Evangelium Matthaei*, II, 5 (Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, Vol. XXVI, col. 34).

⁵ Pseudo-Clemens, *Recognitiones*, III, 28 (Migne, *PL*, Vol. I, col. 262).

THE MEANING OF THE FIRST BEATITUDE

41

intelligence and wisdom.⁶ Others take this poverty in a more spiritual and moral meaning, as humility or modesty.⁷ To sum up, there is no agreement among early Christian writers about the significance of the first beatitude.

The same disagreement is found in modern commentators. We can distinguish again many currents. The first one assumes that beatitude is a reward for having spontaneously renounced material wealth.⁸ This notion seems to be dominant among Catholics. Another explanation points to an intellectual poverty, that is, to the feeling of how inadequate and limited is human wisdom and intelligence.⁹ An explanation which seems to be rather exceptional thinks that the poor are those who having tried to live piously and to keep faithful to God are oppressed and downtrodden.¹⁰ Most of the Protestant commentators attach to poverty a spiritual meaning; that is a consciousness of one's lack of good will, or virtue, or faithfulness, and so on.¹¹ On the whole, we cannot get any light as to the first beatitude either from the church tradition or from modern commentators, notwithstanding that the spiritual explanation

⁶ Macarius, *Homiliae*, XII, 3 (Migne, *PG*, Vol. XXXIV, col. 558); Theophanes Kerameus, *Homilia*, 51 (Migne, *PG*, Vol. CXXXII, col. 911).

⁷ For instance, Clemens of Alexandria, *Liber quis dives salvetur*, 17 (Migne, *PG*, Vol. IX, col. 622); Origenes, *Homilia V in librum Jesu Nave*, Vol. I (Migne, *PG*, Vol. XII, col. 847); Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum CXLI* (Migne, *PL*, Vol. XXXVII, col. 1836); *De sermone Domini in monte*, I, 1 (Migne, *PL*, Vol. XXXIV, col. 1232).

⁸ For instance, Bar Hebraeus, *Commentary on the Gospels* (ed. W. Carr; London, 1925), p. 16; Melancthon quoted by Tholuck, *Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount*, p. 71; Loisy, *Les Evangiles synoptiques* (Ceffonds, 1907), p. 546; Weiss, in Meyer's *Kritisch-exegetisches Kommentar*, I, 1 (10th ed.; Goettingen, 1910).

⁹ For instance, Kuinoel, *Commentarius in libros N.T.* (Lipsiae, 1823); Tholuck, *op. cit.*; Thayer-Grimm, *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament* (New York, 1892): *s.v.* πτωχός.

¹⁰ For instance, *International Critical Commentary* (New York, 1907), p. 39.

¹¹ Clarke, *Holy Bible, Commentary and Critical Notes* (Cincinnati, 1851); Holtzmann, *Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament*, I (Freiburg, 1887), 102; *Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie*, I (Freiburg, 1897), 205; *Das Neue Testament*, I (Giessen, 1926), 96; Beyschlag, *Neutestamentliche Theologie*, I (Halle, 1891), 134; Nicholl, *The Expositor's Greek New Testament* (New York, 1897), p. 97; Meyer-Weiss, *op. cit.* (7th ed., Goettingen, 1910), p. 90; Feine, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (Leipzig, 1911), p. 65; Dausch, *Die heiligen Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, I (Bonn, 1923), 108-109.

seems to be nearer the truth. But even this explanation is far from affording any satisfactory contribution to those who want to know the actual relation of this spiritual poverty to religious life. One cannot get over the feeling that these manifold explanations form a kind of religious literature which beats around the bush without being able to go to the center of Jesus' saying.

It seems to me that the best way would be to start from the words themselves without any religious or Christian preconception. The problem consists, in other words, in a philological inquiry as to the meaning of the word *πτωχός*, for the other words leave no room for doubt.

The only possible way to determine the meaning of this word is to go back to classic tradition. The Greek classic tradition used two words for defining poverty: *πτωχός* and *πένης*. Aristophanes gives a brilliant definition of these two concepts in his comedy *Plutus*, in an episode which is extremely important for our present purpose. Blexidemus and Chremylus have decided to have the blind Plutus (Wealth), healed in order to attain a more just distribution of wealth in the world. Penia (Poverty) comes on the stage and complains that they want to have her ousted. She declares herself quite ready to demonstrate that she is the true source of every good; and she starts with the assumption that poverty is the source of all human activity and progress. Chremylus rises up in arms against Poverty's claim and gives a humorous account of the life of the poor. But Poverty replies that the life depicted by him is not by a long shot the life which she bestows upon her followers; that is, the life of the poor (*πένης*); the life described by Chremylus is the life of the beggar (*πτωχός*). Now—according to Penia—the beggar has absolutely nothing of his own; while the poor man has to work very hard in order to make a living but does not lack anything at all. And Penia concludes that her people—the poor—have a modest but dignifying life, to be preferred to the life of wealthy men. I think the most important part of the episode¹² deserves quotation:

¹² Aristophanes, *Frogs*, vss. 534-64 (trans. by B. B. Rogers).

THE MEANING OF THE FIRST BEATITUDE

43

- Chr.* Why, what have *you* got to bestow but a lot
of burns from the bathing-room station
And a hollow-cheeked rabble of destitute hags,
and brats on the verge of starvation?
And the lice, if you please, and the gnats and the fleas
whom I can't even count for their numbers,
Who around you all night will buzz and will bite,
and arouse you betimes from your slumbers.
Up! Up! they will shrill, *'tis to hunger, but still*
up! up! to your pain and privation.
For a robe but a rag, for a bed but a bag
of rushes which harbour a nation
Of bugs whose envenomed and tireless attacks
would the soundest of sleepers awaken.
And then for a carpet a sodden old mat,
which is falling to bits, must be taken.
And a jolly hard stone for a pillow you'll own;
and, for griddle-cakes barley and wheaten,
Must leaves dry and lean of radish or e'en
sour stalks of the mallow be eaten.
And the head of a vat you must borrow, and that
all broken. So great and exceeding
Are the blessings which Poverty brings in her train
on the children of men to bestow!
- Pov.* The life you define with such skill is not mine:
'tis the life of a beggar, I trow.
- Chr.* Well, Poverty, Beggary, truly the twin
to be sisters we always declare.
- Pov.* Aye you! who to good Thrasybulus forsooth
Dionysius the Tyrant compare!
But the life I allot to my people is not
nor shall be, so full of distresses.
'tis a beggar alone who has nought of his own,
nor even an obol possesses.
My *poor* man, 'tis true, has to scrape and to screw
and his work must never be slack in;
There'll be no superfluity found in his cot;
but then there will nothing be lacking.
- Chr.* Damater! a life of the Blessed you give;
for ever to toil and to slave
At Poverty's call, and to leave after all
not enough for a grave.

Pov. You are all for your jeers and your comedy-sneers,
 and you can't be in earnest a minute
 Nor observe that alike in their bodily frame
 and the spirit residing within it,
 My people are better than Wealth's; for by *him*,
 men bloated and gross are presented,
 Fat rogues with big bellies and dropsical legs,
 who strike at their foemen and sting them.

Chr. Ah, yes; to a wasplike condition, no doubt,
 by the pinch of starvation you bring them.

Pov. I can show you besides that Decorum abides
 with those whom I visit; that mine
 Are the modest and orderly folk, and that Wealth's
 are "with insolence flushed and with wine."

Aristophanes points out very clearly the essential difference between a poor man (*πένης*) and a beggar (*πτωχός*). *Πένης* is a poor man who is satisfied with modest station and is consequently happy; *πτωχός* is a man who lacks everything and is restless and unhappy. Suidas works out the same difference; to him *πένης* is a poor man who must work and worry in order to get his modest food; *πτωχός* is a poor man who is always fearing and begging.¹³ It seems that Plato has in his mind the same differentiation when he makes allusion to the various issues of tyrannies.¹⁴ Stephanus quotes in his *Thesaurus* a definition contained in a commentary of the Psalms which is unknown to me, wherein it is assumed that *πένης* is a man who has always been poor and *πτωχός* is a man who has fallen from wealth into misery.¹⁵ This definition runs in perfect keeping with Aristophanes. In fact, a man who has always been a poor man gets accustomed to his poverty and does not want to change his station; but a man who was rich once and has fallen to misery must worry about his poor station and long for his former wealth.

Greek mythology gives two typical examples of such a rich and

¹³ Suidas (Bernhardy): *s.v.* πτωχός. Cf. Hesychius (Schmidt): *s.v.* πτωχέειν.

¹⁴ Plato, *Republic* x. 618a: (τυραννίδας) εἰς πείνας τε καὶ φυγὰς καὶ εἰς πτωχείας τελευτώσας.

¹⁵ Choerob, in Psalms (quoted by Heinricus Stephanus, *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae* [London, 1816-18]): *s.v.* πτωχός.

THE MEANING OF THE FIRST BEATITUDE 45

powerful man who has turned beggar: Odysseus and Oedipus; the first one when he comes back to Ithaca, the second one when he takes his refuge at Athens after having been expelled from Thebes. Both were powerful kings once, and both are now nothing else than beggars, whose beggary is recognized both by themselves and by others.¹⁶ Homer and Sophocles depict in a stirring way the sufferings of these kings who are obliged to go around begging. One cannot read without deep emotion the words of Odysseus and Oedipus when they complain about their destinies. Odysseus says, addressing his former servant Melantho:

Good woman, why, pray, dost thou thus assail me with angry heart? Is it because I am foul and weary, mean raiment on my body, and beg through the land? Aye, for necessity compels me. Of such sort are beggars and vagabond folks. For I too once dwelt in a house of my own among men, a rich man in a wealthy house, and full often I gave gifts to a wanderer, whosoever he was and with whatsoever need he came. Slaves too I had past counting and all other things in abundance whereby men live well and are reputed wealthy. But Zeus son of Kronos brought all to naught; so, I ween, was his good pleasure.¹⁷

Listen now to Oedipus:

On that very day
when in the tempest of my soul I craved
death, even death by stoning, none appeared
to further that wild longing, but anon,
when time had numbed my anguish and I felt
my wrath had outrun those errors past,
then, then it was the city went about
by force to oust me, respited for years;
and they my sons, who should as sons have helped,
did nothing: and, one little word from them
was all I needed, and they spoke no word,
but let me wander on for evermore,
a banished man, a beggar.¹⁸

¹⁶ For Odysseus see *Odyssey* xiv. 58; xv. 308 ff.; xvii. 337, 366, 387; xviii. 41, 49; xiv. 74 ff. For Oedipus see Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, vss. 444, 751, 1335.

¹⁷ *Odyssey* xix, vss. 71 ff. (trans. by A. T. Murray).

¹⁸ Sophocles, *op. cit.*, vss. 433 ff. (trans. by F. Storr).

Now we can realize that the traditional interpretation is very far from grasping the meaning of the word *πτωχός*.¹⁹ None of the fathers of the church refers to the spiritual and moral tragedy which is involved in this word. The Vulgate translation is a shining example of the absence of philological sensitiveness. "*Beati pauperes spiritu*" does not at all correspond to the meaning of the Greek text, for "pauper" does not correspond to *πτωχός*; the Latin word corresponding to *πτωχός* is "miser." "Pauper" is the translation of the Greek *πένης*; in other words the Vulgate substitutes for the notion of a dissatisfied restless destitute beggar, who is conscious of his decay, the silly notion of a peaceful narrow-minded man who is perfectly satisfied with his low station. Consequently the kingdom is not a goal toward which mankind moves through suffering, longing, and repentance, but a reward for everyone who is self-satisfied.²⁰

The explanation of this strange misunderstanding lies in the fact that the differentiation between *πτωχός* and *πένης* had been lost in Hellenistic Greek. In the Septuagint there is no difference at all; both words are used with the same meaning.²¹ I think that the absence of differentiation in Hellenistic Greek—or at least in the Greek of the Septuagint—may find an explanation in the very important fact that this differentiation is quite alien to Hebrew,²² which could not mark this difference on account of the great number of synonyms.²³

Now the point is, why do the Gospels use only the word

¹⁹ A shining example of ignorance of the whole philological tradition is found in Cremer, *Biblisch-theologisch Woerterbuch der neutestamentlichen Graezitael* (Gotha, 1915): s.v. *πτωχός*; Loisy, *op. cit.*, mistakes *πτωχός* for *πένης*.

²⁰ Tertullian is so far as I know the only early Christian writer who gave the right Latin translation (Tertullian, *Adversus Marc.*, IV, 14): *Beati mendicie* (sic enim exigit interpretatio vocabuli quod in Graeco est); *De Idolatria*, 12 (Migne, *PL*, Vol. I, col. 7540): *felices egenos Dominus appellat*.

²¹ See Hatch and Redpath, *Concordance to the Septuagint*, etc.: s.v. *πτωχός* and *πένης*.

²² See Hatch and Redpath, *ibid.*, where five Hebrew words are translated by both these Greek words.

²³ Outside of the words in common *πτ.* corresponds to five other Hebrew words: *הָלַךְ*, *עָנִי*, *עָרֵךְ*, *קָטַן*, *רָרַשׁ*; and *πέν.* corresponds to five other words: *מִקְבָּץ*, *רָךְ*, *רָאשׁ*, *עָקָה*, *עָקָר*.

πτωχός²⁴ and never the word πένης, the only exception being due without doubt to the influence of Hebrew.²⁵ This cannot be mere chance. The absolute preference given to one of the words points to a linguistic habit which is alien to Hellenistic Greek. I would not venture a generalization, but no doubt can exist that the Gospels seem to have maintained a sensitiveness for the difference between πτωχός and πένης which the Hellenistic Greek had lost. The spiritual implication of this sensitiveness is worth consideration. In fact, πένης means nothing from a spiritual point of view; πένης would mean a man who is perfectly satisfied with his inferiority and is consequently very far from needing salvation. On the other hand, πτωχός means a man who is aware of his spiritual weakness and longs for light and peace; moreover, a man who was once very proud of his wisdom and is now conscious of its emptiness and uselessness. Translated into spiritual terms the tragedy of these two typical beggars, Odysseus and Oedipus, becomes a symbol of the Christian tragedy. The Christian was also a powerful and proud king once; he had plenty of every pleasure and satisfaction. But a moment has come when this kingdom breaks down, and the king is now obliged to go around stretching out his hand to anyone who might help him out. Jesus wants us to behave like Odysseus and Oedipus; to behave like beggars²⁶ and to be aware that our reign is over. There is nothing about a πένης in the Gospel; a πένης never would accept Jesus' suggestion to knock at the door. A πένης would answer him that he has

²⁴ Matt. 19:21, 26:9, 11; Mark 2:42; Luke 14:13, 16:20, 19:8; John 12:5, 13:30; II Cor. 6:10; Gal. 2:10, 4:9; Apoc. 3:17, 13:16; Jas. 2:2, 3, 5.

²⁵ II Cor. 9:9: γέγραπται· Ἐσκόρπισεν, ἔδωκε τοῖς πένησιν. The only place where πέν. is used. Here πέν. is not opposed to πτωχ.; it has a general meaning. The quotation refers to Ps. 112:9. The word used in the Hebrew text is עָנִי which corresponds both to πέν. (Exod. 23:11; Ruth 4:10; Esther 9:22; Ps. 108:16, 131:15; Prov. 14:31, 31:20; Isa. 14:30) and to πτωχ. (Exod. 23:6; Ps. 11:5, 34:10, 36:14, 39:17, 48:2, 68:33, 71:13, 85:1, 106:41, 108:22, 112:6, 139:12; Amos 2:6, 4:1; Jer. 20:13; Ezek. 16:49, 18:22, 22:29).

²⁶ Matt. 7:7-8: Αἰτεῖτε καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν· ζητεῖτε καὶ εὐρήσετε· κρούετε καὶ ἀνοιγήσεται ὑμῖν. πᾶς γὰρ ὁ αἰτῶν λαμβάνει, καὶ ὁ ζητῶν εὐρίσκει, καὶ τῷ κρούοντι ἀνοιγήσεται (cf. Luke 9-10).

nothing to ask and to knock for; moreover, he would consider this indifference as the climax of human wisdom. Jesus wants us to be insistent with God that He might help us; a *πένης* never would insist on anything and would put his wisdom just in the absence of every wish:

It is impossible to come to a beggar's estate if there is still a bit of the former pride. To become a beggar means to lose the last bit of one's dignity. It is necessary for us to witness our spiritual annihilation that we may become worthy of entering into the kingdom. To be humble and modest means nothing; certainly it is advisable to be humble, and Jesus is perfectly outspoken on this point.²⁷ But this kind of intellectual poverty has nothing to do with salvation. You can feel as weak as you like, as humble as you like, without feeling the least need for salvation; in other words, you can be a *πένης*. The point is to pass from *πένης* to *πτωχός*, from poor man to beggar, to become dissatisfied with the poverty which you once had accepted and liked; to be ashamed of this satisfaction and this indifference. Blessedness is not a reward for modesty and humility; it is the consequence of an upheaval. Beggary and salvation are two successive stages of a single process.

Neither the fathers of the church nor the modern commentators nor the Vulgate were able to grasp the meaning of the word *πτωχός* because they stood under the influence of the Hebrew and of the Hellenistic Greek. Jesus himself was of course for the same reasons unable to distinguish *πτωχός* from *πένης*.²⁸ But he meant to speak of *πτωχοί*, not of *πένητες*, of *egeni* not of *pauperes*, of unhappy restless disappointed poor, not of satisfied poor. Had he spoken Greek and had he lived in the fourth century B.C., he would no doubt have used the word *πτωχός*.

²⁷ Matt. 23:12.

²⁸ Luke 4:17-18 says that Jesus took his inspiration for the beatitudes from Isa. 61:1. As a matter of fact the Septuagint text of Isaiah uses the word *πτωχός*. But no doubt can exist that this is a mere accident since for Hellenistic Greek *πτ.* and *πέν.* mean the same thing. Moreover, the Hebrew word used by Isaiah is also translated by the Septuagint with *πένης*.

THE MEANING OF THE FIRST BEATITUDE

49

Now it is a matter of fact that the typical Christian experience corresponds to a complex of emotions and thoughts which are involved in the word $\pi\tau\omega\chi\acute{o}s$; moreover, the Gospels never use the word $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta s$ although in the age of Jesus it meant one and the same thing. We are led to the conclusion that it cannot be just an accident that the typical "Christian" word $\pi\tau\omega\chi\acute{o}s$ entered into the Gospel. I think the necessity to find an adequate expression for the Christian experience of salvation, that is, of the spiritual annihilation, made the first writers of the Gospel sensitive to the true meaning of a word which had lost its meaning long before, and this word became a symbol of the tragedy which mankind must go through in order to become worthy of entering into the kingdom.

DOES JAPAN NEED RELIGION?

RIICHIRO HOASHI

Waseda University

I. ANTIRELIGIOUS TENDENCIES

DOES the present-day Japan need religion? If so, what sort of religion does it need? To cope with these questions adequately, we must first notice sundry facts inimical to religious sentiments and tending to counteract anything spiritual in open hostility. The antireligious tendencies of today can be grouped together under three categories: hedonism, the social-reconstruction movement, and scientific civilization.

1. *Hedonism*.—The modern world is no doubt hedonistic over against the medieval ideals of other-worldliness. In this point, Japan is no exception, but what is remarkable about the Japanese is a hedonism inherent in their racial characteristics. See how they emerged from the ashes of the great earthquake with but a smile! They are now beset by the world-wide depression due to overproduction and unemployment, but they do not feel the economic pressure as intensely as the occidentals do. This fact is easily shown by the increasing prosperity of establishments for recreation and amusement in spite of the general industrial stagnation.

That a number of decadent elements are working becomes apparent the moment we center attention upon such current words as "ero" (erotic), "gro" (grotesque), and "nonsense" literature, together with such American words as "jazz," "dance," "review," "cafe," "bar," etc. The most subtle agency for the broadcasting of "ero," "gro," "nonsense" is the plebeian fad of movie shows, which are fast replacing theatrical performances, especially those of the old fashioned "kabuki."

Most women's journals, which are numerous and have greater circulation than men's, devote their front pages to movie pictures and romances.

All these are, in short, due to a bad influence from America, although the susceptibility thereto belongs to us. Things American are often frowned upon, yet the fact that modern Japan cannot alienate herself from American influence is suggestive of a temperamental affinity between the two nations. Each of them loves to claim the leadership of civilization, east or west. American dollar worship, for instance, is disdainfully spoken of in Japan; nevertheless, its votaries here heap up their secret offerings at the temple of Mammon. The loosening of sex morals in recent years is also attributable to American influence. Judge Lindsey's *Companionate Marriage*, of which ten thousand copies were sold in a few months, was a much-discussed book. Information brought over the Pacific concerning the revolt of youth for sex freedom and sex shamelessness stimulates daring imitators in this country.

There is another current of hedonism, no less antireligious; that is, a literary movement among the youth. European literature, French and Russian novels in particular, formerly cultivated our taste for the *belles lettres* of an art-for-art type. With the waning of Tolstoian influence, proletarian literature is at present in the vogue. Young literati talking nowadays about romantic poetry seem to themselves antiquated. Courtly refinement and bourgeois love affairs are scoffed at before the charm of crude humanity in the work-a-day life of farm and factory. "Can we be so hardhearted and unfeeling," they would say, "as to reject such maternal, filial, nuptial affections as did Brand of Ibsen in behalf of salvation? Do we not find more congenial elements in Raskolnikov, that murderous criminal of Dostoievsky, worshiping the spirit of humanity at the lap of a street-walker?" A religion that aims at a supernatural life is indeed, for them, a superfluity!

2. *The social-reconstruction movement*.—Another antireligious

tendency is involved in social-reconstruction movements. The cry for democracy of a decade ago is now superseded by the cry for socialism, especially of the Marxian type. Stalin's successful régime finds an echo in Japan with its proletarian dictatorship and its slogans for anti-imperialism, anticapitalistic government, and what not. It grips most seductively the heart of the rising generation. The dissemination of communistic ideas is not due particularly to high pressure propaganda but rather to the universal fact of social discontent and maladjustment coupled with numerous cases of scandal among high officials.

Corrupt politics hiding behind hypocritical phrases of loyalty and patriotism have long been preparing a seed bed of socialism. The financial depression throughout the country, together with the increase of population at the rate of a million a year, both conspire to facilitate the perversion of thought.

Capitalistic exploitation is not only aggravating class struggles between bourgeoisie and proletariat, but the city population more and more turns to exploit the farmer, as was strikingly evident last year during the so-called "full-harvest famine"—a famine indeed for the farmers, with a disastrous fall of prices resulting from a mere ten per cent increase in rice production. The country population is now staggering under a heavy weight of debt calculated to be five or six hundred million yen, and yearly increasing with no hope of improvement.

In this state of affairs, a vague oriental mysticism has no power to check the people from falling into a crass materialism which, with its appeal to urgent physical needs, is easily understood. To the materialist there seems to be no other way out but a social cataclysm more or less similar to that of Soviet Russia. Such ideas are in conflict with the traditional ideals of our national constitution; but any attempt to suppress with vigor the propaganda of these "dangerous thoughts" is certain to create martyrs to the cause. Communist zealots are rather proud of their imprisonment and tortured life. Marxism in Japan is almost a religion. Herein is revealed the deep religious

nature of the Japanese people, just as it was apparent in the time of the "Kiristan" persecution centuries ago.

At any rate, a study of the so-called "social science," which means Marxism in Japan, often leads young men to reject individualism for the sake of social control. "Social science" clubs, which at one time were to be found in every college and higher school, are now strictly banned; but the study of the science still goes on in a subterranean manner, and often it crops out in violent agitations against the school authorities. The year 1930 alone saw more than forty cases of school strikes. Boys of middle schools and even of primary grades were not immune from this epidemic. A few trained agitators with their up-to-date tactics can lead the whole school body astray. Students in general have no moral courage to withstand these "left" agitators, although they would not identify themselves with the red movement. On the other hand, the fact that large numbers are dragged into a school strike shows that there is something wrong, not only within the limited circle of an educational community, but in our entire social order. Moreover, the lack of moral courage to stand against temptation is perhaps due to the defect of our own national education which has never assumed its function in character-building through religious training. Be that as it may, the Marxian agitators' curse upon individualism in the interests of socialization and class-warfare puts Protestantism to discredit, since the communist literature of Europe often ascribes the progress of the capitalistic régime to the Protestant principle of individual freedom. Thus the denial of Protestantism means for them a denial of Christianity and, accordingly, of any religion whatever.

3. *Scientific civilization*.—The mere name "scientific" has a charm to the rising generation. The epoch-making advance of natural science and machine industry forces upon us a complete break with miracles and superstitions. While rationally-minded, cultured people tend to think in terms of cause and effect, the populace still frequent the places of gross superstition for

the cure of disease and the escape from evil. This encourages the intelligentsia in the opinion that religion, identical with superstition in their eyes, is doomed with the progress of science.

The omnipotence of knowledge and the triumph of intellect have long been the goals of our general education. The Japanese government, in fact, has been singularly one-sided in its educational policy, almost all effort being concentrated upon intellectual instruction at the expense of moral discipline. The preponderance of intellectual education goes hand in hand with a general respect for great men rather than for good men. "Be great, no matter how good or bad" seems to be our aim of education. No wonder a ferocious robber, who terrified the city of Tokyo years ago, was made a hero at the time, a sacrilegious name of "Sermon Robber the First" having been conferred upon him. Kindergarten children often sing in the street a song with its concluding words as follows: "And then we all shall be *great!*" The worship of greatness over goodness, intelligence over virtue, came to us with the introduction of Western civilization. Consequently religion is discounted, contrary to the intrinsic spirit of Western culture, which at bottom is religious. Cultured people in Japan today are content to live without religion, or at least they are skeptical about religious affairs.

II. DEFECTS OF POSITIVE RELIGIONS

Religion is losing its grip on the Japanese heart. College students preparing for ministry have lost much of the old-time zeal for their faith. The land where many a Christian martyr once preferred death to stepping upon Christ's image has lost its enthusiasm for spiritual affairs. Neither Buddhist nor Christian church today can attract a large congregation to the Sunday services. Religion is stagnant, and the church not prosperous. Christianity now indigenous with us is no longer discriminated against, it is true, but the cessation of persecution has hastened its senility. As we have traced in the foregoing discussion the

external causes for the decline of religion, let us now turn to the internal causes.

1. *Weakness of religion for sanctifying the beautiful.*—We may mention, in the first place, the impotence of religion for purifying the beautiful. "A thing of beauty," as Keats sang, "is a joy forever." The present age, well steeped in pagan hedonism, tends more and more to aesthetic enjoyment. Religious poetry and fiction no longer attract people—and why? Because religion has lost its creative force for artistic achievement. In the middle ages a Madonna, a cathedral, a *Divine Comedy*—each was itself a superb product of art, apart from its religious content. It was, of course, an age dominated by other-worldly religion; still, at the present time, religion ought to have enough power to move artistic temperaments to spiritual expression. Hugo and Tolstoi in the last century had such power to lead men, and their fascination is still lingering among us. But our century has not yet seen its literary prophet speaking forth from his sanctuary.

Our emotional life is left to drift in indulgence, and religion does not purify our taste nor sublimate our beastly "libido" to a lofty, consecrated ambition, since it takes no positive attitude toward cultural refinement and aesthetic enjoyment. Failure to sanctify the true or the good may cause little harm, but the failure to purify the beautiful with a religious sanctity may plunge man into a life that is vile and rob religion of vitality.

2. *Absence of well-defined social ideals.*—Except for certain recent movements religion has not taken positive interest in social reconstruction. The essence of religion, we often hear among religionists, and especially Buddhists, has nothing to do with social problems. Social amelioration is deemed secondary to the primary function of individual redemption or enlightenment. Sermons at Christian churches are still largely concerned with the soul's welfare in the heavenly life, and to the ills of this world we are instructed to shut our eyes or to be content with

the *status quo* of our ungodly environment. Religious people in Japan are mostly puritan or pietistic.

Most Buddhist temples, having a hereditary priesthood and considerable inherited property, and most Christian churches, being supported by well-to-do members of the community, are both liable to attach themselves to the existing capitalistic order. Religion is today a bulwark of social stratification, bourgeois rule, and traditional authority. Institutional work such as that of the settlement, day nursery, dispensary, etc., is often undertaken by churches to meet social needs. But it easily turns out to be simply a means of proselytism or for cultivating the favor of the people. Religion is not yet deeply conscious of its social function in this age of industry and proletarian movement.

3. *Antagonism between religion and humanism.*—Positive religions, finally, do not meet the present-day needs of humanity. Humanity today tends to have its own spirituality. Self-righteous men, contented with their moral practices limited within the bounds of the visible world, do not aspire to any superhuman reality. They doubt the existence of an omnipotent God, all wise and all good, above or within this imperfect world of evolution. Ethical culture, they say, is sufficient to carry on our fight against evils, individual and social, where divine omnipotence, if it exists, hesitates to exercise its supreme power. There is no need of the supernatural where it gives no basis for moral discipline nor meaning to human life. For, the gods of positive religions do not take real interest in human affairs, but rather they love to use mankind as a means of their own glorification—as it is in the Westminster catechism.

The trinitarian God of Christianity who holds the destiny of man in his hands is rather to be dethroned as a despot than to be worshiped as the stay of our moral struggle; nor does the Buddhist religion give us strength for moral effort except for its ideal of the pure land where our moral distinctions cease to be. Most of our religious ideas, in short, are but a legacy of the

medieval and feudal age, having no power to grapple with the complex problems of social adjustment and personal freedom.

III. INEFFECTIVE ATTEMPTS TO CURE OUR SPIRITUAL ILLS

Our people in general, especially men of culture, are gradually falling away from religion as defined in the foregoing. Our rising generation is in such a precarious situation that the propaganda of Marxian materialism can easily take advantage of their spiritual defects. To meet this situation, one of the supposed cures invented is that of Japanism. Thought must be conquered by thought, they say, and they therefore propose to emphasize more than ever the preservation of our historical national characteristics—a history mystified beyond criticism. Books on Japanism have continued to appear during recent years by various authors seeking to counteract the “reddening” tendencies. This, however, is tantamount to the American One-Hundred-Percentism or the Italian Fascism and often results in reactionary violence.

Another attempted cure is a revitalizing of ancestor worship and devotion at the public shrines. The government has long separated, *de jure*, the Shinto shrines and temples from the Shinto religion. Cultus at the shrines and temples is not considered by the authorities to be a religious act but rather the commemoration of national heroes. Therefore, the forcing of school children to bow before the village shrines is supposed not to interfere with the freedom of faith, safe-guarded by the constitution. Thus they try to awaken a deeper respect for the fatherland and its traditions against the incursion of pernicious foreign ideas. But to the popular mind, a cultus at the shrine is not distinct from religion. And such a religious act often degenerates into superstition, since the objects enshrined even at famous temples are not always national heroes and may even have been traitors to the imperial household or former fetishes in the primitive religion. Such ceremonies demoralize religious sentiment.

Still another remedy is a more diligent inculcation of the ideas of our unique nationality with the imperial household at its center. "The leading-to-better-thought movement," as encouraged by the department of education, is an example of this. It is neither imperialism nor militarism, but simply a household ideal of national integrity with the emperor at its head. Can reverence and loyalty to the emperor as a living god take the place of religion? The government has undertaken for the past half-century to carry out its educational scheme based upon the Imperial Rescript on moral instruction with its guiding principles of loyalty to the emperor, and has tried to substitute patriotism for religion. It has indeed been efficacious up to the early teens, but as soon as youths in the middle school begin to learn science and general history, they cannot help but be thrown into a skeptical attitude. Since science knows no bounds, and cultural intercourse now encompasses the whole world, a proud self-complacency on national peculiarities can hardly stand.

The more we inculcate the national ideals, the more is it liable to stimulate the revolt of youth, since it is natural with them to grow contentious to what they have accepted by authority. At all events, the inefficiency of this kind of remedy grows more convincing with the advance of universal knowledge. The existing religions and their substitutes being now impotent or antiquated as we have seen, let us venture to offer some suggestions upon a future religion.

IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR SOME FUTURE RELIGION

Religion is an attempt to establish personal relationship with the Universe, and an effort to co-operate with its superhuman power or powers for realization of a better life. With this end in view, the chief function of religion is to unify our life in its various aspects of intellection, affection, and volition. Religion ought to furnish us with the highest ideal of life. It must enable us to support this ideal with enthusiastic emotion. It must also

give us a power of will to live up to our ideal in the social environment. Neither philosophy, nor science, nor art, nor ethics, nor any substitute is adequate to this task, but religion. It is religion that welds all of our life interests and activities into a hierarchy of values.

Why, then, the decline of religion in the present time? Because it is ceasing to perform its proper function, owing to its arrested development, while the world incessantly progresses. Religion cannot stand alone outside of evolution. It must liquidate antiquated elements within itself such as the omnipotence of God, the Christ myth in Christianity, or the pantheistic impersonalism and the negativistic Nirvana of Buddhism. It must cast off the impediments laid upon it by the traditions, in order to meet the demand of a new age.

To speak particularly of our country: Japan is a trysting place for all the religions of the world, for their further development. No religion comes into Japan unaffected by her selective genius. Japan would do well to feel her mission for a unification of the world religions. Her spirit of tolerance is admirable. But, on the other hand, incoming religions are often narrowed down to her national peculiarities and bound to lose their creative force. Buddhism has for centuries been subservient to ancestor worship and narrow nationalism. Christianity, likewise, has been exposed to the temptation to which Buddhism succumbed. But present circumstances demand a different attitude. Any religion which means to be the guiding principle of the new age must purge itself of local prejudices. It ought to be emancipated from narrow nationalism. The World War indeed would not have happened, had not Christianity been subject to nationalism! There may arise a persecution from bigoted nationalists, but a true religion must stand firm on the ideals of universal brotherhood and love of humanity, irrespective of racial and local colorings.

Second, a new religion must emphasize the supreme value of individual personality—personality set over against property,

things, institutions, customs, traditions, and concepts. Hence, religion ought to turn from its dogma of the Dharma, considered as a concept to the living Sakyamuni, from Christ of faith to Jesus of history. At the same time, however, religion should transcend worshiping its founder as an absolute pattern of life or an infallible authority for faith. Recognition of an absolute authority belongs to the feudal age with its caste system. Hence, new religion, even though professing itself to be Christianity or Buddhism, should not confine itself to its own tradition but revere all prominent sages such as Sakyamuni, Confucius, Socrates, and Jesus.

Finally, a new religion should have a well-defined leading principle for social reconstruction. We do not mean by this that the church should have a program of social reform, which rather belongs to the experts of social science. But we mean that religion, the guiding principle of human life, ought to have its social gospel adequate to deal with the problems of the day from the universal point of view, which a socialist or social scientist is liable to miss. The leading principle of social reconstruction that religion should afford ought to be above class spirit. There should not be, therefore, a religion of laborers as there should not be a particular religion of the rich. Religion ought to give stimulus to all such social activities as insure the general welfare of humanity. Social sins which had been left unnoticed in previous centuries now prick our conscience even more keenly. Salvation henceforth is not only individual but social as well. Social evils should be fought against by the concerted effort of all religions, in order to secure personal welfare. The enlightenment or salvation of the individual soul apart from society is nonsense. Social service is no longer a means to an end for individual redemption, but itself a growth and progress of the soul in her godward march!

ENERGY THE SOUL OF MATTER

OLIVER L. REISER
University of Pittsburgh

I. BODY AND SOUL

IT IS a curious fact that man insists upon asking himself questions which he cannot answer. Man thus appears as an enigma to himself, a cosmic question mark amidst a world of facts. Today, no less than in the age of Job, the question insistently is asked, What is man? Is he indeed so wonderfully made that we can with certainty answer in the affirmative the query of Job, If a man die shall he live again?

It is common knowledge that one of the oldest solutions to that riddle is presented in what is now termed the "interactionistic" theory of human nature. This dualistic solution—a view which alone seems to justify current religious teachings concerning the immortality of the soul—is so widely accepted among the laity that it involves but little exaggeration to state that only those who have become philosophically sophisticated by the study of science in our modernistic universities have come to despise this classical explanation of human experience and conduct.

It is the purpose of the present paper to criticize the dualistic theory and suggest an alternative doctrine. But first we must understand the reasons put forth in support of the view. Accordingly we will first glance at one classical defense of the view, the doctrine of Plato as it is expounded by his spokesman, Socrates. In the *Phaedo* Socrates is discussing with others a point of view which, after examination, he rejects, but which appears to me to be one of the most satisfactory of the various proposed solutions to this problem. The explanation which Socrates abandons is the idea that the soul is the harmony of the body. It will be remembered that Pythagoras, who saw in num-

ber patterns and numerical ratios the explanation of all natural phenomena, and who also made discoveries concerning the mathematical basis of musical harmony, had presented the musical scale which was later to develop into the generally accepted scale. It is clear, therefore, that the facts concerning the relation between the lengths of vibrating strings and the corresponding tones which they give forth were known to Pythagoras. Accordingly it was to be expected that some theorizer acquainted with the ideas of this philosopher-scientist would suggest the idea that what is called the "soul" is comparable to musical harmony. In the *Phaedo* the body is compared to a lyre: just as the lyre has strings of varying lengths, so the human body has strings set in its frame. Both produce a compound which is harmonious when there is a proper admixture of parts. Harmony, as Plato puts it, is a thing invisible, incorporeal, divine, abiding in the lyre which is harmonized—though the strings are matter, composite and earthly. This view, attractive as it is, is rejected by Socrates, who, destined to drink the cup which is to immortalize him, is interested in finding a theory providing something more than social immortality. And so Socrates (or Plato) spurns this view, and finds three reasons for doing so. In the first place, harmony in music is not prior to the elements which compose the harmony. If the soul be simply the harmony of the body, the soul cannot exist prior to or after the instrument of which it is the harmony. But Socrates is not willing to grant that the soul perishes with the body. Plato and Socrates, like other Greek philosophers, favor the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul.

A second reason which Socrates finds for discarding this view is found in the fact that the harmony does not lead the parts which make up the harmony, but only follows them. To quote Plato's words: "... the soul, being a harmony, can never utter a note at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other affections of the strings out of which she is composed; she can only follow, she cannot lead them." But

Socrates then argues that we actually discover the soul doing the exact opposite—leading the elements of which, by this theory, she is supposed to be composed. The soul is always opposing and coercing the body. (For Plato matter, when it is not thought of as illusory and unreal, is conceived to be a principle of opposition—something dumb and recalcitrant.) Undoubtedly it is this feeling of coercing the body against its own inclinations, the feeling of a struggle against the “lower” desires of the “flesh,” which lends plausibility to the dualism of soul and body. We find this interpretation implied in Paul’s observation that the things he ought to do he does not, and the things he ought not to do he does. This sense of a conflict of a higher and a lower nature leads him to declare that there is a body spiritual and a body material. This conflict is real, and any theory which pretends to explain all the facts must provide a basis for that type of conduct. Freud has attempted to explain this inhibiting power of the soul by the notion of the “psychic censor.” Unfortunately he has not told us how this *deus ex machina* goes about its work. The view which is here proposed is that this struggle is not a conflict between the soul and the body, but between the desires of special or segmental bodily cravings and the total momentum of the body as it is integrated into a unified whole.

The final reason why Socrates rejects this view lies in the fact that harmony admits of degrees, whereas the soul does not. According to Socrates we cannot admit that one person is more or less a soul than another person. This view follows from the definition of the soul as a thing which is simple, indivisible, and not composed of parts. By way of reply, and in defense of the view that the soul is the harmony of the body, we must insist that our definitions should not be asserted on a priori grounds but must be devised to fit the facts. The fact is that the soul is not simple and indivisible. We know too much of multiple or split personalities to affirm that the soul may not consist of parts. Also, the soul admits of degrees. We can speak of some

persons as having more or less of a soul than others. And the test of the degree of soul life is a question of wealth and variety of interests or richness of content of integrated experience.

In the view which Plato and Socrates defend we clearly have before us a dualistic theory of the relation of soul and body. In contemporary psychology this view that the mind coerces the body is termed the doctrine of "ideo-motor action." Ideas are said to be dynamogenic in the control of conduct. Such a view corresponds to the parallel doctrine in biology which is known as "vitalism." As the reader knows, in modern science these views are much criticized. The history of science illustrates the truth of the statement that in its earlier stages science always involves an animistic or vitalistic view, and that as time goes on science tends to become more and more mechanistic in character. Since we will be discussing these two contrasting views at some length, it will be well for us to define the sense in which we shall understand the terms "mechanism" and "vitalism."

By a mechanical or mechanistic view we will mean the doctrine which holds that any reality of nature is nothing but the material structures or units out of which it is made. By a vitalistic theory we will mean that doctrine which holds that the functions and modes of behavior of any specified reality of nature cannot be explained entirely in terms of the material units or elements into which it can be analyzed. Function cannot be reduced to structure. But if what a thing does is not to be explained by its structure, what, then, is its explanation? Vitalism always involves the assertion that what a thing or an organism does is caused by some agency or force of coercion which acts upon the configuration of material elements. This force or active principle is capable of separation from the structure through which it functions or expresses itself. In this way of stating the matter it is evident that vitalism is not a term restricted solely to biology. You may have a vitalistic physics as well as a vitalistic biology or vitalistic psychology. It is important to keep in mind that vitalism, no matter in what field it appears, always

involves a dualism. It asserts that matter or body is inactive, inert, and passive, and that the cause of the active functioning of matter or body is the force or agency behind body. Matter or body, in this view, is that which is acted upon by forces.

2. THE TRADITIONAL DUALISMS

The oldest of these dualisms is that which is presented by the antithesis between soul and body. This dualism appears in the speculations of primitive philosophers. Obviously it is what is termed "psychological dualism." Later on, when the biologist had arrived at the notion of the "physical basis of life" there appears the dualism of protoplasm and life (or the vital force). This is a biological dualism. The corresponding opposition in physics is the antithesis between matter and energy. It is difficult to state just when these dualisms first appeared in human thought, but they are all present in Greek philosophy four or five centuries before the birth of Christ. These dualisms still exist. But before going farther let us set down these contrasts so that we have them before us:

Matter and Energy (or Force).....	in physics
Protoplasm and Life.....	in biology
Body and Mind (or Soul).....	in psychology

In order to weigh the truth and the merits of the views of nature which are given in the mechanistic and the vitalistic explanations we must first understand what the motives are which lead to the oppositions in the foregoing types of vitalisms.

At the present time we hear much of the conflict between science and religion and science and poetry, or, more generally, the conflict between the mechanistic and the idealistic attitudes toward nature. In early thought this conflict did not exist because these distinctions in interest and points of view were not yet established. Science, religion, and philosophy were united in primitive thought. The conflict first appears when the theory of matter embodied in classical materialism is presented. It is only when science develops as an independent interest, freed

from the bondage to religion and mythology, that theories of matter appear which provide no place for the vital forces of the animistic system. And when the notion of matter is thus de-vitalized so that body is so conceived as to be incapable of spontaneously initiating change it then becomes necessary to find in some extraneous force which acts upon matter the generative principle of motion and development. If this is true it follows that the development of physics, with the concomitant tendency toward the increasing mechanization of matter, has contributed in no small measure to the growth of vitalism in all fields. The assumption which is implicitly made, and which seems to make it necessary to introduce vital forces, is the notion that rest is more natural than motion. But why, we may ask, should this assumption become incorporated into historical materialism? Why should we have defined our conceptions of matter in such a way that if a thing is changing or in motion we must suppose that some sort of force or agency is responsible for that activity? Perhaps the answer to this question is that we human beings are naturally lazy. Therefore we cannot understand why anything else in nature should exhibit activity unless "forced" to do it because we ourselves do not do anything unless we are "compelled" to do it. This explanation of why rest should appear more "natural" than motion probably has some truth in it. However, I think it is unjustifiably exaggerating the slothfulness of human nature. I should prefer to rephrase the statement in this fashion: The notion that rest is more natural than motion, and hence that moving bodies must be acted upon by coercing forces, is not so much a consequence of the laziness of human beings as it is a consequence of introspectively noting the fact that when we do move external objects there is always present a conscious sense of effort.

It is now rather generally agreed that this sense of effort, the sense of muscle strain when lifting or pushing external bodies, is the origin of our notion that when bodies move they are acted upon by forces from without. Thus, as we have seen in the pre-

vious chapter, the notion in physics of force is an anthropomorphism. It is the result of a projection into nature of our own sense of effort. This is evident from the fact that in every case of the foregoing dualisms the second term of the antithesis is the active cause which overcomes the inertia of inactive bodies. Inertia here means the tendency for a thing to continue doing what it has been doing—or failing to do. We have already noted the way in which this idea appears in Plato. It may help us to understand the psychology of a dualistic view if we also glance at the way in which this same notion that motion is not natural (i.e., self-explanatory) appears in Aristotle.

What is the cause of motion? In answer to this question we ordinarily point to some antecedently operating force which is believed to produce the given motion. But we can always find another antecedent state or cause which preceded our original cause. Are we therefore compelled to admit that the cause of any given state was the preceding state, and that this state in turn had its antecedent state, and so on *ad infinitum*? If so, we must admit that motion is eternal, and that there is no first cause of motion, since motion never had an absolute beginning. But rather than admit the possibility of an infinite regress, which really leaves motion unexplained, Aristotle argues that we must stop somewhere, and this absolute beginning or first cause of motion he states is God. We must have an eternal Unmoved Mover who is the ground of all subsequent motions and developments, but himself is unmoved and unchangeable. Hence God for Aristotle is that being in terms of which everything else is explained, but who himself is forever inexplicable. This argument of Aristotle's is one of the classical proofs for the existence of God. As an explanation of the origin of motion it still appeals to many minds.

It is easy to understand the way in which the doctrine of relativity cuts under this argument. By introducing the notion of the relativity of motion Einstein removes the last vestige of the notion of force as a cause. By insisting upon the relativity

of time measurements Einstein abolishes the notion of absolute beginnings. Finally, by showing that we cannot separate the containing vessels of space and time from the content, which is matter, the relativist completely removes the foundations which support the idea that matter and its motions could have originated at some time in the past. That is to say, the world could have had a beginning only if time and space could exist even though there were no matter "in" these containers. But we now know that time and space are not the containers of matter, and that if there were no matter time and space would cease to exist. Hence it is nonsense to talk about absolute beginnings or first causes of motions, if by this we mean that matter and motion appeared at some specific date in the past of a temporal series which was flowing along long before the universe was. But these are very recent ideas, and thinkers of earlier ages could not avoid the errors which the theory of relativity now makes evident to us. Hence it is easy for us to understand why, once the idea was established that the motions of bodies require forces for their explanation, it was natural that philosophers and scientists should introduce these active principles *ab extra* to explain each new level of behavior or each realm of functional activity.

Those who were responsible for these previously-mentioned types of dualism had noted the following levels of functional activity: (a) the difference between matter at rest and matter in motion; (b) between inanimate bodies and living matter or protoplasm; and (c) between conscious human beings and unconscious living forms (such as plants). Since the activities of each of these levels called for a distinct kind of cause, the following types of forces or causes were invoked: (1) Energy, as that which causes and directs the motions of inanimate matter; (2) life, as that which causes and directs the motions of organisms; and (3) mind or soul, as that which produces and directs the motions of human beings. In each case the active cause is responsible for the behavior of the material complex upon which it acts. Each new type of behavior is explained by the introduc-

tion of a new entity or force. This type of explanation is a consequence of the inveterate tendency of our reasoning processes to make entities out of modes of behavior. This process of hypostatizing or reifying functions so that they are the expression of indwelling and imponderable forces is illustrated in primitive man's explanation of insanity, headaches, and disease as being due to the presence of some external entity, spirit, or force in the individual who is thus obsessed. The practice of casting out devils, and the surgery now called "trepanning" which primitive man resorted to to provide an opening in the skull through which the inclosed spirit might escape, illustrate the practical effects of this type of explanation. This type of explanation is also illustrated in the early history of chemistry, where all sorts of caloric fluids and phlogistons were injected into matter to explain its chemical behavior.

Now that we have a thumb-nail sketch of the historical development of our problem before us we must next ask ourselves what we can do to resolve this dispute between the mechanists and the vitalists. By way of a beginning let us raise the question of whether these are the only choices before us—or is there another possible point of view, a *tertium quid*, which we have not stated? Those of my readers who have followed recent discussion know that the movement popularized under the term "emergent evolution" is held by its advocates to provide an escape from the two horns of the vitalistic-mechanistic dilemma. And the defenders of the doctrine known as *gestalt*-psychology also claim that their view disposes of the old antithesis. These doctrines are mentioned merely to show that it is not necessarily a question of choosing either mechanism or vitalism—we may reject both if we wish. This we propose to do in the view which is now outlined in its gross features.

3. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION

In the traditional dualism which we have just examined it is evident that the terms of the three antitheses involve an opposition between that which is acted upon and that which pro-

duces the action. We have, in other words, a dualism of substance or matter on the one hand, and of force or activity on the other. It is my contention that the materialist emphasizes the structural or substantial aspects of the reality which he studies, while the vitalist emphasizes the functional or activity aspect of this reality. That is to say, the dualism of substance (or matter) and action (caused by force) is but a special case of the dualism of structural and functional.

It seems to me that even more fundamental than the dualism of mind and body, of life and protoplasm, of energy and matter, is the dualism of the static (or structural) and dynamic (or functional) aspects of nature. It is our belief that this ubiquitous dualism of the structural and the functional has its origin in the dualism of space and time. In other words, the thesis here presented is that energy, life, and mind are designations of the dynamic, functional, or temporal aspects of realities of which matter, protoplasm, or body are the static, structural, or material designations. Life and mind, standing as they do for the functional aspects, are therefore to be regarded as forms of time or temporal organization. In the words of the great British philosopher, S. Alexander, "time is the mind of space." Whenever any structural complex or configuration of material elements is so unified into a dynamically integrated whole that we have what I shall variously call a "unitary mode of behavior" or a "macroscopic rhythm," *there mind is present*. Mind or soul, therefore, is not a gift from on high; it is an achievement by organisms. In place of metaphysical forces invoked to explain the various levels of behavior in nature we must, then, substitute the notion of dynamic syntheses. An entity (e.g., molecule, crystal, and organism) behaves as it does not because it possesses, or is acted upon by, a meta-empirical force, but because, as a going concern, it is integrated into a unitary mode of response. We must, then, assert that energy, life, and mind should not be hypostatized into entities; they are functional unities. Let us set down these oppositions for future reference:

ENERGY THE SOUL OF MATTER

71

The Spatial Aspect

The Temporal Aspect

Material.....	Activistic
Substantial.....	Energic
Structural.....	Functional
Static.....	Dynamic

This allows us to make various proportions or analogies. Thus we may say that soul is to body as life is to protoplasm, or as time is to space. Since in physics energy is the dynamic aspect of which matter is the structural or static aspect, we can also assert that energy is the soul of matter. But it was already stated that soul is the harmony of the body. In order that these statements may square up with each other we must reinterpret the meaning of the concept of energy in such a way that the changes initiated by physical energy are understood to express the striving for harmony. This is a view which physicists have neither discussed nor espoused, and I am afraid that at this point the prosaic physicists of the older school will be inclined to exclaim, What nonsense is this you are uttering? What has energy to do with harmony? This we must now try to show.

4. ENERGY AS HARMONY

In defense of this view let us first note that energy is commonly held to be of two forms, namely, kinetic energy of motion and potential energy. A body is said to possess potential energy when it has the capacity to do work. But what confers upon it this ability to perform work? The answer usually given is that bodies possess potential energy by virtue of their position. Potential energy may, therefore, be said to represent the tendency to change position or spatial location. A body possesses this tendency and capacity because, in the position in which it is, the forces concerned are not in equilibrium—or if they are it is an equilibrium under stress, and when the equilibrium is upset a readjustment occurs in which the forces involved tend to alter the positions of the bodies concerned in such a way that a more stable equilibrium results. But what is there about the

positions of material objects or particles which gives them this capacity to perform work? What is there in common between the chemical energy of a carbon molecule and the rock perched on a cliff? Here we have a profound mystery.

We use the terms equilibrium, energy, potential, stress, and the like with much glibness, as though the meanings of these terms were entirely clear to us. But perhaps they are only charitable words covering our scientific sins. Indeed, some would go farther and object to the use of the term "energy." In his *The Philosophy of 'As If'* Hans Vaihinger tells us that "energy" is a personificatory fiction. But it is also obvious, as W. Ostwald pointed out, that we know "matter" only in terms of its actions and effects upon us. Therefore, if we reject energy as a reality we must also reject matter. Rather than accept such a bleak scientific skepticism we will assume that energy has as much reality as what we call matter, and that the one notion is as necessary to the other as the functional aspect is to the structural. Alice in Wonderland found a cat which could evaporate into the thin air and leave only its grin behind. In physics such things cannot happen. If you have a grin (behavior) you will always find the cat (matter) to which the grin is attached, and vice versa. This analogy illustrates the inseparability of structure and function.

The best guess concerning the nature of potential energy seems to consist in trying to articulate in more detail the conception of stresses and strains which are supposed to be associated with potential energy. These strains were formerly supposed to exist in the ether of space, but since the ether, like the Cheshire cat, has attenuated itself almost to the point of non-existence we find it difficult to imagine an elastic distortion in something which does not exist. However, we still have with us, in some form or other, the notion of the electromagnetic field. Here is one reality of the old physics which is still in good repute. Perhaps the potential energy due to position has for its basis a stretched condition of the lines of force which are asso-

ciated with the configuration of material elements. Physicists tend to regard the "lines of force" which, e.g., lie between a magnet and a piece of iron, as a kind of geometrical abstraction; but Faraday, who first presented this theory, really took them to be actualities. Moreover, Sir J. J. Thomson, who conceives the ether to possess a filamental structure, also thinks of "tubes" of force as physical realities. If this conception, in which the field of force takes the place of the older ether of space, should continue to preserve its good standing we will have to conceive space to be spiderwebbed with interlacing lines of force. We will then be driven to interpret the behavior of material bodies in terms of tensions and relaxations within energy fields. And this is where the notion of harmony comes in.

Nature is trying to establish conditions of equilibrium. She is seeking to reduce the potential energies of bodies. The resulting shifting of the gradients of the corresponding energy-fields upsets the equilibria of the other bodies which are thereby influenced. The (relatively) isolated configurations within nature must adjust themselves to other and neighboring configurations, with their corresponding energy potentials. Since the motions resulting from the conversion of potential energies of bodies into kinetic energies are due to relative positions, we cannot interpret potential energy in terms of single bodies alone. We must seek for the explanation of motion in the universe as a whole. The activities of material complexes must express the impulse toward readjustments on the part of the cosmos in its entirety. This is consistent with what the general theory of relativity expresses in the statement that "gravitation simply represents a continual effort of the universe to straighten itself out."¹

An absolute equilibrium condition, involving the universal rest of an Aristotelian God, is possible only if the energy patterns associated with the various microscopic material com-

¹ E. T. Whittaker, "The Outstanding Problems of Relativity," *Science*, LXVI (1927), 227.

plexes were integrated into some macroscopically equilibrated pattern of lines of force. But equipotential surfaces running through all the dimensions of the universe as a whole seem to be impossible. There seems to be some tendency in the universe which opposes an absolute equipoise. If we interpret the second law of energetics (or thermo-dynamics) to express the tendency of energy to run "down hill" toward an equilibrium, we may find that it is eventually self-defeating because, in order to lower the potential energy in one part of the universe, it is perhaps necessary for energy to run "up hill" in some other part of the universe. This may sound like nonsense, but if so it merely illustrates how nonsensical the "new" physics can become. But this is a digression. The point which is relevant is that it is no mere figure of speech to say that nature is trying to produce a harmony out of the body of matter with which she has to work. In this sense nature has something of a soul, and the soul is the integrated energy patterns and constellations of lines of forces associated with the potentials of positional objects.

According to this view, which resembles pan-psychism in some respects, consciousness is associated with the potential energy of matter, and the more potential energy a thing has the more soul it is capable of expressing. This forces us to conclude that we can find in "inanimate" nature the promise and potency of mind. It also follows that adaptive behavior in organisms has its earliest analogy in the adaptive behavior of inorganic bodies. A rock tending to fall down the incline of a cliff has the same sort of directed response which in organisms we call "instincts." But in such a situation there is lacking that integration and intensification of synergy which is present in complex organisms. Nevertheless, it is correct to say that wherever in nature there is a store of potential energy in an unstable equilibrium, which can be released by a trigger effect, whenever in nature an object is under stress and strain and is trying to equilibrate itself with its environment by reducing its potential energy to a minimum (in accordance with our interpretation of

the second law of energetics), there we have the condition for the presence of consciousness.² Energy is regarded as the soul of matter because it represents this persistence of tendency in the direction of doing work. Soul is regarded as the harmony of the body because it represents the integration of energy patterns as they are unified into a dynamically functioning complex of "behavior-stuff."

Such an interpretation of potential energy may seem to secure little support or encouragement from physics itself. But this is because physicists, in the past, have entered into a kind of unconscious conspiracy not to admit that the phenomena of physical nature might be explained in many other ways than those which were fashionable. All textbooks were written in such a way as to maintain the uniformity of doctrine which was (and still is) to be found in them. But that we actually have a choice among different types of physical philosophy is one of the secrets physicists can no longer keep to themselves. The secret is out, and now mischief is afoot. Let us justify the apparently heretical doctrine that alternative types of physical philosophy are available to those who like variety in their intellectual menus.

5. THE CONCEPTS OF PHYSICS

A few years ago the opinion was generally held that the mechanical picture of nature which physics presents is objective, that physics had solved all of its important problems, and that no radical reconstruction of its fundamentals was at all likely. The universality of this view was largely a consequence of the fact that most textbooks to which the average reader had access were concerned with the same subjects, treated these subjects in approximately the same manner, and agreed in most of what they had to say. And so the belief was current that there was no element of choice, arbitrariness, or subjectivity in physical

² So far as I am aware, the only other philosopher who has asserted an intimate connection between consciousness and potential energy is Professor W. P. Montague. Among scientists similar views have been presented by W. Köhler and N. Rashevsky.

science. Physics was supposed to give us an objectively real account of nature, free from all anthropomorphism. This idea, we now know, is quite false. In a moment we will examine the reasons for this change of front. But before doing so it will be well to examine the method by which physics proceeds in building up its explanatory concepts.

The general procedure of physics consists in defining certain primary magnitudes and then constructing from these the derived magnitudes. These are built up by complicating the fundamental magnitudes. Physicists generally select length (L), mass (M), and time (T) as the primary units. This gives us the centimeter-gram-second system of measurement. Now let us notice how the derived magnitudes arise out of these primary magnitudes. Velocity, as we all know, is directly proportional to the distance covered by the moving body and inversely proportional to the time. Or $V \propto L/T$. To state the matter in other terms, velocity is the time-rate of change of position. If the velocity of a body is not constant, but is uniformly accelerated, then the velocity of a body at the end of t seconds is expressed thus: $v = at$, where a is the acceleration. In other words, acceleration is the time-rate of change of velocity. In the same way we go on to define force as the space-rate of change of energy. We may summarize these facts and the method by which the process is carried on in the following table of derived magnitudes:

Velocity	= cm. per second
Acceleration	= cm. per sec. per sec.
Force	= $M \times a$ = dyne
Work	= $F \times S$
Power	= $\frac{\text{Work}}{\text{Time}}$

We can express all these physical quantities in terms of length (L), mass (M), and time (T). Whenever we use the symbol T^{-1} , this means that time occurs in the denominator:

ENERGY THE SOUL OF MATTER

77

Area	$= L^2 T^0 M^0$
Volume	$= L^3 T^0 M^0$
Velocity	$= L^1 T^{-1} M^0$
Acceleration	$= L^1 T^{-2} M^0$
Force	$= L^1 T^{-2} M^1$
Energy	$= L^2 T^{-2} M^1$

This method of scientific procedure is very useful. Its effect becomes vicious only when we conclude that, since we can express the qualitative results studied in the higher sciences (e.g., psychology, biology, etc.) in terms of complexes of the simple units of the primary magnitudes, therefore the data studied in these sciences are reducible to physical magnitudes. Even this would not be harmful provided we were willing to read into physical reality the properties and qualities of the original phenomena which were thus analyzed into physical magnitudes. For example, there would be no objection to the view that when we analyze the activities of living organisms—such as growth, self-repairing processes, etc.—into surface tensions, ionic migrations, osmotic pressures, phasic equilibria, etc., the adaptive behavior of life *is* these chemical reactions. But when we do this we must be willing to admit that inorganic chemical reactions contain within themselves the essence of that which appears in organisms as purposive response. It is clear that physical chemistry as ordinarily interpreted does not permit of this vitalization of physical reality.

A brief survey of the manner in which physics came to be interpreted in a materialistic-mechanistic way will fortify our contention that physics might have been, and still may be, interpreted in such a way as to provide the basis for purposive behavior. The failure on the part of some physicists to recognize this fact is a natural consequence of the ignorance on the part of these physicists of the historical evolution of their own subject. It is particularly clear that some contemporary scientists do not sufficiently appreciate the importance of the

interaction of the views of Descartes, Leibniz, and Newton, and how the triumph of Newtonian physics determined the course of the subsequent development of physical doctrines.

The view which we are advocating rests on the belief that, in order to arrive at a doctrine in which human purposes do not appear as alien influxes in a hostile physical world, we must, like Leibniz, reinterpret the notion of matter in dynamic terms. This is precisely what modern physics is doing. It is interesting to note that philosophers of widely differing points of view (e.g., Bertrand Russell, H. Wildon Carr, *et al.*) concede that in one respect or another Leibniz has anticipated several of the ideas which we now associate with the theory of relativity. In any case, quite apart from the truth or falsity of that statement, we can make out a strong case for the thesis that one of the consequences of the theory of relativity has been to throw in doubt the assumption that length, work, potential, etc., are objectively measurable and invariant existents. This is the view which Professor Eddington has suggested in his book, *The Mathematical Theory of Relativity*. Eddington is quite willing to admit that there is much more anthropomorphism in physics than physicists of the recent past were willing to grant. This same idea is also brought out by Norman R. Campbell in his book on *Physics: The Elements* (chapters x, xiv, xv). Both derived and fundamental magnitudes contain an arbitrary element connected with the arbitrary choice of unit. Mass, length, and time, Professor Campbell points out, are not necessarily basic magnitudes, but such special features as they possess are derived partly from the dynamic equations in which they occur and the high accuracy with which weights and lengths (but not times) can be compared.

All this, of course, merely illustrates the point that there are various ways in which the behavior of the elements of the physical world may be described and explained. In the past it has seemed convenient and fruitful to exclude certain ideas, such as the notion of purpose, from the domain of physical science. But

the fundamental ideas of physics were enunciated before the days of evolutionary thought, when the notion was prevalent that physical nature and human experience were mutually exclusive realms. Now the time has come to take seriously the implications of evolution. In bringing physical nature and human nature closer together, evolutionary philosophy leaves us with the choice of mechanizing human conduct or vitalizing physical reality. I prefer the latter alternative. We must rewrite our physics and our psychology, and in doing so we must tear down some of the walls which man has established—especially where, as in the case of the distinction between the physical and the psychical, nature herself has placed no such barriers. If it is true that the psychological theory of most physicists is obsolete, it is equally true that the physical theory of most psychologists is antiquated. We must again get back into nature those qualities which Newton expunged from the realm of physics. The science which results from this fusion of physics and psychology might be called physical psychology, or biophysics. Whatever its name, the future of this discipline appears bright and promising.³

³ For a more detailed exposition of the foregoing views, especially in relation to the theories of others, the reader may consult the following papers by the writer: "Mathematics and Emergent Evolution," *Monist*, XL (1930), 509-25; and "Gestalt Psychology and the Philosophy of Nature," *Philosophical Review*, XXXIX (1930), 556-72.

RELIGION AND TRUTH

• GERTRUDE C. BUSSEY
Goucher College

ONE of the most dominant tendencies in religious thought for the past generation has been an utter contempt for theology. This attitude seemed to lift vital religious experience above the endless conflict of religious disputes and to offer a possibility for maintaining a fruitful religious experience in spite of the necessity for abandoning outworn religious dogmas. The pragmatic emphasis on emotion and volition was undoubtedly a justified reaction against an overemphasis on creeds, and the claim that religion does not consist primarily in rational knowledge has been fully borne out by students of the history of religion. Yet it is never safe to ignore man's intellectual needs, and the earlier pragmatic justification of religion is gradually leading in many quarters to the denial of religion, and to a large degree of scepticism. Popular religious teachers may insist that religious beliefs do not matter, since religious experience is the fundamental necessity, but such experience itself presupposes certain beliefs which the religious believer considers to be true. If he once suspects these beliefs to be false, the experience is likely to evaporate, or at least to be profoundly modified. For a while the will to believe may have served to save men the arduous work of a reformulation of theological beliefs, but fundamental problems which cannot be easily shelved are once more being forced upon us, and attempts to save religion by appeal to emotion or to practical utility are being met increasingly by the counterblast of those who insist upon the necessity of our escaping from mere wish beliefs and fancies and who urge us to rest our ideals on the solid ground of true beliefs. On the whole, this is a far saner attitude, and far more in harmony with religious tradition. Throughout the

course of its history, religion has claimed to give a true view of man's relation to the wider order in which he finds himself. Although many religious beliefs may seem to us more-or-less wild and fanciful illusions, to the men who held them they were no mere make believe, but the very substance of reality.

The recognition of the necessity of true beliefs is an easy matter, but it is far more difficult to see how the need can be met. Reliance on authority based on revelation has largely lost ground, but in its place there has sprung up a rather hectic interest in the religious beliefs of successful men of all sorts. While we may smile at the uncritical fashion in which large numbers of people devour the last word of famous inventors, financiers, authors, etc., concerning religion, we may well ask how they are to discover truth. No unanimous verdict can be attained if they consult the high priests of science, and, now as always, the philosophers give no single answer to the age-long query of religion.

In popular discussion our age is frequently characterized as peculiarly bewildered. Sometimes this bewilderment is laid at the door of science, and sometimes we are assured that science will lead us safely out of our difficulties. Yet historical perspective shows that we are by no means unique in our conflicting views, and while the advance of scientific knowledge has without doubt demolished some of our traditional mythologies, it leaves and must leave central issues largely unaffected. Evidence for this may be seen in the re-emergence among present-day thinkers of many of the classic roads to religious beliefs. There are still among us those who deny God completely; those who regard God merely as a man-made ideal; those who believe that God can in no wise be discovered through science but must be found through the avenue of direct feeling or through faith; and those who believe that God can be known by reason, as an explanation or interpretation of some phase of the universe, or of reality in its totality.

Obviously it is impossible within the limits of this paper to

deal adequately with these diverse views. All I can do is to call attention to representatives of each point of view, and then to point out a few of the difficulties inherent in the situation.

Those who believe that the advance of scientific knowledge leaves no place for a conception of God are somewhat divided in their counsels. On the one hand some are willing to be frankly atheistic and to disavow religion altogether, while others think that religion is too fundamental and powerful a human attitude to perish, even when all belief in a cosmic God has gone. For them religion is to be maintained but is to be transformed from a theocentric to an anthropocentric system of values. "Humanism," in the sense of belief in man and striving for human values, is to replace trust in God. Like the Freudians the "humanists" believe that man's beliefs in God were pure wish beliefs, affording men a sense of security in this hazardous life. Beliefs concerning God were illusory, yet early religious beliefs contained a measure of truth, since they embodied true beliefs concerning ideals. God as a human ideal is still powerful and may still be worshiped. The mistake of the past has been to suppose that human ideals were borrowed from God. Rather God is created definitely out of human desires. When this is clearly seen the individual learns to do without the idea of God in the old sense. As one of the leading humanists put it in a recent book:

The everlasting arms of the Absolute grow nebulous. The dear strong gods keep watch no longer within the shadows. The torch of science has fired the walls of heaven. And by a stroke of irony, the same science, busily applied has made our modern problem of social living a maze of Minotaur. But religion need not fail. In our hands are power and knowledge and method adequate for victory. Failure will mean only one thing—that we have betrayed the quest of all the ages.¹

Another humanist writes:

Let man stand on his own feet and trust his own powers. The universe is not unfriendly; rather is it the natural scene of his birth and achievements. It is something within which to work in a human way, bravely,

¹ A. Eustace Haydon, *The Quest of the Ages*, pp. 175 f.

creatively, gently, wisely. Here is a new attitude, that of an adult shifting for himself; set on carving out his own fortunes, aware that life is not a path of roses, knowing that tragedy may claim him, and yet fighting a good fight for whatsoever things are honorable and of good repute. Here we have man and religion coming of age.²

Thus, the humanist no longer offers to the individual comfortable beliefs to solace him. Rather he urges him to face the truth, and to make the best of it. There is no God, but there is man, and man's ideals which he may call God if he so choose.

It is, perhaps, a matter of minor importance whether we designate this new view as religion or not. The really important question is whether "humanism" can serve the same purposes which religion centering in God has served in the past, and this seems highly doubtful. Logically it would seem strange if it could, for unless one believes that truth does not matter, it would be hard to see how the same ideals could flourish equally well on the ground of utterly conflicting metaphysics. Although humanists sometimes appear inclined to dislike the word "metaphysics," they nevertheless furnish us with a metaphysical view of the world supposedly grounded upon science. According to this metaphysics, there is not only no place for supernaturalism and revelation, there is also no possibility of God. Values are purely human concerns, with no cosmic significance whatsoever, and in no sense absolute. Yet, even though these values are completely relative, they are worth striving for. Not only may men strive for values, but the humanist apparently feels justified in urging them to do so, and in demanding that the individual sacrifice himself for the public good. Just why he should do so if he does not happen to care to is not clear, nor why he should be sustained by the progress of humanity, when he has no means of defining progress, and no guaranty of its continuance.

By all means, if the humanistic metaphysics is justified, let us accept it with whatever grace we can, but let us not deceive

² R. W. Sellars, *Religion Coming of Age*, p. 156.

ourselves into thinking that its implications necessitate a noble idealism. We may hope that men will continue to cherish noble ideas, but there seems no logical way to persuade them to do so. The humanist may reply that he is basing his view on the character of the ideal itself—goodness is intrinsically better than evil, and does not need to be bolstered up by any external sanctions. This may well be admitted and even insisted upon, but if goodness does have this intrinsic quality, it seems to have an objective nature or reference of which the humanistic philosophy gives no adequate account. The universality of good which alone justifies obligation demands that in some sense values have their roots in reality and are not dependent upon the mere whim of diverse individuals. One of the sanest of the humanists recognizes the importance of transcendent ideals, but can indicate no way in which faith in these transcendent ideals can be validated.³ The humanists of today insist upon their recognition of the part played by the environment, but, in their insistence on the purely human character of values, they seem to leave us with an abstraction which is ultimately untenable. The universe is not merely the scene of man's activities, it is rather the very stuff out of which man carves his ideals, and the sustaining power which alone makes their realization possible.

Humanism, then, as a new religion includes a metaphysics which cannot be merely taken on faith, but must be carefully examined. This examination should include a careful study of (1) the nature and limits of scientific method, (2) the conceptions of the world suggested by science, and (3) the nature and status of values. It is unfortunate then, that some of the less careful humanists in their popular presentations of the theory appear to claim that it is the inevitable outcome of modern thought, and that any who dissent from it are necessarily held in the bond of ancient prejudice.

As opposed to the view that science spells the end of a belief

³ Cf. H. W. Schneider, "Faith," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXI, 39.

in God, there are many who contend that science and religion are two utterly separate roads to reality. Among this number are included Lloyd Morgan and Eddington. For them science can afford no evidence for or against religion as the two are essentially incommensurable. For Eddington science is essentially quantitative, while religion deals with qualities and values. Thus, he writes:

To those who have any intimate acquaintance with the laws of chemistry and physics the suggestion that the spiritual world could be ruled by laws of allied character is as preposterous as the suggestion that a nation could be ruled by laws like the laws of grammar. The essential differences, which we meet in entering the realm of spirit and mind, seem to hang round the word "ought." Dismiss the idea that natural law may swallow up religion, it cannot even tackle the multiplication table singlehanded.⁴

and, also:

The scientific answer is relevant so far as concerns the sense impressions interlocked with the stirring of the spirit, which indeed form an important part of the mental content. For the rest the human spirit must turn to the unseen world to which it itself belongs.⁵

Natural law is not applicable to the unseen world behind the symbols, because it is unadapted to anything except symbols, and its perfection is a perfection of symbolic linkage. You cannot apply such a scheme to the parts of our personality which are not measurable by symbols any more than you can extract the square root of a sonnet. There is a kind of unity between the material and the spiritual worlds—between the symbols and their background—but it is not the scheme of natural law which will provide the cement.⁶

Such statements are vastly comforting to those who believe that the subordination of religion to science is untenable, yet they are open to rather serious questions and difficulties. It may be urged that Eddington considers science too narrowly, as consisting only in physics and chemistry, and fails entirely to take account of the recent work in the biological sciences.

⁴ *Science and the Unseen World*, p. 54.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

More than that, his positive statements concerning the nature and existence of God are comfortably vague and do not seem grounded in any rational argument. He practically goes no farther than a vague appeal to mysticism, and relies entirely on a felt communion with a personal God.

Lloyd Morgan also believes that science and religion deal with diverse sides of reality, and works out a somewhat new version of the relation between the phenomenal and noumenal orders.

There are two ways in which one may account for any event. One may explain it as due to the act of some agent, or one may interpret its occurrence as in accordance with the order of nature. The former I begged leave to call a dramatic explanation; the latter a natural interpretation. . . . My philosophical creed is that any event, and the whole system of events, may be interpreted in terms of evolution, and that any event and the whole system of events may be explained as due to the creative activity of God.⁷

The two accounts meet for Lloyd Morgan in the concept of person. A person is both a product of evolution and a creative agent. Lloyd Morgan attempts to justify this assertion by showing in detail the biological and psychological stages in the development of personality, and an adequate criticism would have to consider this attempt in detail. The main question is whether he can succeed in maintaining both the complete diversity and independence of the scientific and dramatic accounts and their complete unity. If so, Lloyd Morgan's twofold description aids us more than Eddington's reliance on feeling of union, and his concept of God seems more integral to his whole philosophy and more verifiable. If God is the supreme creative agent, then the good old doctrine that God can be known through his works is upheld, and God becomes knowable through the whole course of evolution, even though he is never to be introduced to fill up inconvenient gaps in the evolutionary series of events.

Another familiar form of a twofold road to truth is expressed

⁷ *Mind at the Crossways*, pp. 169 f.

in Baillie's careful work, *The Interpretation of Religion*. Here Baillie tries to maintain the thesis of an independent theology based solely on an intuitive sense of moral values. He disclaims both the authority of mystic experience, such as Eddington relies on to afford direct knowledge of God, and also all rational arguments for the nature and existence of God. According to Baillie, theology is independent both of science and philosophy, and must refuse subordination to them. Religious faith is neither a direct intuition, a felt communion with God, nor a scientific hypothesis demanding verification. Religion asserts the reality of God on the ground of complete faith in moral values.

Our fundamental moral values are given to us directly and are intuited by us directly; but for everything in religion that goes beyond this direct intuition of moral value, there is required the activity of faith.⁸

In our awareness of moral obligation there is contained a piece of original knowledge—knowledge, that is, of the truth of a proposition for which we either cannot give reasons or which is more certain than any reasons which we may afterwards try to find for it. . . . For my belief that I must do my duty no reason can be given and no reason is required.⁹

Religion consists in trust in this ideal. It is not, however, mere loyalty to human good, but rather the faith that human good has backing in reality, that the ideal present in moral obligation is a clue to the nature of the real.

The essential concern of religion is not simply with value but with the *relation of value to reality*; not simply with ideals but with the relation of our ideals to the actual scheme of things; not simply with human life but with the relation of human life to the ultimate background against which it is set. Thus if it is true on the one hand that the nature of reality is the concern of religion only in so far as it has bearing upon the status and stability of our ethical standards, it is no less true on the other hand that not until these standards have been referred to reality are we in possession of anything that is worthy to be called religion.¹⁰

⁸ *The Interpretation of Religion*, p. 246.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 345 f.; cf. also p. 244.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 317 f.; cf. also p. 101.

This account of religion, Baillie maintains, has the merit of describing the nature of the religious consciousness as disclosed in the history of religions. Although there is much in this view that shows profound good sense and keen insight into the real nature and needs of religion its adequacy does not seem entirely assured. Baillie is undoubtedly right in maintaining that "the objectivity of good and evil, that is where swords must be crossed in defence of religion."¹¹ Yet one may well ask whether he can make good his claim for the intuitive sense of moral values and for their objective character. Furthermore, the history of philosophy does not afford much ground for hope of the success of any attempt to separate completely knowledge of values from both philosophy and science. To maintain as Baillie does that religion must have certainty, and that any question implies a distrust or treachery to one's highest ideals, is in line with the views of many religious teachers, but it leaves religion dangerously free from rational criticism.

Fortunately, there are still among us those who would neither deny religion completely nor try to save it by any form of compartmental treatment. A number of philosophers are still trying to show what conception of God is rationally justified. For them there is no separate avenue to religion, whether of intuition or of moral faith, but religious beliefs must stand or fall with one's fundamental beliefs concerning reality. Among this group are numbered both realists and idealists of many varying types. Differing greatly in conclusions, they agree that reliance on religious beliefs must be based on rational examination, and that in this way religion must be ultimately tried at the bar of philosophy. Thus Whitehead writes,

Religious truth must be developed from knowledge acquired when our ordinary senses and intellectual operations are at their highest pitch of discipline. To move one step from this position towards the dark recesses of abnormal psychology is to surrender finally any hope of a solid foundation for religious doctrines.¹²

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

¹² *Religion in the Making*, p. 123.

In the same way Webb rejects

.... any theory of religion which makes it an affair of feeling and not of reason, which assigns it the region of the subconscious as its proper seat, which would dispense it from the formation of a theology, or which denies the possibility of its having a conflict with science on the ground that it should make no assertions of facts to which sciences could have anything to say.¹³

Whitehead's conception of God as the "principle of concrection" is indeed a philosophic concept wrapt up in his whole organic view of nature. It would, I think, never have been suggested by the independent analysis of the religious consciousness, and as some critics have pointed out it is utterly unlike the average man's conception of the God whom he worships. Yet surely such criticism is wide of the mark. If one desires truth in religion, and if one attempts to think of God in terms of one's ultimate conception of reality, then obviously there is no reason why the concept of God should be tested by its simplicity or obviousness. The one question which is pertinent is whether the belief can stand the philosophical tests of coherence and adequacy. Are there genuine grounds for this conception of God in reality as we know it? Can we think of God in this fashion without contradiction? If we cannot do so completely, the question arises whether religion must modify its concept in the light of truth, or whether religion can be justified in maintaining symbolic expressions better fitted to its own needs. The answer, of course, depends upon one's whole concept of truth. Surely it would be absurd to demand that the worshiper should be compelled to master Whitehead's abstruse philosophy. This demand need not be made, however, even if Whitehead's view be true, for all that is necessary is that in a general way the religious believer's demands should fall within the compass of Whitehead's conception. Whether his view does meet this requirement, and whether his view seems to be adequate, could be shown only by detailed examination of the concept in its full implications in Whitehead's system of thought.

¹³ *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, p. 84.

Although it is sometimes stated dogmatically that objective idealism is a mere survival of the past, there are still many thinkers trying to reach religious truth along the lines of the idealistic tradition. For them the belief that the universe is rational and spiritual is in no sense an outworn or disproved statement, but is rather a fundamental belief involved in the very nature of thought. For them the question is still to what extent this rational and spiritual order can be identified with the God of religion. Here, again, the test of the identification of the Absolute with God cannot consist in its agreement or disagreement with any crude conception of God held by the man on the street. An idealist like Hoernle or Webb does, to be sure, believe that the concept of God must be more directly related to an analysis of the religious consciousness and its demands than appears to have been the case with Whitehead's view, yet they never take this religious consciousness merely as it stands or accept its dicta at their face value. Rather, they believe philosophy must analyze carefully the religious consciousness, discovering its implications and its tendencies to see what its real satisfaction implies. By so doing both Hoernle and Webb maintain that only the Absolute can be God. In religion as elsewhere man strives more or less blindly with half-understood and contradictory ideas, but though these ideas are never fully true, men are striving by their means to express that which can only find complete expression in the Absolute. Webb, to be sure, goes somewhat farther than Hoernle in maintaining that religion adds a concrete meaning to the concept of the Absolute that would otherwise be lacking. Thus, he writes,

I take God, that is the object of my religious worship to be the one all comprehending Reality, but that, in worshipping I recognize this as God, that is, I recognize that this one all comprehending Reality is worshipful: and so God is more (not less) than the Absolute, in so far as in religion I know (or at least feel) the Absolute to be in this respect more than by itself the abstract term Absolute expresses.¹⁴

¹⁴ *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, p. 234.

The enumeration of conflicting beliefs might, of course, be carried much farther, but this brief sketch shows that ancient positions are by no means dead, and that it is a bold person who claims that this view or that is the only possible view for the modern man. From the philosophical point of view the question of the truth of various religious views can only be settled through an examination of many subsidiary questions. Of these subsidiary questions, the problems of the nature of truth, of the nature of knowledge, of the nature and status of values are perhaps the most important. Until philosophers can forge agreement on these questions, they can hardly reach agreement in regard to religion. The professional philosopher may indeed see the necessity for the controversy, and may be willing to trace out the intricate issues involved, but what of the man who desires religious faith and has no time or ability for philosophic thought? Must he wait upon the confused counsels of philosophy? He desires true religion, not merely comforting delusions, and for him the question is pressing where he shall find truth. He cannot in gymnastic fashion follow each scientific discovery, each philosophical controversy, in order to secure guidance for his soul, and so he is simply lost and bewildered. His religious teachers have lost their authority for him, for not only has he lost his faith in revelation, but these teachers speak with uncertain and conflicting voices. Yet religion cannot afford to make its appeal to the learned alone, it must also be available to the simple.

Bradley put the situation well when he wrote, "any positive metaphysical doctrine must remain esoteric, while a religion condemned to be 'esoteric' is but a refuge amid general destitution. Therefore a religious belief founded otherwise than on metaphysics, and a metaphysics able in some sense to justify that creed, seem to me what is required to fulfil our wishes."¹⁵ This is no doubt true, but it seems to be what the present age is least able to achieve. In the classic days of Christianity there

¹⁵ *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 446.

was a wide difference between the concept of God held by Thomas or Albertus and the idea of God in the mind of the simple peasant. Yet they both believed in the reality of God and believed that they worshiped the same God. It is this faith in the reality of God which seems to be decreasing.

From the philosophical point of view one can only reiterate the uncertainty of religious positions and scrupulously avoid the temptation to dogmatize. Yet this does not really meet the situation fully. Even though people crave truth, many are not yet ready to prefer truth to apparent certainty. Unable and unwilling to follow the turn of philosophical argument, men will today as always prefer dogmatic myths to the philosophical search for truth. Unfortunately these myths will for the most part not be the creation of the philosophic spirit, but will rather be survivals of ancient theology, half-digested bits of scientific teaching, or, at worst, crude revivals of primitive superstitions of all forms, suited to the fundamental needs of human beings. Many people have pointed out the recrudescence of wild cults and of belief in magic, and there is certainly grave danger in that direction. It is sometimes suggested that religious forces are merging for a final battle between orthodox fundamentalism and scientific humanism, but this is undoubtedly too narrow a statement of the issues. The battle will be between all kinds of beliefs proclaimed in the name of reason, religions based on traditional authority, religions claiming the testimony of direct experience, and countless forms of magic.

One would like to think that rational religion, coming to terms with science and philosophy, would prevail. One would like to believe that philosophy would furnish at least certain guiding conceptions which would insure a greater degree of truth in religious beliefs, but history gives us no basis for assurance here. One's belief depends in large measure upon one's own philosophical conclusions. If one believes that the human mind is indeed a vehicle of universal reason, then one may well trust that through this dialectic, reason may create and main-

tain more adequate ideas of God. If one believes in an inherently progressive evolution, then one can rest confident that the human mind in its seeking and striving will find greater truth, that the future will outstrip the past. Even if one is sustained by no such assurance, one can gain at least a measure of comfort from the realization that men always have lived by superstitious errors as well as by truth, that the rank and file have never been saints and sages, but that nevertheless there have always been spirits here and there who have esteemed truth the highest prize, and who have allowed no idol of false belief to prevent their quest of the true and living God.

“LIBERAL” BIBLIOLATRY

GEORGE P. HEDLEY

Pacific School of Religion

DESPITE the publicity which “fundamentalism” has given itself, and the greater amount of advertising which has been given to it, “liberal Christianity” has made steady headway both in Great Britain and in the United States. For every mind which has turned from free inquiry to rigid orthodoxy, a hundred have made the transition in the opposite direction. Leading city pulpits of all the major denominations are filled by men who neither think nor speak in terms of the “confessions” or “articles” set down by the founders of their respective groups. Few of the standard theological seminaries are satisfactory to the self-appointed “defenders of the faith.” Thousands of young people, growing up in the church and educated in the colleges, have come naturally and painlessly into a religious life whose characteristics and connotations are essentially “modern.”

Some historic opinions of the church have passed silently into oblivion. Others have been re-interpreted in terms which we consider more adequate for our own generation. The uniqueness of Jesus we believe to be guaranteed by the events of his life rather than by a miracle of his birth. The metaphysical nature of the Trinity is subordinated to the inward experience of God made manifest. The physical second coming of the Christ receives mention only in those circles which mention little else; elsewhere his ethical guidance and spiritual presence are the great *desiderata*. The atonement becomes a reconciliation through life rather than a propitiation by death. For the evidential value of miracle we substitute a profound reverence for a world of natural law. The devil and the angels equally have ceased to appear significant in what we regard as an order-

ly universe. Our religious thinking thus is dominated not by tradition, but by our personal experience and by our scientific and philosophical environment.

Nevertheless, many of us have failed to escape from an assumption which underlies all the specific doctrinal insistences of our more conservative brethren. That assumption is that in the sixty-six books of the Bible we have not only a primary source of information and inspiration in religion, but also the ultimate authority by which we are to measure any new teaching or emphasis.

Our fathers conceived that a doctrine which they found to be stated in the Bible was necessarily true. If reason made it difficult to hold the doctrine, so much the worse for reason. *Credo quia absurdum* has been the declaration of the Protestant bibli-cist no less than of the Catholic theologian. This view, stated in these terms, we have been willing to reject. But, not yet freed from the elements of which the view consisted, we have tended to state the proposition in a most curious reversal of its terms. We start now with reason, with the individual's judgment and experience. But with this personal authority we are not all content: the implicit faith of many "liberals" is that a doctrine which we believe to be true must necessarily be in the Bible.

No clearer example of this is to be found than Lyman Abbott's altogether charming and notably helpful little book, *What Christianity Means to Me*. The title is fitting; the author's statement of his faith is both attractive and effective; but we shall be greatly misled if we suppose that what Christianity meant to Dr. Abbott is identical with what it meant to those who wrote the sentences which head his chapters. A great mind and a great heart, feeding on the riches of twenty centuries of Christian experience, have given us a superb expression of a twentieth-century faith; they have not stated the attitudes and convictions of Christians of the first century. The tendency of this book is the tendency of us all: to read not what actually is

in the documents, but to read *into* them that which we wish were there.

The problem of creation has given rise to much of this species of interpretation. Informed by the astronomer that ours is one of a host of worlds in an infinitude of space, we have sought to etherealize the very material "firmament" which an earlier cosmology placed as an inverted bowl over a flat earth. Convinced by the geologist that our world is millions of years old, we have attempted to make the P document writer mean by "day" not a day at all, but an aeon—despite his specific, and six times repeated, "evening and morning." Persuaded by the biologist that man is a product of a long evolutionary process, we have forced the biblical stages of creation into an awkward recapitulation of the steps which lead from the "primitive protoplasmic globule" to the noblest specimen of *homo sapiens*—despite the fact that P and J give us, in Genesis 1 and 2 respectively, two variant orders for the creation. Such argument profits us nothing. There is no sufficient evidence to indicate that our modern knowledge of the physical universe was available to the writers of Genesis. For their lack of information they are not to blame; but we do not praise them rightly by misreading their naïve cosmogonies in the attempt to fit them into a framework of our own.

The study of the New Testament provides examples as striking, and much more important. We find especially foreign to our own rather literal minds the eschatological interests and ideas of the Judaism out of which Christianity grew. Accordingly we have sought either to ignore or to explain away the apocalyptic sections of the New Testament, and especially of the Gospels. It may be conceded that a cataclysmic consummation of the age, and a violent physical conquest of the world by the Messiah, have lost their attractiveness for many of us. But it is less certain that we are justified in declaring that they offered no attractions to Jewish Christians, whose nation had suffered untold oppression and repeated disappointment, and

whose world recked naught of natural law. We may prefer the parables to the apocalyptic discourse; but we are not entitled to infer, upon the simple ground of our preference, that the parable of the mustard seed is an authentic *logion* of Jesus, while the thirteenth chapter of Mark "must be" an interpolation by an unauthorized editor. It is a disquieting fact that the thirteenth chapter of Matthew contains not only the parables of the soils and the leaven, but also those of the tares and the dragnet. If literary and historical criticism can demonstrate that the former are primary and the latter secondary, we are entitled to rejoice. The grounds of the decision, however, must be literary and historical, not preferential.

The same principle applies in discussion of the "plan of redemption." That the death of Jesus is significant as a part of his life; that the life as a whole, not the death as such, offers salvation to mankind; that salvation itself is redemption from the power of sin rather than from the fear of punishment—these views we may defend philosophically, dialectically, empirically. But we may not defend them biblically, we may not assign them to Paul or to John, unless we can show that Paul and John thought in these terms: that their mental and spiritual milieu provided for them, and that the weight of Pauline and Johanne teaching is in the direction of such emphases.

That in Jesus is a "provision" for our sins, and for those of the whole world, we have a perfect right to believe. But such a belief does not authorize us to translate *ἱλασμός* as "provision," rather than "propitiation," unless we find the word so used in Greek documents. The early Christian view of redemption was colored by sacrificial systems of many sorts, all of them strikingly alien to our modern thought. Our view depends upon a personal psychology and a social consciousness which, however much indebted to Jesus in spirit, had received no explicit statement in the New Testament, and no general recognition in the Hellenistic world. That, under conditions so different, we still find redemptive power in Jesus is cause for rejoicing. It is not

reason to insist that redemption was offered by the primitive church, or accepted by the first-century believer, in exactly the way which gives satisfaction to us.

The Bible continues to be, as its constituent parts have been since the first words of the J document took form in the primitive Hebrew script, a fount of religious inspiration and personal guidance. When in it we find ideas and ideals which experience proves to be valid for our inward and our outward life, we rejoice with gladness, and with reason. From it we learn much that is vital for our spirits and for our society; and from it, as we continue its study, we shall continue to learn. But we do it no honor by making it mean what it did not mean, by making its authors say what they did not think. The practice of proof-texting is no more legitimate, no more scholarly, when used in the interests of "modernism," than when employed by the "fundamentalists." Certain elements of Augustinian and Calvinistic theology may be shown to depend upon a misuse of the biblical text. It does not follow that a proper use of the text guarantees unqualified support to twentieth-century liberalism.

The issue is whether life is to be tested by the Bible, or the Bible by life. So long as we indulge in special pleading, depending upon forced exegesis for the authentication of our own convictions, we are lending aid and comfort to the forces of bibliolatry. Historic Protestantism substituted for an infallible church, an infallible book. These infallibilities have failed to meet the needs of the world. The alternative, and the only recourse, is the authority of individual experience—confessedly fallible, but having possibilities of learning and growth which were difficult for the institution, and impossible for the documents.

We have not abandoned the church, and we shall not abandon the book. As guides, as interpreters, as preservers of a glorious heritage, they are to us no less necessary than was the one to Hildebrand, the other to Luther. But we, as believers in continuing revelation, as participants in continuing discovery, are required to continue the working out of our own salvation.

Frankly must we admit that our world is not that of the scriptural writers: that many of their categories do not suffice for us, and that many of ours would have had no meaning for them. To force these writers to live and to think in our day and our terms is an injustice as real as that which would limit us to their modes of thought and expression. Vital religion requires no such artificial support. Out of life the Bible grew; in life must it be evaluated; through life, however slowly, "the Bible of the race is writ."

REACTIONS OF EX-MINISTERS TOWARD THE MINISTRY

H. G. DUNCAN
University of New Hampshire

WITHIN recent years a number of articles, discussing the dearth of ministers and general conditions in the churches, have appeared. According to certain estimates there are 10,000 Protestant churches in the United States without pastors, and according to statements of some seminary presidents there is each year a more decided determination on the part of promising young men to shun the ministry. More recently a few ministers have published their reasons for resigning from the active pastorate. These, and contacts with a number of teachers who were formerly ministers, led me to attempt this inquiry into why men enter and leave the ministry. Letters were sent to sixty-five Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish theological schools, both white and colored, asking for the names and addresses of their former students who had left the active ministry; but only thirty-five replies were received. Although a self-addressed and stamped envelope was enclosed, not a reply was received from any Catholic seminary. Two of the Protestant seminaries proffered to sell their year-books or general catalogues, and four offered to engage a secretary to go through their files for the desired information provided I would bear the expense, but as no fund was available for making the study, these offers had to be rejected. A number of theological seminaries, especially in the South, apparently make no effort to keep any records of the activities of their former students, and have no idea of what happens to most of them after graduation. While a number of the seminary officials were heartily in favor of the investigation and have co-operated in every way possible, a few were evidently afraid that the study might reveal conditions which they thought should not be made

EX-MINISTERS AND THE MINISTRY

101

public. Finally, through year-books, classmates, colleagues, and friends, a list of two hundred names was secured. To each was mailed a questionnaire, requesting him not to sign his name, but to state place of birth, age, preparation, reasons for entering and leaving the ministry, length of active service, present church activities, and present occupation. One hundred twenty-four replies were received, but on account of incompleteness only one hundred eleven were usable.

These men are somewhat homogeneous in respect to training and experience. Their ages vary from twenty-seven to eighty-one, 50 per cent being between forty-two and fifty-six years of age. Twenty-five states and four foreign countries were given as places of birth. The group is highly trained. One hundred three hold the B.A. degree, 6 the B.S., 2 the Ph.B., 44 the M.A., and 28 the Ph.D. One hundred five have had theological training: 53 had the B.D. degree, 43 the seminary diploma, and 9 spent one or two years in seminary training; 2 hold the Th.M., and 3 the Th.D. Two hold the LL.B. degree, and 1 each the M.D., D.D.S., and B.C.E. Ten have been honored with the D.D. degree, 3 with the LL.D., and 1 each with the F.A.C.S., F.R.A.I., and F.R.E.S. The length of service in the ministry ranges from one to fifty years, the median being a little over six years. Seventy-two are now either teachers or administrators in universities, colleges, or public schools; 14 are following business pursuits, such as banking, insurance, and contracting; 5 are engaged in social work; 3 are practicing law; 2 are ranchers; 2 are editors of religious publications; 1 each is judge, mayor, boy scout executor, Y.M.C.A. secretary, physician, dentist, lecturer, civil engineer, chiropractor, funeral director, film distributor, carpenter, and retired business man. The responses to the other questions furnish the data as to the personal reactions of this group. These will be considered from the following points of view: (1) reactions toward entering the ministry, (2) reactions toward leaving the ministry, (3) present participation in church activities.

REACTIONS TOWARD ENTERING THE MINISTRY

An analysis of the personal reactions toward entering the ministry shows that each entrance has been the culmination of certain attitudes which have been gradually shaping themselves. Sociologically speaking, the final decision to enter the ministry generally comes as a crisis resulting from the interplay of certain interactions and reactions. It is difficult, therefore, to say definitely just what the principal reason or reasons are. A few gave two or more reasons. Added to this is the fact that "it is fifteen years or more since I left the ministry, and therefore my impressions may not be strictly accurate. I have never been asked before to set down my reasons in writing." The various reactions toward entering the ministry fall somewhat roughly under five heads. These are taken up according to apparent importance.

Desire for service.—Forty men mention a desire to be of service as a factor in their decision to enter the ministry. The term, "service," however, bears slightly different connotations. A philosophical idealism pervades many of the reasons given. "A strong desire to render Christian service," writes one ex-minister, "led me to select the ministry. But being a country boy I did not have an opportunity to know the practical side of the profession. So I rather idealized the calling and entered it for service's sake."

The object toward which service was directed, also, appears somewhat vague and indefinite. To one the ministry offered an opportunity to serve "the Kingdom of Heaven," to another it "was the greatest place to serve my fellow men." A very personal feeling colors many of these. One writes:

I was a member of a large church, the pastor of which was considered one of the most successful in the denomination. I received the impression that he was rendering a great service for "the cause." I got the idea that it would be a fine thing for me to prepare for similar service. I had the notion that some day I could achieve a position of influence in the religious world equal to that of this man and that I should receive the most satis-

faction life could offer me in the ministry. Not so much in terms of money or prestige as in the satisfaction I felt must accompany such a life of service.

While these reasons seemed sufficiently realistic and definite at the time of entrance, they tended to resolve themselves differently as time went on and as practical problems emerged for immediate solution.

Response to a call.—The response to a "call" was mentioned as a decisive factor in the decision to enter the ministry in thirty cases. Upon analysis, where any has been attempted, the "call" becomes somewhat elusive of explanation. One declares that "I was persuaded in my own mind that I was 'called' for the ministry"; while another replies that "I was convinced that I was called by the Holy Spirit." Two cite scripture texts: "The harvest is great, the laborers few," and "Woe unto me if I preach not the gospel." It is rather interesting that some decided that they had received a call or that they would answer a call at the death-bed of a father or mother, during an earthquake or other crisis. Several of those mentioning a call appear now to question the actuality of a divine call.

Influence of church and pastor.—"The church to which I was apprenticed religiously when a child" was for a number of men in this study "the only ideal offered by that environment that made any appeal to me." In fact, twenty-nine mention church and pastor's influence as a factor in their selection of the ministerial profession. Perhaps one of the greatest influences of the church was the opportunity for active participation. In the words of an ex-minister, "it seemed to be the logical result of very active participation in church work in early years, together with encouragement from the pastor of the church with which I was connected." The following presents a very penetrating reflection:

Just before entering high school I became acquainted with some boys who belonged to a Baptist Boy's Club in the church. My father refused to allow me to join the church, but I did it, and soon came to be usher,

member of the choir, president of the young people's society, teacher of two Sunday school classes, leader of the singing, etc., etc. It was a true desire to be of service over sentimentalized that led me to consider the ministry. I presume my interest was heightened by the deep glory I got out of church positions. There was a great deal of the Messianic complex I suppose.

Influence of family.—The choice of an occupation or profession involves, among other things, the popularity it has in one's own group. Twenty-six of this group refer to the influence of the family as a deciding factor in the selection of their career. "Perhaps," reflects one, "I was led into the ministry by the exceedingly strong religious convictions of my mother and the atmosphere of my home which was distinctly religious." The son of a minister explains that "it was the profession of my father and I desired to follow in his footsteps"; while another shows the power of suggestion, "all the influences around me from my youth up were strongly religious—my paternal grandfather was a pioneer preacher. In my childhood people often called me 'Elder' from some fancied resemblance to my grandfather." Nor is the element of romance lacking: "The final thing that led me to try the ministry was a good Christian girl for whom I felt I could do no less."

Opportunity for a profession.—In the ministry there is an opportunity for a profession, and twenty-two of the group studied grasped this opportunity. Especially does this appeal to young men of meager means and lower social status. To one "it offered an honorable method to secure a livelihood"; to another "it presented an opportunity to earn my way through school by preaching." Another says, "I knew that I could get financial assistance in graduate study for this profession. I was not aware of opportunities in other fields"; another, "I thought it was the saving of souls then, but now think it was due to the fact that the only 'big' men I knew were ministers and my desire to be something more than a local clodhopper." Ministry appeared to offer other advantages. It attracted many as a "life involving

intellectual pursuits, leisure for study, together with a desire to be concerned with matters vital to humanity, where results secured would be permanent." To the man possessing certain abilities requisite for the ministry, it was especially inviting. "My natural aptitude for public speaking," says one, "and the call for that special work endorsed by the local church led me to enter the ministry." Again it was "a question of making the most of myself and talents for the highest ends."

From the responses submitted, it would seem that the combined influences of family, minister, friends, and community produced a social pressure which greatly influenced the selection of the ministry as a profession. Many of these ex-ministers grew up in rural areas where, formerly more than today, the ministers were about the only professional people with whom the young people came in contact, and where ministers enjoyed an exceedingly high social status. In an atmosphere of this kind religious ideals culminate, paths of duty disclose themselves, and a behavior pattern begins to shape itself. As a person establishes mutual relationships with others deeply interested in religion, his unfulfilled desires begin to find expression in religious activities. While thirty mentioned a definite call to preach, a number of these appear now to question a supernatural or a divine shaping of the decision to enter the ministry. Gradually those with marked abilities for public speaking and leadership found themselves drawn more deeply into church participation. With others there was also a desire to secure higher education and social status.

REACTIONS TOWARD LEAVING THE MINISTRY

The minister is a human being evincing the same human qualities and fundamental desires as his parishioners, but he is often curbed and inhibited in these in order to fit into the preconceived ministerial life-pattern already cut for him. This pattern is never identically the same in any two communities, nor does it always remain unchanged. The minister, therefore, must

grow into a ministerial pattern, adjust himself to the differences in this pattern as he changes from parish to parish, and meet the many and perplexing personality problems which rise from time to time. Since each minister differs from another in experience and in personal attitudes, and since each congregation reacts differently to each of its pastors, each leaving is a personal and unique process. Entering into these processes are many factors which function both directly and indirectly. For example, former occupations or side lines in college are easily resumed. Furthermore, the similarity of the ministry with other occupations makes the transition easy. Some have made a rather abrupt departure; others have long hesitated, leaving and then returning before the final severance; others consider themselves still in the ministry although following other pursuits from which they gain a livelihood. Such a claim would indicate a distinction between pastorate and ministry, the former referring to duties attached to a particular church or field, the latter to a field unhampered by ecclesiastical authority. There are, however, certain reactions growing out of these varied experiences that are more or less common to all. For convenience these may be regarded under four heads.

Larger field for service.—Of the men considered in this study, ninety mention a desire for a larger field of service or the limited opportunities for professional advancement in the ministry as the principal, or as a prominent, reason for leaving the pastorate. It is quite significant that a desire for service was the principal reason for their entrance. Some thirty-five seem to retain the old so-called altruistic view of service, while the others have moved to the more personal consideration. With the former, considerable rationalization is evident; and, when this is reduced to its final analysis, it becomes self-interest. The field of service is larger because they escape a cramped behavior pattern.

In speaking of the attraction to teaching one makes this analysis:

EX-MINISTERS AND THE MINISTRY

107

The meaning of the term, "society," began to drift into my thinking. The need for sociological study began to be realized. There was something about the scope and newness of the field that attracted me. There was opportunity for originality there. I felt that we could not only learn much that would be inspiring, but, because of the newness of the field, would have unlimited opportunity to do something original. Furthermore, there was still the ethical appeal of "service." I felt it would be a superior means of influence; by reaching the world through the students I might teach in sociology courses, I would be coming in contact with prospective leaders in their several communities, since college students are thus considered after their graduation from college. It had the added attraction of offering opportunities for originality of contribution through study and research and writing. I gradually came to feel the superiority of sociology teaching over the work of the ministry. I also discovered it held opportunities for satisfaction that the ministry did not offer. I decided one could remain fresh in spirit in teaching more than in the ministry. The class of people associated with would be more stimulating in sociology teaching. There would be less likelihood that I should get into a rut and go through a life of routine activities merely because they offered a means of earning a living. I could be more myself without necessarily antagonizing those with whom I dealt.

Often a minister becomes interested in social problems, especially those of young people, while the church remains apathetic. As a result, he becomes convinced that the pastorate is not the best place to help solve these. One ex-minister writes:

The opportunity came to work with young people when I was asked to take charge of a group of young Cubans left stranded and running wild in a college town where I was pastor. . . . When I preached my convictions as to the uselessness and iniquity of war, my "leading parishioners," meaning the heaviest subscribers to the budget, resented my views. When I preached on the street to Saturday night crowds, they told me that I was not employed for that purpose. When I brought before the church for membership a converted jail-bird who had served his time and had come home to "live it down," they told me that they couldn't have their children associate with such a character. Finally, when I became associated with an institution of another denomination in the effort to care for a group of homeless stray boys, foreigners at that, it was too much. They handed me my resignation. . . . The satisfaction that I have experienced in teaching young minds even in so juiceless a field as

Spanish literature, and in being able to pay my way by that work and be free to help weak churches as opportunity might offer, has confirmed me in my resolution.

Another shows the lack of interest in social problems on the part of the Missionary Board: "Interest in social problems in Japan led me to study sociology during my first furlough. I planned to return to Japan and teach sociology after my extended furlough but the Mission Board did not desire me to teach that subject. I therefore drifted into social work and later into university teaching."

To many of those engaged in the ministry and desiring to render service their field became too hampered. "The routine of pastoral work—the red tape, the collection, 'the revivals,' the things one is supposed to emphasize," after a time, became very distasteful to a large number of ex-ministers.

I came to a definite decision to spend the rest of my life [says an ex-minister] in the broad service of the Kingdom of God, as far as possible unrestricted and unhampered by the theological controversies and ecclesiastical rivalries. Some of the best years of my life, while not wasted, I hope, were devoted to ardent and faithful labors within bounds of an ecclesiasticism where the kind of things I believed in and came to do best were not appreciated. To be specific, to echo what ignorant and often self-seeking authorities say, to conform, to be "harmless and insincere" has its rewards; but to think, to act, to serve the larger interests of the Kingdom of God, is to commit the unpardonable sin. For me, away with obscurantism into the larger light of freedom.

Inefficient organization and administration.—Seeking the causes for the limitation placed upon their work, 43 of the group traced the source to inefficient organization and administration. The same defects, however, do not exist in all denominations nor present themselves with equal force in all churches of the same denomination. Yet it is of significance to those interested in the functioning of organized Christianity that such defects occur at all. The phases vigorously attacked are: (1) the nature of training received in the seminary, (2) the placement of min-

EX-MINISTERS AND THE MINISTRY

109

isters, (3) uncertainty of tenure, (4) management of church finances, (5) low standards and practices.

1. It is generally claimed by this group that their training has not been sufficient for the demands made upon them. One remarks:

I allowed myself to be a very liberal thinking person. I quit the ministry when I realized that it is an utter impossibility for the average congregation to be led as far in liberal ideas as it would be necessary for me to go. About the same time, I realized that I had not graduated from a liberal school but only from one that thought it was liberal. I attended a lecture two hours in length by — in which he tried to pacify fundamentalists and at the same time prove that Christ was Divine. He cannot do either one. I came to a realization that so-called liberals were just as dishonest with themselves as fundamentalists. I am in hopes that some day there will be a theological seminary in the U.S. that will really allow itself to think.

As regards the curriculum, one declares that the pulpit "seemed to be still immersed in fifteenth century theology," and that the seminary curriculum was "devoted to non-essentials, to eschatological material and to the life of two thousand years ago."

2. There seems to be much criticism, especially among certain denominations, of the methods used in placing ministers. Candidating is especially humiliating to many ministers. "When I closed my last pastorate," explains an ex-minister somewhat inclined toward altruism, "I had no call to any other. I declined to compete with other ministers in candidating. I knew that there were many ministers equally competent, who would be glad to take any church to which I might be called. I felt that by leaving the pastorate I could give some needy minister my place." To a man, returning from teaching in a foreign denominational college and desiring to do active work in the pastorate, the securing of a church proved difficult.

I had heard so much about a shortage of men in the ministry that on my return from — I made a serious attempt to get a pastorate. Three or four student pastorates were available, but I wanted a regular church

that would pay about \$3,000. I was invited as a candidate to one which paid \$1,600. A friend presented my name to another church committee which informed him that there were sixty applicants ahead of me. I quit there and then and decided to keep on teaching.

3. "Tenure of office too uncertain" is a very common reaction. Advancing age lessens the assurance of securing a pastorate. "I gave up the ministry," asserts a now successful business man, "when I was fifty-nine years old because I was told several times that I was too old for certain positions. Moreover it seemed impossible for me to get a definite call from any direction." Among those denominations where the tenure is limited, there is also dissatisfaction. "Too expensive to sell, burn, transport or give away household effects and move every four or six years. Made up my mind that the church that calls me will have to present an opportunity of service and the prospects of a life job."

4. Many protest against the meager salary paid and the methods employed in securing this amount. A high-school teacher declares:

From the viewpoint of finances one cheapens his work by doing it for nothing. . . . I am not a miser but I want enough money to be free from financial worry. Let the church guarantee a good beginning salary to their young men and no one will be stronger for the ministry as a profession than I will be.

Even more critical is another when he says, "The church is purely pagan in its method of paying its servants. As I see it, it is no more Christian in this respect than any commercial organization; if as much so as many."

5. Of the indictments brought against the church, many are directed against low scholastic requirements and the practices employed in its administration. A number join in saying that "the class of divinity students seems to be far below the classes in law, medicine, engineering, and other departments, in mental ability." In some schools the ministerial students are called "boneheads," "sissies," and other derogatory names. Some of

EX-MINISTERS AND THE MINISTRY

III

the seminary presidents seem to think that the ministry is attracting the mediocre and emotional type of students, while the more intellectual young men enter into other professions. A seminary president writes: "Too often the young men who study for the ministry are inferior in their general abilities, but interest in Sunday school work, young people's societies, revivals, Y.M.C.A.'s, has given them an urge towards the ministry." A very significant statement is made by a highly trained ex-minister: "There is no protection for the trained minister; others with little or no training are being ordained."

The low ideals and practices of seminary students and ministers are a common complaint. One says, "Some of the ideals of the seminary men I consider too cheap and below standards I was accustomed to in business life." Another was

shocked when two ministerial students confessed to cheating in the preparatory school; when I saw a ministerial student cheat in the final examination in college; when I heard students in the seminary call each other damned liars and tell each other to go to hell, and learned of the number of thievings, and in another seminary when one student was dismissed for forging a check and another for being in the "red light district."

Speaking of the ministers whom he has known, one ex-minister says:

There was also the disillusionment as to the pastoral character, integrity, and general sincerity of men in the ministry with whom I came in contact. I had experiences with men in the ministry which made me realize that they were simply in the work because it was an easy way to earn money. Others were in it for the pleasure derived from publicity, being in a position in which at certain times at least, an audience was listening to them. Still others I found simply insincere.

A former state Sunday-school missionary relates his experience with his colleagues.

One of the men [pastor] has always been a heretic hunter and same party through deception led me to speak truly what I believed relative to the flood, the atonement, and the second coming, then accused me openly as a heretic. I was tried and acquitted by the state board but resigned. *I can work with any church but not with any ministers who are after their brother's "blood."*

From a man twice experienced in the foreign missionary field comes the following:

After I had entered Christian work I soon ran into the politicians and discovered that unless a fellow is a natural born politician and an under-handed schemer and is willing to play the political game, he will never cut any figure in Christian work. I have no politics in my make up—I believe in recognizing men for what they are and judging their ability on the merits of their performances. So I had a sorry time of it—finally got out of church work and began teaching. After a few years I got over the effects of that bitter experience to some extent and entered the mission school work. But it was the same old story of self-seeking ecclesiasticism—only worse. It took me worse because it came this time in middle life when I had “to see the things I gave my life to broken” and I had “to stoop and build them up with worn out tools.”

Intellectual reconstruction.—Although not specifically stated forty ex-ministers imply that intellectual reconstruction with the concomitant shift in beliefs has played the major or minor rôle in their decision to leave the ministry. Several declare that, while in college, “most of the beliefs that had been instilled into me were dispelled into nothingness when I got into psychology, philosophy and Bible study.” As a university professor states, the person has “passed through a period of intellectual reconstruction.” This intellectual reconstruction, however, has not necessarily led the minister away from his initial interests. “During this period,” explains an ex-minister, “my thinking has led me, I trust toward humanity, but away from the church as a historical institution. There is no religious denomination known to me which I could join.”

Consideration for family.—Solicitude for one’s family has been sufficiently important for twenty to mention it as a cause for leaving the ministry. “My wife’s illness,” declares a former minister, “brought us home from China in two years. Should otherwise have remained and glad to be there still.” There is also the fact that “my wife is not in robust health, and has been so timid that the position of pastor’s wife is very irksome.” Further-

more, "We cannot see it our duty to leave our children in a Home, and there is no opportunity for their education where we were stationed." The relationships connected with parsonage life are not conducive to the maintenance of a wholesome and pleasant home life. The wife quite frequently resents "Church people mixing in the pastor's home affairs"; consequently, "the real cause" for leaving the ministry has oftentimes been the "wife's repugnance to the work and her desire to live an independent life." This study seems to show that a number of men have withdrawn from the ministry because it is difficult to rear a family and lead an independent family life with constant mobility, with absence of stimulation resulting from personal possession, with well-meant but trying efforts of Ladies' Aid in running the parsonage, with the tendency to regard the different members of the family as models of all the supposed virtues.

It may be assumed that those who have remained in the ministry have either adjusted themselves satisfactorily, or else have lacked the courage to withdraw. Those who have left the active service, judging from their responses, are for the most part contented and happy in their new environment. Life is now more secure due to an increased and dependable salary. Their behavior is no longer predetermined by the rigid pattern to which all ministers and their families are expected to conform; hence new and varied experiences may now be enjoyed. Natural relationships may be made reciprocal without the ever present tension of subordination on the one hand and superordination on the other. Recognition is no longer dependent upon the special abilities necessary for successful ministerial service and the ever changing whims of succeeding congregations, but rather upon the capabilities and potentialities of the person in an environment so selected as to be friendly to his own particular interests. And paradoxical as it may seem, he often fully realizes his former ambitions outside the ministry as a detached worker.

PRESENT PARTICIPATION IN CHURCH ACTIVITIES

Finding themselves unable or unwilling to cope longer with certain situations, this group withdrew from the active pastorate. While a minority "thank God" that they have no "relationship whatsoever" with the church, the majority feel that they have not "disgraced the cloth nor forsaken the faith" but have rather "found a new altar on which to sacrifice, if need be, in the interest of helping to free men from soul-binding, or life-binding restraints of the unnecessary in so many realms of life, as is prescribed by custom, convention, mores, and habit." Some of those "continuing in the faith" decline, however, "the functions of a minister and do not wish to be addressed or regarded as such so far as its honors go." Others, as expressed by a college president, "consider that I am still in the 'ministry.' Tho not pastor of a church, I am *Pastor* of faculty and students in the real sense."

Disconnected from a parish and dependent upon other professions or occupations for support, a number of these ex-ministers serve as laymen or pulpit supply. Twenty-three of the number profess neither interest nor participation in any activities connected with the church. As laymen the others, with the exception of fourteen who merely attend church, or Sunday school, seem to show an interest by helping finance the church, teaching in Sunday school, serving as deacon, trustee, or on committees. Thirty-two, however, continued to preach occasionally. An ex-minister, who thinks that the "main purpose of the ministry is to render service," and that ministers in general "feel that their appointed function is to preserve the relics of the past," devotes a large portion of his time to working out courses of study for Sunday-school and week-day instruction. He has occupied "every position in his church except minister and janitor." Another is a "Baptist, teaching in a Reformed College, preaching quite frequently in a Presbyterian Church—a little trick of chance showing how a teacher's influence (perhaps more than a minister's) may overstep denominational lines."

Of the group studied only eight confess either a desire or intention to return to the active pastorate, and these only under certain conditions. "Personally," says one, "I like the work and would be glad to be back in it, but I must confess that observations of conditions from the outside by one who has been an insider are not conducive to optimism." On the other hand, there are those who confess a definite desire not to return. "While I made no abrupt change in passing from pastoral to educational work, being constantly called upon to help out in church school work, while still a pastor; yet I would not consider for a moment returning to the regular pastorate."

In conclusion, we might say, the study seems to show that a group of highly trained men entered the ministry, but for various reasons withdrew; that it is the best trained men rather than the poorly trained who are withdrawing; that it is mainly the mediocre and emotional type of young men who are entering and remaining in the ministry today; and that the non-progressive attitudes of the church group are causing this condition. A large number hold to a personal religion, but many do not believe in institutionalized religion. Many continue to participate in religious activities. It should be remembered, however, that there is evinced a considerable amount of rationalization and compensation for leaving the ministry. It is also evident that many continue to participate in religious activities, because not to do so would imperil their positions or retard them in their professional or occupational advancement.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

THE EARLY INHABITANTS OF MESOPOTAMIA

The biblical story of the tower of Babel, naïve though it may be in its explanation of the origin of languages, still reposes on some background of truth. Through it we can see the great astonishment of the writer when confronted by the bewildering number of tongues spoken in and around the city of Babylon.

What he did not know was that the unfinished temple tower had nothing to do with this. Many centuries before, exactly the same conditions had prevailed. Modern students have been hardly less bewildered at the great mixture of peoples and races that had come to settle in the fertile Mesopotamian plains. Who were its original inhabitants? If not indigenous, where did they come from? Did the great civilization which flourished in Shumer develop there, or is it an offshoot of some other great civilization?

In his book¹ Professor Speiser attempts to answer some of these questions, though fully aware of the many pitfalls that lie in his way. But the problem had to be faced, and we are grateful to Speiser for not having been discouraged by the obstacles that confronted him.

There are different means of approach to the solution of a task of this kind, but all of them are fraught with difficulties and may lead to imperfect results. Anthropologists will attack the problem by carefully measuring skeletal remains; archaeologists will study pottery and objects, endeavoring to find relationships in customs and art; philologists will compare words and grammatical constructions. Speiser's approach is mainly philological.

Through his study, the details of which cannot be here followed, he has endeavored to show that the entire highland between Anatolia and Elam was, in very ancient time, under the influence of two related civilizations which are represented by the First and Second Cultures of Susa. The ancient inhabitants were neither Semites nor Sumerians, and not even related to the Indo-Europeans. For this group, which cannot be easily placed in the well-known divisions, Speiser revives the name of Japhethites. I do not know whether biblical scholars will be willing to

¹ *Mesopotamian Origins. The Basic Population of the Near East.* By Ephraim A. Speiser. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1930. xiii+198 pages. \$3.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

117

adopt this term, especially because in popular practice Japheth had come to be regarded as the father of the modern Indo-Europeans, who now will become orphans, since they cannot be united in any possible way with the sons of Shem and Ham.

Perhaps it might have been better to leave Noah and his children in peace and try to coin some new term that would not necessarily preclude some other designation for the other groups. But this is secondary, and we ought to be very thankful to Speiser for his brilliant contribution which, even though it may have to be modified in some of its conclusions as our knowledge increases, still represents a successful endeavor to shed some light on one of the most difficult questions in history.

EDWARD CHIERA

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

EARLY ISRAEL

This is the first volume¹ of the second section of a series on the evolution of humanity which is now in the course of preparation under the direction of M. Henri Berr, who contributes to this work an interesting Preface. The general theme of the section is the origins of Christianity and the moral crisis of the ancient world.

The scholarship of Professor Lods, were it not already well known, would be amply attested by his achievements in this volume, although one would have liked to have found, both in the text and the footnotes, greater evidence of acquaintance with the works of American scholars in his field.

The conception and plan of the work commands the reader's favorable attention immediately because of the author's recognition that the spiritual force which Israel has exercised on the human evolution can only be appreciated through a study of the environment in which it lived its actual life. In the three parts into which the volume is divided the author sets out to show what life in Canaan was like before the Hebrews came into it, how the Hebrews lived before their intrusion into the new environment, and, finally, what was the result, in terms of social personality, of the experiment. It is most refreshing to find, in a contribution to a historical series, the frank declaration that, in so far as Israel is concerned, its religion "constitutes the supreme object of the historian" (p. 1). That is a statement which applies with equal apposition to the history of all ancient peoples so long as history is understood as the exposition of a life-

¹ *Israel—des origines au milieu du VIII^e siècle*. By Adolphe Lods. Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1930. 596 pages. Fr. 40.

process. In the ancient world the religious key will unlock as many doors as the political or the economic key.

Though the volume is a work of genuine scholarship, presenting an admirable organization of the materials at the author's command, it will nevertheless, one fears, prove disappointing to the student of religion because of its almost complete omission of the study of religion from the standpoint of the human quest for a better life. Here one finds a satisfactory command of archaeological source material on the cult, and a careful study of the world-view from the usual theological standpoint. But no systematic attempt is made to set forth the human sense of values which motivates and controls the whole process. This is all the more disappointing because Professor Lods himself recognizes that, even for the pre-Israelite period in Canaan, materials for such a study can be derived from the religious texts of the peoples of the great neighboring valleys as well as from the text of the Old Testament itself which conserves many echoes of the religious aspirations of Israel's predecessors.

One result of this defect in the approach is a certain failure in the effectiveness of the presentation of the prophetic reaction to the environment. It can hardly be doubted, for example, that the religion of the masses and classes in Israel organized itself around the concept of fertility to a very much greater extent than this volume indicates. When this is not recognized, the understanding of the significance of the prophetic struggle against conformity to the prevailing environment is very much diminished and the real origins of their moral idealism are to some extent obscured.

Yet no man can write the perfect book. One is thankful that there is still work to do while offering to Professor Lods sincere felicitations on his very substantial contribution to the study of the religion of Israel through a scientific methodology.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

W. C. GRAHAM

BABYLONIAN ARAMAIC EXPLAINED IN HEBREW

Dr. Levias, while professor at the Hebrew Union College, wrote *A Grammar of the Aramaic Idiom Contained in the Babylonian Talmud* (Cincinnati: Bloch Publishing Co., 1900). The book was the first complete scientific analysis of the language of Talmudic Aramaic. Now Dr. Levias returns to his labors of thirty years ago and publishes the present work.¹

Inasmuch as the Babylonian of the Talmud is the same as the Babylo-

¹ *A Grammar of Babylonian Aramaic*. By Caspar Levias. New York: Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1930. 394 pages. \$3.50.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

119

an spoken in Northern Babylon for centuries, by Jew and Gentile, the work is as important for the deciphering of the charms, oaths, and spells recovered by archeologists, as it is for the study of the Babylonian tongue preserved in the Talmud itself.

The present book is written in Hebrew, the older one was English. This difference is in itself significant of the vast development of modern Hebrew as a language in which modern scientific terminology can be expressed. Of course, such development is consciously furthered by the writers of scientific books, inasmuch as they must coin new Hebrew words in place of those of Latin and Greek roots previously coined by preceding scholars. Dr. Levias, at the end of his book, gives a list of fifty-five Hebrew words which he was compelled to coin in order to be able to write this book in Hebrew. Many of these words will undoubtedly become naturalized into general Hebrew usage, as for example, "Gizaron" for etymology, "Hibaron" for phonetics, and "kolli" for diphthong.

Besides enriching Hebrew technical vocabulary, the book itself is indicative of the fact that Hebrew is rapidly taking its place with German and English as the language of the *Wissenschaft des Judenthums*.

The work treats the subject thoroughly, dealing with the relation of Babylonian Aramaic to the other Semitic languages, the script, the vowels, the consonants, the verbs, the noun, and the other parts of speech. It is a complete grammar.

The book is handsomely printed and is a credit to the Kohut Foundation which has provided for its publication and to which Jewish scholarship is already so greatly indebted.

SOLOMON B. FREEHOF

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

JESUS AND THE OLD TESTAMENT

Meinhold has treated one of the most neglected problems of this self-sufficient age with keen insight and a sound philosophical background.¹ What shall we do with the Old Testament? The preacher and the religious leader must know it in the language in which it was written. This is the verdict of Meinhold. He scores the superficial philosophies of Aryan superiority which pretend to be Christian and neglect the Judean background of Christianity, attempting to go back to a non-Semitic Christ. The Christian religion cannot be German or Nordic, although modern theologies which consist chiefly in the appeal to the experience of a living Jesus try to achieve such a Christianity. One way of escaping the dan-

¹ *Das Alte Testament und evangelisches Christentum*. By Johannes Meinhold. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1931. 147 pages. Bound M. 6.00; unbound M. 4.80.

gers of our nationalistic deities is the recognition of the historical background of our religion.

Without the Old Testament Jesus cannot be understood or known. The god of the Old Testament is an integral part of the God of the New Testament. Meinhold is not blind to the problems presented to the theologian by the Old Testament. With a ready pen and surprising thoroughness he describes the history of the Old Testament text and the formation of the canon. He skilfully sketches the religious conceptions of the Hebrews with true historical perspective. He concludes that the Old Testament is a record of revealed religion. Even as Jesus came into a greater knowledge of God through the Old Testament, so must we. "And so we can find the God and Father of our Lord Jesus in the Old Testament when we read it with a Christlike eye." I may add that recent research concerning the nature of the popular cult of Israel proves that Meinhold is right at this point.

This is a book which the modern minister should read, ponder over, and act upon.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

WILLIAM C. GRAHAM

JEWISH MODERNISM

In 1920 Rabbi Emil G. Hirsch said in a public address: "Ten more years and there will be no difference between Reform Judaism and liberal Christianity." If one were to judge only from the contents of this book¹ by an outstanding leader of American Judaism that prophecy has been fulfilled. There is the same leaning toward social idealism, the same fundamentals of belief, the same shadowy God, and the same inhibitions in regard to naturalism and science. But there is also one great difference. Rabbi Silver has treated Christianity with greater understanding and sympathy than the Christian liberal is accustomed to show toward Judaism.

The book is a collection of addresses threaded upon the theme of social idealism. They deal with social justice, social service, world peace, democracy, the home, education, and the way religion is related to these and to science. It would be entirely misleading to interpret the Judaism of the author by means of these essays from which it has been rigorously excluded, but they may be taken as an illustration of what religion means today in Jewish Modernism.

The most interesting thing to the historian is the vast difference be-

¹ *Religion in a Changing World*. By Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. 1930. 204 pages. \$2.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

121

tween religion as here expounded and the Judaism of the tortured centuries of Israel's sojourn among the nations. This new Judaism has taken on the Christian pattern. Instead of being a code of living which made a synthesis of all social activities, religion is something above and apart from politics, morality, and social institutions—an idealism, a dynamic, a belief, "the voice of eternal spiritual truth, irrefutable and invincible." The ills of the church pattern have infected Judaism in the modern age.

The author speaks the language of the Christian Modernists in his fundamentalism and in his treatment of the relation between religion and science. "The conflict between science and religion is more apparent than real. There is no fundamental issue between them." "There is not a single scientific fact which has undermined a single religious truth." "In a mechanistic and impersonal world there is no place for ideals." "Religion is not a science but an art." "The need of God is as real a need in human life as the need of food." This is the mood of Modernism and very familiar. But all these statements are grounded in wish, not in factual knowledge. They are the result of refusal to allow the fundamentals of faith to face the fires of science. The religious sciences have amply demonstrated that faith in God is not a universal human attitude. Social science has shown that ideals are integral elements in the social level of our planetary development irrespective of world views or theologies. They are grounded in desire and not in thought. Moreover, the natural, social, and religious sciences take as their domain all the facts of nature, of history, and of human experience. By what authority does religion deliver truth excluded from these realms? Is it by revelation or by special apostolic endowment or from some source of esoteric knowledge hidden from ordinary men? Orthodoxy would answer in a vigorous affirmative; Modernism hesitates and yet asserts as though it had affirmed. This is the source of the timidity of Modernists in the presence of science which finds outlet in defiance of it. From this comes also the obscurantism of words that are eloquent and lovely as abstractions but vanish as vapor when one seeks a concrete meaning. Rabbi Silver is, however, much more frank and more fundamentalist than most Modernists. He says: "Religion is called upon to sponsor agnosticism and atheism to turn from faith to sociology. It must refuse. It must hold to God." Yet it is necessary to remember that by the unfortunate failure of religious authorities such faith is an option grounded in agnosticism. It can exert no compulsion upon the modern mind and may offer little comfort to our bewildered age.

The world is changing; Will religion change? "Religion is a summary of the basic spiritual interests and needs of all ages. It is concerned with what is timeless and fundamental in human experience. It cannot be ex-

pected to adjust itself to the shifting moods of every epoch. It should not." This seems to say that since the world is changing, for the world's sake religion should remain unchanged. But it is and has always been impossible for a living religion to remain unchanged in a changing world. Religions remain unchanged only when they have lost touch with life. Religions frozen in creeds or in the form of abstract ideals may remain unchanged for ages but only because they have no practical meaning. The vitality of a religion may be tested by its capacity of adjustment to the changing needs of succeeding epochs. In spite of what Rabbi Silver says about his religion, his social idealism is practical, challenging, and inspiring. Here he touches the vital issues of our age.

A. EUSTACE HAYDON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ALLEGED SUPPLEMENTARY GOSPELS

The search for more information about the historical Jesus of Nazareth is a worthy one. Any genuine contribution to our knowledge will be welcomed both by historical scholars and by those whose interest in Jesus is altogether religious. But as many fine things are exploited by imitators so, urged by mixed motives, the charlatan, the seeker for publicity, and the searcher for documentary authority have been busy in this field.

For a considerable time, but with increasing frequency in recent years, specialists in the New Testament field have been questioned by theological students and lay inquirers alike as to the authenticity and value of certain alleged discoveries in early Christian literature. Sometimes these documents have occasioned genuine distress. It is, therefore, opportune that an expert in early Christian literature should investigate the documents that are paraded so blatantly by their sponsors.

The volume before us deals with eight of these literary claimants: namely, *The Unknown Life of Jesus Christ* (based on an alleged Tibetan lost Life of Saint Issa, Best of the Sons of Men); *The Aquarian Gospel*; *The Crucifixion of Jesus, by an Eye-Witness*; the notorious *Archko Volume*; *The Confessions of Pontius Pilate*; *The Letter of Benan*; *The Twentieth Chapter of Acts*; *The Letter of Jesus Christ*. There is brief mention of a number of other documents similarly motivated.

Professor Goodspeed has done much painstaking investigation of the origins of these documents and has interrogated their contents by means of the scholarly application of historical principles. Some are shown to be insolent impostures, others have a slightly less reprehensible character.

¹ *Strange New Gospels*. By Edgar Johnson Goodspeed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. xi+111 pages. \$2.00.

The impossibility of the claims made for these documents is mercilessly disclosed. The author has surely laid these ghosts and has rendered a signal service to those who were not able to detect the spurious character of the documents themselves. The volume is not large but there is much in it. It will well repay reading and will be welcomed by specialist and public alike.

ERNEST W. PARSONS

COLGATE-ROCHESTER DIVINITY SCHOOL

THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL

The volume¹ here reviewed will doubtless prove a useful book. The motive behind the work, namely, to have a "part in helping the Gospel to take its rightful place in Christian experience to-day," is commendable. Other works, however, have been finely motivated without being useful. But this discussion adds to its actuating desire a scholarship that is admirable and a subject that is important. For whatever views may be held on the many critical questions that focus on the Fourth Gospel this is surely true, that it is one of the greatest and most vital of the literary interpretations of the significance of Jesus for religious experience. It has, however, during the history of its use, been sorely tortured by creedal invasions and by harmonistic attempts to fit it to the procrustean bed of Jewish-Christian apocalyptic. The place which it has occupied in Christian appreciation, in spite of these handicaps, is testimony to its real greatness.

Mrs. Lyman faces frankly the historical and religious problems of the document and interprets the Gospel in the light of its socio-religious origins and purposes. The value of her book lies not so much in a contribution of something new, for there is comparatively little here that can rightly be called new, but in the presentation of matters that were largely confined to the knowledge of specialists in so simple, clear, and frank a way that the untechnical reader may understand. Persons disturbed by questionings as to the historical accuracy of the picture of Jesus which the Gospel presents will appreciate the candor and sympathy of the discussion.

Much has been attempted in small compass and only a considerable mastery of the material could enable a writer to come as near to realization of purpose as the author has. Because of the purpose and the size of the book some questions important to scholarship have been omitted, but few essential matters have been overlooked. Persons who desire the Fourth Gospel to be normative today for creed and Christology will not

¹ *The Fourth Gospel and the Life of To-Day*. By Mary Ely Lyman. New York: Macmillan, 1931. viii+156 pages. \$1.50.

think highly of the book. Those who wish to learn something of the historical origin, the literary art, and the religious meaning of the document will find in the volume a valuable guide.

ERNEST W. PARSONS

COLGATE-ROCHESTER DIVINITY SCHOOL

A STUDY OF CALVIN'S ETHICS

To investigate the ethics of Calvin is to mine a rich vein, and, with the exception of Doumergue, no one has dug so much ore there as Miss Harkness in this valuable work.¹ Since Weber's deservedly famous treatise on the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904-5), many writers have assumed that Calvin's ethical teachings were already known to our generation. In this connection Weber has been cited and quoted *ad nauseam*, yet Miss Harkness points out with absolute truthfulness that "his essay reveals no first hand acquaintance with Calvin." The English Puritan writings on which he drew offer, after all, a poor index of the ideas of the Reformer; and the contents of this book will come as a revelation to all who have not been in the habit of consulting Calvin's own works.

Part I, in three chapters, unfolds the story of Calvin's life. The first is the weakest chapter in the book, and Calvin students may neglect it. His studies are passed over with disproportional brevity and with no realization of the influence of humanism and stoicism in the formation of his ethics. But his figure grows in clarity and impressiveness with the succeeding chapters of this section, and despite the harshness of his public discipline the author is evidently captivated by the nobility and heroism of his nature and the intensity of his devoted labors. The "almost feminine gentleness which he displayed in many of his parish relationships" is also brought to light. "It was not unusual for him to stop on the street in the midst of weighty matters and give a schoolboy a friendly pat and an encouraging word."

The theological basis of Calvin's ethics is examined in Part II which bears the title "The Calvinistic Conscience and Man's Duty to God." The treatment here is of unquestionable fairness but is not always very happy or profound. The statement, even though made with qualifications, that Calvin was a Fundamentalist, is not a discerning judgment. Possibly Miss Harkness has not observed or reflected on such passages as *Institutes* (1559) II, ii, 15, where Calvin, discussing the lessons to be learned from "profane" writers, says: "If we hold that the spirit of God is the sole fount of truth, we shall neither refuse nor despise the truth it-

¹ *John Calvin—The Man and His Ethics*. By Georgia Harkness. New York: Holt, 1931. xiii+266 pages. \$3.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

125

self, wherever it appear (*veritatem ipsam . . . ubicumque apparebit*), unless we wish to be contemptuous toward the Spirit of God." However rigid his doctrine of Scripture, the tag "Fundamentalist" implies a psychology far different from his. His humanism freed him from the eschatological fanaticism of the Fundamentalists, and imparted a strain of liberalism which, though recognized elsewhere in the book, seems at this point to have been overlooked.

Part III, on "The Calvinistic Conscience and Man's Duty to Man," contains the chief contribution of the book. We have here the first detailed exposition in English of the social teaching of Calvin, and there is nothing quite comparable to it in any language. Much of the material cited has a bearing on questions in social ethics which are as much in discussion today as in Calvin's time. The treatment of his ethics of business will be specially useful to the student who has followed the confusions of O'Brien or been misled by Weber's oversimplification. Miss Harkness, however, like Weber, places exaggerated stress on the "isolation" of the soul in Calvinism. The reader of Calvin will regret her failure to link his social ethics not merely with his doctrine of the glory of God, but with his concept of the communion of saints. For Calvin, right social behavior was an extension of the mutual service of the members of the *communio sanctorum*. Hence his principle, unnoticed by Miss Harkness: "Everyone should consider that he owes himself to his neighbors, and that the only limit of his beneficence is the failure of his means" (*Inst.*, III, vii, 7). If we are to pass from his doctrine of God to his ethics we shall do well to go by way of his doctrine of the church. So long as this element is overlooked we shall not get to the heart of Calvin's social teachings.

The political teachings of Calvin, and their influence upon later thought and politics, are discerningly discussed; but the description of Knox as an arch-Calvinist in politics is erroneous. Knox acquired his political ideas from his Scottish predecessors and from his own intense reactions to the misrule of queens in Scotland and England. If Calvin declined to support Knox's political radicalism it should be recognized that he had not engendered it.

The author claims to have "combed the fifty-nine volumes of the *Calvini Opera*." This was a hard task, and if the reviewer is obliged to state that some matters worth notice have escaped the "comb," he can express only his sincerest praise for the book as a whole. It is one that the student of Calvin will in the future have to reckon with, and represents the results of a fair-minded and penetrating investigation of a field in which too little worth-while work has been done.

JOHN T. MCNEILL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE CZECHOSLOVAK CHURCH

The Czechoslovak church is the most important among the post-war non-Protestant communions organized in Czechoslovakia. It originated as a revolt against the Roman Catholic church, from which it at first drew most of its clerical and lay adherents. Thoroughly modernist in theology, national and ethical in spirit, it organized itself without any reference to the doctrine of "the apostolic succession," although it retained episcopal nomenclature.

The volume under consideration¹ is a sociological study of the causes operative in effecting the transfer from the Roman Catholic or other churches to the Czechoslovak communion. It was conducted on the basis of a questionnaire which in turn was carefully studied from various points of view. The result is very illuminating, and affords insight into the motives which actuated the mass movement away from the Roman church. The work is an important contribution to the study of this promising religious group. For the wider public, it would have been better had the preliminary historical survey of the movement been considerably expanded.

MATTHEW SPINKA

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

A HISTORY OF ENTHUSIASM

In this new side-light to the story of the Wesleyan movement² Dr. Lee has traced the principal expressions of "enthusiasm" from the time of the Hebrew prophets forward, not neglecting the ancient Greek ideas which found their way into the stream of Christian thinking. Large place is given to the pietistic and enthusiastic movements of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In his appraisal of early Methodist belief in direct divine guidance and inspiration the author gives special attention to thought-currents as such, rather than to the life-interests and environmental pressures determining or altering these currents. The study is for the most part limited to a consideration of the backgrounds of Methodist enthusiasm, and is therefore not intended as a full explanation of the Wesleyan movement as a whole.

We have here, then, the tracing of the history of a religious idea, together with associated practices. Alterations in the usage of the term "enthusiasm" are fully noted by the author who points out that, as the label was gradually extended to include various hyper-democratic re-

¹ *Za lepší církev*. By F. M. Hnák. Praha: Tiskové a nakladatelské družstvo církve československé, 1930. 240 pages.

² *The Historical Backgrounds of Early Methodist Enthusiasm*. By Umphrey Lee. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931. 176 pages. \$3.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

127

ligious theories and activities, the Methodists became generally known as composing an enthusiastic sect, their puritanical ban on pleasures, peculiar congregational singing and shouting, and passionate, "Spirit-led" lay-preaching being very distasteful to guardians of the established order. Dr. Lee seems to feel that Wesley prevented such fanatical outbreaks as characterized other enthusiastic sects by his highly efficient organization of his followers into "classes" and "societies" and by his rigid personal supervision over all details of the work.

Very little may be said in adverse criticism of this admirable study. It may be suggested that perhaps not enough space is given to the social situation that determined the choice of enthusiastic ideas and practices, and too much to the genetic relationship between earlier and later expressions of these ideas; this, however, is a matter of interpretation. The work would seem to be very complete within its set limits, well organized, adequately annotated, and obviously based on a wide reference to primary as well as secondary sources. There are many quotations, some of them rather lengthy, yet of interest to the student. Dr. Lee writes in an attractive style characterized by many happy expressions. The chapters are briefly summarized, the closing one ending with an interpretative conclusion to the study as a whole. This little volume will be found of most value and interest to scholars, ministers, theologians, and especially to members of that numerous company whose traditions reach back ultimately to Wesleyan sources. There is here some very suggestive material for the use of all students in general who may wish to relate the Methodist movement more intimately and significantly to the life of its time.

MERRILL E. GADDIS

CENTRAL COLLEGE
FAYETTE, MISSOURI

NEWMAN AND MODERN CHRISTIANITY

Of the making of books about Newman there seems to be no end. And there is ample reason why it should be so. The fascination of his life, remote, secluded, yet dramatic, and with its note of tragedy. The allure of his subtle, elusive personality. The power of his preaching and the charm of his literary style. The frank self-revelation of his spiritual pilgrimage in the *Apologia*, one of the world's classics in the literature of conversion. The influence of his thought on two great communions and beyond. The Anglo-Catholic revival is one of the ^{19th} significant currents in modern Christian history, and of that revival Newman was the guiding genius in its earlier stages. The *Development of Doctrine* has been accounted, and probably with justice, one of the roots of Roman-Catholic modernism. Today Newman is seemingly more honored by the Anglican church which

he deserted than by the Roman church which received him but did not know what to do with him and never ceased to distrust him.

Dr. Atkins' *Life*¹ will occupy a high place in the literature of Newman. It is very pleasant reading, with vivacity of style and a ripe sageness of observation. It rests upon independent study of Newman's writings, reinforced by previous biographies and interpretations. After Wilfrid Ward's great work one may hardly expect much additional factual matter. But in the last three of his ten chapters Dr. Atkins develops an illuminating interpretation of Newman as preacher and poet, as thinker and theologian, and as an abiding force in modern Christianity.

The author's key to the "mystery of Newman" (to use Bremond's phrase) is perhaps to be found in the sentence: "He was one of the last of the great believers." The epoch-making events of his day he ignored when he did not hate them as part of the liberalism he feared. He lived in a world remote from contemporary realities—or rather, in two worlds; one the vanished age of the Fathers, the other a transcendent, ethereal world of his own visions and intuitions. Newman seems in a sense predestined to Catholicism, reared though he was in the atmosphere of Evangelicalism. His emotional nature lived in the realm of the supernatural; his self-distrusting reason demanded the sure support of external authority.

It is inadequate to say that the storm over *Tract Ninety* drove Newman to Rome. Of course his sensitive spirit flinched before bitter antagonism. But the explanation lies deeper. So long as Newman held antiquity to be the primary note of Catholicism he was able to remain within the Church of England. When he made universality central he was driven Romeward by his own rigorous logic.

Dr. Atkins more than suggests that Newman would be little mentioned today had not the accidental circumstance of Kingsley's attack on his straightforwardness provoked that mixture of clarity and cloudiness, the *Apologia*. And though Newman's was a "creative" life, the observation is in a large measure just.

WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

PERCY V. NORWOOD

THE VIRGINIA REVIVAL

This excellent study² fills a gap in the history of American Christianity which has never before been adequately understood. Until a few years ago the "Great Awakening" was considered as primarily a New England

¹ *Life of Cardinal Newman*. By Gaius Glenn Atkins. New York: Harper & Bros., 1931. xi+338 pages. \$2.50.

² *The Great Awakening in Virginia, 1740-1790*. By Wesley M. Gewehr. Durham: Duke University Press, 1930. xiii+292 pages. \$4.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

129

movement, with perhaps a middle colony extension. The great importance of the middle colony revival under the Tennents and the graduates of the "Log College," apart from its New England connections, was brought to our attention in C. H. Maxson, *Great Awakening in the Middle Colonies*, published in 1920 (University of Chicago Press). What Maxson did for the middle colony revival Gewehr has done even more adequately for the Virginia and North Carolina revival.

Mr. Gewehr has found that there were three distinct revival movements in Virginia and North Carolina. The first was a Presbyterian awakening called the "Hanover revival," since it centered in Hanover County, Virginia. In this region the ground had been prepared for the Presbyterian revivalists by several devout laymen who began to talk religion among their neighbors and interest them in the reading of religious books. Presbyterian evangelists from New Jersey discovered these interested groups and soon congregations were established, and, in 1748, Samuel Davies and John Rogers were sent by the New York Synod to take charge of the growing work. Hanover Presbytery was soon formed and throughout central Virginia, and in the Great Valley, Presbyterians soon became a religious factor of great and growing influence.

A second phase of the Virginia revival was that carried on by the Baptists. The first Baptist evangelists in the southern colonies—Daniel Marshall and Shubal Stearns—were the product of the New England awakening and came first to Virginia and then to North Carolina where a movement was begun among the lower economic classes which has been described as the greatest revival in the history of the Baptist denomination. A third phase of the Virginia revival was the Methodist, which began just at the opening of the Revolution while the Methodists were still considered a part of the Anglican body. This Methodist movement was made possible because of the work of an outstanding evangelical Anglican, Devereaux Jarratt, who was himself a product of the Presbyterian awakening.

The rapid rise of these three dissenting bodies in Virginia, just previous to the winning of independence, had large political, social, and educational significance. There was thus created well-organized and vocal bodies which were soon to take an active part in the struggle for the separation of church and state and were to be the largest factors in the coming social revolution.

The kinds of sources upon which this study is based have been little used and less understood by the average American historian. And Mr. Gewehr's work is an excellent illustration of what might be expected when adequate attention is given to such materials.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

WILLIAM WARREN SWEET

FUNDAMENTALISM EXPLAINED

Doctors' dissertations do not often make important books, though important books are often based on the findings from the researches of doctoral candidates. Mr. Cole's *History of Fundamentalism*¹ is a welcome exception to the usual type of doctors' theses, not necessarily because it is an exceptional piece of research, but because it deals with a subject of great present-day interest and importance in a most readable and interesting manner. To be utterly fair in dealing with such a controversial theme as recent fundamentalism the writer must possess to a high degree that rare quality we call historical-mindedness, and it is with this quality of mind that Mr. Cole has approached his difficult task.

The discussion is divided into four parts: the first dealing with historical background is gathered under such chapter-headings as: "The Social Pattern of Inherited Christianity"; the "Impact of Secularism upon Christianity"; "Conservative Reaction to Liberal Christianity"; and "The Rise of Fundamentalism." Part II is a discussion of the rise of fundamentalist parties in five of the larger religious bodies of the United States—the Northern Baptist Convention, the Presbyterian, the Disciple, the Methodist Episcopal, and the Protestant Episcopal churches. The author was under the necessity, no doubt, of somehow limiting his subject, which has led him to omit any reference to influences exerted by the numerous smaller churches, especially the holiness and pentecostal bodies which became so numerous from about 1880 onward. It cannot be said, therefore, that Mr. Cole's is an exhaustive study, but perhaps he has served his purpose best because of the limits he has placed for himself. Certainly such limitations lead to greater clarity of treatment.

Part III treats in five excellent chapters the conflict as it was carried on outside the churches through such organizations as the Christian Fundamental League, through reactionary publications, and in the so-called Bible schools and other fundamentalist bureaus, conferences, foundations, and associations. And in this connection it might not be out of place to suggest that at least one chapter on the activities and organizations of modernists would have supplied a body of information both interesting and clarifying.

In the concluding chapter the author attempts a summarization of his findings, and concludes with the statement that the church has not yet recovered "either spiritual poise or clarity of vision," but that Christianity will reassert its power only when "the fine sense of loyalty that in-

¹ *History of Fundamentalism*. By Stewart G. Cole. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1931. xiv+360 pages. \$2.50.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

131

spired conservatives" and the pioneering spirit of the liberals are harmonized to form a true Christlike leadership.

Mr. Cole has rendered a real service to the church at large in giving us this careful and objective study of perhaps the most important religious movement in America in this generation.

WILLIAM WARREN SWEET

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

Custom does not stale Nietzsche. Not long ago in Germany the reviewer was helping to introduce his son to the prose magnificence of Zarathustra. We read in turns page after page out loud. The glow and vitality of the phrases were arresting. Here was a man who felt and thought at one and the same time.

It is usual to speak of Nietzsche as a poet-philosopher. He was not quite the technical philosopher, and yet he was more than the ordinary technical *Fachmann*. In this respect he is often compared to Emerson who, as is known, influenced him. He responded to the world passionately as it made its impact upon him. And he responded in the light of ideas and human problems.

My respect for the late George Burman Foster increased as I read this little book of some two hundred and fifty pages.¹ I remembered that it was written during the war when so much was said against Nietzsche by our patriots and that it was written by one who held Christian ethics in high respect. And yet here we have a sympathetic treatment though it is acknowledged that "Since Voltaire and Feuerbach, religion, and especially Christianity, has had no opponent so sharp and inexorable as Nietzsche, although himself a profoundly religious man in his own way."

I judge that Foster was unable to give the manuscript a final revision for it is somewhat formal and pedestrian in places. Yet it is systematic and thoroughly scholarly. I have found no place where I found myself in marked disagreement with his interpretation. And I certainly found a renewal of my interest in the subject of the book growing within me. After all, philosophy must climax in an interpretation of human life and its most significant direction.

The Table of Contents reveals the systematic character of the book. We read in succession about Nietzsche's life, his relations with Wagner, his conversion to the doctrines of Schopenhauer, his adoption of a volitional optimism as against pessimism or defeatism, his positivism, his

¹ *Friedrich Nietzsche*. By G. B. Foster. Edited by C. W. Reese. New York: Macmillan, 1931. xi+250 pages. \$2.50.

adoption of the ideal of the superman as a final goal. The teaching of Nietzsche with respect to the state, to militarism, to democracy, to art, to science, to skepticism, to religion, to atheism, is taken up in considerable detail with liberal quotations to illustrate the points made. One gets a sense of a vigorous personality reflecting upon a series of challenges to conventional standpoints. It was this feature of the book that particularly interested me.

Suppose we take the discussion of atheism as a sample. "Few things in Nietzsche's writings have impressed me more than the discourse of a madman running about in the clear daylight, lantern in hand, looking for God." Foster points out that Nietzsche's rejection of the God-idea was instinctive rather than rational. That is, it was a result of an approach through values not through ontology. And this accounts for the fact that he is inconsistent, falling, at times, to something approaching pantheism. But the essential demand of Nietzsche was that expressed in Zarathustra as, "I conjure you, my brethren, *remain true to the earth.*" In this he was a forerunner of what is today called humanism.

I doubt that the concept of the superman has much validity. But it stood as a symbol of an attitude, that of creative individuality. We may say that Nietzsche was an anarchist without the sentimentalism which usually goes with that outlook. Be hard. Good means brave.

The book is decidedly worth while. There ought to be a book on Nietzsche every other year at least. He settled no problems but he raised them so that they are inescapable. That is no small service.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

ROY WOOD SELLARS

SYSTEMATIC CHRISTIAN ETHICS¹

Principal Garvie has here presented a well-planned, comprehensive volume on Christian ethics. It is the second volume² in a series of three in which the author hopes to develop his system of theology. Consequently, many of the positions established in the earlier book are here presupposed—at times to the confusion of the reader.

The general scheme of the book falls into four parts: historical, ethical, psychological, and sociological. This very arrangement suggests the weakness of the volume. Its ethics are worked out deductively from certain abstract virtues with the aid of a generous fund of penetrating common sense and acute analysis. In the latter regard Dr. Garvie is reminiscent of Aristotle, whose combination of analytic power and common-sense

¹ *The Christian Ideal for Human Society*. By Alfred E. Garvie. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1930. 477 pages. \$4.00.

² The first was *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead*, 1925.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

133

thought yielded a similar tendency to seek a golden mean. Throughout the treatise runs the view that theological belief in God is essential to a sound moral life; a view explicitly, if not convincingly, defended in the opening chapter. From this follow such arbitrary distinctions as that "religion apprehends *what is*, morality affirms what *ought to be*."

Part I is a general historical sketch, markedly incomplete in its omission of three great formative influences in the development of Christian ethics: The ethics of Pharisaism, and the Graeco-Roman ethics of the classical moralists and of the Hellenistic Stoics and Epicureans.

In the second part the theoretical problems of ethical criteria and ethical responsibility are handled in a fine survey; and the author then passes to a discussion of virtues under heads that echo the Thomist schematization: (1) "the human ideals" of truth, beauty, holiness, utility, and love; (2) "the cardinal virtues" of wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice; and (3) "the Christian graces" of faith, hope, and love. Throughout this section the keen analysis of implications, as mentioned above, asserts itself in some penetrating observations which make the treatment exceedingly useful and suggestive. But the deductive approach is still apparent.

The third section of the book deals with psychological foundations of ethics; and here the author renders a valuable service in recognizing the problems involved in ethical judgment and motivation. The whole discussion is, however, confused by his prejudice against behaviorism, his ignorance of social psychology in any but the old "crowd-psychology" sense, and by a defect which has vitiated so much recent British theology. This last is the inability to divest himself of a theological terminology which hinders, so much more than it helps, in the attempt to work out problems from the new viewpoints suggested by modern scientific findings. An example of this is the confusion that attends his efforts to show that "grace" is operative in the areas of subconscious mental activity.

In the final section, specific problems of a sociological nature are discussed: the family, education, industry, and government; and a concluding chapter tries to assess the church and its message of the kingdom of God. Here again appears that combination of acute insight with an *a priori* set of often unrelated theological phrases referred to above; so that the reader is surprised in the midst of careful discussion of birth control by a paragraph on the empowering grace of God. On the whole, in this section, the author's theology is either irrelevant or connected on a rather attenuated line of deductive logic. In view of the current interest in the eschatological views of German thinkers, like the Barthians, the concluding critique of Brunner is interesting.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

EDWIN EWART AUBREY

DEITY DISCLOSED

In this closely-reasoned argument,¹ which is dedicated to Professor J. H. Muirhead, the author, whose earlier volumes, *Personality and Reality* and *The Nature of Deity*, have brought him to the favorable attention of all who are interested in the contribution of the philosopher to religion, deals in characteristic fashion with the question of a Divine revelation. The book ends with a defense of the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation as being the culminating and absolutely indispensable member in an ascending series of manifestations of the Divine Nature. The discussion as a whole, however, ranges much more widely.

From our human point of view, the most significant of the many forms of the continuous development of the universe is the expansion of self-hood. But that expansion occurs under such conditions that the human personality is inevitably tainted, and, even though there is an inextinguishable desire to remove this taint and to compensate for its consequences, conviction deepens that the self is in the grip of a relentless causal sequence which "can no more be relaxed than can gravitation or heredity." Man is, in fact, if left to his own resources, "subjected to the Sisyphean doom of eternal failure." But God intervenes, and this intervention is the final revelation. "The personality and life of Jesus constitute the sole satisfaction alike of this undying desire of mankind and (the moral) demand of Deity."

The fact seems to be that Mr. Turner, who is quite familiar with the more recent formulations of physical and biological science, and who is at the same time deeply sensitive to the appeal of the Christian religion, is operating within two realms of discourse at the same time, without clearly recognizing the fact. Any such whole-hearted acceptance of the principle of evolution as his discussion in general implies would seem to contravene the very Sisyphean failure in the personal and moral realm in which his argument leaves man enmeshed. The scheme of things, which is itself a revelation of certain characters of the Deity, is such that there inevitably arises an "indelible vitiation of personality"—so we are told.

Mr. Turner really fails to show us how a dual personality, at once human and divine, serves to extricate the wholly human personality of man from its tragic fate. His argument that personality in its development incessantly becomes not only more dynamic and dominant but also more creative crashes upon the rock of man's tragic moral failure. The view that this situation is relieved by the manifestation of a being who is at once God and man does nothing to save the evolutionary program itself

¹ *The Revelation of Deity*. By J. E. Turner. New York: Macmillan, 1931. 223 pages. \$2.75.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

135

from failure. The paradox is that the cosmic scheme, through which the doctrine of revelation developed in the main body of the work is built up, has to be superseded by a better adapted scheme introduced by theophany, which turns out to be the real revelation after all.

HENRY B. ROBINS

COLGATE-ROCHESTER DIVINITY SCHOOL

REASON, FAITH AND ETHICS¹

Bishop Gore offers these Gifford Lectures as his apologia for a Christian ethic based on a rational philosophy, the core of which is faith in "Jesus Christ as the very word of God incarnate." This conclusion follows an extensive survey of religious leaders of the East and West, whose teachings seem to the author to find their culmination in the teaching and person of Christ. The problems raised against this background of experience of the world's great moral prophets are then approached philosophically in the four closing chapters. They are: (1) Is the philosophy of personal theism superior to the more impersonal ethical idealism which speaks of ultimate "values"? (2) Is the Christian interpretation of moral evil, with its pessimism regarding human nature and its optimism as to the final triumph of good, a rational explanation? (3) Is the conception of a divine revelation of moral values in the miracle of the incarnation tenable in modern thought? and (4) Can morality depend on human reason for its judgments? To the first three of these Dr. Gore gives an affirmative answer; to the fourth he says, "No!"

To retrace the author's steps in defining his position we may begin at the end with the foregoing conclusions. The doctrine of probability on which modern science rests precludes any a priori denial of miracle or of the supernatural, and thus leaves an area where basic postulates are received without rational demonstration. Furthermore, science and philosophy both take their rise in common-sense experience which furnishes the postulates of faith without which they could not proceed an inch: the faith "that life is good and can be made better—that the nature which surrounds us is trustworthy in a measure, and will respond to man's efforts—and that our fellow-man is on the whole and within limits trustworthy." But these, he says, are not products but rather bases of reasoning. There is, then, every reason to live by faith.

Especially true and urgent is this in the realm of moral action where the sense of certitude is demanded far beyond the power of rational scrutiny to furnish it. Furthermore, the great prophets of the good life—

¹ *The Philosophy of the Good Life*. By Charles Gore. New York: Scribner's. 1930. xiii+346 pages. \$3.00.

Zarathustra, the Hebrew prophets, Buddha, Socrates, Jesus—have all announced their moral findings not as rational conclusions but as received revelations.

But whence these revelations? Why do they often differ? Why do their assurances so often contradict the palpable facts of human experience? More striking than their discrepancies is their unanimity on so many moral issues, and their convergence toward a common ideal. And the contradiction between optimism regarding human destiny and pessimism regarding human behavior is to be found in God's grant of free will to man as a condition of that moral growth which, when perverted, is redeemed through Christ. Besides, who shall judge the optimistic voice of revelation when the human judge is ignorant of the cosmic totality?

Accordingly, we are forced, says this Gifford lecturer, to fall back upon a faith in the intuitions which come to us of the imperatives of absolute authority in the voice of conscience. But this witness to the objective reality of moral values is dependable only as it reflects an intelligent person in the system of nature. Consequently, the bare abstractions of ethical idealism are inadequate, and we are compelled to assent to personal theism, the most adequate statement of which is found in the Christian conception of God as a trinity, creating, redeeming, and inspiring man for that level of life to which this life only forms the prelude.

The argument is, of course, much fuller than this, and its flanks are carefully guarded by additional lines of reasoning. And yet there are places where the present reviewer felt unconvinced. Does the declaration of modern psychology, that "conscious reason is never pure reasoning" but rests on faith, justify the conclusion that "reason repudiating the very idea of a divine helper who can reveal Himself to man and has in fact revealed Himself . . . is repudiating one of those fundamental human susceptibilities which . . . belongs to the nature of man as he appears in experience" (pp. 327-29)? How is the reader to reconcile the appeal to Eddington's indeterminism, on page 267, in support of moral freedom, with the rejection of Eddington's corollaries, on page 325, when insisting upon science's basic faith in determinate law? The whole argument on this relation of human freedom to natural law (pp. 307 ff.) is in need of restatement, unless the author is satisfied to hide behind the agnosticism expressed on pages 332 ff. A confusion also surrounds the discussion of inspiration in the chapter on revelation, where the former connotes profound insight but is made to support claims for a supernatural revelation (pp. 302 ff.). Can we attribute any significant authority to a "finality" of the revelation in Jesus Christ which "must take all

nations and all periods to exhaust its significance" (p. 310)? In what, definitively, could its finality consist as a basis for human guidance? Any psychologist happening upon this book will be puzzled by "a sub-consciousness which is largely the product of heredity" (p. 327); and by the declaration that "you must recognize that particular races . . . have some special aptitude as for government . . . or for science . . ." (p. 310). One cannot conceal surprise that the old false analogy of the machine of nature (p. 246) should be used by a theologian today despite the exposure which it has suffered at the hands of philosophers.

So many other moot points are so casually or dogmatically assumed or rejected that this series of Gifford Lectures by a theologian compares unfavorably with the recent brilliant volumes of philosophical lecturers on that distinguished foundation.

EDWIN EWART AUBREY

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

AUTHORITY IN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL EXPERIENCE

This is a timely book.¹ By this is meant that it carries religious thought onward another step. The real problem before us today is not as to the seat of authority in religion; educated men are agreed that this can only be in religious experience and not in any extra-human dictum. Our question is as to the seat of the experience, Is it in the individual or in the religious society? Dr. Strachan has made a distinctive contribution to the discussion of this question.

He begins with a frank acknowledgment of the subjective character of religious experiences, and defends this against any charge of futility. He argues that the method of projection in religion is as proper as it is in science.

The real value of the book is in its dealing with the opposing tendencies of writers to emphasize either the social or the individual aspects of the religious experience. The author gives a sharp and searching criticism of the presentations of religion by James, Whitehead, and Otto. He shows that this individualistic interpretation does not account for all the facts, that religion is always a corporate and social activity. The vigor of this criticism is quite refreshing.

But Dr. Strachan turns from his criticism of the individualists to a similar analysis of the teachings of those who make the corporate experience authoritative. At best, he claims, the corporate consciousness is only a powerful succor and source of individual religious life. Here is the

¹ *The Authority of Christian Experience*. By R. H. Strachan. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931. 255 pages. \$2.50.

message of a convinced Protestant, but of one who appreciates the social and Catholic religious emphasis. He stigmatizes the Catholic idea of the church and the Protestant idea of an inerrant book as both very largely the instinctive creation of the herd-instinct in religion, and he argues for the primacy of the individual personal life.

One cannot speak too highly of the breadth of knowledge and the firmness of wisdom which find expression in this book. Here is a message on the most important problems of religion by a man who holds strong convictions, but who not only knows but respects opposing views. If the representatives of the primacy of the social factor in religion, Catholics and religious sociologists, would note Dr. Strachan's approach and be as generous as he to the other camp it would not seem difficult for the two to meet. They might not agree, but they would understand one another and have a rich fellowship.

D. A. MCGREGOR

WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

RELIGION AND PRESENT POSSIBILITY

It is refreshing to pick up a book, written by a theologian of the present day, that is not concerned with the recovery of something or other which was the reputed possession of our forbears in some great age of the past. Dr. Wieman has given us such a book in his *Issues of Life*.¹ He is not interested in the recovery of the kind of worship or the kind of prayer or the kind of God which at one time was quite satisfactory and no doubt beneficial. However, he does not treat lightly or with contempt the thoughts of men of other ages but rather moves out with all the evidence available to the discovery of new ideas.

Again, while many thinkers in the field of Christian theology are concerned chiefly with defending Christianity against the seeming dangers of the newer schools of psychology and some of the life-philosophies which rather grotesquely are being labeled humanism, Professor Wieman attempts no defense of this kind but moves on as driven by the "lure of unexplored possibilities." This again is refreshing, not to say inspiring.

In the very beginning the author points out that there are numerous issues of life, many of them concerned with everyday problems, but that the issue of most importance is, "What is the order of existence and possibility upon which we must depend and to which we must conform, to bring human life to its highest fulfilment and to promote the greatest possible values?"

¹ *The Issues of Life*. By Henry Nelson Wieman. New York: Abingdon Press, 1931. 273 pages. \$2.00.

The whole book takes shape around that question. Whether it is in one of the first four chapters which deal largely with problems of conduct or in the last half which is concerned with an adequate philosophy of religion, this question may be seen as the shaping and controlling factor. The religion advocated is "dedicating life in supreme devotion to that order of existence and possibility which provides the highest values that ever can be actualized." It is this order of existence, "operative in the present and carrying utmost possibilities of value," which Dr. Wieman identifies with God. Thus he distinguishes God from what he calls the ideal, which is the greatest possible good to be sought. It is this order, which may be called God, that makes the ideal a possibility. The supreme function of religion today is the cultivation of an attitude which eventuates in the passionate search for these utmost possibilities of value which the present state of existence can afford.

The value of ideals, beliefs, and programs of action handed down from the past is recognized as indispensable to our search. Yet we should not live with them as though they were final and the supreme good but as trails which lead on in the direction, perhaps, of the unknown possibilities. If we would prevent stagnation of thought and congealment of action programs we must recognize that the ideal is not our idea of what these greatest possible values may be but rather that which truly is the greatest possible good to be sought. It is this spirit which has enabled men, striving for the greatest possible good and at times questioning their ideas, to say, "Though He slay me, yet will I trust Him"; "Not my will, but Thine, be done."

Dr. Wieman sees two ways open before us. One way is to follow the urge wherein reason is subordinated to the automatic biological drive and whereby we would become better animals; the other is to move on in "the new way of life which is an art rather than an urge and which requires the exploratory reformation of desire rather than the simple striving to fulfill present desire" and wherein reason is dominant. This latter way is one of spiritual travail, yet it is the way by which we would become greater personalities. There is a third possibility. Refuse to do either. Thus we would decline and become less than we are both as personalities and as animals.

The book will be severely criticized for its non-personal presentation of the idea of God even though the author insists that God cannot be a personality for the reason that he is more than personality. Others, not concerned with the defense of this position, may question the adequacy of the idea of God which is set forth and doubt the challenge of intangible ideals which can never be realized.

But come what criticism may the reader has the feeling that here is one who is but little concerned after all with what eventually may become of his ideas but is greatly challenged by adventures into what he chooses to call unexplored possibilities. One also has the feeling that the author of *Issues of Life* is quite willing to journey on with others, though their ideas may be quite different, if in them there is the spirit of the explorer who does not hesitate to weigh anchor from familiar shores so long as new adventures and possibilities lie ahead.

NELSON PAXSON HORN

IOWA STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND MECHANIC ARTS

BARTH EXPOUNDED

In spite of its sketchiness and a certain lack of critical poise, this book¹ will serve as an introduction to the study of the "theology of crisis" in so far as the spirit of this theology is to be found in the work of Barth and Brunner. The author mentions other affiliated writers, such as Gogarten, Bultmann, and Thurneysen, but it is from Barth and Brunner that he quotes chiefly, adding brief discussions of the relation of their views to Calvinism, Lutheranism, and the idealistic movement in German philosophy since Kant.

It cannot be said that the present volume helps to make the teaching of Karl Barth entirely clear. The theology is a difficult one whether read according to Hoyle or according to Brunner, the most lucid expositor the movement has had; and, of course, it is especially difficult in Barth's own work because of his love for paradoxes and his abrupt, provocative style. Hoyle's book at least helps one to see that the difficulties which the layman has in understanding this teaching, like the power which the teaching undoubtedly has, derive from the uniqueness as well as the far-reaching implications of the problem which Barth makes central. How, after all, are we to bridge the chasm which Barth, following Kierkegaard, calls that between the world of time and the world of eternity? What should be the attitude of mortal man toward the final riddle of existence? And how can he justify his usual complacent optimism in a world reeking with tragedy?

These questions Barth and his colleagues raise, and it is because the questions themselves are so tremendous and so insistent that their theology has received so much attention. A reading of this book brings home anew, however, the fact that the problems raised are far from having been solved. The theologians of crisis point, as do the mystics, to the useless-

¹ *The Teaching of Karl Barth*. By R. Birch Hoyle. New York: Scribner's, 1930. 286 pages. \$2.75.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

141

ness of articulate argument where ultimate issues are concerned; but, while they reject mysticism as "too human," they go on to offer their own definitions of the God whom mystics have found indefinable. The finite, they say, is not competent to deal with the infinite, yet no one is more dogmatic than they in laying down laws to which the infinite must conform. They assert religion's independence of history, yet found their faith on a historical event. They affirm their own remoteness from the controversial issues of Biblical criticism but they actually make the task of the Biblical scholar more difficult by attempting to prescribe the kind of scholarship with which faith is compatible.

Barth and his co-workers have contributed a healthy reaction against an excess of rationalism in religion, but their emphasis is unhealthy when it takes an anti-rationalistic as contrasted with a non-rationalistic turn. They have tried to make an intellectual defense of a position which eschews all intellectualism. This is the real contradiction in their work, a contradiction which lies deeper than the paradoxes in which they take such delight. It is not possible for them to brush aside historical criticism, philosophical analysis, and psychological description as irrelevant, to talk of a return to the self-revealing Word of God, as if that were a simple stark fact with no relations to history or philosophy, and then to proceed with arguments for the reasonableness of their position. If their views are reasonable it is because they are in accord with the best that human intellect and conscience have discovered. If the Word of God is truly self-revealing, man will find it in his quest for value. The Absolute God whom Barth preaches must be a God of absolute truth.

J. S. BIXLER

SMITH COLLEGE

 THE THEOLOGY OF PERSONALISM

Richard M. Vaughan¹ uses the philosophy of personalism as a principle of interpretation in his discussion of a wide range of theoretical and practical religious problems. He defines personalism as "the world view which finds in personality or man's selfhood a key to the nature of the ultimate reality which religion calls God, and to the significance of the cosmic process and of human history as the scenes in which personal values are realized." In connection with a brief review of the main philosophical positions and the principal psychological notions of the self, he defends personalism philosophically and psychologically. Because the older me-

¹ *The Significance of Personality*. By Richard M. Vaughan. New York: Macmillan, 1930. viii+302 pages. \$2.50.

chanical notions of the physical universe have been displaced by a belief in the "dynamic nature of the material world," we can believe in the "spiritual nature of the universe," in a world "vibrant, alive, spiritual." "If we see that the Power which is at work in the cosmos is acting in ways which are characteristic of ourselves as personalities and of our neighbors as personalities, then we properly recognize the Power as personal. . . . If the universe reveals purpose, mind, love, self-consciousness, then it is indwelt and dominated by Divine Personality." And Dr. Vaughan believes in a personal God because he finds these manifestations in the universe as represented both in the physical order and in the realm of human life. Using this philosophy of personalism as the basis of his interpretations, the main portion of the book is an outline of Christian theology, in which the main Christian doctrines are discussed from a moderately conservative viewpoint and defended in the light of modern knowledge. There is a chapter on "Morality," and another on the "Soul and Society," in which the implications of the principle of respect for personality are discussed in relation to the family, the state, the economic order, the school, and the church. In his closing chapter he argues for the "moral certainty" of the world-view he has been setting forth.

The main theses of the book are summarized by the author in the first paragraph of the closing chapter, as follows:

The world view which has personality for its constructive principle has undeniable elements of attraction. It gives to man's spiritual selfhood supreme importance for its intrinsic worth and for its interpretative values. It finds in personal being our noblest clew to the meaning of God. It sees in nature the garment of God and in history the sphere in which God is working out his beneficent purposes for mankind. It declares that the personality of Christ reveals within human life the reality of a Christlike God and that salvation is a moral experience through faith in God and fellowship with man. It affirms that respect for personality is the guiding principle in ethics and that all the institutions of society are to be appraised and molded with reference to the kind of personalities which they produce. And it believes that personalities, as the goal of the cosmic process and possessors of eternal spiritual values, are not transient incidents in the order of nature but are heirs of immortality.

The book has a clear and winning style and is, upon the whole, written in the finest of the spirit of the personalism which the author defends. For those who already accept the historic Christian position, it will be inspiring and bring a genuine reinforcement to their faith. For those whose scientific studies have caused them difficulty in accepting the historic Christian doctrines, it will probably not prove satisfactory. They may feel that he has not taken sufficiently into account the negative evidence and that

CRITICAL REVIEWS

143

he has gone farther than his positive evidence warrants in his rather sweeping conclusions in regard to a personal God working in nature and history. The difficult problems discussed in the main body of the book are all solved on the assumption that *if* there is such a God, as he has attempted to prove in the opening chapters, then it is reasonable to believe thus and so. Examples of this are found in his discussion of miracles and immortality. "If God is immanent in his world, then he can as readily modify its movements as a man's soul can direct the body in which it dwells." "The character of God is the guarantee of human immortality. The view of God as spiritual, purposive, loving, provides a climate in which belief in immortality is natural and even inevitable." But it is the "if" which is causing the difficulty, and if an individual has not gone with Dr. Vaughan in his opening chapters, the balance of the book will often seem rather like arguing in a circle. To this negative criticism should be added the fact that Dr. Vaughan uses the insights which his knowledge of physical science, sociology, and particularly psychology have brought to him in setting forth the Christian beliefs in a more understandable and usable fashion than is often the case in books on Christian doctrine. Discussions such as those on original sin, on the new birth, on conscience, and on self-expression versus self-realization are especially helpful.

HARRISON S. ELLIOTT

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

FOUND BEFORE THE SEARCH¹

This is another volume in the English series entitled "The Library of Constructive Theology" published in this country by Harper and Brothers. The dean of King's College, London, here presents "an attempt to state the essential elements in the Christian experience of God, and to formulate a view of the divine Nature and the relation of God with the world, which may be acceptable to the reason of modern man" (p. xi). It is important to realize at the outset that for Dr. Matthews these are not two attempts but one: that "the essential elements in the Christian experience" are "acceptable to the reason of modern men." In other words the book is an apologia for the Christian faith in God. This apologia is developed along the lines of that particular manifestation of "the reason of modern men" known as personalism, and provides a broader interpretation of reason than that of logical understanding. Where the logic of personal idealism would lead some (he does not know Professor

¹ *God in Christian Experience*. By W. R. Matthews. New York: Harper, 1931. xix + 283 pages. \$3.00.

Brightman's subsequent volume on *The Problem of God*) to affirm the existence of imperfection within the Godhead itself, this conclusion is branded as "no less absurd than blasphemous" (p. 178). If the logic of personalism, which uses self-knowledge as a clue to the knowledge of God, seems to favor Professor Brightman, the answer is (1) that personality is indefinable (p. 164), and (2) that the divine personality is not wholly understood by our own since it is "at the level of the transcendent" (p. 138)!

With regard to the apologetic character of the book, the "modern man" should remember the author's premise that "the Christian experience of God is religious experience in its purest and highest form" (p. 138); "the supreme and absolute religion" (p. 41); and that theology follows a method different from that of philosophy in that the theologian "begins with a 'revelation,' an experience of God which he accepts as giving the law to his thinking" (p. 92). Unless this approach is constantly kept in mind the critical reader will be upset by such rejections as the following: "A position intolerable for Christian faith" (p. 262); "Religion can find no satisfaction in the thought . . . (p. 254); "No (such) thought . . . can be completely Christian" (p. 130); "As Christian theologians, we must maintain . . . " (p. 263); "There could be no absolute value" (p. 253).

Keeping these methods of argument in mind the reader will follow with interest the author's close-thinking attack upon the major problems of contemporary theology: the bearing of the new critiques of scientific knowledge upon the notions of divine transcendence, creativity, and providence; the meaning of personality and its relation to the indeterminateness of reality in the new physics; and the significance of recent discussions of time for belief in divine Providence.

If, however, the reader wants to challenge the prior assumptions as to the absoluteness of the Christian religion, and wishes to be allowed to "seek satisfaction through religion (of) the need for unity and the need for the substantiation of value" (p. 18), without this premise, then it is hard to see how he will ever bring himself to start in the author's company. The elaborate arguments will all be regarded as conditioned by a *parti pris*, and the book as a reinforcer rather than a creator of belief. But such reinforcement must always encounter the charge of being "merely a rationalization." Presumably the author is content, and expresses his view as that of "God in Christian experience." As such it will probably be "acceptable to the reason of modern men" who have already accepted it.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

EDWIN EWART AUBREY

EXPERIMENTALISM IN EDUCATION

As the outgrowth of a combination of several factors in its social life, American thought has developed an indigenous philosophy. These factors have been the break with European traditions, the influence of the expanding frontier, the experiment in democracy, and the development of industrialism. This philosophy as expounded by Peirce, James, and Dewey has generally gone under the designations of "pragmatism" and "instrumentalism," and has, on the whole, been regarded as involving a method of thought rather than a metaphysic. The implications of this indigenous philosophy for education are far-reaching and profoundly significant and constitute one of America's most significant contributions to the theory and practice of education. It is to the exposition of this philosophy and its educational implications that the first publication in the Century Company's new series on education is devoted.¹ It follows in the tradition of Dewey's *School and Society* and *Education and Democracy* and is the most significant publication in that tradition since the latter title.

Dr. Childs prefers to substitute the term "experimentalism" for "pragmatism" and "instrumentalism" as more accurately descriptive of this movement in American thought. Contrary to the view that experimentalism is primarily a *method* rather than a *philosophy*, he holds that it involves a metaphysic and is grounded in a world view and a theory of the nature of reality. Consequently he holds that the validity of its educational implications is to be sought in the correspondence of these implications to reality as it appears in the human and social process.

The author is convinced that education is much more than a technical procedure which can be dealt with successfully by the exclusive use of the so-called "scientific" method. To his mind education is primarily concerned with persons and society as ends with reference to which techniques are instrumental. It is, therefore, concerned with insight and comprehension in terms of a philosophy of education quite as much as with the mechanics of the operation to which until recently the attention of educationists has been all but exclusively directed.

In accord with the philosophy of experimentalism, the author takes the position that education should deal directly with current personal and social experience, set in its larger historical context. Instead of attempting to reproduce the past or to fit the young by habit-formation into the traditional intellectual and institutional patterns, he believes that educa-

¹ *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism*. By John L. Childs. New York: Century, 1931. xix+264 pages. \$2.00.

tion should enable growing persons to deal with the fundamental issues of social living in a changing culture. From the point of view of experimentalism, the function of education is to organize intelligence for the progressive reconstruction of ideas and behavior patterns in a dynamic human process.

The discussion deals with experimentalism as an indigenous American philosophy, with the metaphysical character of experimentalism, with the capacities of man for experimental living, with experience as a basis for education, with the problem of freedom in education, with the possibilities of the experimental way of life for the rank and file, and with the place of the individual in society. While Dr. Childs whole-heartedly accepts experimentalism as the ground for a philosophy of education as well as for its practice, he deals critically with its fundamental concepts and issues. The style is very clear and the treatment of the subject convincing. This is one of the outstanding contributions to current educational literature.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

WILLIAM CLAYTON BOWER

THE STUDENT AND RELIGION

The basis of this book¹ is problems brought to the author personally in classes, or by letter by some fourteen hundred individuals, and quotations from these communications form the first part of each chapter. Religious and moral problems are first considered. Religion seems to represent for Dr. Charters an innate and inevitable response, when an individual is in a situation where more than human power is necessary or manifested, whether he is facing a difficulty, is recipient of mercy, or is witnessing the forces of nature. She says she follows Kant in believing that the *idea* of God must have had its source outside of human experience as an intuition. Therefore, while an individual may lose certain beliefs about God and while religious belief and experience inevitably must change from generation to generation, it is impossible really to lose faith in God, and nothing can prevent one having a religious experience. The problem is then one of the reconstruction of one's religious experience. Moral law also finds its final source in God and his expression in law, but it evolves and grows according to its functioning, and must be adapted from generation. The basis should be Kant's injunction, "act as if the maxim of our action were to become by our will a universal law of nature."

The balance and the larger part of the book is given to problems of personality adjustment. In discussing these, Dr. Charters shows some insight

¹ *The College Student Thinking It Through*. By Jessie A. Charters. New York: Abingdon Press, 1930. 166 pages. \$1.50.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

147

into the sources of emotional difficulty, but gives her attention chiefly to practical recommendations of the suggestion type as to what an individual might do about them. The chapter on "Moods" seems to make no distinction between the strong emotions of fear and anger, with their physiological accompaniments, and the milder emotions which form the feeling tone of our normal responses and which would seem to be more directly involved in mood. In the discussion of the genius, the dub, and the moron, her suggestions as to facing up honestly to one's native equipment are helpful, but she gives little recognition to the fact that the intelligence tests as used in colleges predict ability to succeed in the college courses as now conducted and are not necessarily general tests of intelligence, and there is no recognition in this chapter that, perhaps for the dub as well as the genius, part of the adjustment should be made by the college rather than that the student simply be told how to fit into the lock-step education now offered. The chapter on leadership is entirely on the leader-follower idea, and, while emphasizing the value to society of the follower, reflects but little of the finer basis for living which underlies the better vocational guidance with its recognition of a "variety of gifts but the same spirit." Other chapters discuss the inferiority complex, making friends, and developing character.

The book is full of practical suggestions, growing out of the author's study and experience, and these are helpful; but there is not sufficient recognition of the causal factors in personality difficulties nor of the complexity of the difficulties themselves. There is too much of an assumption that difficulties can be overcome and more desirable characteristics developed on a sort of "daily dozen" basis; whereas there is increasing recognition that even in physical inadequacies, not to speak of the more complex personality difficulties, a more fundamental attack upon the problems is necessary.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

HARRISON S. ELLIOTT

RECENT BOOKS

HISTORY OF RELIGION

CLEMEN, CARL. *Religionsgeschichte Europas*, Heft 2: *Kulturgeschichtliche Bibliothek*. Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1931. 335 pages. Bound M.12; unbound M.10.

In this carefully written book we have a compressed treatment not of the entire religious history of Europe, but of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Lamaism in that continent. Christianity is given more than half the space. The main developments are indicated, mainly from German authorities, with some stress upon unusual elements such as unbelief in the thirteenth century. Modern issues are given due notice. Islam is studied in Spain, Italy, Russia, and the Balkans. The book closes with a short account of Lamaism in Russia, where it has been in existence since the seventeenth century. One of the twenty-two illustrations is that of the Lamai Temple in Leningrad.

GEORG, EUGEN. *The Adventure of Mankind*. New York: Dutton, 1931. xx+325 pages. \$5.00.

For those who are weary of the ordinary kind of imaginative literature this book may be recommended as a stimulating change. It is a blend of history, myth, scientific fact, and speculative fantasy woven on a theosophic web. It is the story of the evolution and involution of the beginningless One through the vast cosmic ages of the many questing toward and returning at last to the Eternal One. The interesting thing is that it is done as a survey of history. The author sees the future. "After the ages of man and animal 'signatures' will come the age of the gods, the age of *Homo demiurgos*, the hegemonial man of maximum spiritual force. His science will be based on magical energies; his life will be united with the cosmos; the forces of gravitation will serve his needs; he will alter the revolution of the planet and fight the falling moons. He will unveil the greatest depths of love; with him there will be no more ignorance. Suffering will disappear, as the hegemonial man finally brings a world enriched by his love to the author of the suffering of the universe." And then the troubled question comes to us, Will it start all over again?

HUME, ROBERT ERNEST. *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads—Translated from the Sanskrit*. Second edition revised with a list of recurrent and parallel passages by GEORGE C. O. HAAS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1931. xvi+588 pages. \$6.00.

Students of Indian philosophy in particular and Indologists in general have been well aware of the high value of Professor Hume's work. In fact, it may be said that, ever since the publication of the first edition, Mr. Hume's translation became an absolute necessity to all serious students of the Upanishads. The present second edition is much to be welcomed, especially as a valuable new feature is added. This is "a list of recurrent and parallel passages" prepared by Dr. George Haas. This list, which includes the Bhagavad-Gītā, is not an attempt to supplant Colonel Jacob's standard

RECENT BOOKS

149

Concordance to the Principal Upanishads, but is unquestionably a valuable supplement to that work. Scholars familiar with the field need not be reminded of the high merits of Messrs. Hume and Haas's work, but it cannot be highly enough recommended to anyone who is seriously interested in understanding the real foundation of India's mentality and culture.

SCHOMERUS, HILCO WIARDO. *Buddha und Christus: Ein Vergleich zweier grosser Weltreligionen*. Halle-Saale: Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1931. vii+91 pages. M. 3.50.

This work is one of the many comparative studies in religion done in the interest of Christian apologetics. At the last it is no longer "Buddha und Christus" but "Buddha oder Christus," and the author has no doubt as to what the choice should be. The survey covers the story of the two personalities, their religious philosophies, the ideals of salvation, and the means to attain the goal. The author feels that the great difference lies in the stress of the Christian gospel on the worth of personality.

OLD TESTAMENT AND JUDAISM

FELDMAN, ABRAHAM J. *Hills To Climb*. Hartford, Conn.: Beth Israel Pulpit, 1931. 128 pages. \$1.50.

A series of pulpit addresses by the rabbi of Beth Israel Temple in Hartford, Connecticut. The book contains two sermons for the New Year, two for the Day of Atonement, and four miscellaneous sermons.

OLMSTEAD, A. T. *Hebrew History and Historical Method*. New York: Century, 1931. 33 pages.

This essay, in honor of the famous historian George Lincoln Burr, which appears in a volume entitled *Persecution and Liberty*, deserves to be drawn to the attention of all who are interested in Old Testament studies. The author has brought to his stimulating discussion of the sources of Hebrew history a fine command of historical method and of the languages necessary to a student in this field.

While paying a full meed of tribute to the earlier higher critics for their great achievements, Professor Olmstead represents the position that their methods were often highly subjective and suggests ways and means by which their results can be checked through more objective and scientific methods.

Those who read this essay will find themselves better prepared for an understanding of the more conservative positions taken by the author in his *History of Palestine and Syria*. They will also be put in touch with certain lines and methods of research from which much may be expected in the progress of biblical studies during the next few years.

NEW TESTAMENT

MOREY, C. R., RAND, WARD KENNARD, and KRAELING, CARL H. *The Gospel Book of Landevennec*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931. 64 pages, 40 plates. \$4.00.

The publication of this Latin manuscript, "The Harkness Gospels," in the New York Public Library, is the result of the collaboration of specialists. Professor Rand gives a thorough and careful description of the manuscript: its binding, script, headings, etc. He dates the script in the latter half of the ninth century. A note from Dom G. M.

Beyssac, O.S.B., assigns a Breton provenance to the neums. Professor Kraeling finds that the text is a mixture of Celtic and Alcuinic elements. But in nineteen folios of Matthew the text is "virtually purely Celtic." Professor Morey discusses the illumination of the manuscript and its *comes*. These indicate that the manuscript comes from Landevennec. With its sister-gospel-book of Berne, this manuscript provides the only considerable examples of Breton illumination in the Carolingian period at present known.

SANDERS, HENRY A. (ed.). *Beati in Apocalypsin, Libri Duodecim*. American Academy in Rome, 1930. xxiv+657 pages.

This is the seventh volume of "Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome," and is an edition of the Latin text of a commentary on the New Testament Apocalypse by Beatus, a Northern Spanish monk who flourished in the latter part of the eighth century. The work has not been easily available, and Mr. Sanders' careful and arduous labor puts at the disposal of those interested in the history of the interpretation of the closing book of the Christian Scriptures the product of a Spanish scholar's investigation and thought. The editor bases his text upon a careful examination of the best manuscripts and a more cursory survey of those of secondary importance. Scholars are indebted to the Academy and to the editor for this careful volume. Its real importance lies in the aid which it will render in getting at the sources which Beatus so generously used. A study of these is in process, and its publication will be awaited with interest.

VAGANAY, LÉON. *L'Evangile de Pierre*. Paris: Libraire Lecoffre, 1930. xxiii+357 pages. Fr. 50.

This is a volume in *Etudes bibliques* and carries an imprimatur. There must have been a genuine devotion either to a subject or to a position to be maintained to produce so large a book as this on the subject chosen. While little that is striking or new will be found in the volume, it is convenient to have the survey of criticism of the Akhmim fragment set before us as well as the few well-worn references to the Gospel in patristic literature. The field is thoroughly covered and the work will serve as a sort of encyclopedia for the Gospel of Peter. A history of its criticism, a minute examination of its relations to the canonical gospels, the literary and historical character of the Gospel, the date and place of composition, the text of the fragment, a French translation and commentary, together with a lengthy Bibliography and detailed Index, comprise this book. The material has been exhaustively gathered and carefully examined. The conclusions on all moot questions are more or less colored by the ecclesiastical bent of the author.

WINDISCH, HANS. *Der Hebräerbrief* ("Handbuch zum Neuen Testament"). Zweite, neu bearbeitete Auflage. Tübingen: Mohr, 1931. 135 pages. Bound M. 7.50; unbound M. 6.

This is a second edition of a volume in the "Handbuch zum Neuen Testament," edited by Hans Lietzmann. The first edition appeared in 1913. While the greater part of the commentary remains the same as in the earlier edition, there has been considerable re-writing, involving a number of changes owing to the author's study of the document since the volume was first issued. The style of the work is improved, some discussions on special points being separated from the commentary where they stood earlier. The most important changes are the inclusion of later literature, the attention given

RECENT BOOKS

151

to Mandaean parallels, and the presentation of similar coincidences found in the rabbinic apocalypse known as III Enoch. The work throughout maintains the uniformly high standard of the "Handbuch" and is more than ever a *sine qua non* for the study of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY

BARTH, PETRUS, and NIESEL, GUILLELMUS (ed.). *Johannis Calvini Opera selecta*, Band IV: *Subscr.* München: Kaiser, 1931. xi+456 pages. Bound M. 18; unbound M. 16.

This volume of the new scholarly edition of a selection of Calvin's works contains Book III of the 1559 text of the *Institutio*. Notes as well as text are entirely in Latin. The back of the title-page calls to mind the death of Zwingli, *servus Dei pro fide evangelica inter primores fortissime pugnans*, just four hundred years ago. This may mislead some readers into the belief that Zwingli fought as a knight in the battle of Cappel, whereas he merely exposed himself while encouraging others. A prefatory note supplementing the statements contained in Volume III on the sources used by Calvin discusses briefly the reformer's acquaintance with and use of medieval and contemporary authors. With painstaking labor the editors have supplied two sets of footnotes, of which one furnishes comparison with the 1536 and 1539 editions, the other references to passages in previous authors apparently used by Calvin.

BAXTER, J. H. (trans.). *St. Augustine: Select Letters*. With an English translation. New York: Putnam's, 1930. lii+535 pages. Leather 12s. 6d., cloth, 10s.

This is a most useful little volume in the "Loeb Classical Library Series." It contains sixty-two letters of Augustine with the original Latin and an English rendering on opposite pages. There are also a few brief but instructive footnotes, a good historical Introduction with a chronological table, and a fairly full Bibliography. The date of composition is prefixed to each letter in the translation. The Latin text is in the main that of the *Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, and the selection has been made with a view to revealing Augustine in his contact with the varied life of his day, thus exhibiting "the human interest of the man and his environment." Every student of the subject will welcome this valuable aid, and the general reader will find it both interesting and instructive. It is to be hoped that two or three more volumes, which would be necessary to present all of Augustine's correspondence, may some day be issued in this series.

CANSE, JOHN M. *Pilgrim and Pioneer: Dawn in the Northwest*. New York: Abingdon, 1930. 306 pages. \$2.00.

This is the story of the beginning of Methodist missions in the Pacific Northwest and is gathered about the life and work of Jason Lee, the founder of the mission. Lee, with his wife, Daniel Lee his nephew, and three other young men made up the missionary group which gathered in Independence, Missouri, in the spring of 1834 to begin the long journey across the plains and mountains. They were accompanied by two scientists, Professor John K. Townsend of the Academy of Natural Science in Philadelphia and Dr. Thomas Nuttall, a famous botanist. The description of the long journey is based largely upon the journals of the Lees and Professor Townsend and is full of interesting detail. The original intention had been to establish a mission among the

Flathead Indians, but on arrival in the country of the Flatheads they found them so few in number and so migratory in character that they concluded to select another location for their mission. Accordingly the Willamette Valley was chosen, and here in the fall of the year the building of the mission was begun. The building of this mission has been called the beginning of the real settlement of Oregon by Americans and Lee and his associates, though coming primarily to convert the Indian, "unwittingly established the original centers of civilization in the vast Pacific country."

FOLEY, LOUIS. *The Greatest Saint of France*. Milwaukee: Morehouse, 1931. xi+321 pages. \$3.50.

The benevolent and humble spirit of St. Martin of Tours lives again in this book, which is written rather in the tone of the old-time monastic piety than in the manner of the critical historian. Miracle stories, including numerous resuscitations of the dead, are uncritically retailed. References to the art representations of the miraculous and other scenes from Martin's life add interest to the biography. By a free use of historical imagination the author expands the limited information of the sources, so as to give an engaging presentation of the conditions of life in fourth-century Gaul. Inaccuracies are easily discovered; the account of St. Patrick, for example, is a tissue of errors and unwarranted conjectures, apparently based on antiquated authorities.

HOUK, RAYMOND AARON. *Hooker's "Ecclesiastical Polity," Book VIII*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931. xii+346 pages. \$3.75.

The authenticity of Books VI-VIII of Hooker's immortal treatise, which were published posthumously, has hitherto been in doubt, owing to early and repeated statements that the manuscripts were mutilated. Owing to the weighty character of the contents of these books, the problem was one of considerable historical importance. In an extensive Introduction Mr. Houk has shown the high probability that all three of the books in question are extant as Hooker left them. All eight books were written when the first four were published in 1593. But the evidence goes to show that Hooker intended to subject the sixth book to a substantial revision, which was never completed. The seventh and eighth books represent Hooker's position in 1593, but here, too, he probably intended some revision. Charges of mutilation and interpolation are examined and confuted, but the suspicion remains that through monarchical and high-church influence the publication of the books was long delayed. Mr. Houk provides an edition of the eighth book from the Dublin manuscript.

LANGSTAFF, JOHN BRETT. *The American Communion Service*. Milwaukee: Morehouse, 1931. ix+246 pages. \$2.50.

Originally published as *The Holy Communion in Great Britain and America*, this book now appears with an additional chapter dealing with the recent American revision of the *Book of Common Prayer*. The book furnishes a record of the changes made since 1549 in the English, Scottish, and American liturgies.

LOHMANN, ANNEMARIE. *Zur geistigen Entwicklung Thomas Müntzers*. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1931.

A systematic treatment of the early life and training of the great radical, and of his later thought. The stages of Müntzer's development, as Catholic, Lutheran, and follower of Storch, are examined. Sections are devoted to an analysis of the Prague mani-

RECENT BOOKS

153

festos of 1521, of which German and Czech editions were published in simple popular style; the process of the peaceful diffusion of Müntzer's ideas and influence; and the more violent teachings of the period just before the Peasant War. Müntzer's tracts are elucidated by ample quotations.

MONSMA, JOHN CLOVER. *The Story of the Church*. New York: Rae D. Henkle, 1931. 315 pages. \$3.00.

This short church history claims a distinctive quality. The author purposes to write from an impartial point of view, in order to get more attention for the facts of "the story of the church." But before he has gone far he is writing in the tone of a Christian believer. Indeed, how could he, being such a believer, do otherwise? An old-fashioned reviewer would amuse himself with this book at length. For errors are numerous, some of them small, but some great, and a few really grotesque. Concerning the apostles, "the only thing that seems historically certain is that each apostle took upon himself the responsibility of a certain definite part of the Roman Empire." The Roman church is said to have made "a desperate attempt" to hinder the development of printing in the fifteenth century. Furthermore, the building of the Gothic cathedrals is placed in this same period. The work of Peter the Great in relation to religion is thus interpreted: "He did away with a lot of superstitious frills and fads and substituted the gospel of Jesus." Even more damaging than mistakes in particulars are faults in organization. This is not such as to yield a clear outline of the history of Christianity. The treatment of the modern period is particularly confused. It is disagreeable to condemn a book, but this cannot be commended.

SMITH, WILBUR M. *A List of Bibliographies of Theological and Biblical Literature Published in Great Britain and America, 1595-1931*. Privately published, 1931. Address author at Coatesville, Pa. 62 pages. \$1.00.

This valuable little compilation offers rather a selection than a complete record of British and American theological bibliography. The modest author points out the limitations of the work with frankness in his Preface. But he has done a highly useful service for librarians, students, and teachers in placing at their disposal an extensive list of bibliographies. The full descriptions which accompany the titles are the product of careful research. It is remarkable that this much-needed task has been done by a working pastor.

VEIT, LUDWIG ANDREAS. *Die Kirche im Zeitalter des Individualismus (1648 bis zur Gegenwart)*. (Kirsch, "Kirchengeschichte," Vol. IV, No. 1.) St. Louis: Herder, 1930. 528 pages. \$5.75.

The volume under review, representing the first half of the fourth volume of Kirsch's well-known Roman Catholic handbook of church history, covers the period from 1648 to 1800. It is written definitely from the viewpoint that there is only one church. In consequence, Protestantism receives no more attention than Eastern orthodoxy, which is treated under the heading "The Schism." All students of modern Roman Catholicism will find this work indispensable. The facts are clearly and not uncritically presented. Aside from his natural Roman bias the author is admirably objective. What the Protestant historian misses in particular is the interpretation of the history of the church on the basis of a comparison with cultural movements. The title gives promise of such a

method, but it is only occasionally observed, when the historical material itself makes it a necessity. We are grateful to the author for a full presentation of the facts and for an excellent, highly welcome Bibliography.

VOLZ, HANS. *Luthers schmalkaldische Artikel und Melanchthons "Tractatus de potestate Papae."* Gotha: Klotz, 1931. iv+70 pages. M. 3.

Volz examines the genesis and influence of the Schmalkalden articles of 1537, and their incorporation in later documents, and adds a similar treatment of the tractate of Melanchthon on papal power. The latter was intended as a supplement to the Augsburg Confession. It was written in 1537 but not published until 1540. The various Latin and German editions are indicated. The appendixes include a table of dates covering the period of the preparation of these works.

WEBER, JULIUS A. (compiler). *Religions and Philosophies in the United States of America.* Los Angeles: Wetzel, 1931. 333 pages. \$2.50.

To use the words of the compiler, this volume is intended to be a "contribution toward spiritual peace through understanding." The book contains fifty-three chapters, each dealing with one of the religious bodies to be found in the United States, prepared by one within the group. The chief value of the book lies in the fact that it gives a concise statement regarding several religious groups about which little is known.

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

DUHM, HANS. *Der Weg des modernen Menschen zu Gott.* München: Reinhardt, 1931. 198 pages. Bound M. 6.50; unbound M. 4.50.

It is refreshing to read again a theological book that is not filled with discussions on insoluble theological problems. Professor Duhm makes a simple and very direct plea for a return to the natural religion of Jesus. He argues against Paulinism and the doctrines of the Lutheran and Calvinist reformation. Zwingli is made the recipient of compliments in recognition of his common sense. One may adequately describe the author's attitude as rationalism and liberalism. Such a statement does not necessarily contain criticism, but it indicates that his point of view seems to be that of yesterday rather than today.

MULERT, HERMANN. *Religion, Kirche, Theologie.* Giessen: Töpelmann, 1931. 169 pages. Bound M. 6.00; unbound M. 4.50.

Professor Mulert offers an interestingly written introduction to theological study, devoting himself especially to a discussion on the relationships between religion, theology, and church. The ideas he presents are neither new nor particularly thought-provoking, but they will be of interest to those who desire to know what a German professor of theology thinks of his and his students' vocation.

TEMPLE, WILLIAM. *Christian Faith and Life.* New York: Macmillan, 1931. 139 pages. \$1.50.

This book is the substance of eight addresses delivered in the University Church at Oxford early in the year. The addresses were, Dr. Temple says, delivered from very brief notes, and what is here published is—with some slight editing—the verbatim reports published in the *Church Times*. The book is, essentially, as much of a "mission" and "retreat" for Oxford Anglican students as can be put in print. Dr. Temple himself

RECENT BOOKS

155

says that the atmosphere of the mission cannot be recaptured, and he does not offer the book as more than it is. The general line of thought he had already worked out, he says, in his book, *Christus veritas*.

The themes considered are very inclusive: "What Do We Mean by 'God'?" "The Place of Christ in History"; "Is There a Moral Standard?"; "Sin and Repentance"; "The Meaning of the Crucifixion"; "The Holy Spirit in Life"; "Prayer and Sacraments"; "The Christian Society." The whole approach is simple, direct, very practical, mainly uncritical, and controlled by presuppositions common to both the lecturer and his audience. Dr. Temple has a fine distinction of style. Few men anywhere could so nearly talk literature from "very brief notes." If the book is judged by what it sought to do, it is very effective.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

AMES, EDWARD R. *The Unknown God*. Los Angeles: Ivan Deach, Jr., 1931. 288 pages. Not priced. For private distribution.

The failure of Christians to make their religion effective in the modern world is traced to their abandonment of Jehovah for other conceptions of God.

BIERBAUM, MAX. *Religion und Recht in der Ehe*. Münster: Aschendorff, 1931. 71 pages. M 1.50.

This little book contains three lectures on Pius XI's encyclical on marriage (December 31, 1930). It is an interesting commentary on the Pope's statements and an enthusiastic indorsement of them. The well-known Roman Catholic opposition against divorce, birth control, sterilization, intermarriage between Catholics and Protestants, etc., is here presented. The author's reverent glorification of the wisdom of the papal see is almost pathetic. He is aware of the fact that encyclical letters do not possess the character of infallibility. But he declares: "Only in very rare cases one is not obliged to accept the pope's decision. But because such decisions emanate from the highest teacher of the church and because they contain important natural and supernatural guarantees of their truth, they must generally be accepted with inner religious assent." Another most interesting presupposition of the author is that, because marriage is a sacrament, it falls primarily under the jurisdiction of the church and only secondarily, in view of its civil effects, under that of the state.

COLEMAN, EDWARD D. *The Bible in English Drama*. New York: Public Library, 1931. iv+212 pages. \$1.00.

A fundamental reference work for biblical plays in English, consisting of a classified Bibliography fully indexed. The contents of many works are indicated in small type below the bibliographical note, and in some instances reviews of the books are cited. Over three thousand titles are included.

JENKINS, BURRIS. *American Religion as I See It Lived*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1930. 282 pages. \$2.00.

In this volume the liberal minister of a Kansas City church sets out to act as a reporter on present-day American religion, as he has seen it lived. The reporter is very personal—much of the book being largely autobiographical—and his exposition of present-day American religion grows out of contacts he has had with many kinds of people.

"Lambeth Series." Milwaukee: Morehouse, 1931. Pamphlets of approximately 48 pages each. 50 cents each.

The decennial Lambeth conferences of the bishops of the Anglican communion throughout the world have no legislative authority, yet possess great moral weight in registering the corporate mind of one important part of Christendom on matters of faith and morals. Under the general editorship of the Bishop of Liverpool—a prelate who takes seriously the teaching office of the ministry—this series of pamphlets is being issued to interpret and apply the findings of the 1930 Conference in terms designed to help the average thoughtful person. *The Faith and Witness of the Church in This Generation*, by the Bishop of Winchester, is an excellent introduction to the series; the Venerable V. F. Storr writes on *God in the Modern Mind*; Rev. Francis Underhill on *God in Worship*; Archbishop d'Arcy (Armagh) on *God in Science*. The discussion on *Marriage and Birth Control* is divided between the Bishop of Liverpool (liberal) and the Bishop of St. Albans (conservative). In *Looking Forward* Canon Raven enters upon a courageous criticism of certain weaknesses in the 1930 Lambeth report. Bishop Oldham of Albany has collected a number of American judgments on the Conference in *Through American Eyes*. Other numbers are to follow. The series will prove of value to those who would know what representative Anglican leaders are thinking with reference to great Christian problems.

MAY, J. LEWIS (ed.). *God and the Universe*. New York: Dial Press, 1931. 209 pages. \$2.50.

An apologetic for the abiding reality of Christ in a changing intellectual climate. There are three essays by an Anglican, a Roman Catholic, and a Methodist; all of them directed against recent scientific writers on religion.

MOXON, C. *Freud's Denial of Religion*. A reprint from the *British Journal of Medical Psychology* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1931). 157 pages.

TITTLE, ERNEST FREMONT. *We Need Religion*. New York: Holt, 1931. 156 pages. \$1.50.

In an age like ours that has everything to live with and nothing to live for, we stand in desperate need of religion. Dr. Ernest Fremont Tittle charges himself with the responsibility of making this age conscious of its need. The result is a book of deep religious feeling, intense ethical fervor, and genuine spiritual insight. This is a religious book. The author's mind is made up. So sure is he of his convictions, so clearly has he fixed his position on foundations that are intellectually tenable and socially potent, that he doesn't stop to prove anything. The facts are obvious. His business is to make unbelieving minds see them. It is positive preaching for a vacillating world.

There are ten chapters in all. In them religion is related to health, happiness, life eternal, and the energies and motives of men. Two chapters deal with our need of religion and the religion we need. One deals with disarmament, another with the mighty meek, and the book closes with a final chapter on "What Is Spirituality?" This is the only chapter that left the reviewer unsatisfied in a book that seems entirely satisfactory.

Dr. Tittle's preaching is positive, direct, and withal persuasive. He is original without being novel, simple without being platitudinous, and interesting without resorting to any homiletical tricks. He gives one the impression not so much as of one holding convictions as being held by convictions. What more can one say in praise of a preacher?

RECENT BOOKS

157

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

VOGEL, DR. CLAUDE (secretary). *The Franciscan Educational Conference: Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting, June 30—July 2, 1930*, Vol. XII, No. 12. Brookland, Washington, D.C.: Capuchin College, 1931. 202 pages.

The object of the Franciscan Educational Conference is to safeguard the principles and promote the interests of Catholic education, and particularly to encourage the "spirit of mutual helpfulness and co-operation among the Friar educators of the American provinces." The Conference has three departments—classical, philosophical, and theological—and was organized in St. Louis in 1919. Besides the proceedings, this *Report* contains twelve papers together with the discussions. Among the titles of papers are the following: "How Can We Vitalize Our Course of Philosophy and Make It Meet Contemporary Modes of Thought?"; "The Correlation of Science and Philosophy"; and "The Social Sciences in Our Course of Philosophy."

MISCELLANEOUS

BARNES, MARY CLARK. *How Came Our Constitution?* New York: Revell, 1930. 98 pages. \$1.00.

A brief presentation of the development of government in the United States, intended for more or less informal study groups such as women's clubs, forums, and adult Bible classes.

FITCH, F. M. *The Daughter of Abd Salam*. Boston: Gorham Press, 1930. 75 pages. \$2.50.

A very readable story of the major events in the life of a Palestinian peasant woman. The book throws interesting light on the profound difference between the Near Eastern and the Western attitude to life. It is illustrated with excellent photographs. Yet the whole production seems hardly worth the high price that is put upon it.

MACARTNEY, C. E. *Lincoln and His Cabinet*. New York: Scribner's, 1931. xviii+366 pages. \$3.50.

This is a collection of well-written biographies of the several members of Lincoln's cabinet, based largely upon memoirs and autobiographical materials. More than two-thirds of the space is devoted to the biographies of Seward, Chase, and Stanton while relatively slight attention is accorded Cameron, Smith Bates, Welles, and Blair, and nowhere is the cabinet treated as a whole. The author is not afraid to tell the truth, and in his account of the appointment of his cabinet he brings out the fact that Lincoln was a clever politician and a "born bargainer."

Some rather strange mistakes have crept into the book, and one is inclined to question certain statements and conclusions of the author, but as a whole we have here a very informing and interesting presentation of a group of men who, as a whole, served the nation well.

Permanent Preventives of Unemployment. Addresses delivered at the Conference on Permanent Preventives of Unemployment, held in Washington, D.C., January 26-27, 1931. 100 pages. Paper \$0.50, or \$20 per hundred.

The Foreword to this volume states that while the churches of all faiths responded generously to the special call for immediate relief in the unemployment situation, "it was felt that it was highly important also to focus the conscience of the nation on

permanent preventives of unemployment and point out the moral and ethical necessity of eliminating from our economic life the tragedy of unemployment with its human suffering and economic loss. Three national religious organizations, the Social Action Department of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Social Justice Commission of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, and the Social Service Commission of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, therefore jointly sponsored a national Conference on Permanent Preventives of Unemployment which was held in Washington, January 26-27, 1931." The sixteen addresses delivered at this Conference are printed in this volume. The speakers were distinguished employers, economists, government officials, labor representatives, and church leaders of various faiths. Naturally different and sometimes conflicting views are expressed, but together these statements comprise a useful contribution to the thinking of the nation on this grave and troublesome problem. The book is available at the offices of each of the agencies sponsoring the Conference.

This is a time for
serious thinking in
the realm of character values.

The Religious Education Association welcomes into its fellowship those who want the best thought on problems of living in this machine age.

The Association journal, RELIGIOUS EDUCATION, stimulates the membership in its thinking. It is the mouthpiece of the movement.

Mail this coupon today and
be a part of this movement

OFFICE
of the
R. E. A.
59 E. Van Buren
Chicago, Ill.

Religious Education Assn. _____ 193_____
59 East Van Buren Street
Chicago, Illinois

Please enroll me as a member in the Religious Education Association.

Enclosed is my check for \$5.00.

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

BUSINESS _____

BAYLE THE SCEPTIC

By
Howard Robinson

No modern theologian, student of religion, or ecclesiastic can afford to neglect this first full biography and appraisal of the writings of the famous seventeenth century French refugee—one of the foremost to attack outworn theologies and powerful superstitions. (The book contains a bibliography which is more complete than any other in existence.)

Price, \$4.25

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Descriptions of books on request

3 outstanding series of books in religion to meet 3 separate needs

Constructive Studies

A series of more than thirty courses of study for the church school, week-day school, and vacation school, organized for age groups.

Principles and Methods of Religious Education

Eighteen books on teaching technique.

Handbooks of Religion and Ethics

The historical method and individuality of treatment characterize this series, suitable for textbooks, collateral reading, and of wide general interest.

Write for descriptive circulars

The University of Chicago Press

By the Waters of Babylon A Story of Ancient Israel

By LOUIS WALLIS

The first novel written in view of modern critical scholarship, showing how religion evolved out of heathenism through a great struggle for social justice and international peace. Can be used for collateral reading in Bible study and for homiletical suggestion.

From Prof. Lewis B. Paton, Hartford Theological Seminary: "The first Biblical story that I have seen that has behind it sound critical and historical knowledge. A story that is consistent with history and that gives a true picture of the times with which it deals. Deserves a wide circulation."

From Prof. J. M. Powis Smith, The University of Chicago: "I congratulate the author upon the creative imagination that the book displays, and upon the closeness of its description of Palestinian life in the fifth and sixth centuries to historical reality."

\$2.00 through all booksellers or from

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, 60 Fifth Avenue, New York

THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

CONTENTS FOR APRIL 1932

No. 2

Vol. XII

JOB ANSWERS GOD: BEING THE RELIGIOUS PERPLEXITIES OF AN OBSCURE PHARISEE	159
By MILTON STEINBERG, Indianapolis, Indiana	
CONCERNING THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD	177
By DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, University of Berlin	
A STUDENT OF THEOLOGY AT THE END OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY	186
By JOHN G. FRANK, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee	
THE RELIGIOUS BEARINGS OF A SECULAR MIND: GEORGE HERBERT MEAD	200
By T. V. SMITH, University of Chicago	
THE GOAL OF RELIGION	214
By A. STEWART WOODBURN, Crozer Theological Seminary	
EAST AND WEST: A STUDY IN IRENICS	230
By ALBERT E. SUTHERS, Ohio Wesleyan University	
THE EFFECT OF THE COLLEGE EXPERIENCE UPON STUDENTS' CONCEPTS OF GOD	242
By ARTHUR C. WICKENDEN, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio	
CRITICAL REVIEWS	
PRIMITIVE ELEMENTS IN ROMAN RELIGION	268
By ARCHER TAYLOR, University of Chicago	
SKETCHES OF RELIGIOUS FOUNDERS	269
By SOLOMON B. FREEHOF, Chicago, Illinois	
SOME RECENT BOOKS ON JESUS	270
By ERNEST W. PARSONS, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School	
CHRISTIANITY'S INTERPRETATION OF JESUS	272
By HENRY B. ROBINS, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School	
STUDIES OF JESUS FOR THE LAYMAN	275
By ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL, University of Chicago	
COMPARATIVELY SHORT GRAMMAR	277
By ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL, University of Chicago	
A MANUAL OF THE HISTORY OF THE POPES	279
By J. MINTON BATTEN, Scarritt College	
CHURCH HISTORY BIBLIOGRAPHY	280
By ROBERT HASTINGS NICHOLS, Auburn Theological Seminary	
YOUNG CALVIN'S HUMANISTIC STUDIES	283
By J. MINTON BATTEN, Scarritt College	
THE BAPTISTS ON THE FRONTIER	284
By CARL E. SCHNEIDER, Eden Theological Seminary	
TRENDS TOWARD A UNITED CHRISTENDOM	286
By BERNARD E. MELAND, Central College, Fayette, Missouri	
A THEOLOGIAN'S VIEW OF THE CHURCH	288
By WILHELM PAUCK, University of Chicago	

[Contents continued on following page]

THE PROSPECTS OF ROMAN CATHOLICISM	24
By R. E. E. HARKNESS, Crozer Theological Seminary	
CHANGING SOCIAL PATTERNS AND THE IDEA OF GOD	24
By HENRY B. ROBINS, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School	
RELIGION AS KNOWLEDGE AND AS LOVE	24
By HENRY NELSON WIEMAN, University of Chicago	
THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO THEOLOGY	24
By HENRY B. ROBINS, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School	
RELIGION ON THE RADIO	24
By EDWIN EWART AUBREY, University of Chicago	
STUDIES IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION	24
By JOHN S. CORNETT, Kansas Wesleyan University	
RELIGION IN UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES	24
By W. A. HARPER, Elon College	
HUMANISM—ANOTHER BATTLE LINE!	34
By CURTIS W. REESE, Chicago, Illinois	
GOD AND MAMMON	34
By MILES H. KRUMBINE, Plymouth Church of Shaker Heights, Cleveland, Ohio	
NEW HOME MISSION STUDY BOOKS	34
By CHARLES T. HOLMAN, University of Chicago	
RECENT BOOKS	34

BOOKS REVIEWED IN THIS NUMBER

<i>Ballard</i> , Roving with the Migrants	34
<i>Bennett</i> , The Dilemma of Religious Knowledge	24
<i>Branscomb</i> , The Teachings of Jesus	24
<i>Breen</i> , John Calvin: A Study in French Humanism	24
<i>Burriss</i> , Taboo, Magic, Spirits: A Study of Primitive Elements in Roman Religion	24
<i>Burrows</i> , Founders of Great Religions	24
<i>Case</i> , Jesus through the Centuries	24
<i>Case</i> (ed.), A Bibliographical Guide to the History of Christianity	24
<i>Hayward</i> , A History of the Popes	24
<i>Heiler</i> , Im Ringen um die Kirche	24
<i>Hobson</i> , God and Mammon	34
<i>Horton</i> , A Psychological Approach to Theology	34
<i>Hunting</i> , The Adventures of Mr. Friend	34
<i>King</i> (ed.), Humanism—Another Battle Line!	34
<i>Kirkland</i> , Portrait of a Carpenter	24
<i>Lietzmann</i> , Der Prozess Jesu	24
<i>Lotz and Crawford</i> (eds.), Studies in Religious Education	24
<i>McConnell</i> , The Rural Billion	34
<i>McLean</i> , God and the Census	34
<i>Mathews</i> , The Growth of the Idea of God	24
<i>Moore, J. F.</i> , Will America Become Catholic?	34
<i>Moore, J. M.</i> , The Challenge of Change	24
<i>Radin</i> , The Trial of Jesus of Nazareth	24
<i>Robertson and Davis</i> , A New Short Grammar of the Greek Testament	24
Science and Religion (A Symposium)	24
<i>Sweet, L. M.</i> , The Head of the Corner	24
<i>Sweet, W. W.</i> , Religion on the American Frontier	24
<i>Towner</i> (ed.), Religion in Higher Education	24
<i>Trattner</i> , As a Jew Sees Jesus	24
<i>Warner</i> , The World on a Farm	34
<i>Winkler</i> , Das Wesen der Kirche mit besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer Sichtbarkeit	24

THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

Volume XII

APRIL 1932

Number 2

JOB ANSWERS GOD: BEING THE RELIGIOUS PERPLEXITIES OF AN OBSCURE PHARISEE

MILTON STEINBERG
Indianapolis, Indiana

I

LOST in the débris of literature—that pathetic agglomeration of broken ideas, shards of books, unprinted manuscripts, unedited texts, and tomes moldering in the dust of research libraries—lie all of those products of the human intellect on which the judgment of posterity has issued adverse decision. Despite all mystic faith to the contrary, the generations that follow the appearance of a literary work are no more trustworthy judges of its value than those contemporary with it. And yet, as with men, so with books, a rough, though delayed, justice may eventually be dispensed.

Buried and half forgotten under deposits of literary rubble, a book waits for a review of judgment—appealing from the verdict of two millennia of posterity. An evil fate has pursued the slender volume known as the “Ezra Apocalypse.” Corruptions of text, alien additions, unsympathetic translations—all alike have conspired to muffle its agonized voice of protest against the iniquities of the universe. And yet, to the initiate, to a small esoteric circle, this frail booklet has been a prime achievement of the moral and literary life of man, burning with restless indignation, rebellious of prevailing modes of thought, and expressive of eternal determinations of man’s heart. Taking up the thread of discourse at the point at which Job sinks into unsatis-

fied silence, it challenges God's administration of his world. The "Ezra Apocalypse" stands spiritually, therefore, as a sequel to the Book of Job; it expresses the thoughts and doubts which Job might have uttered had he spoken again in answer to God after a silence of three centuries. It speaks with the same dramatic force and literary majesty with which Job would have again indicted God.

So beautiful a spirit, so high a quest, and so dynamic a challenge should not be forgotten from the hearts of men. The correction of a literary misjudgment, the exposition of the background and content of what is essentially a classic, the mitigation of an intellectual neglect—these are the motives which impel this essay.

II

Of making theodicies there is no end. For if man insists on having his God-idea as the primary principle of explanation of the universe, he must needs then defend that idea when the phenomena of the world deny the God postulated to explain them. The business of justifying God's ways to man is therefore an inevitable concomitant of the having of a God.

In the last analysis, the God-idea is a universal solvent in which all the turbid, variegated aspects of the universe dissolve into the clear lucidity of one principle of sufficient reason. It is not the intention of this statement to minimize the influence of cultus and emotion as determinants in the genesis of the God-idea. And yet, since religion left the animistic stage, one of the major practical functions of Gods has been to account for man's world. By virtue of his belief, man succeeded in finding a rationale for the perplexities into which he was plunged. The Gods he found useful, not only because they sent rain and healed disease, but also because through them one knew why the universe behaved as it did. Man has clung to his Gods, not only for what they could give him, but equally because through them life and the universe became explicable.

The universe, however, is not so simple as to submit to com-

plete solution in any one solvent. There remain, like chemical precipitates, certain aspects of reality that defy solution. It is this fact, that no God-idea ever quite explains the entire universe, that an inexplicable residue always remains, which makes the spinning of theodicies the inevitable counterpoise of the building of theologies.

For if Brahma, why Maya? If the One, why the Many? If the Absolute, why the transient Relative? If the sons of God assemble, why must Satan also be numbered among them?

The aspects of the universe that the God, who was to explain everything, does not explain; the elements that resist the universal solvent and render turgid its clarity—these account for the fact that every theology casts a shadow in the form of a theodicy.

Given a simple God-idea, then a simple theodicy accompanies it, even as the simple tribal God of ancient Israel was accompanied by an equally naïve theory of tribal sins. Given a subtle, sophisticated God-idea and a subtle, sophisticated theodicy follows not far behind—witness the recourse to mathematics by Leibnitz and the ingenuities of Hegel and the absolute idealists.

III

The literature of no ancient people is so completely preoccupied with the idea of God as that collection of Hebrew writings which is preserved in the Bible. For, in a very real sense, the entire Bible is the biography of a God. In it, there is recorded the genesis and evolution of that theology which was destined to impress itself indelibly on the mentality, not alone of Israel, but equally of the entire Western world. Step by step, degree by degree, Scripture depicts the growth of a God-concept from a primitive henotheism to the incomparable beauty of the God of Deuteronomy, Isaiah, Hosea, and Job. And at each step, paralleling each variant in this history, is to be found a compensating theodicy calculated to render intelligible such elements in experience as apparently denied the truth of some aspect of the

contemporary theology. Each advance and evolutionary modification in the God-idea necessitated and evoked a corresponding step in apologetics.

To be sure, the problem of God's justice did not become an acute one until the bewildering shock of the Babylonian exile. During the first commonwealth, a ready answer was at hand to account for the apparent irregularities in the dealings of a just God with man. God and Israel, it was believed, had entered into a covenant or contract. By virtue of an agreement made first with Abraham, renewed by other patriarchs, and solemnly reaffirmed by the blood-covenant at Sinai, God took Israel to be his own peculiar people out of all the nations of the earth. Israel, in turn, agreed to obey the Law as revealed at Sinai. The terms of the contract were clear. If Israel, as one contracting party kept the Law, God would give the rain of the land in its season, the former rain and the latter rain, and Israel might gather in its corn and its wine and its oil. But if Israel broke God's Law, it would be visited for its breach with all the curses contained in what is perhaps the finest bit of malediction in all literature, the curse of Mt. Gerizim.

When, therefore, calamity befell the Hebrews and they were confronted by the question as to why God should send drought, famine, or military defeat to his own chosen people, the answer was patent. God was thereby punishing his people for violating the covenant as embodied in the Law. And since Israel always had its share of lawbreakers, there was nothing in the answer to render credibility impossible. Much of the early literature of the Bible is but an expression of this philosophy of Jewish history. In the simplicity of the scheme lay its potency. Some members of the House of Israel sinned against God, and God punished Israel as a whole. For Israel was one people not only politically but also in blood descent and God treated with Israel as a unit. There was no empirical refutation of this theodical scheme for there was no way of estimating how large a proportion of the Hebrews were sinners nor to what extent they had

departed from the covenant. The celestial bookkeeper defied an accounting. It is not for nothing that this primitive philosophy never quite disappeared from religious thought despite subsequent progress in the refinement of the God-idea.

Now, it is obvious that such a scheme of justification could have efficacy only so long as God was conceived as dealing with Israel as a whole. Once the individual had emancipated himself from the clan, once he had shifted his theological emphasis from the relation of God to a people to the relation of God to the individual—the solution that had hitherto sufficed now became hopelessly deficient.

Such a shift in emphasis took place in the last years of the first commonwealth and was given added impetus by the destruction of the Jewish state and the Babylonian captivity. That God was just had by that time become an unchallenged dogma of Jewish thought. But both the absence of national life and the growing sense of individuality make a defense of God's justice in terms of the whole people irrelevant and naïve. A new philosophy was required; one that, without relinquishing God's righteousness, would account for the world's injustice in terms not of Israel but of the individual Israelite.

Shocked by the national calamity that had destroyed the Jewish state and stimulated by a quickened sense of personality and individuality, the Jewish exiles in Babylonia looked critically at God's administration of his universe and decided that it was not equitable. They perceived what men have since never failed to perceive, that there was little or no correlation between virtue and happiness. Their fathers had sinned and were no more and the children bore the consequences of the iniquities of their ancestors. To defend God's justice by an appeal to the doctrine of national responsibility was no longer possible. Wherefore, the cry arose, "The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the teeth of the children are set on edge."

Against this folk saying which negated completely the concept of a righteous God, the prophets adopted an attitude of

unbending opposition. Confronted by a disturbing and unwelcome fact, they proceeded flatly to deny the fact. The very dogmatism of the denial as recorded in the eighteenth chapter of Ezekiel lends credence to the suspicion that that prophet attempted to crush the budding heresy by drowning it in the very vehemence of his negation. "What mean ye that ye use this proverb . . . is it My ways that are unequal? Is it not your ways that are unequal?" There are no inequalities in God's world. Rather is its equity quick and certain—"The soul that sinneth, it shall die."

In short, Ezekiel asserted that God's justice in this world was unimpeachable. There was no evil without antecedent sin, and no man suffered for the transgressions of another. Away with criticism of the régime of the divine. God's ways were equal—man's were not and therefore he suffered.

That such a theodicy should have gained acceptance may seem to us an instance of a theological curiosity. For it runs directly into the face of every evidence of human experience. Several factors, however, operated to render it acceptable—the prestige of a prophetic utterance, the restoration of the state which made possible a relapse into the theodicy of group responsibility, and, above all, a passionate desire to cling to belief in God's righteousness. Whatever the case, the dogma became part of the doctrinal paraphernalia of Jewish life. From this doctrine a particularly obnoxious corollary was drawn. For if sin was the cause of all suffering, it followed relentlessly that misfortune was evidence a priori of sin. And the wretched sufferer now bore not only his own burden but the added one of the opprobrium of the orthodox who saw in his calamity proof of hitherto unsuspected transgression.

Rebellion was inevitable. The realities of experience as well as a sense of resentment of the unwarranted corollary led inevitably to a re-examination of the whole philosophy. The revulsion finds its classic expression in the Book of Job. There is no need of recapitulating the burden of that masterpiece. It

suffices for our purposes to state that here the issue is clear cut—the orthodox and self-righteous friends of the sufferer insist that his trials are the punishment for sin, and Job clings to his integrity. The entire argument has no other purpose than illuminating the *impasse* resulting from the confrontation of Ezekiel's theory with actual living experience. Nor does the *deus ex machina* in the form of God's answer resolve the problem, for the upshot of God's speech is merely to assert man's ignorance and His own inscrutability. Job admits contrition; he has spoken that which he understood not and he is no nearer a solution of his problem than when he started.

At this point the issue rested—at a rather uncomfortable patchwork of blind faith in the righteousness of God and blind ignorance of its workings. During the two centuries that followed the publication of Job, pious Jews must have squirmed uncomfortably at the sight of God's mismanagement of the world. There was little solace in an appeal to ignorance, but the problem seemed insoluble and it was obviously the part of wisdom to let the sleeping dogs of heresy and doubt strictly alone.

IV

And then, suddenly, a new and brilliant solution was found—so comforting, so astoundingly simple that troubled minds must have taken refuge in it in veritable gasps of relief. For, during the second century before the common era, Jewish theologians discovered the sweet uses of immortality. There has always been a vague, inchoate belief in a shadowy survival of the soul after death. But it was not until the second century that men discovered in the future world an answer to the problem of God's justice. The first authentic reference to immortality in the Bible as found in Daniel shows how fully men understood its availability as a resolution of the *impasse* of Job. To be sure, God's ways seemed unequal in this world, but that was only because both reward and punishment were held in partial abeyance until the life that followed death. The problems of God's

justice were no more. Whatever wrongs this world knew had assurances of correction in the world to come.

It is difficult for us, who live in an age when immortality and retribution are more uncertain hopes than positive beliefs, to sense how completely ancient and medieval Judaism and Christianity centered about them. This life was but a corridor leading to the next and the goal of human effort was the attainment of its bliss. Such injustice as the world exhibited was no longer a stumbling-block to faith, for reward and punishment waited beyond to render the balance even.

Not least among the charms of this doctrine as a solution of the problem of the theodicy was its irrefutability. No one had empirical knowledge of what followed death and men could believe much as they chose without fear of contradiction. The perfect theodicy had been found, one that solved all problems and defied refutation. To be sure the doctrine rendered religion naïve. Every difficulty of life in this world no longer presented a challenge—for in heaven all things were perfectly adjusted. It was all naïve—but comfortable; and who would have the troubled sophistication of Job's perplexities when he could have the tranquil assurances of a world and a God justified by a glorious immortality.

Considering the complete absence of materials in the form of direct evidence as to what follows corporeal dissolution, the scheme of heaven and hell as developed by rabbinic Judaism and adopted by Christianity is a masterpiece of artistic *creatio ex nihilo*. The rabbis, over a period of centuries, produced elaborate schemata of the exact procedure in the future world, even to equipping it with recreational facilities in the form of a celestial academy for the study of Torah. Probably the most bizarre ramification of the whole system was the development of a type of theodical calculus. God, it was asserted, gives prosperity to sinners in this world to reward them for such feeble virtues as they possess so that their punishment may be unmitigated in the world to come. Conversely, the righteous are made

to suffer in mortal life for their few stray lapses so that the bliss of Eden may be complete and unalloyed. A complete solution, almost too complete, for it tended to make, by a strange paradox, adversity a sign of God's grace.

Simple, sufficient, irrefutable, unlimited in potentiality, there is no cause for wonder that it became the classic solution of the problem of the theodicy for over two thousand years. Without significant challenge save by an occasional stray heretic, it dominated theology, knowing no rebel.

To be sure, the nature of the justice distributed in the next world was differently limned by various expositors and justifiers of God's ways to man. These ranged from the abstruse immortality of the "acquired soul" in some philosopher's timeless bliss as depicted by Maimonides to the quite tangible heaven and hell of the simple pietist, undisturbed by considerations of the abstract. But under all the variations in visualization of divine retribution there was one common basis of agreement, namely, that the injustices, wrongs, and sufferings of this world would be rectified when man awoke from the sleep of death. That, if not in the flesh, at least in spirit, man would live to see perfect justice done.

V

Against this background of perfect agreement, the obscure figure of one protesting dissenter stands out all the more boldly. Amid the harmonious chimes of assent, the faltering, timid, and uncertainly discordant voice of one who dared to disagree rings like some refreshing false chord in music dull by virtue of too much harmony.

The nebulous source of the timid and faltering voice of protest was that of the unknown and much-neglected author of the Apocalypse of Ezra. Lost in the débris of the literary heritage of Israel is a little-read, badly corrupted volume, preserved in the Apocrypha, entitled variously Second Esdras, Fourth Ezra, or more simply, the Apocalypse of Ezra. Written approximately at the end of the first century of the common era, this little book

has suffered a strange fate. Composed, as the preponderance of evidence seems to indicate, originally in Hebrew, it was thence translated into Greek and thence again into Syriac, Ethiopic, Arabic, Armenian, and, most important of all, into Latin. The Latin version reveals the linguistic history of this little volume, for in the Latin text can be perceived vestigial remains of the Greek and Hebrew forms. This Latin version suffers, not only in style from the disturbing idioms, grammar, and phrases of the languages of the earlier basic versions, but it has been further corrupted by later additions interpolated by early Christians of a distinctly and obviously irrelevant christological nature. As though the difficulties connected with the text were not sufficient to discourage the average lay-reader, another obstacle has been added in the paucity and poverty of translations. The most widely circulated English translation is that included in the King James Apocrypha. Unfortunately, this attempt at the translator's art was made with a modicum of critical judgment so that both later Christian addition and textual corruptions have been piously preserved to bewilder the reader. In addition, the King James version is entirely uninspired by any perception of the inmost viewpoint of the book, and one may read that translation again and again and still miss the heart and crux of the author's protest.

The only intelligible English translation is that of Box. It is sympathetic and understanding. Unfortunately, Box's translation is vitiated in great measure by the fact that the translator has an axe to grind in the form of a special theory concerning the critical unity of the work. Intent on demonstrating, on the basis of very meager evidence, strata in the composition of the original Hebrew text, Box restricts the possibilities his translation possesses for the average lay-reader.

It is a curious irony of history that so bold, and in its skepticism so modern, a book should suffer the unpleasant and undeserved oblivion which has been its lot. It is, in a sense, in the interests of literary justice, that this expository article is writ-

ten. For the author of the Apocalypse of Ezra was a rare and unique figure, one who dared to examine and challenge the universal belief of his time and to protest against it on the grounds that human standards of justice demand a more equitable world than even a retribution after death allows.

Who the author of this book may have been no one knows. The sum total of knowledge about him is that he wrote about the year 100 C.E., and that the evidence reveals clearly that he was a member of the Pharisaic or Tannaitic party in Israel. All irrelevant facts as to name, personal history, and experience are, unfortunately for the pedant, lost. All the relevant materials for a knowledge of the inmost essence of the author's soul, his faiths, his doubts, his gropings, are revealed for all to read in the text of his much-neglected revolt against God's administration of his world.

VI

"In the thirtieth year of the downfall of the city, I, Salathiel, who am also Ezra, was in Babylon and I lay sore disturbed on my bed, as my thoughts rose to my heart; for I saw the loneliness of Zion and the multitudes of those who dwell in Babylon and my spirit was profoundly moved and I began to speak fearsome words to the Most High" (Fourth Ezra 3:1-2).¹

With this paragraph, the author under the name of Ezra or Salathiel (following the custom of the day by which all authors ascribed their works to ancient worthies) sets the scene for the dialogues which follow. It is the thirtieth year after the fall of Jerusalem, and the author finds himself in Babylon (Rome) face to face with a flagrant instance of God's injustice. For he remembers that Jerusalem lies in ruins while about him surge the prosperous multitudes of impious Rome. His heart grows bitter at the contrast. He challenges God. "Where, pray, is the justice of the Almighty?"

And lest God return the trite reply that Israel has sinned,

¹ All references are to verse and chapter of the text of the Apocrypha. The translations are the writer's.

Ezra anticipates the answer. It is true, he admits, that "they sinned, those who inhabited the city" (3:25). Their punishment of exile and destruction was well merited, for Israel had, indeed, broken the covenant.

But, "I said then in my heart, 'Do those who live in Babylon act more righteously' It came to pass moreover when I came hither that I saw in my mind the impieties and the innumerable sinners these thirty years and my heart suffered. . . . For has Babylon done better than Zion? Has any people acknowledged thee save Israel or what tribes have believed thy covenants as has Jacob? Do thou, now, weigh in balance our sins and those of the other inhabitants of the world and it will be discovered which way the dial inclines" (3:28).

The issue is clearly defined to Ezra. Israel may be paying the penalty for its sins but if so the injustice of the world is all the more flagrant. For Ezra knows the world and he knows that Rome and its Gentiles are fully as sinful as Jerusalem and its Jews. The theodicy via tribal responsibility has potential validity only when Israel is considered alone and absolutely, but once comparisons are drawn, God's justice becomes painfully suspect.

With a touch of impatience, an angel speaking for God demands of Ezra that he recognize his place, even as Job was asked by what right he "darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge."

"Do you," asks the angel, "think to comprehend the way of the Most High?"

But unlike Job, Ezra refuses to be contrite and lay his hands on his mouth. With superbly simple insolence he replies, "*Ita, dominus meus*. I do, my Lord." Nothing less than comprehension of the ultimate rationale of God's administration of his universe will satisfy the seeker.

And then the angel in contempt overwhelms Ezra with unanswerable questions much as God crushed Job with a deluge of challenges indicative of his ignorance.

"And he said unto me:—'Come, weigh me the weight of fire,

or measure the blast of the wind, or recall for me the day that is gone.' And I said to him:—'Who of those born can do this that you should ask such things of me?'

"And he said to me:—'Had I asked you saying: How many dwellings are there in the heart of the sea, or how many springs form the source of the deep, or how many are the paths above the sky, or where are the exits of paradise?'

"Thou wouldst perchance have said to me, 'Into the deep I have not descended, nor ever as yet down into hell nor ever mounted to the skies!'

"Now, however, I have asked you only about fire, wind and the day, things which you have experienced and without which you cannot be, and you have not answered me ' . . . how shall your frame be able to comprehend the way of the Most High?' " (4:5-11).

Like Job, Ezra is oppressed by a sense of his ignorance and frailty. Yet he refuses to capitulate to irrelevant sophistry. He will not be put off with a catalogue of his ignorances, the world's injustice is a matter not of conjecture but of bitter certainty.

"For I had no desire to ask about paths too high for me but about those experiences which overtake us daily" (4:23).

And in the face of Ezra's persistence, before his unyielding refusal to accept either the argument of group punishment for collective sin or the attitude that frail, ignorant man must not question, the angel retreats into the impregnable position of a final rectification in the coming catastrophic messianic age and the subsequent judgment.

"For the world hastens to pass away" (4:26). The end of the world is coming, coming inevitably in its own time even as a womb gives forth when its period has come (4:40). That end is near at hand, arriving with strange portents and awesome wonders, and at its advent the crooked will be made straight and absolute justice will be dispensed.

And so through four visions or cycles of dialogue the argument continues, the same problems viewed from various aspects,

expressed in richly exotic and variegated metaphor. But in each case alike, the argument leads only to the final faith that the messianic age will resolve all difficulties.

If the Apocalypse of Ezra had rested here, it would have been in no way distinct from any of the mass of eschatological literature of the period. But the same instinct that impels the obscure pharisaic author to refuse the accepted solutions, that leads him to tell God that nothing less than a knowledge of the ways of the Most High will satisfy him—that instinct leads him to question whether even the bliss of the future world can make right life's wrongs. His questions are inchoate, indecisive gropings rather than coherent challenges, but they demonstrate that in his very acceptance of an almost universal belief, he boldly ventured rebellion. And if he sinks into ultimate acceptance of the Weltanschauung of his generation, he has at least raised one timid, wavering voice of protest.

Emerging, therefore, again and again in the argument are these uncertain probing questionings. To Ezra's persistence, the angel attempts response, unsatisfactory and unconvincing. Judged from its final results, from the theodicy finally predicated, the Apocalypse of Ezra, like the drama of Job, fails wretchedly. Its glory lies not in having found a solution but in perceiving bitterly and poignantly an *impasse* and in venturing to formulate it.

If the goal of creation and the cosmic drama is the bliss of the future world, why, Ezra demands, did God not create all souls directly into paradise without the turmoil and pain of mortal life? Why is the whole agonizing process necessary?

God is a God of mercy, protests Ezra (7:132 f.), but he can scarcely be said to have been merciful to man. For it was he who created man and then put him into an evil case.

"Let the race of men mourn and let the beasts of the field rejoice, let all who have been lament but beasts and cattle be glad. For much better is their lot than ours, for they expect no judgment and know of no torture nor has bliss after death been

promised them. For what avail is it to us that we shall live eternally only to suffer torment forever?" (7:65-67).

What point is there in the assurance of eternal bliss when that promise means practically that an unattainable goal is offered to man to render his despair and failure the more complete?

"For what avail is it that we have been promised eternity when we do deeds that lead to death . . . and that paradise be revealed to us with its incorruptible fruits in which are delight and healing when we shall not enter therein, since we have moved in evil places" (7:119 f.).

How few, moreover, are those that are saved! What wanton cruelty it is on God's part to create untold multitudes of which only the slightest portion attain paradise while the vast majority come into being only to suffer eternally.

"And now I see that for few shall the world to come bring joy but to many suffering. For there has grown in us an evil heart which has caused us to err from these statutes, and has led us to destruction and into the ways of death, has shown to us the ways of perdition and moved us far from life, and this, not a few but almost all who have been created" (7:47 f.).

To Ezra's lament of the bitterness and hopelessness of man's fate and the fewness of the saved, God returns a series of answers.

In the first place, it is to be expected that those who attain to paradise be few for all precious things are rare even as gold is less common than clay (7:55).

And if man does perish, the fault, the angel insists, rests with him. Life is a fair fight, anyone who chooses can attain immortality and bliss for the effort.

"This is the logic of the struggle which man, born on the earth, must fight, that, if conquered, he suffer what you have said; but, if victorious, he shall receive the reward I declare" (7:127).

The doomed sinner receives his just due. His chance at paradise was offered him and he refused it; let him perish.

"Let the majority perish," the angel says cruelly, "rather than that the Law of God which has been laid down of yore be condemned. . . . For they have not been convinced and have denied it and have established for themselves thoughts of vanity" (7:20).

But to Ezra this callous attitude is shocking, patently unfair and inconsistent with a God merciful by nature. For if God shifts the burden of error onto the shoulders of the sinner, he is guilty of wanton, pointless cruelty. By what right does God, then, destroy his work when his is the responsibility and odium?

"For thou art alone and we are all together the fashioning of thy hands as thou hast said. . . . If therefore thou destroy lightly him who was molded by thy order with such great labor, to what end then, was he created?" (8:6 f.).

And when God justifies himself by contending that only a few can be saved, just as a farmer harvests but the slightest part of what he plants, Ezra refuses to exonerate God of his responsibility.

"For if the farmer's seed come not up, it is because it has not received your rain in its time, or if it be spoiled by too much rain, then it dies. But man who was formed by thy hands and called thine image because he has been modelled after thee, for whose sake thou didst form all things, wilt thou liken him to the farmers' seed? Not so, God above us. . . ."

Again and again Ezra considers the fate of man and finds it inequitable. To him, the theodicy of the future world offers no solution. For he cannot see the justice of a God of mercy, who could have created man directly into paradise and would not; who first creates man sinful and presents before him a hope of blissful immortality, only to condemn him to eternal torment; who damns the human race because of the evil heart which he himself has implanted in it. Most touching in its pathetic universalism is Ezra's concern for the great masses of ignorant humanity, who, in their blindness, move to endless torment. It is too cruel, too wanton and wasteful. He will not, he cannot, hold God guilty of it.

But as for the answer, Ezra does not know. All he feels is that somewhere there must be an explanation and for this he gropes.

Time and again, he consoles himself with a reassurance of God's mercy. Once, early in the dialogue, God reassures him by recalling his love for mankind.

"And he said to me, 'Art thou sore disturbed in mind over Israel? Dost thou love him more than he who made him?' " (5:33).

But not even the assurance of God's love is sufficient.

"No, Lord, but out of my grief have I spoken, for my reins scourge me every hour as I seek to understand the way of the Most High and to investigate some part of his justice" (5:34).

It is in his groping for the solution that he finally puts into the mouth of God a remarkable confession of defeat. At the end of the dialogue God admits that even he could do no better. His program for the world was one of mercy, he simply failed in his attempt to execute it. The Almighty God concedes defeat to undefined powers of evil, thereby anticipating, by two millennia, H. G. Wells and William James.

In a poignantly moving passage, God, as it were, bows his head in an admission of impotence. His world has gone awry, he is saving what he can.

"For there was a period of the world, even the time when I was preparing for those who live now, before there came into being for them the world in which they live, that no one opposed me for no one existed. But now, having been created in this prepared world with an unfailing table and an inscrutable Law, they became corrupt through their manners.

"I considered my world and behold, it was doomed; my cosmos and behold it was endangered through devices that came into it. And I saw and spared some with difficulty and saved for myself one grape out of a cluster and one plant out of a great forest" (9:18 f.).

VII

The seeker sleeps silent and forgotten in the dust these nineteen centuries and his heart-wrung questions remain unanswered

and unanswerable. Even his Weltanschauung is now in the process of dissolution before our very eyes.

The cosmic scheme he professed is on its way to join him in shadowy oblivion. It would be a rare child of the twentieth century who would turn to the Apocalypse of Ezra for his religious philosophy. And yet, there is something in his protest, something in his rebellious challenge that strikes in us a responding chord. For there is in the Ezra Apocalypse an expression of an eternal determination of the human heart.

Since time immemorial, man has demanded one thing of the universe and the Gods he posited behind it, and that is that they fail not and fall not short of his own moral ideals. He demands that somehow, somewhere, the cosmos obey the dictates of his moral life. With a universe less ethical than he, man refuses to come to terms.

One may deprecate this persistence of the human heart as a psychological projection of the ego, as philosophic immaturity, as human insolence and impudence in the face of a disinterested physical mechanism. Be that as it may, the giants of human aspiration have made this demand and in their insatiability lay their greatness. This is the basis of the majesty of the Book of Job, of Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound* and the dramatic epics of Judaism and Christianity.

And when those who have given voice to this persistent determination of man's heart are enumerated, there must be included, as not least in their glorious impudence and majestic insolence, an obscure Pharisee, author of a recondite book, who dared to demand that his God conform to man's standards of the merciful and the just.

CONCERNING THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD

DIETRICH BONHOEFFER
University of Berlin

IN THE present article I do not pretend to present the Christian idea of God in its entirety. I am trying to give no more than the framework within which this idea should be thought. The fact that I am concerned only with the Christian idea of God and not some general speculation, that is to say, the fact that the theme is essentially dogmatical, has led me to select the following topics for discussion: First, the reality of God with regard to the problem of the theory of knowledge; second, God and history; third, the paradoxical God in the doctrine of justification. The connection between these three parts and the progress from the first to the last one will be seen in the course of the treatment.

I. GOD AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

If this inquiry were purely philosophical we should never be permitted to start with the reality of God; and as long as theology does not see its essential difference from all philosophical thinking, it does not begin with a statement concerning God's reality but tries rather to build a support for such a statement. Indeed, this is the main fault with theology, which in our day no longer knows its particular province and its limits. It is not only a methodological fault but, likewise, a misunderstanding of the Christian idea of God from the very beginning. Philosophical thinking attempts to be free from premises (if that is possible at all); Christian thinking has to be conscious of its particular premise, that is, of the premise of the reality of God, before and beyond all thinking. In the protection of this presupposition, theological thinking convicts philosophical think-

ing of being bound also to a presupposition, namely, that thinking in itself can give truth. But philosophical truth always remains truth which is given only within the category of possibility. Philosophical thinking never can extend beyond this category—it can never be a thinking in reality. It can form a conception of reality, but conceived reality is not reality any longer. The reason for this is that thinking is in itself a closed circle, with the ego as the center. The last “reality” for all consequent philosophical reflection must be an ego, which is removed from all conceivability, a “*nichtgegenstaendliches Ich*.” Thinking does violence to reality, pulling it into the circle of the ego, taking away from it its original “objectivity.” Thinking always means system and the system excludes the reality. Therefore, it has to call *itself* the ultimate reality, and in this system the thinking ego rules.

It follows that not only the other man but also God is subordinated to the ego. That is the strict consequence of the idealistic, and, as far as I see, of all exact philosophical thought which tries to be autonomous. This fact of the captivity of human thinking in itself, that is to say, of its inevitable autocracy and self-glorification as it is found in philosophy, can be interpreted theologically as the corruption of the mind, which is caused by the first fall. Man “before” the fall must be thought of as being able to think of “reality,” that means to think of God and of the other man as realities. Man “in” and “after” the fall refers everything to himself, puts himself in the center of the world, does violence to reality, makes himself God, and God and the other man his creatures. He never can get reality back because his thinking is no longer “in reality”; it remains in the category of possibility. But there is no bridge between possibility and reality. Possibility might be conceived of and even proved, reality must be given before and beyond all thinking. Reality is consequently beyond my own self, transcendent—but, again, not logically transcendent, but really transcendent.

Reality limits my boundlessness from outside, and this out-

CONCERNING THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD 179

side is no more intellectually conceivable but only believable. This remains to be explained below.

Theology, then, starts with the statement of the reality of God and that is its particular right. But that at once gives rise to the question, How can theology state the reality of God without thinking it? And, if it thinks it, how can it be avoided that God should again be pulled into the circle of thought? That is the central and most difficult problem of a genuine theological epistemology, which springs from the Christian idea of God.

The basis of all theology is the fact of faith. Only in the act of faith as a direct act God is recognized as the reality which is beyond and outside of our thinking, of our whole existence. Theology, then, is the attempt to set forth what is already possessed in the act of faith. Theological thinking is not a construction a priori, but a posteriori as Karl Barth has maintained. Therefore, it has to be conscious of its limitations. As thinking per se, it is not excepted from the pretension and boundlessness of all thinking. But the property of theological thinking is that it knows of its own insufficiency and its limitations. So it must be its highest concern to guard these limitations and to leave room for the reality of God, which can never be conceived by theological thinking. That means that there is no one theological sentence which could presume to speak "truth" unless it refers to the reality of God and the impossibility of embracing this reality in theological sentences. Every theoretical sentence generalizes. But God does not permit of generalization. Because he is reality, he is absolutely free of all theoretical generalization. Even a sentence like "God is love" is, in the last analysis, not the truth about God, because it is not a matter of course that by such a sentence I could calculate that God is love. On the contrary, God is wrath as well as love and this we also should know. Therefore, every statement concerning God's essence must contain both of these contradictory aspects in order to give room to the reality of God.

This reality, which is said to be transcendent to all thinking, is now to be defined more exactly as "personality." The transcendence of God does not mean anything else than that God is personality, provided there is an adequate understanding of the concept of personality. Idealism defines personality as the subjective realization of objective spirit—that is, of absolute spirit. Each personality is constituted by the same spirit, which is, in the last analysis, reason. Each personality is personality as far as it participates in reason. Thus each one knows the other. Personality is no secret and, therefore, another personality is no real limit for me because, in the last analysis, I have at my disposal the spirit of reason, as does also the other person.

For Christian thought, personality is the last limit of thinking and the ultimate reality. Only personality can limit me, because the other personality has its own demands and claims, its own law and will, which are different from me and which I cannot overcome as such. Personality is free and does not enter the general laws of my thinking. God as the absolutely free personality is, therefore, absolutely transcendent. Consequently, I cannot talk about him in general terms; he is always free and beyond these terms. The only task of my theological thinking must be to make room for the transcendent personality of God in every sentence. Only when he himself avows a human word, whenever and wherever he pleases, is my word "about" God to be accepted as truth—that means, only then is my word God's own word. But the question is, Where does God speak? Where can I find his inaccessible reality which is so entirely hidden from my thinking? How do I know about his being the absolutely transcendent personality? The answer is given and must be given by God himself, in his own word in Jesus Christ for no one can answer this question except God himself, in his self-revelation in history, since none can speak the truth except God.

II. GOD AND HISTORY

The problem that thus sets itself to us is complicated. We see that there is no other way to talk about God than that God

CONCERNING THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD 181

himself speaks his word in his self-revelation. This self-revelation is executed in history.

No man can reveal God because God is absolutely free personality. Every human attempt to discover God, to unveil his secret reality, is hopeless because of God's being personality. All such attempts remain in the sphere of the idea. Personality as reality is beyond idea. So that even the self-revelation of personality cannot be executed in the sphere of idea. The idea is in the realm of generality. Personality exists in "once-ness" because of its freedom. The only place where "once-ness" might occur is history. Therefore, revelation of personality—that is to say, the self-revelation of God—must take place in history if at all. That happened according to the testimony of the Bible and the present Christian church in the revelation of God in Christ. God spoke his word in history, yet not only as a doctrine but as the personal revelation of himself. Thus, Christ becomes not the teacher of mankind, the example of religious and moral life for all time, but the personal revelation, the personal presence of God in the world. It is important to point out emphatically that it is not Jesus who reveals God to us (that view is the consequence of all theology which is not in the strict sense theology of revelation, and leads to a very confused Christology), but it is God who reveals himself in absolute self-revelation to man. Since God is accessible only in his self-revelation, man can find God only in Christ. That does not exclude God's being elsewhere too, but he cannot and should not be grasped and understood except in Christ. God entered history and no human attempt can grasp him beyond this history. This is the great stumbling-block for all general religious thinking. God revealed himself in "once-ness" in the years from one to thirty in Palestine in Jesus.

The main difference between a so-called revelation in the sphere of idea and a revelation in "once-ness" is that man always will be able to learn a new idea and to fit it into his system of ideas; but a revelation in "once-ness" in a historical fact, in a

historical personality, is always anew a challenge to man. He cannot overcome it by pulling it into the system which he already had before. That is the reason why God reveals himself in history: only so is the freedom of his personality guarded. The revelation in history means revelation in hiddenness; revelation in ideas (principles, values, etc.) means revelation in openness.

We are going to speak below concerning the content of this revelation. Christianity gives us a new conception of history. The idealistic philosophy conceives of history as of the realization of ideas, values, etc. History becomes "symbol," transparent to the eternal spirit. The essence of single historical facts is that they mean something general, but not that they really are something. The earnestness of ontological consideration is weakened through reinterpretation in axiological judgments. Jesus becomes here the symbol of God's love, his cross means forgiveness, and in the very moment that we know what all that means we could, theoretically, forget the facts forever. The fact being only the transient bearer of eternal values and ideas—that is to say, Jesus being only the transient bearer of the general new truth taught by him according to the will of God. In short, idealistic philosophy does not take seriously the ontological category in history. Which means that it does not take history seriously. This is true, not only as far as an interpretation of the Christian revelation is concerned, but likewise everywhere; and it becomes very conspicuous in the interpretation of the other man, of the neighbor, that is, of present history.

We cannot pursue this point further here. The fact is that Christianity brings a new interpretation of history. History in its essence does not enter our system of ideas and values. On the contrary, it sets for us our limitations. History in its essence is to be interpreted ontologically. The true attitude of man toward history is not interpretative, but that of refusing or acknowledging, that is to say, deciding. History is the place of decision, nothing else. Decision in its most inward sense is

CONCERNING THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD 183

possible only as a decision for or against God. This decision is executed in facing Christ. Within the world of ideas there is no such thing as decision because I always bear already within myself the possibilities of understanding these ideas. They fit into my system but they do not touch and challenge my whole existence. Thus, they cannot lead me into the situation of personal decision.

III. THE PARADOXICAL GOD OF THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION

Here the Christian "idea" of God comes to its sharpest issue. The question becomes one of applying this most objective "idea" of God to man—which is absolutely necessary if the whole treatment is not to remain merely in the metaphysical realm. If God alone can speak truth and I with all my thinking remain within my own limitations, not being able to reach God, how can I know anything at all about God? Moreover, there must be some knowledge of God, if Christianity has a message to bring to the world.

The pathway to this knowledge is action. I can know God only if I can effect an act—an act which makes me transcend the limits of myself, which carries me out of the circle of my self-hood in order to acknowledge the transcendent God. While it is obvious that I myself cannot effect such an act, there is, nevertheless, such an act, which is executed by God himself, and which is called "faith." In my faith God reveals himself through Christ in me. In his self-revelation in Jesus Christ he gives himself to be known. In my faith no one speaks other than God, because, if so, it would not be the truth. The word of God spoken to me in the act of my faith in Christ is God in his revelation as the Holy Spirit. Faith is nothing but the act of receiving this word of God. God remains always and entirely subject, and even the answer of man can never be more than "I believe, help thou mine unbelief."

It is just here that the personalities of God and of man come in contact with each other. Here God himself transcends his

transcendence, giving himself to man as Holy Spirit. Yet, being personality, he remains in absolute transcendence; the immanence of God means that man hears God's own word, which is spoken in absolute self-revelation, always anew.

It is not unessential to note that we have been able to conceive of the idea of faith only from the rigorous conception of the self-revelation of God, and this without having touched the matter of the content of this revelation. The formal idea of self-revelation has as its counterpart the idea of faith, whatever content the self-revelation may possess. Faith is primarily directed toward the authority of God, not to the content of his word, whether it be understandable or understandable. It is the authority that gives weight to the content, not the reverse. In the Christian message, the particular proportion between authority and content is expressed by saying that the latter is not only an appendix of the former, but that the content itself is the message of the sole authority of God. Therefore, when we come to interpret the content of the self-revelation of God, we will see that this content is only the explication of the fact of the absolute self-revelation and authority of God.

God entered history in Jesus, and so entirely that he can be recognized in his hiddenness only by faith. God gives an amazing proof of his sole authority in the cross of Christ. In the very same moment when Christ dies upon the cross, the whole world dies in its sinfulness and is condemned. That is the extreme judgment of God upon the world. God himself dies and reveals himself in the death of a man, who is condemned as a sinner. It is precisely this, which is the foolishness of the Christian idea of God, which has been witnessed to by all genuine Christian thinking from Paul, Augustine, Luther, to Kierkegaard and Barth. God is where death and sin are, not where righteousness is. Further, it is to be said that the absolute knowledge of the sinfulness of the world or of the single individual person is a judgment of faith. Without faith no one can know what sin is. He will inevitably confuse sin with moral imperfection, which constitutes a grave misunderstanding.

CONCERNING THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD 185

But the cross would not be the revelation of God were it not followed by the resurrection of Christ. With Christ's death and resurrection the old world of righteousness is dead. He who is in Christ is a new creature. The resurrection of Christ as well as the resurrection of man was and is conceivable only by faith. God remains in His hiddenness. In Christ all men are respectively condemned or resuscitated and it is the work of God, the Holy Spirit, to apply this general condition in which all men are, to the single person. The act of application is the act of faith—that is to say, of this faith, which believes that God's word in Christ is valid for itself; or, in other words, the act of justification.

Here the paradoxical essence of God becomes visible to the faith of the Christian believer. Justification is pure self-revelation, pure way of God to man. No religion, no ethics, no metaphysical knowledge may serve man to approach God. They are all under the judgment of God, they are works of man. Only the acknowledgment that God's word alone helps and that every other attempt is and remains sinful, only this acknowledgment receives God. And this acknowledgment must be given by God, as the Holy Spirit, as faith. That is the foolishness of the revelation of God and its paradoxical character—that just there, where the power of man has lapsed entirely, where man knows his own weakness, sinfulness, and consequently the judgment of God upon him, that just there God is already working in grace, that just and exactly there and only there is forgiveness, justification, resuscitation. There, where man himself no longer sees, God sees, and God alone works, in judgment and in grace. There, at the very limits of man, stands God, and when man can do nothing more, then God does all. The justification of the sinner—this is the self-proof of the sole authority of God. And in this justification man becomes a new personality by faith, and he recognizes here—what he never before could understand or believe—God as his creator. In the act of justification God reveals himself as Holy Trinity.

A STUDENT OF THEOLOGY AT THE END OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

JOHN G. FRANK

Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee

AN UNPUBLISHED manuscript in the Harper Library of the University of Chicago contains the biography of Johann Jacob Breiting, anstites of the Reformed church in Zürich.¹ From it we obtain some insight into a student's life at the end of the sixteenth century. We can see what attracted the students to different universities, what manner of life they led, and what zeal and devotion inspired their work. Such details illuminate a period about which we are ill-informed. In his admirable survey of German education Friedrich Paulsen says: "We are less in touch with the period from the middle of the sixteenth to the beginning of the seventeenth century than with any other in the entire national history."²

According to C. G. Jöcher, Breiting was a Swiss theologian; he went in 1593 to the Academy of Herborn, in 1594 to Marburg, Bremen, Franeker in Friesland, in 1596 to Heidelberg and Basel; in 1597 he became pastor at Zumikhen (near Zürich), in 1600 preceptor at the Gymnasium of Zürich, in 1605 professor at the Gymnasium, in 1605 professor of logic in the Collegium humanitatis, in 1611 deacon of St. Peter in Zürich. He was then offered the *professio theologica*, but he refused it. In 1613 he became pastor of the Great Minster and in 1618 he was sent to the synod of Dordrecht. He died on March 26,

¹ "Lebens Beschreibung Hrn. Joh. Jac. Breitingers Dieners der Kirchen zu Zürich, Geschriben durch Heinrich Füßli." The manuscript bears the shelfmark DQ. 118, fB8F9. It comprises 639 pages done in a neat hand. The language of the biography is the Swiss dialect of about 1700.

² Friedrich Paulsen, *German Universities* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906), p. 37.

A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY STUDENT OF THEOLOGY 187

1646. He left numerous publications, among them are to be noted his *Acta* and *Decreta synodi dordracenae*.³

From other sources we know also how important a man Breitingen was in the city-state of Zürich. A. Tholuck praises him thus:

The greatest character of the Swiss church during the 17th century is Joh. Jac. Breitingen. Long ago this man whose memory lingers even now among the Zürich people would have deserved a biography to bring back the history of his life. There is no phase in the ecclesiastical nor in the civil life of the town of Zürich which did not feel the active hand of this prince of the church, who, free from hierarchical desires, even refused the title "Anstites." He chastises sternly the shortcomings of the clergy in his masterly synodal sermons; without reserve he preaches against the councilmen to warn and to reprove them, he is even a mighty factor in decisions on war or peace. He greatly betters the moral life of the people who are devoted to him. He introduces general hymnsinging in the Reformed Church, he establishes a general day of prayer. He abolishes privileges of the wealthy over the poor, he regulates the employment of the clergy, he establishes the archives of the church, he creates scholarships for worthy students, erects houses for the poor, revises the schools; he proves himself a father for all those who are pursued on account of their religion. . . . In regard to his belief he stays strictly on the ground of the orthodox confession. When he hears that the Arminian sect is troublesome in the Netherlands he sends a message to the General States where he is esteemed very highly. Just as effectively he treats the Anabaptists, but he regards them in spite of the prevalent opinion as brothers in Christ. "The Lutherans," he says, "have more foolish ideas than they." Only in kindness he thinks of the Roman Catholics.⁴

In 1582, when Breitingen started to school, there were ample educational opportunities in Zürich, a Collegium inferius and superius and also a Carolinum, the continuation of the old cathedral school founded by Charlemagne. The young boy was brought by a relative of his, Christophel Breitingen, to the Collegium superius.

How highly studies were esteemed in the eyes of the elder Breitingen may be seen from the following fact: in order that

³ Christian Gottlieb Jöcher, *Allgemeines Gelehrten-Lexikon* (1750), Vol. IV.

⁴ A. Tholuck, *Vorgeschichte des Rationalismus*, II, 361.

his young nephew might not be distracted from studying after his death, the uncle created a scholarship, though he himself had children and grandchildren. The young student should first profit by this favorable arrangement and then all his descendants, who wished to study.⁵

The reason, however, why Christophel Breitingen sent his nephew to school and gave the funds for his education was chiefly religious. The old relative himself was very pious and he wanted to do a good turn for his church, whose servants he knew intimately. He was especially well acquainted with one preacher, with the name Ludwig Lavater; this friend advised him to bring the boy to the Collegium superius.⁶ Of course it is not necessary to mention that education at the end of the sixteenth century meant largely religious instruction; it was quite natural that at the end of their studies the pupils became theologians.

This kind relative, Christophel Breitingen, directed the boy's education much against the mother's wishes; probably there was some danger that the loving mother might spoil the youngster and make him unfit for success in life. Her husband, who had died in 1581 at the early age of thirty-six, had left her enough means to provide her and the two sons with considerable comfort and to enable the education of the boys.⁷ Young Breitingen, however, stayed only for a short time at his uncle's house; the lonely mother wanted to have her son near her again after he had gone to school for some time. Under the circumstances she wanted to get hold of him without the knowledge or consent of Christophel Breitingen, her brother-in-law. This wish was ac-

⁵ " . . . , hat er . . . ein gült, auf dem Schloss wartenfels. Zu dem End dass es ein Stipendium, zum anfang auf disen jungen, und hernach auf alle die, so seines geschlechtes studieren wolltend dienen solle" (MS, p. 3).

⁶ "Und weil Er ein sehr eifriger liebhaber gewesen der Relligion, hate er viel kundt-same zu den dienern der kirchen und er denselben war ihm besonders bekannt Heri Ludwig lavater. Aus dises herrn Roht lies er den jungen Vettern führen in die latein-ische Obere schul im Jahr 1582" (MS, p. 2).

⁷ "Weil sein Mutter mit ziemlichen mittlen nach gestalt selbiger Zeiten von gott gesegnet war, hat sie diesere ihre 2 söhne selbst erzeihen wollen" (MS, p. 2).

A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY STUDENT OF THEOLOGY 189

complished by a trick: she took her boy along on a pleasure trip (*bodenfahrt*) and kept him. Apparently the uncle accepted the situation without serious objection.

In spite of his fame in later years Johann Jacob Breitingen seems to have been a poor student from his entrance into the elementary school in Zürich in 1582 at the age of seven until the completion of his preparatory studies in 1593. We learn he spent there three years in one grade and four in another.⁸ When he was seventeen and when graduation was but one year off, he wanted to give up his studies and learn a trade, because he feared he could not pass.⁹ Only the tears of his mother moved him to finish his preparatory training after he had been absent from school about two weeks.¹⁰ According to the chronicler, the reason why he did so poorly is that nobody supervised his school work and the boy himself did not know anything about studying.

Teachers at that time could easily serve two masters, because teaching was only a sideline to the more serious and more profitable business of preaching; especially was this the case in preparatory schools.

We know something of the lives of two men who taught Breitingen in the Zürich Gymnasium. The two professors are: Magister Rudolf Hospinang, who was provisor, and Hans Fries, ludimoderator.¹¹ Rudolf Hospinang was born in Altdorf in 1547; after he had studied in Zürich, Magdeburg, and Heidelberg, he was first a country preacher five miles from Zürich; at the same time he was elected head of the third class and appointed provisor of the Great Minster. Afterward he was chosen provisor of the Carolingian School and finally preacher at the Great Minster.¹² Hans Fries, another teacher of Johann Jacob

⁸ "Da dan zu wissen, dass er gesessen in der 4ten Class 3 und in der 5ten für 4 gantze Jahr" (MS, p. 2).

⁹ "Im Jahr 1592 wollte Er sich ganz vom Studieren abwerfen, darum dass er zum Studieren wohl Lust aber schlechte gelegenheit und beförderung hatte" (MS, p. 4).

¹⁰ "Ihne aber hatten behalten die thränen seiner lieben Mutter" (MS, p. 4).

¹¹ MS, p. 2.

¹² Jöcher, *op. cit.* (1750).

Breitinger was born in Zürich; he was a preacher in his native town and professor of theology at the Gymnasium; in 1611 he died of plague.

These were some of the men under whom the boy had been so unsuccessful in his studies, but during their lifetime he became a preacher at the Great Minster.¹³

When Breitinger finally ended his preparatory-school career, he visited different universities in Germany and in the Netherlands. It looks as if no education of a Swiss at that time could have been complete without visits to foreign universities. Johann Jacob Breitinger's teachers had studied in Magdeburg and Heidelberg. The two reformers, Huldreich Zwingli and John Calvin, received part of their education abroad, before they started to preach their new doctrines. Zwingli studied in Vienna, and Calvin in Paris, and the influence of the German and of the French schooling can be seen in the works of the two men.

Johann Jacob Breitinger made his educational journeys from March, 1593, until about Christmas, 1596. He was a student in Herborn, Marburg, Franecker, Heidelberg, and in Basel. On his travels he passed through numerous towns and often turned aside to see the sights. After the Frankfort fair in the fall of 1594 he journeyed through Hesse, Braunschweig, Bremen, and Emden in Westfriesland to the Academy of Franecker.¹⁴ In October, 1595, he went to Leyden in the Netherlands.¹⁵ In May, 1595, he and his friends went across the Zuider Zee to Amsterdam, visited the famous towns in the Central Netherlands, among them "des Graffen hag" (Haag), and then came

¹³ "Er ist aber hernach zum grossen Münster Pfarrer worden, noch bey lebzeiten fast aller derjenigen Herrn, welche Jhne gehörter Zeiten und massen ungefürderet sitzen lassen" (MS, p. 4).

¹⁴ "Nach der frankfurter herbstmess des 1594 Jahrs zog er durch hessen, durch das land von braunschweig, brämen [i.e., Bremen] und Embden in westfriesland auf die hohe Schul zu franequer" (MS, p. 5).

¹⁵ "In october 1595 zog er gen leyden in holland" (MS, p. 6).

A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY STUDENT OF THEOLOGY 191

on night trips, because on account of wars the streets and highways were very unsafe, through Cologne to Siegen.¹⁶

How, one may ask, can it be that students could travel so far and so swiftly at a time when the means of transportation were slow and expensive? Very simply. When in spring and fall the merchants brought their wares to the fairs, the students took advantage of the numerous opportunities to travel; very likely they journeyed without considerable expense. Quite regularly Breitingen started his trips in spring or in autumn.

It seems that he traveled always in joyous company, for we are told the names of countrymen whom he had with him at various times. These travels brought sometimes mishaps and difficulties. In 1593 the wedding of Frederic IV, electoral prince of the Palatinate and Ludovica of Nassau, princess of Aragon, took place at Dillingen Castle, an hour's walk from Herborn, where young Breitingen was then a student. He went to see the festivities, especially the games and the tournaments of the great lords, which were held on the great plain beneath the castle of Dillenburg. On this occasion Breitingen had bad luck. A horse ran wild and came so swiftly toward him that he, in trying to escape the horse, hurt his leg by stumbling against a tree. There was great danger that he would be lame his whole life, but through the grace of the Lord he recovered completely again.¹⁷

Another unfortunate accident occurred, when he and a friend were on the homeward journey from the Netherlands. In 1596, when they returned from their studies in the newly formed Dutch Republic, the wars were still going on between Philip II of Spain and the Netherlands. On account of these unruly times

¹⁶ "Kamend durch mittelnächtlicher Reyssen, weil damahls wegen der kriegien die Strassen gar unsicher durch Cöln gen Sygen [Siegen] in die grafschafft Nassau" (MS, p. 6).

¹⁷ "Müsste Er einem pferdt . . . in eyl weichen des schlug er sein rechtes knie an einen baum; hat etliche wuchen grosse noth und stund in grossen sorgen, das er die tag seines lebens wurd hinken müssen; doch aus den gnaden Gottes ward Er vollkommen widerum heil" (MS, p. 5).

it was only possible to travel at night. In Emmerich, not far from the Dutch border, Breitingen was advised not to carry too much money in cash with him, but to purchase a letter of credit, which was already extensively used at that period by the merchants. He therefore gave an innkeeper ten Philipps-thaler for safe-keeping. He requested the landlord to send the money later to Frankfort at the time of the fair. Breitingen trusted the innkeeper completely, because he declared himself to be a member of the Reformed church. In reality, however, he belonged to a different faith and was a scoundrel. The money was never forwarded to Frankfort and was lost to Breitingen.¹⁸

Of course the schools which Breitingen attended were schools of the Reformed church, institutions which held the doctrines of Zwingli and Calvin. The first school which Breitingen visited was the Academy of Herborn (die Hohe Schule in Herborn). It was founded in 1584 by the Count of Nassau-Dillenburg on the advice of Caspar Olevianus, who had been expelled from Heidelberg because the University had turned Lutheran in 1573. When Breitingen was there in 1593, Herborn was the only reformed school in the state of Nassau which had adopted, as a whole, the reformed religion. Herborn was a flourishing school at that time; around 1600, between three and four hundred students were in attendance. The students seemed to be enthusiastic about their Alma Mater. In 1601 one student wrote from Herborn to his friend, a certain Simler: "The crowd at our school is so large now as it was never before nor did we ever have more joyous students."¹⁹ In spite of the fact that the students must have been rather lively, the school was strictly religious in the reformed sense. A. Tholuck praises Herborn: "In Nassau more than in Hesse the close connection with Switzerland and the close relationship of the dynasty to the

¹⁸ "Diser wirth war ein schalk, gstellte sich der Reformierten Religion zu gethan, weil er aber ein papist war war das Geld verloren" (MS, p. 6).

¹⁹ "Scolae nostrae coetus tantus nunc est, quantus antea unquam neque unquam turbulentoires studiosos habuimus" (*Collectio Simlerana*, saeculum XVII).

A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY STUDENT OF THEOLOGY 193

Netherlands preserved the strictly reformed type of religion in church and school."²⁰

Breitinger visited two other German seats of learning; the University of Marburg in Hesse and the University of Heidelberg. At the end of the sixteenth century both schools adhered to the Reformed church. It depended naturally on the opinion of the rulers which kind of religion they wished to have at their schools. The princes controlled the universities and exercised also here their prerogative, established on the contract of Augsburg, *cuius regio, eius religio*. Thus we see that Marburg, though it had the distinction of being the first German university to be dedicated at its very foundation in 1526 to the Protestant church, attracts the reformed student Johann Jacob Breitinger in 1594. Olevianus was ejected from Heidelberg in 1573, because he favored Zwingli and Calvin; about 1600 we see an edict of the elector of the Palatinate permitting the individual members of the faculty, if they wish, to lecture on Calvin's *Institutio*.

The principal resort for an adherent of the Reformed church was, however, the Netherlands. "To that country the Reformed church sends its students, and from there it tries to take its teachers of theology, although it is necessary in most cases to give up their own academic teachers, other countries could not compete with the salaries of the wealthy commercial land. From the Netherlands issues the program of the things which one should believe, and ideas and disputes are transplanted to German soil."²¹

In Franecker in the Netherlands Breitinger stayed longest and there he did most of his work. At Franecker he gave two public debates, which were later printed, and also a Latin oration on the human soul.²²

Because of the success of the University of Leyden, the Uni-

²⁰ A. Tholuck, *op. cit.*, II, 306.

²¹ A. Tholuck, *op. cit.*, II, 204.

²² "Zu Franequeren hielte er zwo offentliche disputationes so getrukt worden, desgleichen ein lateinische oration von des menschen seel" (MS, p. 6).

versity of Franecker was founded in 1585 by the Frisian states. It occupied, as often happened after the Reformation, the buildings, and drew from the funds, of a religious order which had been dissolved.

The Swiss university to which Breitingner went in 1596 was Basel. Circumstances rather than free choice led him to attend this University; for in Heidelberg, where he was studying, the plague had broken out and the University had to be closed.²³ Only for this reason did Breitingner become a student at Basel, a university which probably was not rated too highly by orthodox theologians of his faith. No wonder, the professors at the University of Basel did not know exactly what to believe themselves. Montaigne, who visited some professors at Basel in 1580—the professors were Grynaeus, the physician Jakob Zwinger, and others—made the following remark: "They were not of the same belief: some said they followed Zwingli, some Calvin, and some Luther." He found in this way that quite a few were Roman Catholics in their hearts.²⁴

What did a future theologian of the Reformed church study? Of course, the students at the time when Breitingner was at the University knew Latin very well. As mentioned before, Breitingner himself gave a Latin oration in Franecker. He studied chiefly the Bible, both the Old and the New Testament. He tried to learn all the things which might be of some practical value in his chosen profession. These auxiliary sciences were (a) Greek and Hebrew, in order to understand the meaning of the holy word of God in the original texts; (b) logic or philosophy, to sharpen the mind for the frequent disputes; (c) law, since the theologians in Zürich, where Breitingner was to have his future field of activity, ruled more or less the town and they had to know the difference between right and wrong in civil and ecclesiastical matters; (d) the last subject that Breitingner

²³ "Nach der herbstmess dis jahrs weil zu heidelberg die Acadamei zerstört worden wegen eingerissenen Sterbens zog er mit anderen Studenten gen Basel" (MS, p. 7).

²⁴ *Journal du voyage de Michel de Montaigne en 1580 et 1581*, Rome, 1775, p. 33.

A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY STUDENT OF THEOLOGY 195

studied eagerly was rhetoric; perfection in the art of public speaking was highly necessary for pastors, since the sermons were then more frequent and lengthy than now.

There were several ways to acquire all this knowledge in Breitingner's day.

One could go to the lectures at a university as we do now. Then one could attend lectures at a professor's house. Such lectures were usually more expensive than the public lectures, but on the other hand they were also more worth while. Thus Breitingner attended in Marburg public lectures at the University and he heard the lectures given at the house of the famous and distinguished philosopher Rudolf Glöcenius.²⁵

One also could learn at meals. The students usually ate at a professor's house. Under the guidance of a wise teacher the conversations were expected to contribute much to the student's intellectual advancement. The biography of Breitingner always mentions carefully where he took his meals.

There were, last but not least, debates and orations. After all, medieval studies were lifeless; teaching depended on the printed letter. Debates and orations were the only interesting part in the studies of the students and therefore very popular. Especially in the Netherlands debating was the style and even as late as 1645 a student in Franeker wrote how much he benefited and enjoyed the continuous exercise in debating at his school.

Since the professors at the end of the sixteenth century were not specialists, but could instruct in almost every university subject, it would not be right to group Breitingner's teachers according to the subjects in which they gave instruction. It is perhaps better to discuss them according to the universities where Breitingner heard them.

No particular professor is mentioned in Herborn. We learn only that Breitingner lived in the house of Dr. Olevianus and that

²⁵ "Er hörte daselbsten sowol auf der Universität öffentlich als auch daheim besonders den hochberühmten, fürtrefflichen philosophum Herrn Glöcenium" (MS, p. 5).

he had his meals at the commons established and run by the count of Nassau.²⁶

Professor Olevianus had died in 1587 and presumably left his house to the school. Originally a professor of law at the University of Lyons, he had studied at different French universities. He was also the first who translated Luther's Bible into French. From his example one can see how preachers were made at that time. Once he was in great danger of drowning and he vowed, if saved, to accept the reformed religion. After his rescue he went to Geneva to study theology. Later on he preached with great success in Treves. Then the elector of the Palatinate called him as a professor to Heidelberg and finally he became a professor in Herborn.²⁷

In Marburg Breitinger's professor was Rudolf Gloceus, teacher of logic and one of the most important men at the University. He was called "Hassorum Aristoteles."²⁸ Breitinger had his meals at the house of the learned Nicolaus Vigelius, doctor and professor of the imperial law.²⁹ According to Jöcher, Nicolaus Vigelius died in 1600 in Marburg at an advanced age; probably he was already during Breitinger's residence in Marburg too old to teach, but was still able to preside at the meals of the students.

In Franecker, Breitinger had two famous men as teachers. They were Librana Lubbertus, doctor of the Holy Bible, and Johannes Druscus, lector of the Hebrew language.³⁰ Both men had traveled far and wide during their university careers. Lubbertus studied in Bremen, Wittenberg, and Geneva; he became then a preacher at Emden, until he finally received a pro-

²⁶ "In disem herborn herblib er ein gantzes jahr und hatte seine Herberg in Hr. Doctor oleviani haus den tisch aber in der gräflichen communutet" (MS, p. 4).

²⁷ Jöcher, *op. cit.*

²⁸ A. Tholuck, *op. cit.*, II, 283.

²⁹ "Ging zu tisch bey dem hochgelehrten Herrn Nicolai vigelio Doctor und Professor des kaiserlichen Rechtem" (MS, p. 5).

³⁰ "Er hörete auf diser universitet furnemlich die zwei berühmten männer Herren Librana Lubbertem D. der hl. schrift und Hr. Johann Druscium, lesen der hebreischen Sprach" (MS, p. 5).

A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY STUDENT OF THEOLOGY 197

fessorship at Franecker. He was of tireless industry, but also inclined to become angry very easily. . . . He died in Franecker in 1625, as rector. The other professor, Druscus, otherwise called "von Dreischke," was a famous philologist. He was born in Switzerland and was dedicated in his youth by his parents to the church and to spread the gospel. On account of his reformed religion he had to go to England after years of study at Geneva and Louvain. In Cambridge he found a position as professor of oriental languages. Then he went again to Louvain and devoted himself to the study of law. Soon, however, he became professor of oriental languages, first at Leyden, later at Franecker.³¹

At Heidelberg, Breitingger heard Daniel Tossanus and Jacob Kimedonius, two famous doctors of the Holy Bible.³² Daniel Tossanus was born in Switzerland and had studied in Basel and in Tübingen; in 1586 he became professor of theology at Heidelberg. His colleague, also a professor of theology, was also in Heidelberg during the years 1591-1601.

In Basel, Breitingger took his meals at the house of Frederic Castalion, professor of public speaking. This teacher was born in Basel; he devoted himself just like his father to the *Humaniora*, to music, poetry, and Hebrew. Because he had studied theology, he was for some time a preacher. In 1589 he became professor of the Greek language and afterward professor of rhetoric. In Basel, Breitingger heard two other professors: Jacob Grynäus and Polanus Amandus.³³ Both professors taught the Old Testament and according to the tradition of Basel were lenient toward other sects. Polanus Amandus was, as his name implies, born in Poland, taught first in Tübingen, but had to leave on account of quarrels.³⁴

At Christmas time, 1596, Breitingger had to come home, al-

³¹ Jöcher, *op. cit.*

³² "Auf Heidelberg Breittingger höre er profitieren Heren Daniel Tossanum und Herrn Jacob Kimedonium zwen alte hochberühmte Doctores der h. Schrift" (MS, p. 6).

³³ "Er hörte profitieren Herrn Jacob Gryneum, Hrn Amandu Polanu, zwei schöne liechter" (MS, p. 7).

³⁴ Jöcher, *op. cit.*

though he wanted to study further. There were several reasons for his return. His home town of Zürich had been stricken by the plague and he had already lost his only brother. His mother entreated him to settle down, probably because, on account of deaths, several openings existed in the district of Zürich, into which young Breitingen could step immediately. The obedient son fulfilled the wish of his mother, took his pastor's examination in Zürich, and became preacher in Zumikhen near Zürich.³⁵

We see Breitingen's self-control already during his schooldays in Zürich. The streets of his home town in the sixteenth century were narrow and steep. The boy about fourteen years old was coming home from school. He wanted to get out of the way of a wagon which was racing down the hill by stepping quickly behind the corner of a house. Unfortunately the boy slipped and the back wheel of the wagon crushed his foot. In spite of great pain he went to school, although he had to stop later.³⁶

The spirit of Humanism and Renaissance inspired Breitingen. His desire to find out things for himself is characteristic of him. When the Jesuits had been expelled from France by Henry IV, their libraries were destroyed because the Jesuits were said to plot the assassination of the king. A Hebrew Bible had by chance come to Leyden from these treasures. Breitingen, who was in Franeker at the time, wanted to see it immediately. In October, 1595, he set out for Leyden in Holland in order to see this Hebrew Bible bound in quarto, printed in Paris; it had come from the Jesuit Collegium in Paris.³⁷ The territory through which Breitingen had to travel was probably full of the troops

³⁵ "Wie gern Er sich wider hinaus an andere ohrt ein mehrers zu lehren begeben wollen Er dennoch der sehnlichen bitt seiner getreuwten sorgfältigen Mutter statt und platz geben müssen in seinem Vatterland zu bleiben" (MS, p. 7).

³⁶ "Das fleisch war den Schenkel hinab zermürset, und der knoden zerknirscht, und gieng er doch selbigen tags vollendts in die schul, müsste aber ein Zeit lang sich innhalten, und curiert werden nit mit gringem schmerzen" (MS, p. 4).

³⁷ "Im octobri 1595 zog er gen leyden in holland von wegen hebreeischen biblinen gebunden in quart zu zweyen teilen Parysser trucks dise bibel kam aus der Jesuiteren Collegio zu Paryss da ihnen geplünderet worden Jhre Bibliothec weil aus ihrem anstiften sollen ermordet werden Henricus IV" (MS, p. 6).

A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY STUDENT OF THEOLOGY 199

of Philip II of Spain, who had tried in vain to suppress the Dutch Republic. One must admire his courage in daring to undertake so long and perilous a journey to Leyden only to get a look at a Bible printed in Hebrew. We can see from this instance that Breitingger had in him the qualities of an upright, fearless scholar.

From Breitingger's student life we can assume that at the universities there was not much knowledge available for laymen. We hear of many courses for languages and the civilization of antiquity; there was plenty of time devoted to the explanation of the Holy Scripture and to the finer points of religious doctrines. When we consider then the opportunities for travel which the students had, it is not astonishing that the universities turned out numerous and good theologians. On the other hand, we know from history that few university students devoted themselves to medicine, law, or the sciences. The universities at the end of the sixteenth century were, in one word, schools of theology, and we may consider Breitingger's student life not only as an example of a theological scholar but of any scholar of his time.

THE RELIGIOUS BEARINGS OF A SECULAR MIND: GEORGE HERBERT MEAD

T. V. SMITH
University of Chicago

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD built upon secular foundations a mind and personality and philosophy so wholesomely virile as constantly to seem to exemplify and celebrate in daily living the finest human emotions. To religious men who are at the same time statesmen of the modern spirit he has therefore more to offer than a substantial reminder of what as thinkers and teachers they are up against. He has a formula of life prepotent to engender such emotions as he celebrated in theory and practice. Moreover, he has a doctrine to accompany his formula, a doctrine of altruistic potentiality not unlikely more intelligible to this generation than any yet presented in the name of religion.¹ But before articulating his formula or indicating his doctrine, let me take up, conjecturally where I cannot do it more substantially, the slack between his religious childhood and his secular, unscarred maturity.

I

Even as before college days were over he had achieved independence from the dogmas of the church and had joyously set out to direct his own course in life,² so he was later to project cosmically his own early competence. German idealism had absolutized the autonomy which he ascribed to nature, and in doing so had made it impossible to find, as Mead has it, any "such

¹ Other aspects of his philosophy I have noted in two articles. The one, "The Social Philosophy of George Herbert Mead," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXVII (1931), 368-85; the other, "George Herbert Mead and the Philosophy of Philanthropy," *Social Service Review*, Vol. VI, No. 1 (March 1922).

² *George Herbert Mead* (Memorial Addresses and a Biographical Note by His Son), p. 34.

RELIGIOUS BEARINGS OF A SECULAR MIND 201

intelligent process within ourselves as would enable us to take the helm into our hands and direct the course of our own conduct, either in thought or action."³ He needed only to drop the absolutistic basis of the romanticism supporting idealism in order to find empirically what others sought transcendently. This he early and, it appears, easily did, though not without being first endued by it with a "vision," as he says of Royce's influence upon him at Harvard, "that followed me for many years."⁴

That vision, indeed, appears to have borne fruit throughout his whole life of speculation, though it was sublimated into scientific modesty by kindly time and maturing insight. Mead appears never to have doubted that the universe is itself an active process, coming to consciousness in man, and receiving increments of meaning as well as direction from man's resolution of his own perplexities. Science, indeed, appears as but man's systematic attempt to orient in nature the exceptions which nature's spontaneity breeds; and in the scientific process the human individual plays the directive rôle.⁵

To this supreme confidence in science as a technique and in man as its agent, Mead came by a process which critically and overtly, though always graciously, eliminated religion from any primary rôle in his life. He came to it by discovering that problem-solving is the most intellectually interesting and the most spiritually rewarding thing in life and that problem-solving transpires in terms of the resources of the problem itself rather than in borrowed terms. In publicly calling attention once to the work of the University of Chicago Settlement, he told of his friendly conversations with a scientist who was to immure him-

³ *International Journal of Ethics*, XL (1930), 217.

⁴ The entire sentence summarizing Royce's influence is worth quoting. "I received an impression from him of freedom of mind, and of dominance of thought in the universe, of a clear unclouded landscape of spiritual reality where we sat like gods together—but not careless of mankind—and it was a vision that followed me for many years" (*ibid.*, XXVII [1917], 170).

⁵ See his contribution to *Creative Intelligence*, perhaps Mead's most systematic and profound essay.

self with the same leper settlement on the island of Molokai to which Father Damien (whose heroism was celebrated by Robert Louis Stevenson's spirited and eloquent defense of him) had been attached as a self-sacrificing missionary. Mead remarks upon this incident with the freshness of which he was capable: "it never occurred to me till long after these conversations not to look upon him as a very lucky fellow, as he indeed regarded himself."⁶

This incident will help to make clear why Mead could never regard the alleged heroism, the self-sacrifice, the borrowed wisdom, the adventitious sanctions, which make up so large a part of religious morale, as hardly more than pathological, morally if not psychologically so. Any justifiable "self-sacrifice" would not merely become but would be and seem self-realizational, if one had the right kind of self. The more strictly religious element of the great religions, Mead habitually thought of as arising from some frustration rather than as some fulfilment of human life. I do not mean that he did not see a positive and beneficent rôle sometimes played by them. I shall speak of this in course. But their inception and genius he seemed to see as life gone awry rather than as life come to fruition. Indeed, in one of the last and best articles Mead wrote he says, by way of celebrating man's benevolent tendencies: "Universal religions have issued from their frustration—New Jerusalems where all tears are wiped away, Nirvanas where all wants have ceased."⁷ Whether commenting upon the negative side or the positive aspect of historic religions, Mead could be relied upon to see their implication for human welfare and yet to keep straight, as he in one place puts it, the fact that "human experience, especially in recent times, has abundantly proved that the implication lies in social attitudes, which religious doctrines have formulated but for which they are not responsible."⁸

⁶ "The Social Settlement: Its Basis and Function," *University of Chicago Record*, XII (1908), 109-10.

⁷ "Philanthropy from the Point of View of Ethics," *Intelligent Philanthropy*, p. 140.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

RELIGIOUS BEARINGS OF A SECULAR MIND 203

This borrowed nature of its insight, this rôle secondary to any creation of values, made religion unavailable because inapplicable in the adventurous realm where Mead lived. Not only invidiously⁹ contrasting the church with the social settlement as an agency of betterment but also in a more seasoned assessment, he puts tellingly the limitations of institutionalized religion. "The pulpit," he says, "is committed to a right and wrong which are unquestioned, and from its point of view unquestionable. Its function then is not the intellectual one of finding out what in the new situation is right, but in inspiring to a right conduct which is supposed to be so plain that he who runs may read."¹⁰ This assessment cannot be dismissed, even from our vantage-point of a quarter of a century later, as an indictment growing out of an identification of religion as a whole with Christian fundamentalism. It is a basic attitude hardly less characteristic of modernism than of fundamentalism of which Mead here speaks, as his subsequent illustrations make clear: "The result has been that in the great moral issues of recent industrial history, such as the child labor, woman's labor, protection of machinery, and a multitude more, the pulpit has been necessarily silent. It had not the means nor the technique for finding out what was the right thing to do."¹¹ Not unction but penetration, as he makes clear in the article on the social settlement, is what sensitive men need. For such men to know is ordinarily for them to do; but to assume knowledge available in situations that are genuinely doubtful—as are most of the situations that challenge us—is to be worse than useless; it is to raise false confidence where what we need is not confidence but light. It is only after issues have been fairly settled on economic or moral or more broadly social grounds by other than religious

⁹ The university of course partakes of the merit of the settlement; for it too "is the community organized to find out what culture is as well as to give it; . . . to find out what is right and what is wrong as well as to teach them . . . that is, to be continually redefining education as well as administering it" (*Survey*, XXXV [1915], 351).

¹⁰ *International Journal of Ethics*, XVIII (1908), 321-22.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

methods that religious men can fruitfully take sides, and that is too late for any logical aid. The best that Mead can say of the church in the really crucial situations of life is that "it holds its peace, for it must give no uncertain sound to the battle." Indeed, as he concludes, "the only overt social issues with which the pulpit in recent times has identified itself have been temperance and chastity."¹² Deferring his evaluation of religious insight, we may summarize his weighed judgment of religious institutions: What we most poignantly need is not exhortation to do our duty, but, as Mead puts it, light "to enable us to form new moral judgments as to what is right and wrong, where we have been in such painful doubt."¹³

II

Science carried for Mead all the fine connotation that religion lacked. Indeed, science is but a name we give to the attitude most opposed to what Mead had delineated as religious impotence. It is intelligence at work; "once it has been set to work it can only be dismissed by dismissing the intelligence itself."¹³ The attitude is the same wherever, though the difficulties increase with the metamorphosis from nature to man; and Mead is unfaltering in his trust of the attitude which expects to get its light for darkness from inspecting the darkened situations themselves. He rings the changes on the necessity of rendering scientific the social field and of identifying morality with science become effective in the social field. In his philosophy of the social settlement, he sings the praises of "an identification of moral consciousness with our modern scientific consciousness"; and in the sequel adjudges that if the social settlement "did nothing else it illustrates concretely how the community ought to form a new moral judgment," i.e., by open-mindedly living with the difficulties themselves. "The same interest," he avers, "which the scientific observer of social phenomena takes to his investi-

¹² *University of Chicago Record*, XII (1908), 110.

¹³ *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXIII (1925), 236.

gations takes possession of the genuine settlement resident, for his first task is to comprehend his social environment. His most important virtue is not blind devotion but intelligence."¹⁴ Mead elsewhere generalizes this belief in such a fashion as to make clear its larger bearings: "Moral advance," he says, "consists not in adapting individual natures to the fixed realities of a moral universe, but in constantly reconstructing and re-creating the world as the individuals evolve";¹⁵ for, as he elsewhere concludes, "the order of the universe that we live in is the moral order."¹⁶ What he wars against here as elsewhere is not religion as such, of course, but against every form of externalism. Whatever transcends the situation in question is suspect. It may be useful to and for the situation, but this must be decided by mobile intelligence in the presence of the situation as itself the test and measure. The moralist is as guilty here as is the theologian: "the besetting assumption of the moralist that a moral reconstruction can be made intelligible only by a perfect moral order from which we have departed, or toward which we are moving, has very grave practical consequences."¹⁷ If the moralist in the long run proves more fruitful than the theologian, it is because the former can without complete loss of cast transcend (though with what difficulty let the history of ethics bear witness) his intuitionism and formalism and accept the scientific method as his only reliance. The religious, when he undertakes such metamorphosis, falls naturally into mysticism. Not that there is anything wrong with mysticism—save only that it lacks even more flagrantly than does formal religion a technique for validating its presumed insight. It sees so much in its moment of illumination that it cannot later prove that it saw anything. Such experience may reveal to one, as a contemporary mystic has it, "the anatomy of the body of God"; but it cannot elucidate even the simplest human perplexity. This does not mean

¹⁴ *University of Chicago Record*, XII (1908), 110.

¹⁵ *International Journal of Ethics*, XVIII (1908), 318.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, XXXIII (1923), 247.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, XVIII (1908), 319.

that moral insight must be itself mere awareness of consequences; but it does mean that sensitivity to and respect for consequences is the only validation of moral insight—or of any other kind of insight, for that matter.¹⁸

Indeed, it is this implied continuity of all kinds of insight which constitutes Mead's major emphasis. Freudianism he appraises as making functionally continuous with consciousness what is popularly supposed to be outside the pale. Behaviorism he espouses as uniting through the act the psychical and the physical. Pragmatism he preaches as being the best generalized account of this pervasive and functional continuity, "the unity of the object and of the world in our own activity."¹⁹ It is mind, everywhere mind, that transforms temporary contradictions into abiding continuities. This is Mead's legacy from idealism, but it is a legacy which he puts out at a high rate of interest. Mind does not discover merely what seems to be contradictory and then by true seeing resolve the false seeming. It discovers real contradictions but, by a more careful inspection of their possibilities, transforms through action the discrepant into the accordant. This function ascribed to the finite intelligence guarantees from Mead an amazingly high estimate of the significance of human individuality; but his conception of the conditions of this function of mind guarantees at the same time the most confirmed suspicion of any attempt to set off from curiosity and inspection and manipulation any segment of experience. To him there can be nothing sacred except the shared. More blamable by far than impotence, through lack of a technique for assisting intelligence in this high vocation, is the constant tendency of religion and transcendental ethics to thwart the realization of a growing better by emotional fixation—piously called devotion, invidiously phrased as loyalty to a cause—upon an absolute good inaccessible in its sterile fixity. "Society gets ahead," Mead

¹⁸ The basic use Mead makes of this utilitarian principle in promoting philanthropy to the plane of justice may be seen in his article for the symposium, *Intelligent Philanthropy*, edited by Ellsworth Faris *et al.*

¹⁹ *Philosophical Review*, IX (1900), 5.

RELIGIOUS BEARINGS OF A SECULAR MIND 207

thunders in many keys, "not by fastening its vision upon a clearly outlined distant goal, but by bringing about the immediate adjustment of itself to its surroundings, which the immediate problem demands."²⁰ The memorable article of Mead's on "The Philosophical Basis of Ethics" is crammed with fine insights. I must content myself here with its concluding gem: "not only does an external moral ideal rob immediate moral conduct of its most important values, but it robs human nature of the most profound solace which can come to those who suffer—the knowledge that the loss and the suffering, with its subjective poignancy, has served to evaluate conduct, to determine what is and what is not worth while."²¹ We are now prepared to state the formula of life already foreshadowed: "The imperative necessity . . . is that responsibility should be tested by the consequences of an act; that the moral judgment should find its criterion in the mutual determination of the individual and the situation."²² The psychological foundation for this formula is furnished by Mead's conviction that "the motive is the recognition of the end as it arises in consciousness."²³

More important, however, than the formula is the doctrine that implements it. The confidence in human nature to find its own best way by trusting as good the fulfilment of its own impulses and as right what occurs to it to do when confronted by problematic situations constitutes Mead's substitute for religion. Mead could treat as secondary all religious claims because he had found to have primary significance insights that were not religious. Secular insights must be secularly discerned. It is correct to say that he started at the bottom, for he makes no initial assumption of a human soul.²⁴ Since, indeed, there is no source from which a soul could be borrowed, man must navigate without one or manage to construct one as he voyages. Honestly and diligently Mead undertook and consummated in his social

²⁰ *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXIII (1923), 247.

²¹ *Ibid.*, XVIII (1908), 323.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 322.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

²⁴ Mead of course normally uses the term "self."

psychology no less a task than that of elaborating a natural history of the soul. Important as this is, I must content myself with a reference to available articles for Mead's own elaboration of the view that starting as animal organisms we achieve by an empirical assuming of the rôles of others the self-consciousness of which personality consists.²⁵

III

Suppose that, assuming Mead's sociological derivation of the self, we admit with him that religion is but a name for values already achieved, that it has no technique for the achieving, that at worst it stands in the way of the birth of new values, but that at best it loves the child born of the poignancy of another and regularly celebrates its birthdays. Forgetting our former dispraise, suppose we have adequate motivation for wanting to know what at the best could be said in praise of religion. The best that could be said is, I believe, to be found in the work of George Herbert Mead. Let us see what it is.

The first observation would concern the moral significance of the cult as such. Mead has made clear in an article upon "Scientific Method and Moral Sciences" that "though an institution should arise and be kept alive by its own function," nevertheless "in so far as it does not function, the ideal of it can be kept alive only by some cult, whose aim is not the functioning of the institution, but the continued presence of the idea of it in the minds of those who cherish it."²⁶ The church Mead proceeds to single out as the "outstanding illustration of such an institu-

²⁵ For the more systematic presentation of the bases of Mead's social psychology, see his articles in the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vols. IX, X, and XIX; and in the *International Journal of Ethics*, Vols. XXXIII and XXXV. A volume is now being edited by Professor Charles W. Morris, perhaps under the title, *Mind, Self and Society*, containing, in addition to the articles upon social-psychological problems, stenographic reports upon Mead's justly famous course at the University of Chicago on "Social Psychology." For suggestions as to the content of his social psychology as it appears from the vantage of other social preoccupations than religion, see my two articles referred to in n. 1.

²⁶ *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXIII (1923), 240.

RELIGIOUS BEARINGS OF A SECULAR MIND 209

tion. Its most important function has been the preservation in the minds of the community of the faith in a social order which did not exist."²⁷ He goes on to show that the cult makes its values sacred, stands in the way of their realization, and should give way to "functional value" in so far as the institution "approaches realization." But in periods when idealism is wholly impotent, Mead seems to feel that they also serve who only kneel to worship. His most explicit word upon this point is this: "The cult value of the institution is legitimate only when the social order for which it stands is hopelessly ideal."²⁸

The second observation favorable to religion is closely connected with the first. One may celebrate the actual as well as the "hopelessly ideal." Mead does not himself seem to see why one should call religious this celebration of the desirable actual, but the rôle he assigns to the aesthetic in human experience is clearly appropriable by religious persons who seek a substantial (non-theological) content for religion, as not a few contemporaries appear to do. Modern life has made it increasingly impossible for the majority of men to combine the ends for which they work with the work itself as means. Only "the artist, the research scientist, and the skilled artisan" enjoy vocations where normally "something of the delight of consummation can crown all intermediate processes."²⁹ For most the reward is distant; drudgery is at hand. Only imagination can pole vault one from the dreary here into the shining there. Consequently the not astonishing popularity of the two institutions—the cinema and the yellow press—which can support the imagination in its will to escape by spreading before it for two pennies or fifteen cents the rich substance of reverie. What the picture paper and the movie do consummately, other institutions, including the

²⁷ *Ibid.* Elsewhere and much earlier he had already defined "the religious object as one which, while transcending through its universality the particular situations of life, still is felt to be representative of its meaning and value" (*Philosophical Review*, IX [1900], 17).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

²⁹ "The Nature of the Aesthetic Experience," *ibid.*, XXXVI (1926), 382-93.

church, do haltingly. That is to say, the significance of a cult is not exhausted by keeping a hopeless ideal alive until a more fortunate day for its realization. It also imports into the otherwise arid present a semi-substantial experience filched from the yet-to-be. In Mead's fine phrase, "it has been the inspiration of universal religions . . . to bring something of the universal achievement, of the solemn festival, of common delight into the isolated and dreary activities which all together make possible the blessed community. . . ." ³⁰ In so far as religion can transubstantiate the prospective into the aesthetic, not to say kin-aesthetic, it plays an evidently enriching rôle. Moreover, these actualized escape values perform a wholesome therapy of catharsis in what Mead so happily calls "the economy of keeping house with oneself."

The third indicated observation in praise of religion follows hard upon if not indeed from the second. The value of values is the having of the desirable in common. Approving Professor Dewey's saying that "shared experience is the greatest of human goods," Mead in the foregoing article gives a new definition to isolation: "the isolated man is the one who belongs to a whole that he yet fails to realize." ³¹ "We have become bound up in a vast society," as he continues, "all of which is essential to the existence of each one, but we are without the shared experience which this should entail." While we wait and work for such social inventions as will remedy "man's isolation in society," religion as well as art can help us, in Mead's phrase, "to taste in Whitmanesque manner the commonalty of existence."

IV

If we drop for a moment, however, the rôle of the expositor for that of a most kindly critic, there is a point of view from which it might appear that Mead was more Christian than he intended. That the preponderant social solicitude in the Christian tradition appealed to Mead profoundly, as to so many sen-

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 384.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 389.

RELIGIOUS BEARINGS OF A SECULAR MIND 211

sitive thinkers, may be passed as a simple fact. But the assumption so easy as to make its opposite unthought, if not almost unthinkable, that the sharing of experience is the greatest good—this assumption by Mead provokes and rewards questioning. That which is private is “therefore subject to disintegration” and in fact exists only “because of the incompleteness of social organization.”³² It is the goal of science and the burden of morality, as Mead thinks, to complete this organization of society. This passion for solidarity is a veritable *idola tribus* of our time, and Mead is its secular prophet. “In the society which is closest to that of the primitive man,” we hear him saying, “we find the reality of all that is prefigured and set out in . . . institutions.”³³ And yet it is not really unthinkable that individuality in the most subjective and private sense, the unsharable, is a great virtue to be treasured and fought for rather than bartered away in a passion for gregariousness. That even more than this mild demurrer is thinkable, remember Nietzsche, who set the life-work of more sensitive modern thinkers than perhaps any other single man, and this because he called in question the rightful ubiquity of the Christian emphasis upon thoroughgoing community.³⁴ Wise men in other cultures have sometimes shown a high regard for antipathetic tendencies in human nature. The

³² *Ibid.*, p. 393. Cf. his early article (*Philosophical Review*, IX [1900], 5), where he makes clear the logical basis of this ethical assumption: the subjective, the private, the psychical, arises only as a result of disintegration and exists for the sake of reintegration. Subjectivity is the homeless sprite of that which is no more and of that which is not yet.

³³ *Journal of Philosophy*, XII (1915), 152–53. Indeed, where this is not assumed, Mead sometimes seems to make its discovery the goal of science. “We assume,” he says in an early article, “that human society is governed by laws that involve its solidarity, and we seek to find these out that they may be used” (*American Journal of Sociology*, V [1899], 370).

³⁴ Cf. W. M. Urban’s feeling remarks: “I shall never forget the long night in which I read through the *Genealogy of Morals*. It was, I believe, the greatest single spiritual adventure of my life. In the grey light of the morning I found myself surveying the wreckage of my beliefs in a curious mood. . . . Enough that I knew from that moment that, not only was the problem of values my problem, but also that it was destined to be the key problem of the epoch in which I was to live” (*Contemporary American Philosophy*, II, 359).

brotherhood of man as a cult has challenged loyalty longer than its complementary cult, the fatherhood of God. But anyone who has pondered realistically Mark Twain's account of Captain Stormfield's visit to heaven, or who has observed the practices of his neighbors friendly gossiping at the dinner table, which latter, at least, Mead had realistically remarked,³⁵ may be forgiven a doubt as to whether, down below the level of talk, we actually do want such social solidarity as the brotherhood of man implies and as Mead's social philosophy seems constantly to assume as norm. It is so uncharacteristic of Mead's cautious curiosity to make a cause of what really is not uncontestably good that it arouses the suspicion that he but carried on uncritically in this regard the Christian tradition. Would a Mohammedan thinker, not to mention a classic Greek mind, of Mead's acumen have assumed that all human experience implies enlargement and intensification of community without limit? If not, it is certainly a high tribute to the strength of the Christian heaven that it could so raise the threshold of even Mead's tough mind as to bring curiosity to its knees before the sacred altar of brotherhood.

If Mead unconsciously owed this basic assumption to the Christian religion, then he consciously paid back the debt in liberal measure. For his social psychology, which I have elsewhere described as his prizepole to budge charity toward reform and to heave social service on to the plane of justice, may equally truly be described as his corrective for the most fatal weakness of religion. This weakness, as the foregoing discussion has led us to see, is perfectionism. If Mead had been consciously and proudly Christian, he might well have said to himself: "I will scientifically implement this Golden Rule by showing that man to his very marrow is adapted to practice what some who do not understand his nature have scouted as utopian." Has he not indeed shown, or sought to show, that we are actually members

³⁵ See the delightful quotation from Mead, *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXVII (1931), 375 n.

RELIGIOUS BEARINGS OF A SECULAR MIND 213

one of another? Have we not acquired, by his account, our very souls by putting ourselves in one another's place until what arises in us as psyche is really socius? We are made of one sociological stock, and our being can do no better than to perpetuate the process of our becoming. Without the habit of taking the rôle of others, we ourselves should never have come to be; and this habit once established easily implements the injunction for us to do unto others as we would have them do unto us. In fact, and this would be indeed an eventuation so curious as to mock while it comforts, has not Mead implemented the Golden Rule so thoroughly by his social psychology that it is no longer a prescription at all but now a description of how we do inevitably act?

So to query is covertly to charge Mead with being romantic even after his transcending of romanticism. His, however, is the romance of man. How profoundly he did believe in man! The strength of our hands is not yet disclosed, because our hands move as yet to cross purposes. We do in small groups exemplify the Golden Rule by the very technique of our being; but it remains a mere prescription across group lines, which is to say in most of the areas of life. But Mead's philosophy of prescriptions, of ideals, renders them always ingratiating candidates for actuality. *Man can if he will; and he will if he knows; but he can know only through the concrete technique called science.* This profound confidence in man's indigenous power to know what he needs to know and in his natural willingness to follow his knowledge all the way might itself be called Mead's final capitulation to religion—if it did not in its first element contradict most religions and in its second element transcend them.

THE GOAL OF RELIGION

A. STEWART WOODBURN

Crozer Theological Seminary

THE diversity among the formulas devised to define the goal of religion is notorious. Each formulation reflects a point of view, and probably expresses one phase of the truth. Although Jesus was not interested in the logic of religion, he used a phrase in regard to his own life work, which is eminently serviceable in describing the purpose of religion: "that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly." (John 10:10.) It is the glorious mission of religion to humanity to enrich life, by giving it a maximum of meaning and value. Its purpose is achieved by conserving the best from the past, by inspiring man to creative endeavors to make present living most satisfying, and by laying enduring foundations for the happiness and safety of the children of tomorrow.

Our immediate problem is concerned with the realization of the goal of religion up to the limit of our ability under existing conditions. We want to know the best methods for getting the maximum contribution from life in this modern world, for life's enrichment. Religiously, as well as scientifically and morally, we must take the world as we find it. There is nothing to be gained by shutting out from our purview any of the facts. The world in which we are religious contains factors that hinder as well as those that help. We encounter ugliness as well as beauty, error as well as truth, evil as well as good, suffering as well as happiness. While we are trying to extract from our envioning world all that we can for life's enrichment, we dare not neglect the other side of the picture. Perhaps we may find that because the picture has an ugly side, we love its beauty all the more.

THE GOAL OF RELIGION

215

For life is full of paradoxes, and its profoundest meanings can only be disclosed to him who sees all, holds to his faith, and refuses to be dismayed.

I

We live in a world where there is much that is beautiful. Poets, musicians and painters have consecrated their talents to expressing the joy experienced in appreciation of the beautiful. Religious people too have felt the glow of the world as a light divine, and interpreted the world's vast places as the temple of the divine. The world is full of unspeakable charm and beauty for the soul that is sensitive and appreciative. Yet, that is not the whole story. There is a deal of ugliness too, and it would not be fair to try to decipher the meaning of life, leaving the ugly facts out of account. If the beauties of the world are to contribute to the enrichment of life, it must be with our minds fully cognizant on the other side of the picture.

1. All of us have been conscious at times of the ennobling influence of Nature. In spite of the presence of much that is commonplace and some things that are repulsive, Nature has a way of directing our attention to her glories. It often is true that man's aesthetic sense can find something to call forth his admiration even in objects that are otherwise disgusting. We are repelled by the green scum on the surface of a stagnant pool, but, when we put it under a microscope, we discover patterns of exquisite beauty. It is one of the prerogatives of human nature to choose as between the ugliness and beauty in a scene, which may exercise the dominant influence. You may walk along in the evening with your eyes open to nothing but the scum on the water and the mud in the street; or, you may feast them on the glory of the departing sun. Nature provides both the scum and the sunset. You and I must choose which is to dominate our souls.

One recalls the Persian legend of a visit which Jesus made incognito to a market place. A number of people had gathered about the carcass of a dog, and were heaping their abuses on

the dead beast. It was torn, blood-besmeared, and repulsive to the last degree. Then, in the midst of the comments was heard a voice: "Pearls cannot equal the whiteness of its teeth." And the people began to say: "It must be Jesus of Nazareth. None but he could see anything to admire in the carcass of a dog." That is a parable of the way in which it is open to us to enrich life. Wordsworth reflected the faith of one whose life had received precisely that kind of enrichment, when he sang,

Nature never did betray
The heart that loved her; 'tis her privilege
Through all the years of this our life, to lead
From joy to joy: for she can so inform
The mind that is within us, so impress
With quietness and beauty, and so feed
With lofty thoughts.

2. Art is the outward expression of what man has found to be beautiful in the universe. It is the embodiment of spiritual value in terms of beauty. It is not just ornament, not something superfluous; but it is interpretation and creation. Art is great when its interpretation is so faithful that it stirs within us the sense of reality and of worth. The greater the art the more it appeals to us as conveying truth that would otherwise be imperceptible. The artist is perfectly sure that what he has attained is illumination, not illusion. Browning expressed it:

The rest may reason and welcome
'Tis we musicians know.

In our modern emphasis on the scientific basis for certainty, we need reminding that art, with its appreciation of the beautiful and its power to create beauty, is also unlocking one of the gateways that lead to the temple of truth.

It is quite legitimate to think of art as a way of escape for the triviality of life. There is much in the experience of the ordinary man that is drab or commonplace. He needs some thing that will give him relief, and make him feel that life is worth the living, and even he may help to make the world more

THE GOAL OF RELIGION

217

attractive. It is the glory of fine art to give him the feeling that there is something more to life than simply making a living. A stroll through a beautiful garden or an evening of soul-uplifting music will do much to reconcile a man to life, to make him feel that there are better things in store worthy of his struggle to attain. Good art also inspires a man with the desire to become an artist himself in his own sphere. It makes him want to create the best possible things, to excel in his own vocation. Stradivarius carried the artist's vision into the making of violins, and music was sweeter and life more noble because he did. The way is open to us to make use of art as a contribution to the more abundant life.

Nevertheless not all art is great. All art is not faithful to the ideal. All art is not a pathway to truth. Since the instruments of art are symbols and sensuous draperies, it sometimes happens that art is debased by veiling or distorting the truth. Art has given us debasing pictures as well as masterpieces, sirens as well as symphonies. If art is to be the servant of enriched living, it will be in the measure that we keep the ideals pure and uplifting, in the measure that we enlist it in the service of the best that we know. The more that art has been employed in the service of religion, the better the art that has been created. Great art has never flourished apart from religion, and the major part of the world's best art has been distinctively Christian. Art has contributed and continues to contribute to worship, helping us to express our feeling of worth-ship through the channel of beauty. It has been a refining influence on religion, even as religion has been a perennial source of inspiration to art. Together they have made life sweeter, richer, and more satisfying.

Truly the contemplation of beauty is an enrichment to life. It is the faith of the great artist that beauty is a phase of reality, one of the sure pathways to truth. He believes that beauty is positive and ugliness negative; beauty is normal and ugliness abnormal. May not we, who are in quest of the most abundant life share that faith? We cannot prove by any mathematical

demonstration that beauty outweighs ugliness in the world. We cannot even prove that beauty is a truer portrait of reality than ugliness. But we believe it to be true. And we are somehow sure that beauty is thrice beautiful because of the unbeautiful against which it stands in contrast. We rejoice that beauty is not all ready-made, but there remains for us something of the creative task of the artist, a task that brings us into co-operation with the divinest in nature and in man. We insist that we have a right to feel at home in this universe which gave us birth and sustains us. We have a right to a feeling of at-homeness when we are devoting ourselves to the task of making beauty outstrip ugliness. Browning said,

If you get simple beauty and nought else,
 You get about the best thing God invents:
 That's somewhat: and you'll find the soul you've missed
 Within yourself when you return Him thanks.

II

We live in a world of expanding knowledge and growing truth. Every day the sciences are bringing to humanity an enrichment of knowledge both about the universe in which we live and about ourselves. And philosophy is helping us to interpret our growing body of knowledge that it may do its full stint of service for life. We cannot but be amazed at the vastness of scientific achievement, even within our own day. Its gifts to the needs and comforts of life are incalculable. It has increased the facility and rapidity of transportation, has added immensely to the comforts of home, and has solved problems of disease and of social maladjustment. It has given us power in many forms. It is undoubtedly one of the greatest instruments for the enlargement of life. Nevertheless it also provides new and more terrible ways of destroying life. Within our own memory it has provided the war demons with a great Juggernaut car that they rolled relentlessly over the bodies of millions of our fellow-men. The record of science is far from being unsullied. Yet, should we say that it was science that maimed and killed? Should we

not rather say that it was the inhuman use of the human instrument that caused the tragedy? Despite the failures and catastrophes of the past it is still our hope that humanity will learn how to make humane uses of the great instruments of science, and will refuse to allow them to be debased for inhuman ends. Human ingenuity must not be allowed to create mechanical robots or any other devices that will get out of control. Science was made for man, and not man for science. Our criterion for judging it must continue to be its serviceableness to humane interests.

The scientific temper is particularly evident in the indefatigable search for truth. Sometimes it is said that the scientist seeks for truth for truth's sake. He is most scientific when he is most disinterested, when he keeps his mind open to truth from any quarter. This is an attitude that is helping to make life more meaningful and worthful. The religious man ought certainly to welcome truth at all times and from all sources. A religious life that shuts out any aspect of truth is bound to be to that extent fragmentary and emasculated. A vital concern for truth in its entirety has been the glory of religion. A religion that dares not make full reckoning with truth is doomed to disintegration.

1. Religious experience for us must be in a world about which science is continually extending our knowledge. The scientific descriptions depict a universe so vast as to stagger the human imagination. When physical scientists talk to us of space having a radius of millions of light years, the rate of speed of light being 186,000 miles per second, it somehow seems vaster than what used to be meant by the word "infinity." Our nearest spiral nebula is at least 850,000 light years away. Our largest telescopes reveal thousands of millions of stars. There are stars which emit 10,000 times as much light as the sun. The present astronomical knowledge points to a plurality of universes, our own universe with its sun and moon being insignificant as compared with some of the others. And our earth, the distance of

which took our humanity so long to conquer, is very small as compared with many of the other heavenly bodies. In such immensity of time and space, one feels like asking,

What am I?

An infant crying in the night,
An infant crying for the light,
And with no language but a cry?

Religious experience for us must be in a world that behaves with remarkable regularity and accuracy. Indeed, it is so accurate that modern physicists propose to interpret it through pure mathematics. They tell us that the concepts of mathematics are much more appropriate than those of biology or of engineering for the interpretation of nature. Nature is therefore dependable. We can make plans, and not have to live in suspense lest they be upset by some freak in nature's behavior. There is no danger of cosmic lawlessness setting in, and throwing the machinery out of gear. This regularity of nature's working is expressed through the concept of natural law. Natural law seems to suggest to some minds the notion of obligation imposed on nature from without. That is not the scientific meaning. It rather signifies "a rule that is never broken." As Eddington has said, "In the physical world what a body does and what a body ought to do are equivalent." It is quite out of consideration for anything else to happen than what does happen. In logic, however, there is a normative significance to the concept of law. We cannot say that the way we think and the way we ought to think are one and the same. It is more true to think of a law of nature as a human description of the observed way that nature behaves. It is not the statement of a law by which nature, including man, is governed. Even were we to admit that man's own behavior is in accordance with a law, still we know that the law is of his own formulation, and in that sense he is greater than the law that describes his actions. There is another observation to be made about a natural law. As the scientists add to man's stock of knowledge regarding the universe, he has to re-

THE GOAL OF RELIGION

221

revise his formulations. So the validity of the law is functional and relative to man's state of knowledge. At best it can only attain probable certainty. It is man himself who formulates and revises. All of which proves the richness of man's mental life, a wealth to which he is continually adding through his scientific labors.

2. Our growing scientific knowledge is with reference to ourselves as well as the world in which we live. And, as we have already seen, these two phases of knowledge interact. The vaster the universe is discovered to be, the more infinitesimal do we ourselves appear. We are like mere specks in the great cosmos with its imponderable reaches of space. Our lives are like mere flickers in the immeasurable stretches of time. And yet man is possessed of the capacities of self-consciousness and self-determination within his world and day, capacities which the nature from which he has sprung does not have. In the gifts that matter most, in the affairs of intelligence and feeling he transcends the mighty cosmos beside which he is otherwise so insignificant.

The natural sciences have demonstrated the fact of man's integral relation with the universe. Nature has given him birth, and has nurtured him. He belongs to Nature, bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh. He bears in his body the indelible marks of Mother Nature. And life is a continuous process of adjusting himself to other parts of the natural order. It is a ceaseless experiment of seeking to establish satisfactory relations to his environment. Yet man is more than merely a bio-chemical organization. If he is a product of Nature, he is the finest flower of the creative processes. He has powers of action and initiative, and the power of self-examination and self-criticism. He has a creative part to play in his own development. Blaise Pascal has given expression to this great truth in a remarkable passage:

Man is but a reed, the weakest in Nature, but he is a thinking reed. It is not necessary that the whole universe should arm itself in order to

crush him. A vapor, a drop of water would be sufficient to kill him. But even though the universe should crush him, man would still be nobler than that which is killing him, for he knows that he is dying, and the advantage that the universe has over him. The universe does not know.

It is in his self-consciousness that man transcends the nature that gave him birth. His greatness is most transcendent in that he is religious.

3. As a result of our growing knowledge of the truth about the universe and about ourselves, we are finding it more and more incongruous to try to use concepts that suggest the old fashioned dualism as between nature and the supernatural. The old lines of demarkation are inadmissible. The limits of nature have been pushed back so far that our concepts of nature transcend what our forefathers dreamed about the supernatural. The traditional distinction between the sacred and the secular no longer holds. The instruments of the sciences, the tools and utensils of life in all its departments may be turned to account in the quest for the abundant life. For the sacredness of a thing is not fixed by its unearthly source, but by the ideals to which it contributes or in the service of which it is employed. "The sabbath was made for man" and that is how it attained its sanctity. So may science be sacred to the abundant life of man.

The tragedies of life are the outcome of misusing the gifts of nature and of science, turning them to harmful rather than helpful uses, impoverishing ourselves when we might be enriched. There is no royal road to the abundant life, no celestial guaranty of its security, despite our foolishness and misappropriation of our heritage. But there is challenge that comes to the soul of humanity out of this modern world to make the best of our inheritance. It is a challenge to be venturesome in the task of building a better world and living a richer life, a challenge to harness the possibilities and powers of the sciences to the supreme ideals of life. Can we still have faith to believe in the ultimate triumph of truth over error, in the ultimate consecration of the gifts and tools of science to the enrichment of life?

We have a right to such faith only in the measure that we throw our own lives into the adventure. We may indeed contribute to our own victory. In that way we shall be adding to the enrichment of life.

III

We live in a world where the good goads us to be better, and the better urges us toward the best. We are in a world where happily a great many people prefer good to evil, in a world where there is so much that is good that an interpretation of life and of the universe that failed to give an account of goodness would be inadequate. And yet, the world in which we live has so much evil that it is quite easy to be stampeded by it. The more abundant life obviously must be a good life, a life in which we are conscious of getting the upper hand of evil, not only in ourselves but to some extent in the environment. The more abundant life is, in a real sense, a life of conflict, with evil as the arch-enemy against which we have to wage battle repeatedly. There is no assurance of an ultimate victory from any of our little struggles, though we find support for carrying on the contest by the faith that sometime our humanity may rejoice in a greater victory than has yet been dreamed. Perhaps after all it is the struggle itself and the consequent courage and perseverance that it imparts to us that contributes most to the enrichment of life. If there were no foe to fight there would be no victory to win, and life would be impoverished to that extent. There is a sense in which we might say of goodness what Lessing said of truth, "Did the Almighty holding in his right hand *Truth*, and in his left *Search after Truth*, deign to proffer me the one I might prefer—in all humility, but without hesitation, I should request—*Search after Truth*."

1. The moral man is the finest flower of nature's processes. Kant was everlastingly right in his insistence on goodness as the only jewel that shines by its own luster. And he was also right in pointing out that goodness is only possible for man because he is free to choose between alternatives. The mystery

of the moral life consists in this very fact that the good implies evil. Real morality is impossible unless there be a chance of choosing as between good and evil. Be it said to the merit of Christian ethics: it has never blinked the fact of evil. In the main Christian moralists have been quite clear as to the reality of evil. We have had some extreme idealists who would do away with our human distinctions as between good and evil for ultimate Reality. We are perfectly willing to admit the limitations of our human insight, and the probability that some of the facts that we label as evil may prove to be good in the long run. Nevertheless our errors of judgment are surely poor ground for blotting out ultimately the distinctions between good and evil. It does not afford us much help in the moral struggle to be told that we are the victims of illusion. In that case the Hindu is right in regarding ignorance as a greater enemy than moral evil.

It is more rational to believe that the moral struggle is a real struggle, that the evils against which we do battle are real evils, that such victories as we achieve are real victories, that moral values are real values. It would seem that if this be denied and evil be supposed to be illusory, the logical conclusion would be that goodness is also chimerical. In that case a thoroughgoing naturalism is more reasonable than metaphysical idealism. Our religious quest can get little nurture for the abundant life from such a philosophy of life. And we still believe that there is nothing in the world that is good except a good man.

2. Our study of history discloses the extensiveness of our indebtedness to the good people of the past for the enrichment of life. The quest for the more abundant life is a co-operative endeavor. The sharing of our values, paradoxical as it may seem, increases them. It is the moral miser whose life is impoverished to the starving point. It is the moral philanthropist who adds to his wealth by giving it to others. Lowell has clothed this thought in imperishable language:

The Holy Supper is kept, indeed,
In whatso we share with another's need;

THE GOAL OF RELIGION

225

Not what we give, but what we share,
 For the gift without the giver is bare;
 Who gives himself with his alms feeds three,
 Himself, his hungry neighbor, and Me.

Our debt to the good people who have gone before us is past reckoning. The world in which we live has been made immensely richer by the unselfishness, the sympathy, the courage, the faith, the idealism of the men and women who have preceded us. Our indebtedness to the past is not simply with respect to works of art and creations of science, but more profoundly with regard to the gifts of personality, of mind and of heart. There have been bad men in the past, and there are more than enough today, destroyers of happiness and enemies of human welfare. But the religious man refuses to believe that the future of the world and of man rests with the wicked man. Moral progress may be difficult to prove from history. Regress is not any easier to prove. Our faith in the conquering goodness of humanity is unquenchable.

3. The history of religions furnishes us with the records of men and women of all races who have dared to live on the highest levels of life, and have believed that such living was cosmically significant. Buddha taught his followers that suffering was the universal character of existence. It is the meaning of the world, and the cause of it is human desire. The way to overcome all this evil he defined as the noble eight-fold middle path of virtue. A life of moderation and virtue helps to make a better world. Brahmanism teaches that a life devoid of selfishness, a life of disinterested devotion to duty will help to bring to an end the everlasting round of rebirths, and will unite the doer with the cosmic Soul. Confucius and Lao-Tze both urged men to live virtuously, and claimed that virtue was but the human expression of cosmic law. The prophets of Israel and Muhammad urged people to cease from their evil ways, and to behave toward one another with righteousness and kindness, if they would win their approval of God. Jesus said: "Blessed

are the pure in heart; they shall see God." Religion has ever urged that the good life is not only humanly satisfying but cosmically purposive.

4. We are consciously experiencing the presence of evil in the world. It is like a many-headed monster, appearing and re-appearing in a multiplicity of forms. Sometimes it seems to us that the modern forms of evil are more terrible than any of the past. That is probably because these are the forms with which we are personally concerned. They are living problems for us. The pessimist is so overwhelmed with evil that he concludes that, though this is the best possible world, it could not be worse. But while there is moral life there is hope. The sciences have helped us to conceive of the world and humanity as still in the making. They have delivered us from the dread lest evil should be ultimate and ineradicable. We have learned that bad habits can be replaced by good ones, that temperaments can be amazingly transformed. We have also learned that scientific method can be harnessed to the tasks of altering and improving the physical conditions of life. All of which fills us with optimism in regard to the possibility of making the world a better and a safer place. But it can be no arm-chair optimism. He only has a right to hope who enlists in the great moral battles that are being waged. There are tasks enough to challenge all the moral heroism that man can summon. It is not difficult to discover plenty of moral equivalents for the venturesomeness of war and our modern racketeer life.

There is no occasion for us to lose hope and courage. There is no evidence sufficient to make us believe that the universe is against us as we strive to achieve moral values. Nor are we forced to the conclusion that nature is neutral. Even if it were, we may still experience the challenge and thrill of the moral life. It is worth any risk that may be involved. The struggle sweetens and enriches life, even if we can find no guaranty of ultimate victory. But our religious faith is a summons to believe that the universe actually lends us support when we are trying

THE GOAL OF RELIGION

227

to be good. We claim that we have more of a right to be at home in this world than has the destroyer of human values. Still we hope for the time to come when the victory will be complete. Best of all we rejoice in the fact that we have a vital part to play in bringing to pass victory for the good. We can co-operate with all the forces of righteousness, and help to realize our own ideals.

IV

We have made three observations about the world in which we live. It is a world in which there is much of surpassing beauty, in which truth is constantly expanding, and in which the good is perpetually alluring us. We have learned to believe also that we can find support from our environing universe when we try to achieve and conserve these cherished values. The world is made more of a spiritual home and life itself is ennobled and enriched as we spend ourselves in the service of the beautiful, the true, and the good. This is to live more abundantly, and this is the significance of religion. The abundant life which is the goal of religion gathers up into itself all that we have learned to cherish as worthwhile, and integrates all in noble living. Nature, the arts, the sciences, and morality have their tribute to bring, their gifts to the life of religion. There is nothing worthwhile to life that is not significant for religion. By the integration of all that is of worth to life, religion not only ennobles life, but fills to the full the meaning of its quests.

1. The presence in this world of so much that we hold as valuable, and the ability to achieve still more that is valuable confirms us in the belief that we have a right to make this world a home. We find that it is possible to make this present world more beautiful, possible to find new truth, possible to make life and the world better. That carries significance for the meaning of the world. Being a world that gives us support as we seek to enrich our lives, we cannot avoid the conclusion that value is deep-seated in the nature of Reality itself. Reality is qualitative as well as quantitative. It has value as well as existence. Such

a faith need not involve us in dualism, as it sometimes has done. The world in which we live has spiritual facts as well as merely physical. As it is still in process of development, it has potentiality as well as achievements. When we know that in this self same world men in the past have been enabled to enrich life so greatly, we feel sure that we too can obtain support in the endeavor to enrich life for ourselves and those who come after us.

2. So also the presence of so much purposefulness in history and in life, and the success that humanity has achieved through persisting in high purposes confirms us in our faith that we with our purposes have a right to feel at home. In this conviction we are strengthened by the findings of the sciences. Present-day scientists are repeatedly reassuring us that they find the meaning of the universe as development plus direction. It gives evidence of development in harmony with intelligent purpose. It would be difficult to understand the purposive factor in human life on any other basis. So we conclude that the world is more than a mechanism. Even if it were a mechanism, such an analogy only points in another way to a designing and controlling intelligence. However we look at it, we reach the same conclusion. The element of purpose is part and parcel of the universe in which our human purposes are formulated and fulfilled. Who knows but in our faithful effort to achieve high purposes we may be helping to achieve the greater purposes at work in the universe?

3. So we conclude that the abundant life that we have called religion sends its roots right down into the nature of Reality. It is not concerned with merely ephemeral or chimerical efforts. Religion as the quest for the enriched life is not just the phantom hope of people suffering from neurotic temperaments. It is the eternal struggle to reach for the better, the higher, the nobler; the ceaseless upward reach of man to attain that enrichment which he believes the cosmos has in store for him who devotes himself to the best that he knows. Religion has the ele-

THE GOAL OF RELIGION

229

ment of challenge and adventure. It is a challenge to faith in these greatest values and in their ultimate significance, even when the way to their attainment seems blocked by a thousand hindrances. It is a call to high adventure in the sphere of creative enrichment in the face of forces that are doing their utmost to impoverish life. It is the faith that the universe is after all a realm of ends with the task of achievement largely in our own hands. Yet it is a partnership enterprise between man and his universe.

We Christians have a symbol that gathers up into itself this our faith in the validity of the religious quest, our faith in the ultimate reality of the beauty, truth, and goodness with which we are seeking to enrich life, our faith that the more abundant life is cosmically significant. That symbol is God.

EAST AND WEST: A STUDY IN IRENICS

ALBERT E. SUTHERS
Ohio Wesleyan University

CHARITY in religious belief is not a grace that is come by easily. To apply it to those with whom we have considerable mental affinity is simple enough, but to extend it beyond the zone of our own orthodoxy where opinions and ideals are personal is a different matter. A feature of recent ecclesiastical history is the movement toward denominational unification. It is a laudable scheme, but the larger problem of co-ordinating the teachings of religions popularly conceived as disparate has hardly as yet been taken up seriously except in an academic way and by a few intrepid spirits. The church historically has been so wedded to dogma that she is timid toward truth which is not of her pronouncement, her interpretation or sponsoring. To suggest, therefore, open-mindedness to a degree of acquiescence to the religious philosophy of the "pagan" saints of the past, is never popular in a communion whose tradition has been to turn the hapless condition of two-thirds of the human race into a plea for pity, an argument for philanthropy, a pretext for proselytism. To be beyond the pale of the church is to be pitied. "Out there" is the belt of humanitarianism, where good will and Christian love merge too readily into *amor militans*. It is the domain of private judgment, that is private to others; it invites penetration; we hope it will yield to persuasion, but failing that, there is often the temptation, if not the tendency, to resort to other means to bring the non-conforming brother "bound to Jerusalem." Church history is testimony enough to this. On the grand assumption of the superiority of our own faith—an assumption verifiable enough, but as taken for granted amounting often to Christian bigotry—we frame our judgment of the non-Christian systems, equally without knowledge

or examination, usually according to the sight of the eyes against the background of social conditions—criteria we would resent in the valuation of our own religion. The ethical groundwork on which those cultures rest is concealed from us and therefore rarely guessed.

It is this chronic conceit in our own rightness, coupled with our timidity in asking ourselves questions, which has turned what was our problem, and might have been our opportunity, into a weapon in the hand of the less sympathetic "outsider." Writers occasionally indulge their pique against the church by charging the denominational schools of this land, the "alleged preservers of the truth," as being the "most serious obstacle in America to human liberation and enlightenment." To a degree, the accusation might be sustained against certain denominational postgraduate institutions in that they emphasize only aspects of truth, thereby disciplining the mind of the student in the groove of an ancient schism. In so doing, they cannot but be factors in promoting the imperialistic spirit in religion. By being educated along the lines of that particular persuasion to which by an accident of birth he belongs, the student imbues prejudices which cramp the spirit and restrict freedom of thought.

In contrast to this inclination on the part of the Christian church, the writer would like to draw attention to some exemplary aspects of certain other religions in at least this particular. That other faiths are divided into discordant bodies is not to be denied, but, on the whole, the major groups (excepting Moslems) evince toward other systems a good will unhappily not always exemplified by the professed followers of Christ. The spirit of Gautama, for instance, like that of Jesus, is a perpetual reproach to those who cannot rest until they have "compassed sea and land to make one proselyte." India takes her teachers seriously, more so than we do. Is it because of that that the religions of that land today, though rich in ritual, are destitute of dogma? To the Buddhist as to the Hindu a spiritual

experience means more than its intellectual formulation. To symbolism he might be a slave, but he is averse to literalism. Questions therefore which disturb our minds leave him unstirred, except perhaps he stands aghast at our agitation. Our distress over the credibility of the Virgin Birth, for example, the Indian mind finds difficult to understand; to one to whom an idea is of more value than an incident, and an illustration more compelling than an argument, the act is nothing but obviously a symbol of something deeper and infinitely more significant. Herein also is a partial explanation of their freedom from fanaticism in respect to belief, though not always as to conduct, for fanatical zeal seems to break out most readily when experience is under the tight rein of reason, and an adjustment has to be made to some new proposition for which the mind is unprepared. Hence also the relative indifference of the Oriental to propagandism, except where self-defensively he has begun to copy our methods. He seems almost to sense the truth, that the desire to proselytize limits one in his sympathy and action; that it means the imposition of one view, namely, one's own, upon another. Anyway, the Oriental mind, generally speaking, is not so imperious; it prefers rather that every man should enter his own peculiar religious heritage at his own level and in his own particular way.

In the light of this, it is worth bearing in mind that the religion of Jesus was supremely a religion of the rule of the Spirit. "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." That the primitive church also emphasized this inner authority is evident from the teaching and the language of the day. The very meaning of the kingdom was that men would give spontaneous allegiance to the will of God, through an inner harmony, making outward restraints and ordinances superfluous. And in doing this the church was not only falling into line with the spirit of Jesus but was running true to the insights of the sages of Asia. In the sixth century before his day, we read of a certain Chinese statesman protesting against the conduct of a neighboring state in reducing its laws to permanent form by inscribing them in bronze, on

the ground that written law would encourage meticulous observance of the letter at the cost of the spirit. And it was when the spontaneity of the Spirit subsided and the period of high enthusiasm passed that the early Christians turned to the letter for the legislation of their lives, a departure, unhappily, which was destined to become the governing principle in the church through succeeding ages.

In the light of the fair-mindedness of this age toward the unfoldings of science, the dogmatic mind, therefore, that demands conformity in belief or practice, or insisted on finality in affairs creedal, is somewhat anomalous. It is an elementary lesson which psychology would teach us that the experiences of all good Christians, not to mention sincerely religious people of varying persuasions, need not be alike, any more than the manner of their expression; and that in being different from our own they need be for that reason neither less real nor less valid than our own. The church early caught the vision of an internationalism in Christ arising out of the realization of our oneness of blood. A further vision is yet to be had of another communion—a brotherhood not physical, nor conditioned by intellectual interpretation, conformity of practice, or a standardized experience, but a fellowship founded upon respect for the varied and universal findings of the human spirit in its strivings for the truth.

II

It has already been observed that the Oriental's understanding of religion affects in turn his missionary zeal and activities. This, however, is not the reason why Hinduism is non-missionary, for to be a Hindu one must be so born. And yet, Hinduism does not legislate in matters of belief, notwithstanding the fact that touching behavior it is more tyrannous than that exercised by any temporal or ecclesiastical power. The pressure it brings to bear is the pressure of a social mind in common conduct; there is no inquisitorial insistence on conformity of belief, for neither does confession of faith accord any status, nor intellec-

tual independence afford ground for rejection or complaint. On the other hand, orthodox Islam with its insistence at the outset on creedal acquiescence as conditional to membership in the faith and its continued emphasis thereon throughout the life of the believer fairly exemplifies the lengths to which fanaticism will go in its opposition to new truth. It is no surprise to the student of religion that the accusation made against the Abbasid Caliphs of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was that of infidelity, for no other reason than the encouragement they accorded science and their patronage toward learning. "For it has ever been the case," said Vincent of Lerins, "that the more a man is under the influence of religion, so much the more prompt is he to oppose innovations."

With Buddhism, the Protestantism of ancient India, the case is different. In accord with the spirit of its parent faith, Hinduism, we find in it liberty of thought in the most pronounced form. The Buddhist has his scriptures, but he is not mentally enslaved to any specific interpretation thereof as the *sine qua non* of salvation. The Pitakas are not used to bind the mind or standardize faith in the sense that some Christians would use the Bible. "Do not think, O Monks, that you are to pronounce expulsion against a monk for this or that, saying, 'It occurs to us to be so.' " Salvation was an experiential reality—it was no moot point—but none had a monopoly of it, and between experience and theory the distinction was clear. The ground of religious authority is well defined in the answer given by the sage himself to a seeker who came confessing perplexity as to what he should believe, wherein the latter was advised not to believe anything on mere hearsay; or traditions because they are old; or even because of "the written testimony of some ancient sage"; nor because presumption is in its favor; nor even on the mere authority of teacher or priest. But "whatsoever according to thine own experience and after thorough investigation agrees with thy reason and is conducive to thine own weal and that of all other living beings, that accept as truth and live

accordingly." In a sense an impossible position, and yet how scientific, how like Him who commanded us to "call no man Rabbi!" Compare with that the pontifical counsel given by Stephen to the Bishop of Carthage: "Let there be no innovation—nothing but what has been handed down"; or that of Sixtus III to the Bishop of Antioch: "It is not fit that any addition be made to antiquity"; or the words of the Gallic monk¹ who, fearing the calamitous influence of a new idea, wrote:

To preach any doctrine therefore to Christians other than what they have received, never was lawful, never is lawful, and never will be lawful; and to anathematise those who preach any other than what has once been received always was a duty, always is a duty, and always will be a duty.

From all such, the mind of the Tathagata is celestial diameters removed.

And the history of Buddhism bears testimony to the degree to which the followers of the faith have striven to emulate the advice and example of their founder. Of the first council of the fifth century B.C. it is recorded that a celebrated but dissentient monk, Purāna, at the head of a following, refused to concur in the action of the Conference, preferring to abide by his own judgment as to how the "doctrine and disciplinary rule" should be sung, which assertion of religious individualism elicited no rebuke. The story possibly is fiction; even so, only in an atmosphere of great forbearance could such a fiction grow. It is certainly no fiction that the great Apostle-King Asoka two centuries later implored his people, in the spirit of that same master, to desist from speaking unkindly of their neighbors' faith. "He who does reverence to his own sect," runs his Twelfth Edict, "while disparaging the sects of others, wholly from attachment to his own, with intent to enhance the splendour of his own sect, in reality by such conduct inflicts the severest injury on his own sect."

It is impossible to say how thoroughly this spirit controlled

¹ Vincent of Lerins, fifth century A.D., alleged author of *A Commentary against the Profane Novelties of All Heresies*.

the life of ancient India, but that its influence was rather general and persistent may be inferred from the manner in which Emperor Harsha twelve centuries later was wont to conduct the quinquennial assemblies. To these we are told would come a great concourse and kings a-plenty, and for days costly clothing would be distributed first to the worshipers of Buddha and then to the devotees of Siva; then for twenty days gifts would be made to the Brahmans, the orthodox hierarchy, and for ten more, gifts to the heretics(!).

Neither motive nor method was exactly the same as that which characterized the conduct of the Christians of the post-apostolic period and which drew from Julian the comment, "These godless Galileans feed not only their own poor but ours; our poor lack our care"; but it was a good expression of biblical ethics as laid down by Paul: "Let us do good *to all*, especially to those who belong to the household of faith." Whatever criticism, therefore, we might level against the rule of Harsha, we must at least admit that his was a mind evidently unrestricted by theological presuppositions and free to enter sympathetically and appreciatively into the very varied religious life of his subjects. Yet the humanity of the man was only in "the light of Asia"; but alas! the contemporary church of Christ was using what it believed to be a drop of her Lord's blood, consecrated in the Eucharist, to put her official signature to a document of doom upon a dissenting patriarch.

One wishes that the past were past and that this were ancient history, but the spirit was too ingrained. Eight more centuries pass, and we find Europe in the throes of an age of religious reconstruction and ravage, and an intolerant church solemnly declaring with a wearisome iteration of "*anathema sit*,"

If anyone receive not as sacred and canonical the said books entire with all their parts as they have been used to be read in the Catholic Church and as they are contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition, and knowingly and deliberately condemn the traditions aforesaid, let him be anathema.

And yet look at contemporary Asia. A monarch in India is mounting a throne—and a Moslem at that!—and to his capital at Fatehpur Sikri he is to draw Hindu pundit, Christian priest, and Zoroastrian scholar in an effort to effect some sort of synthesis of the truth he seeks; and in Japan—the irony of it!—while Buddhist priests are placing a monastery at the disposal of the emissaries of the church, “the vehemence of the Christian fanatic” is being made “known for the first time to men themselves usually conspicuous for tolerance of heresy and for receptivity of instruction.”²

The truth is that Christianity is not a religion of calm reasoning but a religion of passion. Therein is its glory and the secret of its power—therein too is its danger and the cause of many a shame. What has made its followers exemplars in patience, courage, and self-denying love has also closed their minds and made them on occasion the cruelest of persecutors. It is not strange, therefore, that we find in the fervent Fourth Gospel a vindictiveness toward such as share not the faith of its author strangely out of keeping with the alleged character of the writer. And it has been suggested that, because the church, which came to be, drew deeply from this source for her idea of Jesus and his teachings rather than from the human simple Synoptics, narrowness of judgment and severity of conduct became so distinctive a missionary trait.³ In this connection, the effect of more recent conduct on a high-minded Hindu is not without interest. Writes Mahatma Gandhi:⁴

Only Christianity found little toleration as a creed from my father, who was tolerant toward all other faiths. I developed myself a sort of dislike for it. And for a reason. In those days Christian missionaries used to stand in a corner near the High School and hold forth pouring abuse on Hindus and their gods. I could not stomach this. I must have stood there once only, but that was enough to dissuade me from repeating the experiment.

² *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (11th ed.), article “Japan.”

³ See “Antitheses in Christianity” by J. R. Mozley, *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1922.

⁴ C. F. Andrews, *Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas*, p. 87.

On the other hand, Buddhism, especially the Mahayana branch, early inculcated principles the mass of Christians have not yet understood; it has realized that truth cannot be confined, and that religious thought and experience may be as varied and individualistic, and at the same time as valid, as human character; that when once principles are reduced to literary form they become pitifully inadequate and inelastic, and traditionalize knowledge so that only the most faltering concessions will be made to changing exigencies. For an example of Christian charity^s the proceedings of certain Buddhist councils might well be commended to the attention of some modern ecclesiastical bodies.

We are sometimes reminded that in the East religious affiliations result largely from geographical or social considerations, whereas in the West conscience is the more determinative factor, and that, where conscience is involved, the degree of inflexibility is inevitably greater. There is some truth in this but only a degree, for our rating as Christians, and certainly our denominational preferences, are not as a rule the outcome of a conscientious and intelligent choice on our part so much as of the dice of birth. In the light of this, any attempt at coercion in matters creedal appears all the more inconsistent and bewildering. Granted that we have substantial reasons for "the faith that is in us," or that worthier principles have been operative in our election, it cannot be denied that an attitude of intellectual expectancy toward systems of thought other than our own is at least more Christlike and commendable than the conclusiveness of the doctrinaire.

^s "You know my view about religion," writes a Buddhist monk from Ceylon, with whom it was the writer's privilege to go pilgrimaging in India. "I consider high metaphysical discourses and high philosophy useless, under the cover of which man can make his fellow man like animals, as did Brahminism of old. . . . I appreciate the work of missionaries in India for the uplift of a nation with a great past, but I dislike the activities of some of them which are denationalizing the people. In my opinion, difference of opinion is not the curse of humanity for that is a stimulus toward the search for truth; *the curse is the intolerance which makes us brutes.*"

III

Any attempt to explain this difference between the religious temper of the East and that of the West involves us in a comparison of philosophies, for in its last analysis the difference is one of interpretation as to the nature of existence. However real and rigid might be the divisions within human society, life itself to the Oriental is not departmentalized; the all-animating Spirit invests itself in many forms of which the human is only one. The line of demarcation between the spiritual and the non-spiritual is less restricting and less definite than with us. Man, animal, plant—all are ensouled, of which the first is but the noblest of created things into which has been breathed the spark divine. As with them Time is Eternity continuous and one, the aeons of which they range in thoughtful leisure, so Creation is to them a unit. Racial solidarity is axiomatic notwithstanding the chasms of caste, and is not contradicted by the antithesis between the physical and spiritual. The "togetherness" of all life is something they scarcely need to learn; that truth they already deeply feel. So different is our temper of mind that their conclusions elicit from us little sympathy and, too frequently, less understanding. Our pronounced theistic outlook prevents us from making any ready concessions to pantheism, or acknowledging any possible merits therein. Polytheism, henotheism, monotheism, is our religious pedigree through our Hebrew inheritance, a lineage eminently favorable for the emergence alike of imperialistic and individualistic traits. But polytheism and pantheism, with now and then an aberrant monism, and over all the mantle of intellectual mysticism, is the heritage of India, which has given religion such a universal setting in the mind of the average man as to make impossible any theory of election—Hebrew, Calvinistic, Prussian, or Nordic—in respect to a people or an individual as the chosen of God. And so India rebukes us today, and justly, for our differentiating habit, which as Tagore says, "breeds a strong suspicion of whatever is

beyond the barriers we have built, and everything has to fight hard for its entrance into our recognition."

A realization of the fundamental kinship of all sentient things does not, however, necessarily preclude the recognition of differences. Differences of value may be too apparent to be denied, but a discriminating mind will discern uniting relations. An interesting corollary to this is the attitude of the Buddhist world toward the animal creation, namely, a consistent reverence toward life in every form. It is as though any appearance of generic snobbery is to the Buddhist incompatible with his consciousness of his common creaturehood. In this connection, it is equally interesting to note that old Japanese literature, like Greek poetry of three thousand years ago, immortalized insect life, and that the practice was more prevalent in both pre-Christian and non-Christian literature than in Christian. Lafcadio Hearn has attributed this change in the first place to the violent Hebrew reaction of early times against sacred insects, which in some cases symbolized divinity, to which reaction we fell heir, and in the second place *to the extinguishing influence of dogma* in the later Christian church, which effectively prevented us yielding to ephemera any spiritual qualities which might detract from the pre-eminence, or perchance challenge the existence, of the human soul. In a spirit very unlike that of the Asokan edict, we thought that our exaltation hinged upon their depreciation, and in the resulting callousness on our part to the truth, beauty, and seriousness which attaches to small things, and to experiences not our own, we see our nemesis. It is not that we desire a return to the naïveté of a St. Francis but simply a recovery of the spirit of Him whose sympathy and love embraced alike the lilies and the birds and the children of men, for in so far as we are deficient here we are deficient in our humanity.

Our case, however, is not altogether hopeless, for evidence is not wanting of a growing appreciation of the situation, as well as intimations of an irenicon among the religions. One of the

most encouraging features of the Jerusalem Conference of 1928 was the fact that men who have devoted considerable time to the study of religion, and not merely to experiencing or propagating it, were able to express themselves on this matter. With what outcome? Naturally, the revelation of weakness in our methods; naturally, too, a clearer vision of the Christian ethic, with a re-enforcement of our faith; but with that also the discovery of assets and allies in the thought-movements of the Buddhist and Confucian world enough to enhearten every servant of the kingdom of Christ.

Syncretism! It is a dog with a bad name (we do not stop to think that, in that we are the heirs of the ages, there is a sense in which every science, philosophy, and life is built on that system), for history has some telling lessons on the futility of past efforts in that direction. But the question might well be raised whether such failures were not attributable to a broken perspective in respect to values rather than to inherent evil. But there is a syncretism in spirit which one cannot afford not to cultivate, and one cannot view the efforts toward religious reconciliation of men like Dr. Anesaki, or Dr. Nishida in Japan, or of the good Rabindranath Tagore in India, without faith and profound gratitude. And bearing in mind the amiability of Asia and her courtesy, unhappily too much in contrast to the spirit of the West, one might well raise the further question whether it is to be left to the "Light of Asia" to illumine for us the path taken by the Prince of Peace, or for the followers of those ancient faiths to turn and in a terrible sense be converted even as we have been, and postpone yet farther the day of the Lord.

THE EFFECT OF THE COLLEGE EXPERIENCE UPON STUDENTS' CONCEPTS OF GOD

ARTHUR C. WICKENDEN
Miami University, Oxford, Ohio

THE religion of college students is a subject of perennial interest. Frequently the claim has been advanced that our colleges rob young people of their faith, and as frequently the college has been painted as a place of spiritual enlightenment and development, where significant consecrations occur, and where great spiritual movements are born. Many observations have been published as to the result of the college experience upon the religious life and belief of students, some of which have been keen, and quite true, no doubt, to situations portrayed. Few attempts have been made, however, to determine by methods of objective measurement the effect of the college experience on the religious belief of students. Until such methods are perfected we cannot be sure of the facts. The present study is an attempt to discover by objective method what happens to one important aspect of student religious thinking during college days.

As the idea of God is conceived generally to be the central and pivotal concept of religion, the study has been directed specifically to discovering in what terms students conceive of God, and what changes are produced in their concepts as a result of four years in college. Limiting the study to one fundamental concept was done for the sake both of greater thoroughness with respect to it and the possibility of securing a much larger number of responses to a simple than to a complex study.

Young people find it very difficult to articulate their beliefs in religion, so it was determined that the instrument of investigation must be so constructed that students would have only to identify their own opinions from a number of possible choices

COLLEGE EXPERIENCE AND CONCEPTS OF GOD 243

rather than to formulate them. A simple questionnaire in the form of a check-list was selected as the best means of meeting this end. The questionnaire finally used in gathering data was the product of a considerable evolution, being based in the first instance on a study of student expression of religious ideas as found in various sources, followed by numerous revisions in the light of responses and criticisms secured from students to the experimental instruments. As finally adopted for use in the study the questionnaire included thirty-five statements setting forth ideas of God found to be current among students. An arrangement was made so that respondents could check either agreement or disagreement with each of these statements. If uncertain concerning their position on any statement it was to be left unchecked. This group of statements was followed by lists of concepts and attributes, usually consisting of a single noun or adjective respectively. The student was asked to underscore such of these as he found descriptive of his thought of God. Finally a question was asked concerning the degree of vitality of the concept for the student's total religious faith. The statements and terms included in the instrument of investigation follow herewith.

IDEAS OF GOD

1. I think of God as the supreme personal power of the universe.
2. I regard God as man's loving heavenly Father.
3. I believe God is impersonal creative force.
4. The hypothesis of God is not necessary to the adequate explanation of the phenomena of life and nature.
5. I am of the opinion that there may be a god, but man can know nothing of his character.
6. I conceive God as humanity personified.
7. I regard God as a symbol for the highest social values.
8. I think the term "God" is meaningless.
9. I think of God as the cosmic mechanism.
10. I am of the opinion that all of reality is God.
11. I believe God is the creator of the universe, the author of nature, and the source of life.

12. I am of the opinion that God created the world, but is not active in it, nor interferes in its operation.
13. I think of God as the support furnished by the universe in the quest of human ideals and aspirations.
14. I regard God as comprising three persons in one.
15. I believe God is the order of the universe.
16. I think the character of God is best revealed in Jesus Christ.
17. I regard God and Jesus Christ as identical.
18. I think of God as the creative intelligence and moral purpose inherent in the ordering of the universe.
19. I believe that God inspires, guides, comforts, and strengthens those who trust him.
20. I think God punishes men for their wickedness and rewards righteousness.
21. I am of the opinion that God is the source of the moral law.
22. I believe God is active in all the world from the smallest electron to the largest sun.
23. I conceive of God as sometimes setting aside the laws of the physical universe in order to work a miracle.
24. My conviction is that God is active in the natural order but never contravenes its laws.
25. I regard God as the integrating power of nature.
26. I think it is possible for man to commune with God.
27. I believe God hears prayers and responds with definite answers.
28. I am of the opinion that God glories in the worship of himself by human creatures.
29. I think of God as at work in the social order to perfect it.
30. My conviction is that man may become a co-worker with God.
31. I believe God sends earthquakes, disasters, and misfortunes upon wicked communities in punishment for their wickedness.
32. I am of the opinion that God condemns all who do not profess faith in Christ as savior.
33. I feel that the idea of God is not essential to the religious quest.
34. I think God is oblivious to the concerns of men.
35. For me God is a vague undefined reality.

CONCEPTS OF GOD

Creator	Sovereign	Father	Humanity
Brother	Mother	Judge	Friend
Spirit	Life force	Myth	Supreme power

COLLEGE EXPERIENCE AND CONCEPTS OF GOD 245

CONCEPTS OF GOD—*Continued*

Jesus	Absolute	Trinity	First cause
Nature	Beauty	Truth	Principle
Ideals	Refuge	Love	Integrating power
Guide	Inner light	Energy	Universal mind
Companion	Great mystery	Universe	Natural law
Mechanism	Resource	Reality	Illusion
Comforter	Savior	Inspirer	Conscience

ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

Omnipotent	Omniscient	Omnipresent	Infinite
Limited	Developing	Struggling	Eternal
Just	Merciful	Faithful	Creative
Personal	Impersonal	Purposeful	Miraculous
Human	Active	Approachable	Vague
Loving	Generous	Righteous	Stern
Supernatural	Superhuman	Immanent	Transcendent
Concerned	Unchanging	Christlike	Mysterious
Conscious	Responsive	Free	Perfect
Intelligent	Incomprehensible		

A scale on which to indicate how vital the concept of God is to the student's faith was included as follows: very vital, moderately vital, vital, little significance, no significance.

The study has been limited to colleges and universities within the central states, including Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Minnesota, the area in which the investigator could best secure data. A few excursions into colleges in the East brought results markedly different. Both church colleges and tax-supported institutions have been included in the investigation, but the data are more complete for colleges of the first type than of the second due to difficulty in securing large-scale co-operation in the latter. Fifteen church colleges participated, to a degree at least, in the study, and five non-church institutions.

The plan was to secure the responses of Freshmen as soon as possible after their entrance in college, and those of Seniors late in the Senior year. The assumption is made, of course, that Seniors of a particular year were as Freshmen practically at the

position in their thought of God where the contemporary group of Freshmen are. In a number of colleges it was possible to secure responses from an entire entering class of Freshmen, and in the same and other colleges a good cross-section of the Senior class was secured by gathering responses from advanced students in a variety of departments. Responses from two thousand Freshmen, and almost a thousand Seniors have been included in the study.

IDEAS OF FRESHMEN

If it be agreed that the ideas checked by at least 50 per cent of the group represent the position of a typical member of the group, then we may compare the ideas of a typical Freshman entering a church college with a typical Freshman entering a non-church institution. The percentage of a group checking a particular item would represent the degree of likelihood that the typical Freshman would agree to that item. Listed in Table I are the statements to which typical Freshmen of these two types of institution would give their assent, the degree of likelihood of agreement, and the differences between the two groups. The figures are based on returns from 1,396 Freshmen in church colleges, and 594 in non-church colleges.

We have here the ideas of God most popular among Freshmen and the extent of the difference of adherence to them between the Freshmen of church and non-church colleges. In the light of the total comparison, including concepts and attributes as well, it may be affirmed that a typical Freshman entering a church college thinks of God as a loving, merciful, and generous heavenly Father, whose character is best revealed in Jesus Christ. He is the creator of the universe and the source of all life, and as the supreme power in the universe he is active in all its parts. He inspires, guides, comforts, and strengthens those who trust him. He has ordained the moral law, punishes wickedness, and rewards righteousness. Man may become a co-worker with him in the achievement of his ends and purposes,

COLLEGE EXPERIENCE AND CONCEPTS OF GOD 247

among them being a better social order. Communion with God is a privilege open to men, and when they pray God hears and responds with definite answers.

The typical Freshman entering a non-church college will assent to most of the above but with less assurance. In the matter of prayer, however, there is only a 38 per cent likelihood that

TABLE I

COMPARISON OF RETURNS FROM CHURCH COLLEGE AND
NON-CHURCH COLLEGE FRESHMEN

	Church	Non-Church	Difference
	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent
<i>Affirmations:</i>			
1. God as the supreme personal power in universe...	67	60	7
2. God as a loving heavenly Father.....	84	67	17
11. Creator of universe, author of nature, and source of life.....	87	70	17
16. Character of God best revealed in Jesus.....	83	67	16
19. God inspires, guides, comforts, and strengthens those who trust Him.....	88	75	13
20. God punishes men for their wickedness and rewards righteousness.....	68	51	17
21. God is the source of the moral law.....	63	56	7
22. God is active in all the world from the smallest electron to the largest sun.....	74	53	21
26. It is possible for man to commune with God.....	63	38	25
27. God hears prayers and responds with definite answers.....	61	41	20
30. Man may become a co-worker with God.....	69	51	18
			178
Mean difference.....			16.18

he will assent to the possibility of communion, and only a 41 per cent likelihood that he thinks that God hears prayers and responds with definite answers.

It is enlightening to note to what extent other ideas are held among Freshmen even though checked affirmatively by less than 50 per cent. For instance, we find that 25 per cent of the Freshmen in church colleges, and 30 per cent of those in non-church colleges check the statement (3), "I believe God is impersonal creative force." Only about one-tenth of this group,

however, failed to check either of the first two statements setting forth the idea of a personal deity, making clear that even among Freshmen there is considerable disposition to combine personal and impersonal qualities in the concept of God.

The idea of God as a symbol for the highest social values (7) is affirmed by 39 per cent of the Freshmen in the first type and 31 per cent of those in the second. Forty-five per cent of the one group, and 33 per cent of the other indicate a pantheistic tendency by identifying all of reality with God (10). That God is the support furnished by the universe in the quest of human ideals and aspirations (13) is affirmed by 32 per cent and 36 per cent of these groups, respectively. The tendency to conceive of God as three persons in one (14) is found among 48 per cent and 27 per cent of the two groups. God as the order of the universe (15) is checked by 41 per cent, and 31 per cent, respectively. Thirty per cent of the Freshmen in church colleges make God and Jesus Christ identical (17), and 24 per cent in the non-church colleges. Forty and 39 per cent, respectively, conceive of God as creative intelligence and moral purpose inherent in the ordering of the universe (18). Thirty per cent and 20 per cent, respectively, affirm that God works miracles by setting aside laws of the physical universe (23), whereas only 17 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively, assert that God is active in the natural order but never contravenes its laws (24). Apparently there exists a good deal of haziness in the minds of Freshmen concerning the relation of God to miracles.

God is conceived as one who glories in the worship of himself by human creatures (28) by 23 per cent and 15 per cent of the respective groups. He punishes wicked communities by sending earthquakes and other disasters upon them (31) according to 18 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively, and condemns all who do not profess faith in Christ as savior (32) by 19 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively. God is a vague undefined reality (35) for 23 per cent and 29 per cent of the two groups.

COLLEGE EXPERIENCE AND CONCEPTS OF GOD 249

DO COLLEGES EXERCISE A SELECTION ON THE BASIS
OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT?

Facts gathered concerning the views of Freshmen reveal differences, not only between church and non-church college groups, but also between colleges within these divisions, giving

TABLE II

COMPARISON OF FRESHMAN RESPONSES FOUR SELECTED CHURCH
AND TWO NON-CHURCH COLLEGES

	United Brethren	Presby- terian	Baptist	Congre- gational	State	Techni- cal
Number of responses.....	81	247	228	190	358	192
	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent
<i>Affirmations:</i>						
1. God as supreme personal power in the universe.....	84	85	71	63	65	49
2. God as a loving heavenly Father..	96	90	78	75	75	55
11. Creator of universe, author of nature, and source of life.....	98	93	80	79	77	57
16. Character of God best revealed in Jesus.....	93	88	82	78	76	52
19. God inspires, guides, comforts, and strengthens those who trust him..	100	92	88	79	80	68
20. God punishes men for their wickedness and rewards righteousness...	90	72	60	53	58	43
21. God is the source of the moral law.	88	63	60	44	59	51
22. God is active in all the world from the smallest electron to the largest sun.....	90	75	71	66	56	49
26. It is possible for man to commune with God.....	77	75	65	45	46	26
27. God hears prayers and responds with definite answers.....	79	69	60	41	47	30
30. Man may become a co-worker with God.....	88	70	68	57	58	42

a definite indication that colleges exercise a selection on the basis of religious thought. In Table II a comparison is given of the typical affirmations of the Freshmen of four denominational and two non-church colleges. The church colleges are affiliated with the United Brethren, Presbyterian, Baptist, and Congregational denominations, respectively; the fifth institution is supported by the state and has an enrolment of 2,300; and the sixth is a technical school in a large city. They are arranged in the

order of variance from traditional orthodoxy, with the possible exception that the state university is no more liberal than the Congregational college.

It will be observed in the case of the four church colleges that a one two three four order is maintained throughout except in the case of the first statement where the Presbyterian college outranks the United Brethren by 1 per cent, a negligible difference. The state university and Congregational college are very close together, but the technical school is almost invariably the sixth in order. It is evident that these colleges select students according to their respective types from the standpoint of religious thinking, and this conclusion would be only further confirmed if the comparison were carried on to include statements checked negatively, and the most frequently checked concepts and attributes.

A natural question to ask at this point is whether these differences are due to differences in denominational emphasis? Such is only partially the case. Differences exist between Freshmen of colleges of the same denomination. Moreover when the Freshmen responses are grouped according to denominations rather than colleges no such consistent differences are found to exist as is found in the comparison according to the colleges. Probably the best explanation that can be offered for the fact of selection on the basis of religious thinking is that specific colleges attract their students from particular types of homes in certain localities, and these homes are characterized by a considerable similarity in religious thought.

IDEAS OF SENIORS

To appreciate the ideas of God most largely current among Seniors, it will be well to view them in comparison with the views of Freshmen in the same groups of colleges, and to follow that with comparisons between Seniors of different colleges. It will then be possible to indicate the trends of thought as determined by the college experience. The statements checked af-

COLLEGE EXPERIENCE AND CONCEPTS OF GOD 251

firmatively most frequently by Seniors are much the same as those checked most often by Freshmen. The exceptions are statements 20, to the effect that God punishes men for their wickedness and rewards righteousness, and 27, that God hears prayers and responds with definite answers, which are checked by considerably less than 50 per cent of the Seniors in both types of colleges. The degree of affirmation accorded by Seniors to the other statements in comparison decreases in practically every instance as compared with the responses of Freshmen. So great is the decrease in the case of the non-church colleges that only two of the statements receive affirmative checks of more than 50 per cent. Table III indicates the differences between the responses of Freshmen and those of Seniors with respect to the ideas most frequently checked.

Considering the Seniors in the church colleges as a group, it is evident that the way in which they think of God is not radically different from the way in which Freshmen think. For the most part the Senior is less positive in his affirmations, and somewhat more positive in his denials than the Freshman. A rather large majority of Seniors in this group continue to think of God in personal terms, but not as naïvely and familiarly personal as do the Freshmen. This is probably the most noteworthy change. It is made clear by the responses to the first two statements of the questionnaire. To the first, that God is the supreme personal power in the universe, the responses from church college Seniors show an increase of 2 per cent over the Freshmen, going from 67 per cent to 69 per cent, but in the case of the second statement, which presents God as man's loving heavenly Father, hence more naïvely anthropomorphic, the decrease is 21 per cent, showing a decided trend away from the acceptance of the latter idea. The same tendency is evident in the responses to the statement that God punishes men for their wickedness and rewards righteousness (20); the decrease in Senior affirmations, as compared with Freshman, amounts to 29 per cent, going from 68 per cent to 39 per cent. The case of state-

TABLE III

COMPARISON OF FRESHMAN AND SENIOR RESPONSES
CHURCH AND NON-CHURCH COLLEGES

	CHURCH			NON-CHURCH		
	Freshmen	Seniors	Difference	Freshmen	Seniors	Difference
Number of responses.....	1,396	676	594	290
	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent
<i>Affirmations:</i>						
1. God as the supreme personal power in the universe.....	67	69	2	60	49	11
2. God as a loving heavenly Father...	84	63	21	67	35	32
11. God as the creator of the universe, author of nature, and source of life	87	75	12	70	45	25
16. Character best revealed in Jesus Christ.....	83	78	5	67	51	16
19. God inspires, guides, comforts, and strengthens those who trust him..	88	80	8	75	54	21
21. God is the source of the moral law..	63	51	12	56	41	15
22. God is active in all the world from the smallest electron to the largest sun.....	74	62	12	53	41	12
26. It is possible for man to commune with God.....	63	57	6	39	30	9
30. Man may become a co-worker with God.....	69	64	5	51	37	14
			83			155
Mean difference.....			9.22			17.22
<i>Negations:</i>						
4. The hypothesis of God is unnecessary.....	69	63	6	59	48	11
8. The term "God" is meaningless...	87	75	12	75	61	14
12. God created the world, but is not active in it, nor interferes in its operation.....	66	60	6	60	52	8
31. God sends disasters on wicked communities as punishment.....	55	74	19	61	76	15
32. God condemns all who do not profess faith in Christ as Savior.....	56	67	11	71	78	7
33. The idea of God is not essential to the religious quest.....	67	62	5	55	45	10
			58			65
Mean difference.....			9.83			10.83
<i>Concepts and Attributes:</i>						
Creator.....	85	71	14	69	46	23
Father.....	73	57	16	56	27	29
Spirit.....	52	50	2	37	30	7
Supreme power.....	68	57	11	50	42	8
Truth.....	66	62	4	57	37	20
Love.....	81	74	7	65	43	22
Omnipotent.....	51	57	6	39	35	4
Just.....	69	61	8	53	34	19
Merciful.....	74	58	16	56	35	21
Creative.....	63	50	13	47	37	10
Loving.....	81	68	13	65	40	25
Perfect.....	62	51	11	41	25	16
			121			204
Mean difference.....			10.08			17

COLLEGE EXPERIENCE AND CONCEPTS OF GOD 253

ments 26 and 27 should be considered together, both having to do with God's relation to man's practice of prayer. In the case of prayer as simply communion of two spirits with each other (26) the decrease in Senior responses is only 6 per cent, whereas in the more naïve statement to the effect that God hears prayers and responds with definite answers, the decrease amounts to 16 per cent, or from 61 per cent to 45 per cent.

Seniors in these same colleges likewise conceive of God as less magical and capricious than the Freshmen, confining his activities within the limits of natural law, rather than setting aside laws for the sake of working miracles in that sense. The disagreements with statement 23, which declares this latter idea, increase 18 per cent, while the affirmative checks to statement 24, which asserts that God in his activity never contravenes the laws of the natural order, increase that same amount.

With respect to the concepts listed in the questionnaire the degree of acceptance decreases in most instances between the Freshman and Senior years. In the church colleges the principal decreases are as follows: father, 73 per cent to 57 per cent; friend, 63 per cent to 47 per cent; guide, 64 per cent to 48 per cent; creator, 85 per cent to 71 per cent; judge, 37 per cent to 22 per cent; and companion, 47 per cent to 34 per cent. Considering the case of the attributes, the principal decreases are: merciful, 74 per cent to 58 per cent; faithful, 57 per cent to 42 per cent; generous, 51 per cent to 37 per cent; loving, 81 per cent to 68 per cent; creative, 63 per cent to 50 per cent; and miraculous, 33 per cent to 20 per cent. With the exception of the last-named, such terms continue to be among those most frequently checked by Seniors, hence favorite for them as well as the Freshmen, but the decreases further reveal the trend away from familiarly personal concepts.

Turning to points where the Seniors of church colleges are more positive in their affirmations than Freshmen, we find that the number of such increases is less than the number of decreases, and the differences, or the extent of the changes, are

not as great. Such increases as there are tend to show a growing preference for more abstract concepts. The greatest point of increase has already been mentioned, namely, that of 18 per cent in the instance of the statement (24) to the effect that God does not contravene the laws of the natural order in his activities. Next in order of increase is 14 per cent with respect to the statement (18) which declares God to be the creative intelligence and moral purpose inherent in the ordering of the universe. Put this increase alongside of the decrease of 21 per cent to the statement (2) presenting God as a loving heavenly Father, and one receives a pretty clear indication of the tendency to change from the familiarly personal to the more abstractly personal type of concepts. Another notable increase in this group is in response to the statement (25) that God is the integrating power of nature—an increase from 37 per cent to 49 per cent.

Concepts and attributes which show an increase between the Freshman and Senior years in church colleges include the following: life force, 27 per cent to 34 per cent; absolute, 13 per cent to 19 per cent; first cause, 5 per cent to 18 per cent; ideals, 40 per cent to 53 per cent; integrating power, 8 per cent to 21 per cent; energy, 18 per cent to 28 per cent; universal mind, 20 per cent to 26 per cent; natural law, 15 per cent to 22 per cent; omnipotent, 51 per cent to 57 per cent; omniscient, 16 per cent to 29 per cent; omnipresent, 33 per cent to 44 per cent; infinite, 35 per cent to 48 per cent; personal, 28 per cent to 45 per cent; impersonal, 6 per cent to 13 per cent; purposeful, 27 per cent to 38 per cent; immanent, 2 per cent to 10 per cent; and transcendent, 5 per cent to 11 per cent. Such increases are but the counterparts of the decreases, revealing further the tendency to prefer more abstract concepts to the more concrete and familiar.

A consideration of the Seniors in the non-church colleges reveals similar tendencies at work, but also a more marked trend toward impersonal, mechanistic, agnostic, and atheistic ideas. Only two affirmations of the list of thirty-five are checked affirmatively by as many as 50 per cent of the Seniors in the non-

COLLEGE EXPERIENCE AND CONCEPTS OF GOD 255

church colleges, these being, "God inspires, guides, comforts, and strengthens those who trust Him" (19), which is checked by 54 per cent, and "The character of God is best revealed in Jesus Christ" (16), which is checked by 51 per cent. This is notable in itself, and further indicates that these Seniors do not tend toward one particular pattern of thought but are much more heterogeneous in their ideas than are Freshmen. The aversion to naïvely anthropomorphic ideas is even more marked among the non-church college Seniors than among those of church colleges, but the tendency to replace these by more abstract concepts is less marked. Instead, as already indicated, the tendency is to prefer impersonal, mechanistic, agnostic, or atheistic ideas, as shown by points where Senior responses show an increase over the Freshman. For example, the statement that God is impersonal creative force (3) shows an increase from 30 per cent to 38 per cent. The statement that the hypothesis of God is not necessary to the adequate explanation of the phenomena of life and nature (4) records an increase from 19 per cent to 26 per cent. The agnostic statement (5) shows an increase from 30 per cent to 38 per cent. The atheistic statement (8) reveals an increase from 6 per cent to 12 per cent. The idea of God as the cosmic mechanism (9) increases from 5 per cent to 17 per cent. The idea of God as not essential to the religious quest (33) increases from 16 per cent to 25 per cent, that God is oblivious to the concerns of men (34) from 11 per cent to 18 per cent, and that God is a vague undefined reality (35) from 29 per cent to 36 per cent. The only other notable increase recorded in the list of affirmations is in connection with the statement (24) that God is active in the natural order but never contravenes its laws, from 20 per cent to 29 per cent. Apparently a majority of Seniors of the non-church colleges continue to think of God in personal terms, but the most marked tendency in such institutions is in the direction of mechanistic, agnostic, or atheistic ideas.

Throughout the discussion it has been apparent that there is

a difference between the effect of church colleges on their students and non-church colleges on theirs, considering these as groups. It is possible to indicate the differences in these effects in statistical terms, at least so far as revealed by the data of this investigation. If one will refer to Table III, he will find noted at each point of comparison the extent of the change between Freshmen and Seniors, as 2 per cent in the case of the first statement in the church colleges, and 21 per cent in the case of the second. Calculating the mean difference with respect to the affirmative statements, it is found to be 9.22 per cent in the church colleges, as compared with 17.22 per cent in the non-church colleges. The difference between these two means, or 8 per cent, indicates how much farther the Seniors of non-church colleges have moved in their thought than those of the church colleges. In both instances the direction of movement is away from traditional conservative orthodoxy. In the case of statements most frequently checked negatively the mean differences are 9.83 per cent and 10.83 per cent, respectively; for the most frequently checked concepts and attributes the mean differences are 10.08 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively. The differences between these comparative means indicate to how great an extent the gap that existed between the Freshmen of the two types of colleges widens during the course of the college experience.

DO COLLEGES SIMILAR IN TYPE AFFECT STUDENTS DIFFERENTLY?

Having observed the difference in the influence of church and non-church colleges on the thinking of their students, it may be profitable to make some comparisons between specific colleges within each of these two classifications in order to note differences affected by colleges supposedly similar in type and background.

In Table II a comparison was made of the responses of Freshmen from four selected church and two non-church colleges in order to demonstrate the fact that colleges exercise a selection

COLLEGE EXPERIENCE AND CONCEPTS OF GOD 257

from the standpoint of religious ideas, and that it is possible to arrange them in definite order in the degree of their variance from traditional orthodoxy. If a similar comparison were made between the responses of the Seniors of the very same institutions, the consistent order that was evident as regards the Freshmen would not be found to exist. The United Brethren college would still be the most conservative at all points. The Presbyterian and Baptist colleges would be found so close together as to be almost indistinguishable and to occupy the middle ground. The Congregational, state, and technical colleges would form the most liberal group, but it would be almost impossible to distinguish these from one another as to the degree of liberalism manifest.

A comparison of two colleges with like denominational affiliations, situated in adjoining states, will make even more evident that colleges of the same general type affect the thinking of their students differently (Table IV). In this comparison very little difference will be observed between the Freshmen of the two institutions, those of B college being somewhat more liberal than those of A, but a very marked difference is found between the Seniors, the Seniors of B being much farther removed from traditional orthodoxy than those of A.

The rather small mean difference, only 6.08 per cent, between the Freshmen of the two colleges shows that they are quite similar in their manner of thinking about God. In fact in only two of the instances named above is the difference greater than 6 per cent. But in the case of the Seniors the mean difference of 31 per cent makes it clear that they think in quite different terms. The trend in both institutions is away from the positions of traditional orthodoxy, but it is much more decided in B than in A.

A similar comparison between two non-church institutions, a state-supported university of 2,300 students, and a technical school of 800 students, would yield somewhat different results. The difference between the Freshmen of these institutions would

be found to be considerable, the mean difference in the case of typical affirmations being 15.33 per cent. The technical school attracts a more radical group in religious thought than does the

TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF RESPONSES FROM TWO BAPTIST COLLEGES

	FRESHMEN			SENIORS		
	A	B	Difference	A	B	Difference
Number of responses.....	228	86	96	93
	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent
<i>Affirmations:</i>						
1. God as the supreme personal power in universe.....	71	77	6	68	38	30
2. God as a loving heavenly Father..	78	75	3	66	38	28
11. Creator of universe, author of nature, and source of all life.....	80	79	1	79	47	32
16. Character best revealed in Jesus Christ.....	82	78	4	89	58	31
18. Creative intelligence and moral purpose inherent in the ordering of the universe.....	44	48	4	67	35	32
19. God inspires, guides, comforts, and strengthens those who trust Him..	88	82	6	81	53	28
20. God punishes men for their wickedness and rewards righteousness....	60	64	4	36	17	19
21. God as the source of the moral law	60	66	6	67	26	41
22. God as active in all the world from the smallest electron to the largest sun.....	71	71	74	33	41
26. It is possible for man to commune with God.....	65	44	21	63	20	43
27. God hears prayers and responds with definite answers.....	60	44	16	41	20	21
30. Man may become a co-worker with God.....	68	70	2	67	41	26
	73	37 ²
Mean difference.....	6.08	31

state university. The college experience instead of widening the breach between these two groups, as in the former comparison, tends to narrow it, bringing the two groups of Seniors quite close together, as shown by the small mean difference of 4.67 per cent with respect to typical affirmations. The students of the state university undergo a greater change in ideas than those of the

COLLEGE EXPERIENCE AND CONCEPTS OF GOD 259

technical school. The technical training of the latter is rather far removed from religious considerations and does not affect their ideas in this realm very markedly. In the state university the students are subjected to a much wider variety of cultural influences, many of which are directly related to religious thought, hence have a much more marked effect on their religious opinions.

HOW VITAL IS THE CONCEPT OF GOD TO RELIGIOUS FAITH?

Further light is thrown on the effect of the college experience on the faith of students by a comparison of the answers given by Freshmen and Seniors to the question, "How vital is the concept of God to your total faith?" (Table V).

TABLE V
COMPARISON OF FRESHMAN AND SENIOR RESPONSES ON THE
VITALITY OF THE CONCEPT OF GOD TO FAITH

	CHURCH			NON-CHURCH		
	Freshmen	Seniors	Difference	Freshmen	Seniors	Difference
	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent
Very vital.....	53	39	14	40	22	18
Moderately vital.....	20	19	1	21	14	7
Vital.....	17	20	3	19	24	5
Little significance.....	4	10	6	9	26	15
No significance.....	1	1	4	8	4

In the case of Freshmen in church colleges for 90 per cent the concept is either very vital, moderately vital, or vital whereas this is true for only 78 per cent of the Seniors, making a decrease of 12 per cent during the four years. The same comparison in the non-church colleges shows the decrease between Freshmen and Seniors to be from 80 per cent to 60 per cent, or a decrease of 20 per cent.

That the general influence of the college experience at this point is negative is freely conceded, but the figures leave little ground for the charge that church colleges generally rob students of their faith, when for 78 per cent of the Seniors the con-

cept of God is at least vital. Likewise, as long as 60 per cent of the Seniors of non-church colleges find the concept at least vital to their total faith, these institutions can scarcely be characterized as "Godless."

CLASSIFICATION INTO TYPES

Another method used to determine the nature of the college influence on the ideas of God was that of classification of students into specific types and analysis to determine to what extent students move from one type to another in the course of the four years. For this purpose it was assumed that all students who checked affirmatively either of the first two statements in the check list should classify as theists. They may be conservative, or they may be liberal, but by affirming either one of the statements that lead the list they indicate that they conceive of God in personal terms. This simple method served to classify the great majority of the replies.

Study was then directed to all the responses in which the first two statements were not checked. Of 1,396 responses received from Freshmen in church colleges only 111 were found in which neither of the first two statements were checked. Upon examination it was found that 26 of these should unquestionably be classified as personal theists in the light of succeeding statements, concepts, and attributes which were checked. Numerous of them underscored the attribute "personal," for instance. This left a group of 85 only to be classified as other than personal theists. Thirty-three of this latter group checked statement 3 indicating belief in God as impersonal creative force. But it was found necessary to divide this group into two categories. Fourteen of the 33, although they asserted that they conceived of God as impersonal, did not hesitate to ascribe to God functions and attributes which are distinctly personal. For example, of this group of 14, 11 checked affirmatively the statement (16) that the character of God is best revealed in Jesus Christ; 10 checked the statement (19) that God inspires, guides,

COLLEGE EXPERIENCE AND CONCEPTS OF GOD 261

strengthens, and comforts those who trust him; 6 underline friend, 7 spirit, 11 love, and 10 guide, as symbols descriptive of their thought of God; 9 assert that God is just, 6 merciful, 5 purposeful, and 5 responsive. For purposes of identification this group will be designated as impersonal theists.

Nineteen of those who checked statement 3 affirming belief in an impersonal deity appeared to be rather thoroughgoing in their impersonal conception. This group will be designated as impersonalists. Of the remaining responses not yet classified 12

TABLE VI
COMPARISON OF TYPES

	CHURCH COLLEGES		NON-CHURCH	
	Freshmen	Seniors	Freshmen	Seniors
	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent
Personal theists.....	93.9	81.7	81.7	60.7
Impersonal theists.....	1.	5.2	3.	13.4
Impersonalists.....	1.4	4.6	4.6	11.4
Agnostics.....	.9	3.4	2.2	4.1
Atheists.....	.1	.3	1.5	3.8
Too vague or confused to classify....	2.7	4.8	7.	6.6
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

were found to be quite consistent agnostics by their checking of statement 5 and almost no others in the affirmative. Two responses signified consistent atheism. Thirty-eight were found to be either too vague or too confused to classify. Classifying all the responses received by this method, the results may be exhibited in a comparison table (Table VI).

Examination of this table confirms the conclusions arrived at previously by other means. There is a trend in the direction of conceiving God more impersonally, a trend more marked in non-church colleges than in those with church affiliations, but in neither case is it of the nature of a landslide. Combining the two classes of theists, the personal and impersonal, in the church colleges the decrease in numbers is only 8 per cent between Freshmen and Seniors, and in the non-church schools 10.6 per

cent. The impersonal, non-theistic groups combined show a corresponding increase from 2.4 per cent to 9.5 per cent in the case of church colleges, and from 8.3 per cent to 19.3 per cent in the case of non-church colleges.

A word should be said concerning the attitude of students toward the modern religious phenomenon called humanism. No such classification was included in the above list because humanism has no fixed body of affirmations generally agreed to by those who call themselves humanists which differentiates them from these other classifications. There are theistic humanists and non-theistic humanists, Christian humanists, and humanistic naturalists. The one common bond between them is the devotion to the good life for all humankind. In this broad sense there is without doubt a decided drift toward humanism. The idea of God becomes socialized, but there is no very pronounced movement to substitute naturalism for some form of theism, at least in the colleges included in this study.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHANGES

In an investigation of this kind where significant changes are found to occur in the thinking of students, one naturally becomes curious to know the reasons and forces which lie back of the changes and are chiefly responsible for them. To discover these in any specific situation would require direct first-hand study of that situation. One would have to determine the influence of specific members of the faculty, the contributions of the social and religious organizations that are integral to the life of the institution, the extent and nature of the influence exerted by the local churches, as well as the religious provisions made by the college itself. Such investigations are beyond the scope of the present study.

The data gathered, however, make possible the answering of one important question, namely, Does the field of a student's major study make a specific contribution to his manner of

COLLEGE EXPERIENCE AND CONCEPTS OF GOD 263

thought about God? Otherwise stated, will it make any particular difference in the outcome in a student's thought about God whether he specializes in languages and literatures, science, history, or business administration? The assertion is frequently made that the student cannot study modern science and hold to his traditional idea of God. Can he then specialize in language, or business, or history, and be less affected? When the responses were classified according to the major subjects of the respondents, it was found that of seven groups—biological science, language, sociology, fine arts, history, physical science, and business—the most conservative group in church colleges was the group majoring in biological science, and the most liberal, that in business administration. No surprise would have been occasioned if the reverse had been the result, for one would expect perhaps that the study of biological science would affect concepts of God considerably, and business administration very little. Surely it is not the study of economics, business practice, and accounting that causes the business group to be the most liberal in the comparison. Rather we must conclude that the most radically minded religiously in the church colleges tend to train for business careers, whereas some of the most conservatively minded take pre-medic studies and specialize in biological science. In other words, so far as church colleges are concerned, apparently the matter of major subjects has little to do with the changes that are wrought in ideas of God, for scientific students may remain conservative, and language students may become liberal.

In a comparison of responses from non-church colleges on a similar basis the most conservative group was found to be the business students, with the engineering group a close second. Only four groups yielded a sufficient number of responses to serve for purposes of comparison: business, engineering, science (both biological and physical, but excluding engineering), and language. The general science group was found to be the most liberal with the language group a close second. The business

and engineering students were considerably more conservative than the language and general science groups. This makes it apparent that students in technical courses in the non-church schools which include only a minimum of so-called cultural electives are affected less in their religious thinking than others who are exposed to more currents of thought. But the fact that the difference between the language students and the science students is not especially great would indicate that the major subject here is not the all important factor. The general nature of the course seems more important than the particular field of specialization.

In the smaller colleges there exists much greater homogeneity in religious thought than in the larger universities. Of most church colleges it can be truthfully affirmed that there is a prevailing college mind with respect to religious views. The individual student tends to acquire this mind of the college as his own. If the college mind be conservative, the student tends to be strengthened in his conservatism, whether he study science, sociology, history, or fine arts. If the college mind be liberal the student tends to become liberal irrespective of the field of his major. To be sure, a conservative college may include on its staff a liberal professor who gathers to himself the liberals of the college and through them tinges the whole with a strain of liberalism, or the contrary case may be true. In general, however, the mind of the college in matters of religion tends to impress itself on the student without much regard to his field of major study.

REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

A consideration of the study as a whole leads to certain conclusions, which, while not startling in nature, are of value nevertheless to those working in the field of religion in the colleges in affording a better insight into the actual situation. Freshmen bring with them to college the concrete symbols of traditional faith, which have been accepted uncritically as a rule, and since their ideas have not been subjected to vigorous criticism, they

COLLEGE EXPERIENCE AND CONCEPTS OF GOD 265

are quite definite and certain with respect to their religious positions. This does not mean, however, that these positions are inherently consistent. In fact, there is much confusion, but the Freshman is not particularly aware of the inconsistencies of his position. In this respect he probably reflects the nature of popular religious thinking generally. Many religious ideas pass current among the people which it would be impossible to bring together into a consistent pattern of organization.

During the college experience these inherited ideas are challenged by other ideas received from studies and social contacts, and the student is led to question his body of accepted ideas and becomes unsettled in his religious thought. Although, in the large, the actual change in ideas that transpires is not greatly marked, certainly not revolutionary, yet one apparent result is the decline in dogmatic certainty. The Senior is not so sure of the validity of his ideas as he was as an entering Freshman, and there follows a correlative decline in the degree of vitality that the concept holds for his total faith. The great majority of Seniors, however, continue to regard the god concept as vital to their faith, even though they are less certain as to just what content should be poured into it, or less certain as to what symbols best indicate the nature of the reality meant. There is a growing recognition, as a result of the broadening intellectual experience of the college, of the inadequacy of any of our symbols to comprehend the reality which they would designate by the term God. Students do not discover better symbols than those already in common use with which to indicate their faith in the nature of the fundamental reality, but they do come to appreciate the limitations of those familiar symbols.

It is hardly surprising that undergraduates do not provide us with a new group of symbols, when religious leaders and recognized theologians are themselves perplexed with respect to what analogies from human experience can best be applied to give significant meaning to the concept of God for our modern scientific, politically democratic, and industrialized world. That

religious concepts undergo changes of meaning and development with broadening social experience, no one with a developmental view of life will deny. Certainly the present age is one of those transition periods in which the inherited concept is being newly interpreted in order to be better adapted to the requirements of a new culture. Students trained largely in the views of the old order in pre-college days are made to realize during the course of the college experience the inadequacy of the old symbols and use them with less certainty and great caution. For this reason the effect of the college experience appears to be negative, as the tendency to undermine traditional symbols is more evident than the reception and development of new ones. This is only what should be expected in an age when there is widespread disagreement among leaders in religious thought as to what symbols best describe the meaning of God in present experience. The colleges reflect the general uncertainty prevailing in the religious world.

As things stand in the colleges at present, however, there is evident a distinct preference for personal symbols rather than mechanistic, but personal symbols refined of naïve anthropomorphisms. There is something of a tendency at work to combine both personal and impersonal qualities in the concept, but with the personal predominating. There is also evident a growing disposition to conceive of God as manifesting himself through the medium of the natural order and not in contravention of its laws. The concept also becomes more socialized, the end of God's working in our world being the perfecting of the social order. Withal there is the tendency for the more abstract and philosophic symbols to increase in favor at the expense of the more concrete and familiar. Among other tendencies there is likewise one in the direction of agnostic and atheistic positions, especially in the non-church colleges.

Changes in thought are more marked, as a rule, in the institutions without church affiliations, where fewer safeguards are thrown around inherited religious beliefs. It is noteworthy, however, that in some church colleges the liberal tendencies are

COLLEGE EXPERIENCE AND CONCEPTS OF GOD 267

every bit as marked as in the non-church institutions, and the changes affected in the thinking of the students are fully as great. In general, the mind of the college with respect to the conception of God tends to impress itself on the mind of the individual student. This is especially true in the smaller and more closely integrated institutions, and somewhat less so in the larger more heterogeneous institutions. Conservatively minded institutions may refine the thinking of their students, freeing it from certain crudities, but they send them forth conservatives of their own pattern, while liberal colleges produce liberals according to the nature and degree of their liberality.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

PRIMITIVE ELEMENTS IN ROMAN RELIGION

This attractively got-up book¹ rests in its fundamental concepts on the work of J. G. Frazer and W. W. Fowler. It collects in convenient form materials which are likely to serve the purposes of the anthropologist. I should have preferred to see the material more completely collected and then the task of making comparisons left to specialists in other fields. As it is, the fundamental assumptions are not discussed so fully as they deserve to be. Certainly primitive man did not always form correct inferences concerning the world. Yet I should not have said: "Early man, in common with present-day savages, was unable to form correct inferences concerning the world about him" (p. 1). Such reasoning implies an essential difference in kind between the savage and the modern mind. I doubt such an assumption. In primitive and savage thought the faults are inadequate observation, insufficient experience, haste in drawing conclusions, and reasoning from analogy—all of them faults to which we ourselves yield only too often. There is, *pace* Levy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les races inférieures* and similar works on savage thinking, no essential difference in the kind of thinking, no prelogical mentality (see O. Leroy, *La raison primitive: essai de réfutation de la théorie du prélogisme* [Paris, 1927]). Burriss seems later to agree with my contentions, but I fear the agreement arises from a misprint (p. 4): "But their actions can only be analyzed by tracing the faulty and unconscious line of reasoning upon which they were based. Folk stories abound in similar actions, capable of analysis on the basis of the modes of thinking of an educated man." Surely he means to say "uneducated." I should, moreover, remove the word "unconscious," unless we are to apply it to most of our thinking.

I am not sure that animism is still the best explanation of certain mythological phenomena. Perhaps the notion of the dead in a very corporeal form, "the living corpse"—a concept not wholly foreign to us—may provide a more satisfactory explanation (see such works as H. Schreuer, "Das Recht der Toten," *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft*, XXXIII [1916], 333-432, XXXIV [1916], 1-208; Wilke, "Le-

¹ *Taboo, Magic, Spirits: A Study of Primitive Elements in Roman Religion*. By E. E. Burriss. New York: Macmillan, 1931. 250 pages. \$2.00.

bender Leichnam," in Ebert, *Reallexikon der Vorgeschichte*; and the ideas expressed by K. Krohn in his review of R. M. Meyer, *Altgermanische Religionsgeschichte* in the *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen* [1912], pp. 193-223). I find it surprising that Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, and W. H. Roscher, *Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, are, so far as I can see, never cited. Special studies, for example, E. Samter, *Geburt, Hochzeit und Tod* (Leipzig, 1911), or E. Clodd, *Tom-Tit-Tot* (London, 1898), are rarely, if ever, mentioned. The material of modern folk-tradition which is rendered so easily available by the invaluable *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens* (Berlin, in progress) is very scantily employed. In sum, I find Burriß' work a pleasant and stimulating introduction to primitive ideas in Roman religion, although it is far from including all that might be expected to fall within its scope.

ARCHER TAYLOR

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

SKETCHES OF RELIGIOUS FOUNDERS

A number of attempts have been made in recent years to sketch the history of religion by giving the biography of its greatest exponents. The method has a number of obvious advantages. It permits a wide range, yet does not require exhaustive treatment. It is by nature interesting—as biography always is.

Such books, however, are always debatable with regard to whether the selection of characters is a correct one and whether the desire to find common ground for all of the characters has not led to disproportionate emphasis in the various biographies.

Founders of Great Religions by Dr. Millar Burrows¹ is informative and interesting. The characters he has selected are Lao-Tze, Confucius, Mahavira, Buddha, Zoroaster, Moses, Mohammed, Nanak, and Jesus. In each of the sketches he wisely makes use of the legendary as well as of the strictly historical material. He concludes the book with a chapter in which he derives from the various biographies the elements common to them all and therefore common to all the great religions; namely, that there is a ruling power in the universe and that this power is on the side of righteousness.

There seems to be no particular logic in the order of the chapters. If the order is chronological, then Moses, who is the earliest, should have been

¹ *Founders of Great Religions*. By Millar Burrows. New York: Scribner, 1931. 243 pages. \$2.00.

discussed first, and Nanak, the founder of Sikhism, who lived in the fifteenth century of the present era, should be last. If the order is geographical—beginning in the Orient and going toward the West—then Nanak should be discussed after Buddha. Perhaps the fact that Jesus is dealt with last indicates a desire to arrange the characters in what seemed to the author to be the order of increasing importance.

SOLOMON B. FREEHOF

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

SOME RECENT BOOKS ON JESUS

The religious, and at times the secular, press continues to furnish the reading public with books on Jesus. This indicates the perennial interest in his personality. Professor Branscomb's volume¹ is a reworking and expansion of an earlier work entitled *The Message of Jesus*. It is intended to be a textbook for college students. This purpose naturally colors to some degree the selection and treatment of material. There is a very good survey of conventional positions on synoptic origins and synoptic criticism although some comparatively recent phases of those disciplines are largely ignored, for example: *Formgeschichte* and the formative effect upon the tradition of social and group needs within the growing Christian communities. The teaching is arranged under somewhat formal heads but adequate justification for that is found in the pedagogical purpose of the book. The author has worked his field with considerable care and has produced a volume of distinct worth as an introduction to the teaching of Jesus. The presentation is orderly and gives the impression of historical impartiality. At times there seems to be a too easy assumption that the material embodies accurately the very teaching of Jesus, but to have raised too frequently the critical questions would probably have destroyed the effectiveness of the book for its avowed purpose. Some features of such crucial questions as Jesus' thought of the kingdom and his messianic consciousness might have been made more clear. The book is vigorous and interesting and the reviewer is confident that it will make for itself a useful place among college students and studious ministers.

*The Head of the Corner*² is the title of an attempt by its author "to recover for himself the historical process by which the personality of Jesus entered and became a part of the religion which he founded." This is un-

¹ *The Teachings of Jesus*. By B. Harvie Branscomb. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931. 384 pages. \$2.50.

² *The Head of the Corner*. By Louis Matthews Sweet. New York: Scribner, 1931. xii+248 pages. \$2.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

271

doubtedly a laudable purpose and one which raises expectations in the reader's mind as he approaches the volume. For there can be little doubt that a fearless and impartial investigation of the personality of Jesus and the reasons for his varied interpretation by successive generations of Christians has possibilities of a most rewarding kind. In proceeding to his attempt Dr. Sweet covers considerable ground dealing with the problems of gospel origins from a literary point of view and occasionally from the point of view of community situations. A chapter on "Fact and Interpretation" awakens anticipations by its very title.

The volume is written in a kindly spirit and contains not a few suggestive insights, but the hopes raised by the stated purpose are not realized. The author knows much of historical study and attitude as applied to the New Testament but he makes no thorough or consistent use of such knowledge in relation to his problem. The point of view is traditionalism touched here and there with historical insight. The central questions are frequently ignored or slightly treated. The tendency to take back with a theological left hand what a historical right hand has given unfortunately goes far in nullifying what at the outset promises to be a praiseworthy venture.

When a professor of law turns to biblical study a certain interest is at once assured. The author of *The Trial of Jesus of Nazareth*¹ is professor of law in the University of California. An introductory chapter on the sources of our information concerning Jesus is followed by an examination of the material of the four gospels used in their records of the trial of Jesus. This material is in turn evaluated historically. The conclusion is that there are in reality two accounts of the trial, those of Mark and Luke. Any changes of these as they appear in Matthew and John are not important historically and do not represent an independent tradition. Mark is held to be more historical than Luke with the exception of the sending of Jesus to Herod Antipas. The trial before the Sanhedrin and Jesus' condemnation by that body, the Roman order for his execution, and the waiving of jurisdiction by Herod are the probable "facts." It is likely that a charge of false prophecy brought about the judgment by the Sanhedrin. The *gravamen* of the charge before Pilate was political agitation.

These simple conclusions are labored at length. The writer knows the rules of evidence, he knows Jewish and Roman history of the period, he knows something of gospel criticism. But there are times when his knowledge of the last is lacking, especially from the point of view of tendency in the formation and preservation of early tradition. Some of the material

¹ *The Trial of Jesus of Nazareth*. By Max Radin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. xi+266 pages. \$3.00.

of the book is not strictly relevant although it makes interesting reading. An impartial attitude is almost paraded at times, but there seem to be moments when it is not conspicuously in use. Evidently much earnest work has been done in preparation for this volume; one can but wonder if the result quite justifies it.

The brief pamphlet¹ by Professor Lietzmann is a *Sonderausgabe* of the proceedings of the Prussian Academy of Science and concerns itself with an examination of the records of the trial of Jesus in an attempt to discover the historical facts. He starts with the thesis that there is but one primary source for the passion history, namely, Mark. The others are based on him and where the material used by them differs from his it readily reveals its theological interest and legendary character. A critical analysis of the Marcan material yields the following results. The story of the night trial of Jesus before the Sanhedrin and the condemnation to death on the charge of blasphemy is unhistorical. If this had been the basis of Jesus' condemnation he would have been stoned. But it is certain that Jesus was crucified as a messianic revolutionist. Doubtless the Sanhedrin had a leading part in his arrest but it was their religious pride and not their political fear that prompted them to move against him. Jesus had appeared in a messianic rôle, whether voluntarily or forced by a tumultuous mob of the people is not here important. The Jewish leaders chose the easier way of a treason charge in preference to that of blasphemy. Pilate, weighing the advantage of placating the Jewish overlords against the protection of an unimportant Galilean, did not investigate the charge with any care but sentenced him to be crucified. The Roman apologetic as well as the ascription of guilt to the Jews by means of a night trial and condemnation are products of Christian desire and imagination. In the matter of the story of the trial before the Sanhedrin the procedure in the case of Stephen had important influence.

The discussion is scholarly and careful as one would expect from the author and is important out of proportion to its length.

COLGATE-ROCHESTER DIVINITY SCHOOL

ERNEST W. PARSONS

CHRISTIANITY'S INTERPRETATION OF JESUS

With the volume under review,² Professor Case completes a notable trilogy, a series of studies which have occupied him for many years, each

¹ *Der Prozess Jesu*. By Hans Lietzmann. Berlin: Die Akademie der Wissenschaften in Kommission bei Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1931. 12 pages. RM. 1.

² *Jesus Through the Centuries*. By Shirley Jackson Case. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932. 382 pages. \$3.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

273

of which is a distinctive contribution to the literature of its field. The first of these was entitled *The Historicity of Jesus* (1912); the second, *Jesus: A New Biography* (1927). The present volume maintains the high level of the earlier works, each of which exhibits historical scholarship of rare quality.

It is not the purpose of this study merely to trace Christianity's interest through the centuries since Jesus' crucifixion; it seeks rather the proper basis for a justified contemporary judgment of Jesus, such an estimate of him as one may reach in the light of the results of historical scholarship and of scientific modes of thought. The exceeding difficulty of this undertaking is realized when one considers that no historic personality ever elicited so wide a variety of judgments and that no authority was ever invoked in support of so many different opinions and programs.

Messianist categories proved most available for the initial classification which his disciples achieved after his crucifixion; the triumphant martyr became the new Messiah, the deified hero, the Lord of the Christian cult, the incarnate God, in fairly rapid succession, as the scene shifted. The puzzle of the relation of the incarnate God to Jehovah, long debated, issued at length in the conception of a metaphysical Son of God who completely overshadowed the earthly Jesus. Catholic theology beheld in Jesus, throughout his earthly career, an essentially divine, heavenly being. Medieval piety, attempting to approach lovingly near to this Jesus, even although it somewhat humanized the figure, saw in him essentially the Lord Jesus Christ of the creeds. Protestantism simply hardened and sharpened the features of the creedal Christ, the christological Redeemer. It was a full two centuries after the Reformation ere there emerged a genuine historical interest in Jesus and his teachings. Even so, one may to this day distinguish three types of Protestant treatment of Jesus: a first which is dominated by interest in the supernatural, a second which emphasizes Jesus' human ideality, a third and most recent type which attempts through a critical study of the gospels to recover a true picture of Jesus. Romanism, having suppressed Modernism within its ranks, continues to interpret Jesus, but mainly with edifying or apologetic intent. Anglican writers, though they defer to the results of historical criticism, quite generally feel the constraint of the creeds. Nonconformist portrayals of Jesus tend mainly to stress metaphysical and dogmatic interests. Social and liberal lives of Jesus usually either work from the religious experience which Jesus awakens in the believer or seek to portray the features of Jesus' own personal religious living as the gospels indicate them.

What, now, can the earnest inquirer after the significance of Jesus for modern life make of all this? The answer must lie, of course, in the kind of Jesus whom untrammelled historical research discovers. The hot spots in

the volume under review are to be found where this issue is handled, and thus at the beginning and at the end. In the earlier chapters, in a rarely balanced though greatly condensed interpretation, the author brings before us the figure of the historical Jesus in the reconstructed situation in which he lived and wrought. The utmost resources of scholarship have been called into play to this end. The resulting portrayal funds a remarkably wide and accurate knowledge of the New Testament itself, with the history, religious life, movements of thought, and social motivations of the times. Above and beyond all, it rests back upon a dramatic psychological reconstruction, involving the most exact and illuminating use of the historical imagination. In all of these respects Professor Case handles his materials with the ease and assurance of a master. None knows better than he the points at which, even among those who employ the historical method without reservation, divergences of opinion will arise. Some will demur to the view that Jesus did not apply messianic categories to himself but preferred to be known merely as a prophet, the messianic categories in their apocalyptic form having been first applied to Jesus by his followers after his death. Every type of mediating theologian will, of course, find matters enough in this portrayal to which to take exception.

Jesus, in this light, is seen to have been a prophetic teacher of righteousness who depicted the kingdom of God in genuinely apocalyptic fashion, to be sure, but without putting himself into the center of the picture, a teacher whose words raised false hopes in the hearts of his Galilean followers, hopes of divine intervention and of his elevation to the throne of David, and whose tragic death by crucifixion at the hands of the Roman authority came as a bolt from the blue, though to those who had been more interested in his religious message than in his political potentialities, it must have seemed an attestation of his prophetic calling. By visions and subsequent reappraisals, his disciples were assured not only that he lived but that he was the Messiah of the apocalyptic hope: he would come again shortly in triumph. In the Jewish scriptures, moreover, they found remarkable support for their new view of him.

What can such a Jesus mean to us? It is his personal religious living which, though no substitute for our own, is the core and value paramount of the new appreciation. If we can become contemporaries with Jesus in ancient society instead of making him a twentieth-century man, we may come upon this value of values, for he summons us, too, to creative religious living. His sincerity and devotion, his loyalty to God and man, his delicate sense of spiritual values, his consecrated self-giving, and the moral and spiritual stamina which carried him on to the very cross challenge us to make religion a present-day reality, religion of this sort.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

275

Whether the great majority will be led to discover this Jesus of history or must stand or fall with the Christ of faith rests with the contemporary interpreters of the Christian religion.

HENRY B. ROBINS

COLGATE-ROCHESTER DIVINITY SCHOOL

STUDIES OF JESUS FOR THE LAYMAN

The silent years of Jesus' life, the years before the public ministry, have always attracted the imagination of those interested in the Nazarene. From the second century through the second decade of the twentieth, many have attempted to write in detail the story which the gospels do not tell. Miss Kirkland¹ approaches this difficult task with a reverent evaluation of Jesus that adorns every page with superlatives. If there is anything new in her work, it is the use of "psychological methods." Her method seems to be to reconstruct the childhood and youth of Jesus by a study of human childhood and youth in general, and also by a study of the personality of the mature Jesus.

The book is written in a poetic and graceful style which makes the reading of it as a literary work very much worth while. The author's vivid imagination paints every page with bright colors and sharp contrasts. As a romantic and imaginative account of Jesus' youth, an account composed of dreams and poetry, this work can hardly be surpassed. And it should serve as a source of inspiration to the pastor or religious worker.

But the author has not escaped from inaccuracies sure to mislead the reader for whom it is intended. Her high evaluation of Jesus and Christianity lead her to the construction of contrasts in which the Hellenistic world and the Jewish world of Jesus' day are misrepresented. The Hellenistic world when contrasted with the Judaism which was the religion of Jesus' youth becomes dreary and repulsive; Judaism when contrasted with Christianity which was the religion of Jesus' maturity becomes dead and formal. It is an almost unbelievable anachronism to find the period of Jesus' life referred to as "decadent, dramatic, febrile." The Romans are spoken of as "having tossed away their deities," paganism is dying, and Rome is turning to emperor worship as a substitute for its dead gods. Of the vital and popular mystery religions the author seems to know nothing. In her portrayal of contemporary Judaism she is equally ignorant of those recent works which have shown us that it is unsafe to draw a picture of

¹ *Portrait of a Carpenter*. By Winifred Kirkland. New York: Scribner, 1931. 249 pages. \$2.00.

Pharisaism solely on the basis of Matthew 23. Nor does she attempt any evaluation of New Testament sources; on the other hand, she uses gospel materials in the most uncritical fashion.

The second of these studies of Jesus is of a type which has become common only since the beginning of this century. It is a sympathetic study of Jesus from the modern Jew's viewpoint. Mr. Trattner¹ writes in a pleasant, almost a journalistic, style of the Jewishness of Jesus and the manner in which both Christians and Jews have distorted his personality in their description of it. His book makes no such contribution to scholarship as was made by the work of Klausner. It is not a book for scholars, but it carries to the general reader much of the message of Klausner, Montefiore, Abrahams, and others.

The author attacks the misrepresentations of Jesus from the days of the Evangelists to the time of Bruce Barton. He accepts as historical those "Gospel traditions that normally and naturally dovetail into Palestinian life of the first century." For this method, and for his attacks on the reliability of the portrait of Jesus found in the Fourth Gospel, in the creeds, in the work of Papini, Bruce Barton, and others, many scholars will have nothing but approval. Christian scholarship should be grateful for a book which is interesting and appealing enough to reach the masses and at the same time sane and strong enough to strip from the figure of Jesus the modern costumes in which it has been disguised by such writers as Papini and Barton.

In the appendixes, the author gives brief explanations of such terms as "Son of Man," some Jewish parallels to the Beatitudes in pre-Christian literature, and some rabbinic parallels to the sayings of Jesus. These lists have all the forcefulness of laboratory demonstration for the author's claim as to the Jewishness of Jesus. Jewish interest in Jesus today is shown by the lengthy Bibliography of works about Jesus (available in English) written by Jews.

The work is weakened where it touches the New Testament by several overemphases. Paul, says Mr. Trattner, was filled with antagonism and bitterness toward Judaism; he felt that it was necessary "to frame the Christian message with as little reference to Judaism as might be possible under the circumstances." Such a statement loses sight of what Professor Case has called "the Jewishness of Paul." Paul was in no sense the leader of a "radical left wing" opposed to Judaism; his writings are intelligible only when it is seen that he held certain aspects of Judaism in the highest regard.

¹ *As a Jew Sees Jesus*. By Ernest R. Trattner. New York: Scribner, 1931. xii+232 pages. \$2.00.

In casting the creeds in the rôle of villain, the author again says more than the truth. When he claims that "the creeds apotheosized him [Jesus] into a Gentile cult-savior," he ignores the fact that this apotheosis took place long before the expression of any formal Christian creed. The author implies that belief in the resurrection and the divinity of Jesus was first asserted by the "creeds"; "Jesus was his name in history—theology called him Lord and Christ." It was because Jesus had become Lord and Christ, a Risen Savior, in their vital religious experience that the early Christians described him thus in their creeds. For the creeds are not the creators of faith, they were created by faith.

ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

COMPARATIVELY SHORT GRAMMAR

This ninth edition of Professor Robertson's *Short Grammar*¹ is completely rewritten and Part II, "Accidence," is written by Professor W. Hersey Davis. The treatment of accidence by Professor Davis is a thorough and careful piece of work which observes the admirable limitation of giving only those forms which occur in the New Testament and the Koine. This limitation is an advantage in a grammar designed for students who know only the elements of Greek.

If this limitation were observed in the rest of the book, it would be greatly improved. But instead of giving the young tyro a grammar in which the Greek of the New Testament is adequately placed in its natural environment—Hellenistic Greek—Professor Robertson has vainly attempted to show the relationship of New Testament Greek to all the Indo-European languages. Sanskrit is to this grammar what Attic was to earlier grammars of the New Testament idiom: a pervasive and distorting influence. Before the student can evaluate the language of the New Testament in relation to Indo-European languages—even before he can place it in the life-history of Greek—he must get it well anchored in the Koine. Once he has done that, a course in comparative philology from a specialist in that field may do for him what Mr. Robertson has tried to do here. A listing of parallel forms from other Indo-European languages makes no contribution to the student for whom this book was designed. Yet each of the prepositions is introduced with a list like the following: "§363. 'Επί. The Sanskrit *api* (locative), Zend *api*, Latin *ob*, Lithuanian *pi*, German *auf*, English *up*."

¹ A *New Short Grammar of the Greek Testament*. By A. T. Robertson and W. H. Davis. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1931. xiv+454 pages. \$2.50.

In an attempt to support the use of eight cases, the argument is advanced that the functions of the eight Sanskrit cases still survive in Hellenistic Greek, even though some of them have disappeared as separate forms. It is true that the loss of many of the forms of classical Greek, to say nothing of Sanskrit, in no sense implies the loss of the function for Hellenistic Greek. But this is not to say that the names of the ancient forms must be preserved. As a matter of fact, Mr. Robertson inconsistently drops the dual number "because it does not occur in the Koine." But, of course, it is only the form of the dual that has vanished; the function survived, and the Hellenistic author could write about two men or two apples without the least difficulty even if the dual form had disappeared. Professor Robertson to be consistent should print the plural form twice, once under the heading "dual." Or he could perhaps more easily head the plural form with both words: "dual-plural," as he labels the genitive form "genitive-ablative."

The quality of the whole work can easily be seen in the bibliography. In the first place, it is unnecessarily long. A bibliography of approximately 150 items is in no sense "brief," nor would it seem so to the readers for whom the book is planned. Its bulk is increased by the repetition of titles; e.g., this book itself appears twice in its own bibliography: once as the ninth edition of the *Short Grammar* and once as a separate work; moreover, it appears four more times as translations of earlier editions into Italian, French, Dutch, and German. The practice of citing books that have been translated with the original title and then again in English lends an air of erudition to the list but is certainly a work of supererogation here. On what basis is Streeter's *Four Gospels* included? Moreover, such works as Claflin, *Syntax of Boeotian Dialect Inscriptions*, or Hobart's exploded theory of the medical language of Luke, or half a dozen of the works on comparative philology, or some of the numerous editions of the Greek New Testament might profitably have been left out to make room for works more valuable to the readers of this grammar. Cadbury's valuable work on the language of the New Testament is represented by only one title; J. H. Moulton's introductory grammar is ignored. Furthermore, many of the items are not up to date. The second volume of Helbing's *Grammatik der Septuaginta* is not mentioned although it appeared in 1928, nor is the second edition of Dalman's *Worte Jesu*. The third edition of Milligan's *Selections* has been overlooked, as has also the second—unless it is the work quoted under another title for the same date. The 1910 edition of Buck's *Introduction to the Study of the Greek Dialects* is cited instead of the recent revised edition. The fine range of published papyri, many with English translation and notes, is dismissed summarily as

CRITICAL REVIEWS

279

"Papyri (various publications as Oxyrhynchus, etc.)" but Witkowski's *Epistulae privatae Graecae*, an edition of papyri letters with Latin notes, is given individual representation.

Yet Part I, "Introduction," is probably the weakest part of the book. This is partly due to the attempt to treat briefly entire linguistic disciplines which might better be left to separate handbooks; e.g., comparative philology—from the origin of language to the relation of Greek to the other members of the Indo-European family—is presented in four pages! The Introduction is further weakened by the dogmatic statement of traditional positions; for instance, that all the writers of the New Testament except Luke were Jews who spoke Aramaic as well as the Greek Koine and could read Hebrew also, that Revelation and the Gospel of John were both written by the apostle but with a different amanuensis, etc. This section of the grammar also provides adequate illustration of the careless style in which the book is written. Take, for example, the loose construction of the following sentence: "It would have been strange if these men in their day and time had shown no traces of their Semitic environment including many proper names (p. 18)." Equally confused and abrupt is the paragraph (p. 17) beginning "Style is the man. . . ." Characteristic of the poor arrangement of material is §14 (p. 12) which is headed "Simplification," but says nothing at all about simplification after the first sentence. The astonishing statement is made (p. 14) that "Dr. W. Hersey Davis has found over three thousand words in the papyri of the first century A.D. not in any Greek lexicon." The comprehensive scope of the new edition of Liddell and Scott's *Greek Lexicon*, which is now half completed, makes this seem like an overstatement.

There is a real need for a good intermediate grammar of the Greek New Testament in English, but this revision of Professor Robertson's *Short Grammar* does not succeed in meeting the need.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL

A MANUAL OF THE HISTORY OF THE POPES

Fernand Hayward's manual of papal history is now available in English translation.¹ It is designed for the general reader and is written by a Roman Catholic who professes his intention to write objectively and from an "unreservedly Catholic" viewpoint. The inclusion of a mass of purely

¹ *History of the Popes*. By Fernand Hayward. Translated from the French by the monks of St. Augustine's Abbey, Ramsgate. New York: Dutton, 1931. xvii+405 pages. \$5.00.

traditional materials indicates a failure to achieve the goal of objectivity, but there is no attempt to conceal the shadows in papal history. On the contrary, there is a manifest disposition to linger over the details of ecclesiastical intrigue and to describe without reserve the shortcomings of numerous popes in matters of policy and personal character. The manual presents biographical sketches of each individual in the long succession from Peter and other traditional pontiffs to the present pope. Instead of dealing with the significant personalities and circumstances which served to make papal history, Hayward labors under the necessity of naming each pope and anti-pope and presenting some information about each individual. Where no historical facts are available he utilizes traditional material which is cited from the *Liber Pontificalis* and similar sources. Amid such a mass of details the narrative resembles the work of a chronicler who is charged with the duty of announcing the stately procession of Roman pontiffs. Despite the author's ability in the matter of effective condensation, the plan of arrangement leaves no room for a clear description of the gradually increasing self-consciousness of papal power and the effective embodiment of that conception in the development of machinery of church administration. The concluding paragraphs bestow generous and equally distributed praise upon Pius XI and Mussolini for their attempt at the settlement of the Roman question, but there is no hint of subsequent discord between the peacemakers.

SCARRITT COLLEGE

J. MINTON BATTEN

CHURCH HISTORY BIBLIOGRAPHY

To use, concerning this book,¹ the well-worn phrases about indispensable value and meeting a long-felt want would be platitudinous. It is one of the most important books which have appeared in its field for a long time. Criticism can consist only of description and of suggestions regarding details offered for possible consideration in connection with the further printings which will certainly be demanded, while all the time the extraordinary merits of the work are gratefully appreciated. One of the merits is the copious reference to German and French books. Occasionally, indeed, the scale tips against English. Two of the eight books on the Jesuits are English, and one of the four on Pascal, C. C. J. Webb's recent *Pascal's Philosophy of Religion* being omitted. Another merit is the brief characterizations following many titles.

¹ *A Bibliographical Guide to the History of Christianity*. Compiled by S. J. Case, J. T. McNeill, W. W. Sweet, W. Pauck, M. Spinka. Edited by S. J. Case. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. ix+265 pages. \$2.50.

The Introduction, by Professor Case, contains forty-two titles of books and articles dealing with the writing and study of history and with various types of interpretation, and of books treating general aspects of church history. The two following chapters are also by Professor Case. That on "History of Christianity in General" mentions twenty-four "Outlines and Manuals," and goes on to "History of Church Historiography," under which there is an instructive classified list of church historians, and to titles of "Dictionaries and Encyclopedias" and of periodicals. The *Papers of the American Society of Church History* (p. 39), since they treat all kinds of subjects, would be better placed here than in the next chapter; and while this society, as an officer may perhaps say, is not bragging about its record of publication, its latest volume really was not of 1918 but of 1928. A section on "Specific Phases of Christianity" mentions books on institutions, law, preaching, doctrine, creeds, Christian living, and Christian social activity. The titles on Catholicism do not include Heiler's *Katholicismus* or Cadoux's *Catholicism and Christianity*, valuable not only in itself but also for its bibliography. This subject merits larger treatment. Some of the books listed under "Worship, Church Architecture, and Art" and "The Church and Social Amelioration" in the chapter on "Christianity in Western Europe to 1517," since they are of general scope, would be better placed here. The titles under "Christian Social Activity" do not include one of the best books in this field, *Christ and Civilization*, edited by Paton, Bunting, and Garvie.

The chapter on "Christianity in the Roman Empire," a mine of usefulness, begins with a full list of "Sources of Information," which is followed by sections on "Histories of Early Christianity" and "Christianity among the Jews." A group in the latter consists of ten books on "Jesus and His Followers," a disproportionately small number. The later sections are on "Christianity among the Gentiles," containing a specially valuable list on Graeco-Roman religions, "Christianity and Roman Imperialism," "Early Christian Institutions," "The Christian Life," and "Leaders and Churches." The last might be strengthened. Benson's *St. Cyprian* is not mentioned, or Farrar's *Lives of the Fathers*, still a most useful book; and for Augustine there are only two books by the same author, which are not the best.

In the chapter on "Christianity in Western Europe to 1517," by Professor John T. McNeill, a good general list is followed by sections on "The Extension of Christianity," "History of Church Organization," "Religious Life and Worship," "Education, Learning, and Theology," and "The Decline of the Medieval Church." All of these are usefully diversified. Franciscan enthusiasts will miss Father Cuthbert's life. The Do-

minicans' translation of Aquinas is not mentioned. The books on Wyclif and Hus might well be in the last section of this chapter rather than in later national groups. D. C. Munro's meritorious *The Middle Ages*, 395-1272, appeared in 1928 in a new edition by Munro and Sontag, carried to 1500.

Professor Pauck's chapter on "Christianity in Western Europe since the Reformation" faces the problem of organizing modern church history to good purpose. After a general section there are lists on the Reformation, treated mostly by nations, and "The Catholic Reformation." Then follow sections on the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, where the division is partly national and partly topical. All of this is of very high quality. The books on Calvin do not include Reyburn's life, which Professor Harkness in her recent study of Calvin's ethics calls "the best one-volume biography . . . in English." Macmillan's *Protestantism in Germany*, the best treatment of German Protestant church organization in English, is not mentioned.

The chapter on "Christianity in the British Isles" is by Professor McNeill. A section on "Celtic Christianity in Britain and Ireland" is followed by general books on the Church of England. Then come sections on periods of English and of Scottish religious history to 1689. The section on "Roman Catholicism in England since the Reformation" omits Thureau-Dangin's *English Catholic Revival in the Nineteenth Century*. A group of titles on "Christianity in Ireland since 1172"—a welcome feature—is followed by a topical treatment of Christianity in Great Britain since 1689. Tyerman's classic biography of Wesley is certainly more worthy of a place than Lunn's sketch, and Simon's important books on Wesley's work are not listed.

In the chapter on Eastern Christianity, Professor Spinka's extraordinary command of the subject is at the service of the reader. There are sections on general books and on "Christianity in the Eastern Roman Empire," coming down to the Crusades. The field is then divided into groups influenced by Eastern Orthodoxy or by Western forms of Christianity, Roman Catholic and Protestant. Within these two groups the treatment goes by regions and nationalities. The list on Russian religious history, including late developments, will be gratefully received. Should not D. S. Schaff's biography of Hus and his edition of Hus's *The Church* have been included in the specially valuable Czechoslovakian section?

Professor Sweet's "Christianity in the Americas" begins with a section on Canada and ends with one on "Hispanic America," which will be boons to students. Under "United States" there is a survey of books of general value and of periodicals, with a good group on the "European

Background." American religious history is then followed from the beginnings to the "Last Decade." The treatment is mainly topical, with many subdivisions necessitated by denominational conditions, the whole affording a complete and enlightening analysis of the history. Kittredge's *Witchcraft in Old and New England* does not appear in the books on this subject. The most careful study yet made of statistics of denominational growth, H. C. Weber's *Evangelism* (1929), is not listed, nor is Hotchkiss's *History of Western New York* (1848), the chief source of information about the first half-century of Presbyterianism and Congregationalism in New York.

"Christianity in Newer Fields," by Professor Case, is a comprehensive and most useful bibliography of missions, arranged chiefly by countries. An important feature is the long list of "Reports," bringing together material which is hard to trace.

Misprints are "Montalambert" (p. 73), "Bussel" (p. 85) for "Bussell," "Melanchton" (p. 98), "Tracchi-Venturi" (p. 108) for "Tacchi," and "Tyan" (p. 206) for "Ryan."

The Chicago professors have put all students of Christianity under enduring debt to them.

ROBERT HASTINGS NICHOLS

AUBURN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

YOUNG CALVIN'S HUMANISTIC STUDIES

Doumergue's attempt at a definitive biography of Calvin has encouraged activity in the field of Calvin study. Recent research has been concerned with the interpretation of Calvinism, the evaluation of its influence on the formation of the existing social order, and the solution of biographical problems suggested by Doumergue. The publication of a thorough investigation of Calvin's humanistic studies furnishes an excellent account of the environmental factors which influenced his formative years.¹ In this work Breen presents the familiar facts regarding Calvin's studies at Paris, Orléans, and Bourges, but he has added a useful supplement to existing biographies of Calvin in the form of a detailed and fully documented description of the forces which served to shape the development of the reformer's personality and viewpoint. The distinctive features of French humanism are clearly delineated in contrast to the Italian and other types. Calvin's contacts with the rising tide of French human-

¹ *John Calvin: A Study in French Humanism*. By Quirinus Breen. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1931. xii+174 pages. Silk cloth \$3.00; paper \$2.00.

ism are described with special reference to the influences which were mediated through university curricula, humanistic writings, and personal association with teachers and friends who championed the new movement.

The founding of the Royal College seemed to indicate the triumph of humanism in France, and Calvin was determined to devote his life to study and literary activity in this new and popular field. His early efforts at productivity, particularly his contribution to Duchemin's *Antapologia* and his edition of Seneca's *Commentaries*, are discussed with a keen appreciation of background and an excellent analysis of content. The author is of the opinion that French humanism had practically spent its force when Calvin, motivated by religious interests and concern for the common man, experienced his conversion and dedicated himself to the task of religious reform. Perhaps the most important contribution of this study is to be found in the clear evaluation of the precipitate of humanism which Calvin carried over to his new work as a reformer. Certainly the personality, activities, and writings of the reformer can be understood more clearly in the light of this detailed description of his early environment.

SCARRITT COLLEGE

J. MINTON BATTEN

THE BAPTISTS ON THE FRONTIER

The formal introduction to this volume,¹ written by S. J. Case, reveals not only the nature and purpose of the book but also the spirit of prophetic scholarship in which it was conceived. "Convinced that important documents might soon be lost beyond recovery, the Department of Church History in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago has undertaken systematically to locate and collect these original sources for the history of Christianity in America." As the *Ante-Nicene Fathers* and Migne's *Patrologia* supply the main sources for students of the ancient church, a series of source books covering the history of Christianity on the American frontier might be equally valuable for students interested in this field. The project is thus admittedly of first magnitude and becomes particularly attractive when premised by an appreciation for the significance of social and cultural factors, the consideration of which will make these volumes valuable also for the non-ecclesiastical historian.

The present volume, the first of the series, deals with the Baptists since they were the first to expand into the "early frontier." The latter term is defined as "the territory between the Allegheny Mountains and the

¹ *Religion on the American Frontier*. Vol. 1, *The Baptists*. By William Warren Sweet. New York: Holt, 1931. ix+652 pages. \$5.00.

Mississippi River, from the close of the Revolution to the year 1830." The materials compiled under the editorial supervision of Professor William Warren Sweet of the University of Chicago, "represent a selection of manuscript and out-of-print sources, taken from a much larger body of scattered materials." The book falls into two parts of which Part I is called the Introduction, being more, however, than the title indicates. It consists of five chapters dealing with: "The Status of the Baptists in America at the Close of the Revolution"; "Baptist Migration and Expansion Westward"; "The Frontier Baptist Preacher and the Frontier Baptist Church"; "The Rise of the Anti-Mission Baptists"; "Anti-slavery Movements among Baptists."

The source-value of these introductory articles, which are of genuine historical merit and interest to students in this field, lies mainly in the method of documentation employed and the wealth of references to generally inaccessible materials. This, in a sense, compensates for the non-appearance of precisely such materials in the main body of the book. Additional source material is interspersed throughout the text and quite amply quoted in the footnotes—a candid admission of the difficulty encountered in achieving a uniform and comprehensive spread of the sources in the main body of the book. By this means it was also possible to marshal the materials within the framework of a topical scheme.

Part II, entitled "Documents Illustrating the Work of Baptists on the Frontier," deals exclusively with the sources themselves and contains ten chapters in which we find extracts from John Taylor's *History of Ten Baptist Churches*; the hitherto unprinted *Autobiography of Jacob Bower*, frontier preacher in Illinois and Missouri (which, incidentally, exceeds both the chronological and geographical limits set for the volume); the *Religious Experience of a Candidate for the Ministry as Related before the Church* (also the first printing of this manuscript); *Church Letters* (twenty-three in number, mostly short, but treating of various subjects); extracts from the *Records of Frontier Baptist Churches* (viz. of Severn's Valley Church, Kentucky; Boone's Creek Church, Kentucky; Beaver Creek, Kentucky; and Wood River Church, Illinois); *Records of the Forks of Elkhorn Baptist Church, Kentucky, 1800-1820* (the most complete and extended document contained in the volume); *Minutes of the Elkhorn Baptist Association, Kentucky, 1785-1805*; *Minutes of the Illinois Association of Baptists, 1807-1820*. The last two chapters contain documents and materials relating to the "Friends to Humanity" or the "Anti-slavery Baptists in Kentucky and Illinois," the "Great Western Revival," and "Baptist Missions."

It will be seen that attention is given to a wide variety of subjects.

Since, in the nature of the case, the chronological and geographical sweep of the sources is limited, the question may be raised as to whether, on the basis of this collection alone, one would be able to get a complete and correct cross-section view of the Baptists at any one period of their frontier development. The fact that some of the documents have been printed before does not detract from their present value since in almost every case they are practically inaccessible. Not least important is the bibliography with a listing of manuscript and printed source materials, works containing source materials, denominational periodicals and general works—itsself an indispensable guide to students of Baptist history. Such students, however, may have welcomed further information concerning the location of the manuscripts listed. The lack of a strictly topical arrangement of the source materials makes the Index particularly valuable and indispensable.

The claim of this book on students of American Church history is unique—although the research worker in this field will not restrict his investigations to the sources here assembled but will be stimulated to make further excursions into the rich fields indicated in the bibliography. The work does not propose to supplant the strictly documentary histories which have appeared from time to time under denominational auspices. In its featuring of materials which throw the spotlight on the actual life and work of this religious community evolving in the frontier environment this volume may be hailed as introducing a new technique for the compiling of source books.

EDEN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

CARL E. SCHNEIDER

TRENDS TOWARD A UNITED CHRISTENDOM¹

In his recent book, *Im Ringen um die Kirche*, Friedrich Heiler has gathered together a number of his essays and lectures bearing upon present-day problems affecting the church life of Europe. He discusses such matters as: current conceptions of Christ, present trends in the Catholic church, the World Conference at Lausanne, Adolf Harnack and his relation to Catholicism and Protestantism; but his real interest obviously centers in developments pointing to a return to what he terms "true Catholicism."

Heiler believes that the Lutheran church is destined to become the

¹ *Im Ringen um die Kirche*. By Friedrich Heiler. Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 1931. 568 pages. Bound M. 14; unbound M. 12.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

287

"true Catholicism."¹ "One usually regards the Anglican church as the *via media* between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism," he writes;² "but in a still greater measure can the Lutheran Church be designated the mediating church between Rome and Geneva" for three reasons: first, Lutheranism places greater emphasis upon doctrine than upon constitution; second, it has preserved the Catholic doctrine of the sacrament in purer form, as a comparison of the *Confessio Augustana* with the 39 *Articles* will reveal; third, it has preserved the liturgical tradition in purer form.

Present-day Lutheranism, however, having yielded too much to the influence of reformed puritanism, pietism, and rationalism, has forfeited its individuality, Heiler laments, and thus has really become a New Protestantism. By renewing the ecumenical Catholic Lutheranism of the *Confessio Augustana* and the old order of worship, the high-church movement aspires to bring about a renaissance of Lutheranism in its historical sense.

Yet Heiler sees that the chasm between Catholicism and Lutheranism, historically defined, and the New Protestantism is so fundamental as to defy bridging. The back-to-Catholicism tendency in German protestantism is intent upon renewing confidence in the sacraments—not merely in a symbolic sense, but in a vital, objective sense. And this is the fundamental matter which marks the parting of their ways. Their differences grow out of a divergence of Christologies. The New Protestantism, with its conception of the historic Jesus, can never enter whole-heartedly into that sacramental experience.

Heiler, apparently, means to bridge this chasm by insisting upon a recognition of what he terms the "whole Christ."

The whole Christ is the Christ as he is believed, attested, loved and glorified by the whole Church of Christ. . . . Not only the apostles are witnessed to the resurrection of Christ, but all true disciples who stand in the living procession with the risen Lord. . . . And not only Paul and John have given edifying expression to the mystery of the incarnated Son of God, but all great theologians whose thought and meditation is throbbing and resonant with humble faith. . . . And not only the attesting voice of early Christianity in the New Testament, but the entire praying and worshipping Church of the twentieth century is witness and teacher of the whole faith of Christ.³

The sentiment which Heiler voices here commends itself to the tolerant and inclusive temper of our modern age—a faith in Christ which refuses

¹ It is significant in this connection that Heiler recently left the Catholic church to become a Lutheran.

² P. 476.

³ P. 11.

to pride itself in its antiquity or its modernity, in its mystical or its practical preference, in its Catholic or its Protestant bias—an all-inclusive faith which sees Christ whole! Yet one wonders, as he ponders Heiler's thought, whether seeing Christ whole, in this sense, is seeing Christ at all. Surely Heiler cannot overlook the subjective character of this testimony which he combines to create the whole Christ. He must recognize that the "Christ of the Ages" like the Christ of the New Testament reveals, not so much empirical findings concerning Christ, as Heiler's thesis seems to imply, as it does portrayals of man's reflections about Christ and their responses to him. The Christ of each successive age appears attired in the cultural garb of its own environing mood, just as the Christ of varying contemporary creeds appears clothed in the garb of particular temperamental preferences. And bringing these several portraits into a total synthesis is hardly constructing the whole portrait of Christ in the sense of creating a more genuine likeness. At best it but syncretizes those many faiths.

Reflecting upon what apparently happened at Stockholm and at Lausanne, one is impelled to conclude that if any feasible form of Christian unity is achieved, its basis will be found not in commonality of beliefs, but in community of spirit directed toward co-operative endeavors. Reading Heiler's book, one is inclined to believe that the most reassuring evidence of the dawning of such a Christian unity is the fine, inclusive spirit which Heiler, himself, embodies and exhibits. Here is one follower of the Christ who, with discernment and devotion, is able to blend speculation about dogma with charitable, serviceful living.

CENTRAL COLLEGE
FAYETTE, MISSOURI

BERNARD E. MELAND

A THEOLOGIAN'S VIEW OF THE CHURCH

Observers of the trends in contemporary German theology cannot have failed to notice that the idea of the church is now more prominent than before. The changes which German Protestantism has undergone since the establishment of the republic are responsible for this new phase in its theology. The book under review¹ instructively presents the new attitude and deserves, therefore, close attention.

Winkler admirably describes the three main factors which have forced the church-problem upon the theologians. They are here simply named: (1) The separation of church and state. (2) The ecumenical movement

¹ *Das Wesen der Kirche mit besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer Sichtbarkeit.* By Robert Winkler. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1931. 48 pages. M. 2.20.

and in consequence thereof a renewal of discussions with and of Roman Catholicism. (3) The need of communion (*Gemeinschaft*) which dominates all movements in German social life. Perhaps one should add to these factors the struggle of the German church to make its message effective, particularly in view of the fact that the German people do not easily permit themselves to be enlisted in the services of organized religion.

We should expect that, against this concrete background, Winkler, even if he speaks as a systematic theologian, would treat of the church problem in a practical manner, addressing himself to the situation as it actually prevails. But no—he presents a learned dissertation on the values and limitations of the visible church, occasionally engaging in debates with modern writers on the subject, but mainly devoting his attention to historical theories and doctrines. He orients himself negatively to Roman Catholicism and positively to the New Testament and Luther.

It cannot be denied, of course, that it is highly illuminating to weigh the merits of the “visible” and “invisible” church and to relate the church-idea to the concept of the kingdom of God, but in the light of very pressing practical needs such a discussion appears futile. In this particular case, this impression is the more definite because Winkler presents his thesis that the church must become visible in “word,” “love,” and “organization” in such a way that, with the exception of a few casual remarks, practicable norms are not developed, although they would appear to be of service to the church in its very actual struggle.

We honor the German theologians for their academic learnedness, but we wish that they would display more of the churchman temper. Perhaps they can take such a lesson from their American brethren. American churchmen, on the other hand, may perhaps do well to learn from the German “theologians.” From this point of view Professor Winkler’s book is highly recommended to them.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

WILHELM PAUCK

THE PROSPECTS OF ROMAN CATHOLICISM

Since the birth of the nation America has given evidence of a complex on the Catholic question. The bogey of the pope’s determined and possibly sinister control of our democratic institutions has filled the hearts of many with fear and dread. Volumes have been written to prove the design. Organizations have been effected to defeat it. Rumors have ever been afloat to keep it alive in the credulous mind.

A book that should be read by all who are concerned over the question, and by all who are students of the state of religion in America, whether

Catholic or Protestant, is by John F. Moore, entitled *Will America Become Catholic?*¹ Sane, impartial, impersonal, scientific, it gives an answer which it would seem difficult to deny.

The author is interested solely in the question which forms the title of the book—not with doctrine or organization. He has confined his study almost wholly to Roman Catholic literature and to the published statistics of the federal government. In the church's own materials he finds sufficient "proof" that there is an official hope and deliberate attempt to capture America. But that is only in keeping with the historic ideals and temporal claims of the ancient church.

However, from this same literature he finds that the church admits defeat in its effort and secretly confesses the task impossible. The whole tenor of the country is against it. That immigration which heretofore has been the great source of Catholic growth has been greatly reduced. Present increase of population comes from the rural sections not the urban which are the centers of Catholic strength. Social practices, such as birth control, are adopted by Catholics in spite of ecclesiastical protest and condemnation. Mixed marriages to an alarming extent result in a loss to the church. Few indeed are the converts from Protestantism to Catholicism; and the church has not yet been able to adjust itself to the race question, especially that of the negroes, as efficiently as have the Protestant groups.

All this and much similar, from the church's own confessions, would indicate that the author is correct in his conclusion that there is no need to fear a Catholic America. And, above all, there will doubtless be universal agreement with his final statement:

"The issue today is not whether America is to be made Catholic but whether America, Protestant or Catholic, is to be made Christian. That is the task."

R. E. E. HARKNESS

CROZER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

CHANGING SOCIAL PATTERNS AND THE IDEA OF GOD

Dean Shailer Mathews, in the volume under review,² has again placed the student of the history of religion as well as the theologian in his debt. The work is primarily historical in character, aiming to show how the idea of God has developed in Western civilization; at the same time, the

¹ *Will America Become Catholic?* By John F. Moore. New York: Harper, 1931. x+252 pages. \$2.00.

² *The Growth of the Idea of God.* By Shailer Mathews. New York: Macmillan, 1931. xiii+237 pages. \$2.50.

work is highly contemporary in its significance and culminating positions. In method and approach one is constantly reminded of the author's recent discussion of *The Atonement and the Social Process*. The view common to these two works is that the doctrines of religion are of social origin and conditioned throughout their history by changes in social patterns. The sociological and historical approach to religion is thus valued above the speculative.

Science, like religion, is dependent upon the social life for its patterns, and both science and religion make a functional use of such patterns. When the social order changes, the patterns are outmoded. Thus the idea of God has passed from pattern to pattern. It was fresh social experiences rather than metaphysics which expanded the Hebrew notion of deity. The contribution of Jesus lay rather in the church's use of his person than in what he himself taught. Hellenism gave the changing structure a quasi-philosophical basis, for Christian monotheism blended Hebrew and Aryan strains, through the interaction of groups and individuals along the lines of commerce and trade from Augustus to Constantine. Thus became possible the familiar analogy back of the three persons of the Trinity (*persona* being borrowed from the drama and meaning the actor's disguise or mask): Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the three *personae* of the God-substance—though at heart Christian faith in God adhered still to the pattern of paternity. From Augustine on we find three aspects: the metaphysical, centering in the Trinity; the political, emphasizing sovereignty; the experimental, God's grace made available through the church practices. But God was set forth mainly on the imperial Western pattern of sovereignty. By the end of the Middle Ages, the idea of God was symmetrically organized in the terms which Western theology employs to this day. Lutheranism, Calvinism, evangelicalism, retained the sovereign-creditor conception. The nineteenth century stressed the divine love; God was defined as spirit, but romanticized, since accepted patterns no longer functioned effectively. Evolution was incompatible with the conventional notion of God; and, at the present time, philosophy, the physical, biological, and social sciences, are creating new patterns. They all ignore the God of the theologian.

For humanism, the gods are dead; there remain social values, social needs, scientific improvement. Yet humanism is capable of leading to something more definitely religious, if it follows out the implications of the total relationship in which men live. Scientific knowledge is the point of departure for the reconstruction of the God-idea: the newer patterns will derive, not from politics, but from science. Yet a pattern must be found which will express the equivalent of the earlier values. The current reli-

gious problem is that of setting up help-gaining relations with the cosmic activities which produce and foster personality; these activities we must conceive in a personal pattern. The existence of personality-producing activities can alone account for man. If the conception of spirit no longer has place in our psychology, we must turn to that of the living organism. In our choice of a pattern, we must keep to the frontier of our knowledge of psychology and be true to our understanding of the cosmos. Hence the pattern used will not be sharply defined. For practical purposes, indeed, we may use the old analogies, if we like. While man must struggle scientifically with the non-personal elements of the universe, he can be sure that he is not dependent solely upon his own efforts. The total process in which men are involved is toward personal values. An exact definition of God is less basic than a directed adjustment to those cosmic activities which the word God represents.

If, as Dean Mathews suggests, "God is our conception, born of social experience, of the personality-evolving and personally responsive elements in our cosmic environment with which we are organically related," it would seem that we ought to get on with God quite as well as we get on with ourselves. Current psychology is far from agreement as to what we are, but for practical purposes we know pretty well. Yet theology is not to be blamed for wishing to be "scientific." Only, she will always find that religion is aware of aspects of reality upon which scientific formulas seem to sit but loosely.

COLGATE-ROCHESTER DIVINITY SCHOOL

HENRY B. ROBINS

RELIGION AS KNOWLEDGE AND AS LOVE

The Dilemma of Religious Knowledge,¹ as represented by Professor Bennett, is this: Religion has a peculiar kind of knowledge, not found elsewhere; but as soon as it tries to state what this knowledge is, the knowledge proves to be indefensible in rational terms. Nevertheless, it is genuine knowledge, insists Professor Bennett.

Take, for example, immortality. Professor Bennett says that religion has a literal and certain knowledge of immortality. He rightly rejects, as dishonest evasions, all attempts to interpret immortality as meaning continued influence of one's life after death, or the "experience of eternity" in the sense of something so entrancing that one loses all sense of time, or the cognition of eternal truth. None of these is what religion has meant

¹ *The Dilemma of Religious Knowledge*. By Charles A. Bennett. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931. 126 pages. \$2.00.

when it claimed to know about immortality. It has meant the continued existence of the individual after death.

But if the individual continues as the same individual, he must have a continuation of the same interests, such as a poet continuing to write poetry, and the like. But that would be impossible unless the world after death is very much a mere continuation of the kind of world we have here; and such a continuation is not what religion wants or claims to know. Then take the other alternative. If the individual does not have the same interests, he is not the same individual. Thus the dilemma. Similar inconsistencies can be exposed in all the other claims to knowledge which religion makes, so far as it claims to know what cannot be known outside of religion.

Professor Bennett, apparently, is not discouraged nor skeptical about this claim to peculiar knowledge which religion makes. He simply says that here is a problem which philosophy of religion must somehow solve. He writes: "There seem to be two worlds, that of nature and that of supernature; we find ourselves alternately now in one, now in the other, but the transition in either direction eludes us."

We believe Professor Bennett has himself demonstrated the falsity of the thesis he wants to defend. The honesty of his reasoning does him great credit, even though it lands him where he does not want to go. It is unfortunate, however, that he speaks constantly of religion, instead of the religious man. Religion in the abstract cannot know anything whatsoever. Only this particular religious man, and that one, can know anything at all. So let us start our criticism with the religious man rather than with religion.

Does a man first get this peculiar knowledge of supernature, and then become religious by reason of it? Or does his religiousness endow him with such knowledge? This important issue does not come within the purview of Professor Bennett, because he constantly speaks of religion instead of the religious man. If knowledge comes first, engendering religion, then religion depends solely upon knowledge. Furthermore, it is a knowledge which no one can get by his own efforts. Such a purely cognitive and arbitrary basis of religiousness in man would be defended by few. Then let us take the other alternative. A man is first religious, and then acquires this strange kind of knowledge. But does he? We deny it; and every effort to defend the claim, that he has it, founders on self-contradiction, as Professor Bennett makes plain.

Our correction of Professor Bennett's view of religion would run something like this. What the religious man knows is what everybody else knows, who thinks on the matter at all. These are two facts. First, there

is some actuality, whether one or many, personal or impersonal, which carries highest possibilities of value, and therefore is more precious than all else and worthy of our utmost regard.*Second, this actuality is very imperfectly known to us, supposing we know anything at all beyond the mere fact that it is. But these two items would not make anybody religious. Hence, while this knowledge is indispensable to religion, it is not peculiar to religion and does not constitute religion.

What makes a man religious is not the knowledge that there is such an actuality and the realization that it is mysterious. What makes him religious is the fact that this actuality becomes for him, what it ought to be for everyone, the object of supreme concern. This supreme concern may assume the form of fear or awe and reverence or love and loyalty or passionate seeking after more knowledge of it or passionate reconstruction of the world in its behalf. How he reacts to it, will depend on what he believes about it. But these beliefs are not what make him religious. They only give form and character to his religion. What makes him religious is the fact that the ruling interest of his life is that which should be the object of supreme devotion for all man, namely, that actuality, whatever its nature, and however mysterious, which carries the highest possibilities of value that there are.

What makes a man religious is not his superior knowledge but his love and devotion to God even while he may know exceedingly little about *what* God is, only knowing, what all men know, *that* God is, in the sense of that actuality which carries highest values. He may have a great arsenal of beliefs about this actuality or he may not. But his beliefs do not constitute knowledge except when, and in so far as, they are supported by observation and reason. He may have more knowledge about God than others simply because he is more deeply interested and seeks more earnestly. But there is nothing in such knowledge which another might not have if he was equally endowed, equally interested, and equally earnest.

We grieve that Professor Bennett no longer lives. We honor and respect his memory even when we criticize. Our criticism is actuated by the same loyalty that dominated his life, and we offer it to serve the cause that was dearest to his heart—the clarification and promotion of the highest religion.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN

THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO THEOLOGY

In his recent volume, *Theism and the Modern Mood*, Professor Horton indicated his general theological position. The work under review,¹ while it elaborates the theistic argument of the earlier essay, is more than a mere sequel to the former volume.

Theology, we are told, though she may never again become "queen of the sciences," should at any rate win recognition as custodian of the general body of human wisdom. This she cannot do except as she becomes contemporary, through periodical stock-taking and renovation. Her central interest is really in the question how personality may be unified, energized, and directed to worthwhile ends. Such being the case, the most direct of all practicable approaches to theology—and there are other approaches, notably the sociological—is that to be attained through psychology. Accordingly, an attempt is made in this volume to approach the problems of religious thought from a consistently psychological point of view.

Beginning, in the first part, with a discussion of religion and personal development, the author endeavors to keep close to the assured "results" of psychology. He rightly contends that original human nature is equally misrepresented by Calvinistic pessimism and romantic optimism. But sin and salvation remain chief problems, so that religion becomes, as viewed from this angle, an integral part of the mental hygiene movement. It is argued that the gospel of salvation by education is unsupported by substantial accomplishments. "Love, working through psychological technique, is the way of salvation for society." There is more to be hoped for, we are told, from a slow and continuous liberalizing of evangelical Protestantism than from religious education and the social gospel.

The second part of the book deals with Christianity and personal development. Both Jesus and Christianity must submit to the test of what they actually do for human personalities. Yet a distinction must be made between Jesus and the Living Christ. Modern historical research presents the former, whose friends have wrapped him in a tissue of pious legend and theological speculation. Even though the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement have made the existence of the good God credible and tangibly real, the heart of Christianity is to be found in the experience of the Living Christ, who is immediately accessible as the historic Jesus is not. Liberal Christianity lacks the sense of his presence, the most vital

¹ *A Psychological Approach to Theology*. By Walter Marshall Horton. New York: Harper, 1931. xx+279 pages. \$2.50.

form in which the experience of God comes to us. This experience, so far from being illusory, rests back upon actual contact, past or present, with Christian tradition and the Christian spirit. "Christ's real presence is primarily to be found in the individual and corporate life of Christlike people." Mr. Horton would admit, however, that the Living Buddha has done for the East very much the same service that the Living Christ has done for the West. That is to say, the Living Christ is "the eternal Logos, who embraces in the unity of one magnificent concept all the healing, enlightening, personality-building forces which have ever enriched the life of humanity in any quarter of the globe."

In the last part of the work, which deals with the "ultimate Source and Goal of personal development," we are assured that religion is solidly grounded in objective reality, though the exact nature of the Divine, whether one or many, personal or impersonal, must remain hypothetical. Even in private worship, where the impression of subjectivity is strongest, the ends of worship are won only as the worshiper yields his own self-sufficiency "and reached out humbly for aid into a genuinely objective Beyond"—the God of nature, of society, and of the inner life. However certain we may be of that reality, in our attempt at exact conception, we pass from the realm of fact to the realm of hypothesis. God is a sort of spiritual overtone of all our significant social, ethical, and mystical experiences. There is, as we mature in life, a recession of the stimulus, yet "the later and wider responses of the organism reveal more of the stimulus than the earlier and grosser responses." Can that which has lifted life to its high status through these responses be less than "a purposive, intelligent, personal Life, in which the human purpose and intelligence and personality are organic parts"? The affirmation of immortality is "the last and boldest corollary of faith in God."

Such, in brief outline, is the trend of the argument. That Professor Horton has produced a thought-provoking and stimulating essay in this most interesting field, there can be no doubt. It is a daring thing to generalize the "assured results" of psychology, though one can perhaps by faith visualize the dim outlines of a psychology-to-be which shall reconcile the values of behaviorism, the Gestalt, Freudianism, the functional and dynamic points of view, to mention no others. But of "assured results," what have we, if we pass beyond the barest physiological outlines of the science? Does psychology generally warrant the view that "sin" is the basic fact about human nature? Does not contemporary education assume psychologically that an adequate social and educational technique, an adequate social prophylaxis, if you will, would dispose of both "sin" and "salvation," in the conventional meaning of these terms? Is "the

cure of souls" rather than the prevention of the disease called sin the main interest of religion? Even though it is argued that the gospel of salvation by education is unsupported by substantial result, is not the American public school system an instance, and a chief instance, of "love working through psychological technique"? When it comes to the view of the Living Christ advanced in the second part, why is this divine Logos called "Christ" at all, since it must include, by the author's admission, the Living Buddha, and, by the same token, the Living Confucius, the Living Mohammed, and every other elevating personality and influence in the history of religion? Even if the historic Jesus is difficult to come upon, has the Synoptic Jesus little to contribute to the aspiring life of religion in our day? Is he unavailable, while the diffused and mystical Living Christ portrayed is immediately accessible? These are some of the questions which occur to one who reads this stimulating argument. What the assured results of psychology can contribute to their answer perhaps remains to be determined.

HENRY B. ROBINS

COLGATE-ROCHESTER DIVINITY SCHOOL

RELIGION ON THE RADIO¹

It is a tribute to the British Broadcasting Company and to the British public that so serious and penetrating a discussion of religion could be broadcast as is contained in this symposium. The series of twelve weekly addresses is significant for several reasons: it is singularly free from the mutual backslapping of preachers and pious scientists; it contains very genuine differences of opinion, even strongly adverse mutual criticism, always expressed in a spirit of dignified and friendly discussion; it is shot through with a humor that frees it from the dulness or the asperity which seem the only alternatives in so many debates of this sort; and the various contributors to the series have had liberty to express their personal conclusions as uncompromisingly as they pleased.

Accordingly, the honest differences of very honest men here appear in clear-cut fashion: Professor Malinowski is as frank to state his agnosticism tempered by his regret that religion cannot satisfy his emotional needs as Father O'Hara is to insist upon revealed religion's independence of modern scientific doubts. Principal Jacks informs his radio audience that Professor S. Alexander's Deity gives him cold comfort; and Dean Inge opines that "phrases like 'emergent evolution' only cover up an attempt to assert and deny change in the same breath," while Julian

¹ *Science and Religion*. A symposium. New York: Scribner, 1931. 172 pages. \$1.75.

Huxley insists that the knowledge of the religious man must come through science, and Sir Arthur Eddington repeats his familiar idea that scientific knowledge is really mathematical mythology.

Additional value accrues to the book from the cross-references between the essays, each writer having had opportunity to read the others. Here is a book to stimulate discussion in an undergraduate group, an adult class in church, or a ministers' club. If the issues it raises are threshed out, the deepest problems will be probed.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

EDWIN EWART AUBREY

STUDIES IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

This series of studies¹ is probably the most invaluable tool-book that has appeared in the field of scientific religious education in recent years. It is not a work that will tell the specialist in religious education much that he is not already familiar with, but it will provide him with an easily available summary of viewpoints and techniques that will prove very serviceable. As for the layman the book will make him at once humble and eager or else very despondent; humble and eager in that it will convince him of the vastness of the field to be mastered and eager to strengthen his qualifications for religious educational service, or else it will fill him with a sense of his own utter unfitness and unpreparedness.

It is scarcely to be expected in a series of twenty-nine studies, each by an expert in his own particular department, that the resultant compilation will be notable for unity. When due allowance is made for this fact, one feels strongly that the all-pervading spirit of frankness and candor, the catholicity of view and comprehensiveness of treatment, do much to offset an inevitable lack of unity.

An outstanding merit of the book as a whole is that it steers an even course between extremes of viewpoint. Professor Harkness strikes no uncertain note in contending for the maintenance of a theistic view of the universe as against current more or less popular naturalistic interpretations. On the other hand, Professor Chave stresses a functional as against a theological approach to the problems of religious education.

One is disposed to wonder after reading Professor Bower's now familiar construction of curriculum content in terms of creative experience whether or not he would concur in the statement of aims and objectives which, as they are laid down by Professor Fiske and Dr. Vieth, are distinctly Christ-centered.

¹ *Studies in Religious Education*. By Philip H. Lotz (ed.) and L. W. Crawford (co-ed.). Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931. xxix+689 pages. \$3.50.

The religious educationalist who is at once a devout bibliophile and conventional in his procedures will not extract much comfort from the dictum that "the religious level is not reached by labeling it religious." On the other hand, a timely warning is uttered against the contemporary tendency to pin complete faith to a secular program of moral or character education as a substitute for religious education properly so-called.

Particularly valuable is the inclusion of such chapters as that of Professor Boyer on "Religion in the Church College" and that of Dr. Culbreth on "Religious Education in Tax-supported Institutions of Higher Learning," which convey a trustworthy appraisal of the issues involved. It is gratifying to know of the steadily growing interest of the church in the religious life of state institutions of higher learning. Perhaps we shall have to revise our view of the prevailing agnosticism and materialism of our state institutions! It may be also that the average "small college" would do well to rethink the matter of what makes a college truly religious!

The newer activity in the field of attitude and behavior tests and scales is given due emphasis. Indeed it would be difficult to think of any single interest directly or indirectly related to religious education that is not treated in this compend of materials. The utility of the work is further strengthened by the inclusion of Suggestions for Further Study and a Selected Bibliography at the close of each chapter, as also by a comprehensive Directory of Agencies and a complete Bibliography of Religious Education at the conclusion.

Noted are three typographical errors: "Though" for "Thought" on page 74, "spoilation" on page 411, and "opportnity" on page 460.

The chief value of this work will be as a book of reference; it will not help much in the solution of specific teaching problems, but as a work of general reference and supplement to monographs and articles on individual aspects of religious education as a whole it cannot but prove invaluable.

KANSAS WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

JOHN S. CORNETT

RELIGION IN UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES

An engaging theme in educational circles today is religion in higher education. This book¹ responding to that interest grows out of the third triennial Conference of Church Workers in Universities and Colleges and

¹ *Religion in Higher Education*. By Milton C. Towner (ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. 327 pages. \$3.00.

contains the principal addresses read to that body when it met in Chicago, December 30, 1930—January 2, 1931. The editor, Dr. Milton C. Towner, as president of the Conference, was largely responsible for the program and is very appropriately the editor of this volume, in which he includes two addresses given elsewhere—one by R. R. Wicks of Princeton on "The Reality of Moral Obligation" and the other by George A. Coe on "Intellectual Righteousness or Let Us Be Intelligent." Dean Shailer Mathews and Frederick J. Kelly have written introductions for the book.

It is not often that the introduction to a book says anything significant. Such introductions are usually mere perfunctoriness. But Dean Mathews utilizes his opportunity in his Introduction to say something worth while. In his opening sentence he asserts that "religion in a university or college must be the expression of institutional life." Here is a fresh, vigorous, new idea, which Chicago, Princeton, Yale, Harvard, Duke, Colorado College among the smaller colleges, and others are endeavoring to actualize on their campuses by organizing their religious life around great cathedral chapels erected or in the process of erection—an idea that bids fair to revolutionize the religious life of institutions of higher learning. In due process of time when this idea shall have borne its perfect fruit, these institutions will cease to be the battleground of warring sects and no longer will they be objects of extraneous evangelization programs for their salvation. As Dean Mathews sees it, colleges and universities must give organic expression to the religious values inhering in their situations, and in so doing they will build character in their faculty and students and send forth workers of righteousness to reconstruct the Great Society. It is an alluring challenge. Let us hope that some national body of religious workers will ere long build a program around this idea and so explore the colleges and universities as situations in which inhere ample character-building resources and suggest practical measures for making them functional in institutional and student life.

Dr. Towner, however, built his program on a different basis. Three objectives are specifically stated: (1) to state as clearly as possible the reality of the spiritual; (2) to discover current trends in scientific and social thought; and (3) to present the practical approaches that are now being made to the general problem of religion in higher education. After experts have in each instance presented the findings in their several fields, a summary statement should be made by another expert in behalf of the Conference.

Rufus M. Jones, the Quaker philosophical mystic, was assigned the task of introducing the Conference to the reality of the spiritual, which he found in personal experience. His address and that of William P. Lemon

CRITICAL REVIEWS

301

witnessed eloquently to spiritual reality and gave the Conference a becoming orientation for its later discussions.

Professor Edward S. Conklin, psychologist, Professor Charles A. Ellwood, social scientist, and W. C. D. Dampier-Whetham, physicist, presented the trends in their respective fields and related them to religion. The summarizing address on thought trends and religion was given by Dean Charles W. Gilkey, who reminded the Conference that religion is ultimately a call to creative adventure. One closes the reading of this section with the conviction that modern thought in the scientific realm is undergirding rather than undercutting religion. It is gratifying, for example, to know that physics now lends its support to the freedom of the will and finds a place in the universe for moral responsibility—fundamental tenets of religion, cherished despite seeming negative conclusions of science as formerly conceived. It is also gratifying to have social scientists and psychologists depict for us the healing and restorative possibilities and values resident in human nature and to chart the pathway of future progress—tenets also cherished by religion and now happily given highest scientific support.

Two-thirds of the volume are assigned to what is being done in the field of religion and how the several agencies and their agents are doing it. The contributions made by the major religious groups—Protestants, Catholics, and Jews—separately and unitedly are set forth. The work of college preachers, university pastors, professional teachers of religion, directors of religious life and of social service, and the secretaries of the Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. is described, together with exposition of the professional training they will require. The co-operative religious work of typical university centers is ably presented by experts. What this section, comprising the bulk of the book, says, has, for the most part, been said again and again, but nowhere so well as in this volume. Here is a photograph, not a portrait, of our best present practice and it is far from a discouraging picture. The colleges and universities evidently sense their religious opportunities and they are alert to grasp them. Professional workers in the field of religion will be especially rewarded by studying Professor Bower's major for the religious culture of undergraduates and by Professor Aubrey's description of the preparation necessary for the effective professional teacher of religion. Noteworthy, too, is Professor Shedd's scientific demonstration that the work of the university pastor and of the Christian Association secretary is the same and requires the same preparation. What this involves for the future of these professions presents a problem for serious thought. It may mean the disappearance of the Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. from the university, as at Pennsylvania.

One seriously misses in this volume the clear recognition of certain implications that inhere in the obligation of these institutions of higher learning to their supporting constituencies. These institutions are not isolated groups, but part and parcel of the on-going process we call civilization. They must not only develop their students culturally in the religious field but they must motivate them to be social and religious engineers, no matter what their vocational interests may be. And so they must not only prepare persons to be professional teachers of religion but they have a real obligation, as well, to prepare others, the vast majority, to be workers avocationally in social and spiritual reconstruction. Professor Bower senses this latter need, but does not enlarge upon it.

Much yet remains to be done before we have an adequate philosophy of religion in higher education. We need to know what are the religious values inherent in the college and university situation, how to bring them to consciousness, how to make them functional in life. Before we can do this we must reconstruct, reattitudinize our administrations (including boards of trustees), our faculties, our departments of finance and personnel work, the alumni, and also the communities in which these institutions are located. In addition, we must discover the values for character-building inherent in the various provisions and agencies for serving the life of students whether institutionally controlled or voluntary or co-operative, such as fraternities, religious groupings, publications, athletics, etc., and institute methods to make them positively functional. And so we wait for a conference or a book or an experiment in higher education that will begin with the college or university where it is and demonstrate how to make of such an institution a character-building agency by the utilization of its own inherent religious values, as Dean Mathews so pointedly suggests.

This book is a milepost pointing in that direction and as such it merits the thoughtful consideration of all who are interested in religion in higher education.

ELON COLLEGE

W. A. HARPER

HUMANISM—ANOTHER BATTLE LINE!

Not since the early days of the Trinitarian Unitarian controversy has there been such marshaling of forces as are now assembled along the new battle line—the theist-humanist controversy. True, it is a bit difficult to find out where the line runs. There are varieties of both theism and humanism. And besides there are persons who claim to stand on both sides of the line.

Already the theists have discovered that the fighting edge is gone from the old theism, and that their theology must be completely overhauled. The process of overhauling is proceeding apace, and there are those who say that so much has already been conceded that nothing of special theistic import is left. When the theists reduce God to "a phase of the behaviour of the universe," or "the personality evolving forces of the enviroing situation," or "the order of greatest possibility," but without the cosmic guaranty of human values, we are witnessing the beginning of the end.

On the other hand humanism also is in for an overhauling. Efforts are being made to integrate humanist attitudes into an organic whole, supported by a world-view, and made effective in a planned world-order.

Meanwhile, the literature on the subject increases.

Humanism—Another Battle Line! edited by William Peter King,¹ is a co-operative volume by such well-known scholars as Shailer Mathews, D. C. Macintosh, Lynn H. Hough, J. W. Buckham, and others. On the whole the volume is temperate and friendly. There is some lack of familiarity with the humanist position, as when reference is made to "the materialistic implications of Humanism." Humanists long ago announced the death of materialism, along with that of spiritism.

One of the most able, as well as one of the most disappointing, chapters in the work is that by Dean Mathews, who really faces the issues and attempts to deal seriously with them. His handling of the subject, however, is vitiated from the very start by a false assumption, viz., that humanism deals with man in only his social environment, that it leaves "humanity in a cosmic vacuum." Quite the contrary is true. Humanists have insisted that whereas theism considers man chiefly in relation to a supposititious spiritual environment, humanism deals with man in his total enviroing situation. Owing, however, to man's lack of knowledge of the total situation, and while searching for greater knowledge, the humanist is less willing than the theist to make affirmations about the unknown.

Dr. Mathews deals also with two other fundamental problems, viz., "religion" and "God." He believes that religion historically described is not "the co-operative search for the good life" but rather "the search for aid in getting something better than what men had or feared." "Primitive religion was not a search for ideals but a technique for obtaining super-human help in satisfying specific needs." What Dr. Mathews fails to see is that the essential thing is the effort to find satisfaction and that

¹ *Humanism—Another Battle Line!* By William Peter King (ed.). Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931. 298 pages. \$2.25.

the technique is subject to change. The term "God" is functional. "It is a conceptual word which we use in our psychological processes to set up personal relationship with forces and activities of the universe." So far as I can make out, the real God, as distinguished from the term "God," is "the personality-producing activities of the cosmos." It seems to be assumed that the appearance of human personality argues for personality resident in the universe and capable of producing human personality. There is no effort to find any other possible explanation. Creative synthesis is not explored; and there is no indication that Dr. Mathews considers that personality might not, after all, be the highest form of being.

The difference between a modern theist and a modern humanist is that the theist insists on the cosmic validity of human values, while the humanist regards human values as self-validating. The humanist does not as a rule use the term "God" because he believes that historically it has connoted cosmic guaranty. He uses the term "religion" because he believes that historically it has connoted the human effort to find a satisfactory life.

Mr. King rightly locates Ames and Wieman on the humanist side of the line. The difference today between the position of these men and also of most of the contributors to this volume, on the one hand, and that of the orthodox theist, on the other, is far greater than that between their position and that of the humanist.

What one really misses in this work is a thoroughgoing orderly arraignment of humanism, and a unified statement of the essentials of theism. There is too much fraternizing with the "foe" to justify the title. Upon laying the book down the reader has the feeling that after all the battle line is in fact a tea party.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

CURTIS W. REESE

GOD AND MAMMON

God and Mammon by J. A. Hobson¹ is a little book of four chapters dealing with the interaction between the idealisms born of religion and the urgent economic interests of any given time, in the development of civilization. The book is broken up under specific headings as follows: "Economics in Primitive Religions"; "Catholicism and Economic Life"; "Protestantism and Business"; "Modern Economic Movements." Primitive-

¹ *God and Mammon*. By J. A. Hobson. New York: Macmillan, 1931. 58 pages. \$1.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

305

tive society enriched the priest to gain increase in herds, crops, or health. If he failed by his professed technique of magic, either he was killed or his god was attacked, or both. Catholicism grew rich and potent by capitalizing purgatory and selling the right to sin. Avarice constantly sterilized the high profession of its theories which were invariably above its practices. Protestantism identified righteousness with good fortune, a holy life with a prosperous existence; it elevated the economic virtues into qualities of Christian character; it supplied sobriety, thrift, self-control, abstemiousness, and industry—the very qualities growing capitalism needed and for which it rewarded Protestantism amply. Luther, Calvin, and Wesley are alike guilty. Luther spoke from an agrarian, Calvin from an urban, experience. Wesley did revolt, personally, from a too complacent acquiescence in the mysticism of a success-religion, but he was not heeded. The Quakers, perhaps, came off better because they were, at the outset, of the very humblest origin. Today the prevailing attitude among many Christians is that of the economists, viz., that the economic field is subject to scientific laws that will not bow before ethical considerations, or as Sir Josiah Stamp puts it: “whatever is economically inevitable cannot be morally wrong, for where there is no choice or avoidance there is no moral issue.”

Hobson is frankly in despair of the church. Wistfully, he reminds us that the saints will never be forgotten. There is an inevitable trend to asceticism in human nature. Meanwhile, in America, he thinks God and Mammon are completely reconciled. Says the American millionaire in one of Joseph Hergesheimer's novels, “Christian principles and American conceptions of business have put us where we are.”

This is a racy little book, deeply indebted to Tawney for its argument, though availing itself of abundant other sources. It leaves one still wondering whether a rising middle class from the Middle Ages onward created interests that shaped up our religious attitudes or whether our religious interests dictated the attitudes of the middle class. One gets the impression that Hobson, like most writers in this field, thinks of “prophetic religion” in terms of the identification of religion with the interests of the humble, the meek, and the helpless. In other words, the class not yet come to power. Certainly, historically, religion has grown imposing when it cast in its lot with that class which was on its way to power. If now it is to transfer its loyalty to the class not yet come to power, it will find itself in opposition to the dominant class, but only until the class with whom it has cast its lot comes into power. This, then, seems the paradox of history: religion to commend itself to the enlightened conscience of a

writer like Hobson must, of necessity, fight the battles of the underprivileged, thereby making them the privileged, or so it seems, and finds itself again embarrassed by being identified at last with the powerful.

PLYMOUTH CHURCH OF SHAKER HEIGHTS
CLEVELAND, OHIO

MILES H. KRUMBINE

NEW HOME MISSION STUDY BOOKS

The agencies promoting the study of missions in the churches have learned how to produce study books, rich in human interest. Six new home mission books have come to hand, all of them written in a manner that easily holds attention. Three deal with rural life. One¹ portrays the lives of country people in America—pioneers in the stump country of Wisconsin, dairy farmers in Illinois, cantaloupe pickers in California, negro tenants on the cotton plantations of Mississippi, and others—and tells the story of some helpful service rendered in each case. Another² deals with rural billion of the earth's population, the world around, and sounds the solemn warning: "The ruins of dead cities and decadent states bear mute witness to the truth that civilization neglects at its peril those springs of population that flourish on the lonely mountainsides and in isolated valleys and amid the prairie grass." And still another³ is a child's story, charmingly written, and intended to widen the horizons of American children to include a view into the lives of country children in all parts of the earth.

A fourth book⁴ deals mainly with rural conditions but is primarily concerned with one class of workers—the migrants. The Christian social service program of the Council of Women for Home Missions among this most neglected class is described, with large reference to actual incidents of the work vividly portrayed.

The total task of the home mission enterprise is surveyed in the fifth book⁵ in our list—the work of the pioneers who labored as the frontiers

¹ *The Adventures of Mr. Friend*. By Harold B. Hunting. New York: Friendship Press, 1931. viii+130 pages. \$1.00.

² *The Rural Billion*. By Charles M. McConnell. New York: Friendship Press, 1931. viii+171 pages. \$1.00.

³ *The World on a Farm*. By Gertrude Chandler Warner. New York: Friendship Press, 1931. 83 pages. \$1.00.

⁴ *Roving with the Migrants*. By Adela J. Ballard. New York: Council of Women for Home Missions and Missionary Education Movement, 1931. 95 pages. Paper \$0.50.

⁵ *God and the Census*. By Robert N. McLean. New York: Council of Women for Missions and the Missionary Education Movement, 1931. xii+164 pages. \$1.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

307

were pushed westward; the present problems of "overlapping and overlooking" which this pioneer age has bequeathed to the present; the urgent problems related to education, racial antagonism, social justice, etc., which must now be dealt with. And all this discussed not in abstract terms but with realistic portrayal of actual situations.

And the sixth¹ is a different kind of home mission study book. It is an exposition of a conception of home missions as something much more profound than mere church extension; its objective is seen to be nothing less than the Christianizing of America in all areas of life, and this in a time of cataclysmic social change. Incidentally the author, a former general secretary of the Federal Council of Churches, outlines a formula for the federal unity of the churches which is of more than passing interest.

CHARLES T. HOLMAN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

¹ *The Challenge of Change*. By John Milton Moore. New York: Council of Women for Home Missions and the Missionary Education Movement, 1931. xi+204 pages. \$1.00.

RECENT BOOKS

HISTORY OF RELIGION

ABBOTT, JUSTIN E. *Tukārām: Translation from Mahipati's Bhaktalīlāmṛita*. "The Poet-Saints of Maharashtra," No. 7. Address author, Summit, New Jersey, 1930. \$1.25.

Dr. Abbott's translation of Mahipati's life of Tukaram, the poet-saint of the Marathi land, is much to be welcomed. Tukaram, whose generally accepted dates are 1608-49, was a native of Dehu, a small town near Poona, in the Deccan in the center of the Marathi country. The religion he taught was a form of Vaisnavism with a strong mystic tinge. As such, it belonged definitely to the Bhakti group—that is, it considered whole-hearted devotion to the Deity the most essential thing for salvation and relegated the usual rites and observances of Hinduism to a somewhat secondary place. It is also important to remember that Tukaram's teaching was quite free from the sensual elements which play so prevalent a rôle in the Krishna-Radha cults. The faith of the Marathi saint was very simple, yet pure and noble. Born in a family belonging to the Sudra caste, and by profession a village merchant, Tukaram early felt the urge of devoting himself entirely to the worship of Vishnu; and this resolution he carried out in spite of numerous obstacles. Because of the doctrine he taught and his low-caste descent, Tukaram was bitterly hated by the Brahmans, who repeatedly subjected him to persecution. Yet his simple Kirtans—religious services at which he recited his hymns—appealed profoundly to the Marathi people. According to tradition, even Sivaji, the great Marathi leader, who has been made a national hero by Hindu patriots, visited him and bestowed generous gifts on him. Whether this be true or not, it is, at any rate, certain that the teachings of Tukaram were well known to Sivaji. Dr. Abbott's translation makes available to serious students of Indian religion and civilization source material of great importance.

Atti della Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Serie Sesta, Vol. VI. Rome: Giovanni Bardi, 1930. 271-417 pages, 18 plates. Whole volume, 120 L.

After more than three hundred years of scientific activity in the field of archaeological research, the Italian *Accademia dei Lincei* is continuing to produce weighty reports of field work. This volume summarizes the finds of the year 1930. Three aspects of the work are impressive: the systematic and comprehensive manner in which archaeological research is organized in Italy today, the completeness of the formulated reports, and the importance of the finds that are still coming to light.

DAWSON, MILES MENANDER. *The Ethical Religion of Zoroaster*. New York: Macmillan, 1931. xix+271 pages. \$2.25.

This volume of thirty-three chapters consists chiefly of texts, selected without historical discrimination, from the sacred literature of Zoroastrianism. The author endeavors to convince the reader that Persia's ancient religion is the supreme thrust of individual and social ethics. His argument, based on "authoritative" scripture, is

RECENT BOOKS

309

feebly supported by quotations from partisan devotees of the religion. Parallels are drawn between Zoroastrian and Jewish-Christian teachings; and the ideas expressed are those common to all culture religions. This book may possess emotional value for followers of Zoroaster, but, through its lack of social setting, it will not realize the author's hope that it will be "a genuine and important contribution to the study of comparative ethics."

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITIC STUDIES

TILL, WALTER. *Koptische Dialektgrammatik*. Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1931. xv+139 pages. M. 8.50.

Previous Coptic grammars have followed the rule of treating one dialect, generally the Saidic, as the basis of the language. This one takes the different dialects (Saidic, Akmimic, Subakmimic, Fayyumic and Boharic) together. Extracts for reading in the Chrestomathy at the end of the book are in two or more dialects. In a small volume the author presents an astonishingly large amount of grammatical material and offers an excellent textbook for beginners.

Yearbook Central Conference of American Rabbis, 1931, Vol. XLI, Forty-second Annual Convention, June 17-21, 1931. Wawasee, Indiana. Edited by Isaac E. Marcuson. 531 pages. \$2.00.

The yearbook contains, as usual, the complete proceedings of the annual session (which was held this year at Wawasee, Indiana) and the papers delivered before the assembly. Among these papers are a symposium on "The Debacle of Religion in Russia," "Currents in Jewish Religious Thought," and "The Nature and Scope of Jewish Theology."

Copies of this yearbook may be procured from Rabbi Marcuson, Macon, Georgia.

NEW TESTAMENT

GLOVER, T. R. *The World of the New Testament*. New York: Macmillan, 1931. 233 pages. \$2.00.

The notes of lectures given in various American educational centers in 1930 are here definitely composed in very readable literary form. In general, the author's purpose is to help the New Testament student to realize more vividly the social life of the Graeco-Roman world into which early Christianity emerged. In particular, his contentions are two: that the ancient world had a great cultural heritage and that Christianity won in its competition with paganism because it appealed to the best thought and experience of the men of the time. In this volume Professor Glover is not as depreciatory of Graeco-Roman culture as is his usual wont; but he is as partisan and apologetic for Christianity as ever.

WILFLEY, XENOPHON P. *St. Paul the Herald of Christianity*. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, n.d. 267 pages. \$2.00.

The forty short chapters of this book represent as many popular lectures before a Bible class in St. Louis, Missouri. The point of view is completely traditional and harmonistic. Thirteen letters are regarded as genuinely Paul's. The speeches attributed to the Apostle in Acts are treated as excerpts from sermons actually delivered by him. Pauline sections in Acts are utilized as dependably biographical. The data thus pieced together are "supplemented with historical information apart from, but consistent with, the facts found in the Bible text." *Satis superque*.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY

KRÜGER, GUSTAV. *Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, Teil 3: *Reformation und Gegenreformation*. Zweite Auflage. Wilhelm Maurer and Heinrich Hermelink (editors). Tübingen: Mohr, 1931. 395 pages. M. 17.

This book gives the reviewer an opportunity to perform the most pleasant part of his duty. It can be announced with unstinted praise. The first edition appeared in 1911. Since that time, tremendous progress has been made in the research of the Reformation period. The authors (Hermelink for the Reformation period, and Maurer for the post-Reformation period) found it, therefore, necessary to revise practically the whole text. They were remarkably successful in their efforts. They have rearranged the material and cleverly present it in broad outline as well as in details. Their judgment as to facts and interpretation is based upon the most recent research. In case of controversial issues, they state the problem in preference to attempting a solution. They have collected the vast literature, meticulously striving for completeness. It is natural that not all titles have come to their notice. A few English-American contributions, that ought to have been mentioned, are not listed. But the reader will, nevertheless, find the significant literature relating to all phases of the Reformation. The book must be called the most competent guide to the study of the history of the church during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is unreservedly recommended to all students of the period.

LOTHER, HELMUT. *Realismus und Symbolismus in der altchristlichen Kunst*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1931. 46 pages. M. 1.80.

Students of early Christianity, concentrating on the study of literary documents, have habitually neglected that important source of information about popular piety which is provided by early Christian art. Yet students of the history of art have developed thoroughly scientific techniques for the interpretation of these important monuments. In this monograph methodology is examined, achieved results are summarized, and advance problems are indicated.

MACCULLOGH, J. A. *The Harrowing of Hell*. New York: Scribner's, 1931. 352 pages. \$3.50.

The canon of St. Ninian's Cathedral, Perth, deals fully, sympathetically, and ably with the origins and the literary development of the myth about the descent of Christ to Hades. Kindred beliefs are examined, and the functional significance of the total nexus in answering to widely current human desires is emphasized. Most regrettably the extended and significant artistic development of the tradition is ignored altogether. At the end the author exerts himself to find elements of permanent value in the doctrine. That the myth had value when it emerged may be granted. But to insist that it must have value today, or a thousand years from today, is simply gratuitous.

MOFFATT, JAMES. *The Day before Yesterday*. Nashville, Tennessee: Cokesbury Press, 1930. 167 pages. \$2.00.

By the "day before yesterday" Dr. Moffatt means the generation beginning with the eighteen-sixties. In these five lectures delivered before the Southern Methodist University at Dallas, Texas, in 1929, the author attempts to set forth our immediate spiritual heritage. The subjects of the lectures will give some indication of the ideas presented: "A Third Religion"; "The Loss of God"; "Nature for God"; "Instinctive Faith"; and "Some Fables of the Faith."

RECENT BOOKS

311

NYVALL, DAVID. *The Swedish Covenanters*. Chicago: Covenant Book Concern, 1930. 137 pages. \$1.25.

This little volume is a welcome addition to the history of the foreign-speaking religious bodies in this country. The scope of the book is very broad; it starts with the origin of the Scandinavians, and relates the story of the introduction of Christianity into Sweden and the establishment of Lutheranism as the state religion. In an interesting way the author then pictures the different free-church movements in Sweden, leading up to the work of that important political and religious leader, Paul Peter Waldenström. The author next takes us over to the American continent and tells about that Swedish religious movement which finally resulted in the organization of the Swedish Evangelical Mission Covenant of America. The author, who has been a leading character in the development of the later history of the Covenanters, relates some interesting inside information concerning the relation of the Covenanters to the Congregationalists and concerning the problems which a foreign-speaking religious body has to solve in this country. The last chapter is apologetical, dealing with the Covenant ideals or with the faith of the Covenanters.

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

BIXLER, JULIUS SEELYE. *Immortality and the Present Mood*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931. 69 pages. \$1.00.

In this Ingersoll Lecture for 1931 Professor Bixler offers an interpretation of a qualitative, rather than a temporal, immortality, and does it with rare grace and skill. The real values of life do not demand extended life to vindicate them; and so, if it seems impossible to show that life itself continues after death, that does not negate the abiding significance of its achievements in the universe. "For spirit survival is irrelevant."

CRAWSHAW, WILLIAM H. *The Indispensable Soul*. New York: Macmillan, 1931. 315 pages. \$2.50.

Though not technically a philosopher, Dean Crawshaw has read widely and thought deeply. In this volume he presents an apologetic for the reality and supreme significance of the soul. It will seem confirmatory, if not convincing, to all who share with him a personalistic philosophy.

Science makes no pronouncement on the soul, and no one has a right to invoke science either for or against its existence. Only one type of philosophy, broadly speaking—namely, materialism—denies the soul's existence. The fact is that mechanism fails as a frame of reference. The higher we rise in the scale of values, the more we need the hypothesis of soul.

We have, moreover, an immediate awareness of the soul. The whole of man's knowledge, in fact, begins with a primary intuition of awareness. Even science makes its leap toward universal meanings through the use of intuition. And religion, the most comprehensive activity of the human soul, inquiring what can be known and felt about the soul, God, spiritual reality, naturally employs intuition's helpful light. Idealism assumes that of which science has no knowledge, namely, spirit, though science will ultimately become aware of it, if it can carry its investigations far enough. Idealism claims the whole realm denominated mind, consciousness, spirit, soul. Religion operates within this field, and the poetico-religious point of view envisions for the soul an immortality,

without which the supreme value would itself be lost. Without the soul these interests are as unsubstantial as a dream: there is no mind, no individuality, no personality, no capability of reason or emotion or imagination.

The objections which may be urged against this general treatment of the theme need not be indicated here. Dean Crawshaw is, of course, well aware that certain main trends of contemporary thought move toward conclusions quite opposed to his own. It was a sense of this, indeed, which inspired the writing of the book.

SANDERS, CHARLES F. *The Taproot of Religion and Its Fruitage*, New York: Macmillan, 1931. viii+266 pages. \$2.00.

The author's thesis is that the taproot of religion is human personality, particularly in its aspiring aspects. He defines religion as life motivated, inspired, and dominated by the consciousness of God. He holds that human experience has two sources of contact with the objective world—the sensory and the mystical. The source material of religion comes through the mystical. The analysis and interpretation of the mystical experience constitutes the field of religious research.

The author fails to show how personality is any more the taproot of religion than of science, art, and philosophy, which, together with religion, are different aspects of man's adjustment to his environing world. Many modern thinkers will not follow the author in his view that the mystical experience is the field in which religion operates as distinguished from the whole range of man's values that are operative in the world of reality to which he is adjusting himself and which are operative in his own experience. Such thinkers will feel that this reality is a unity with continuity of process and that to differentiate it into the sensory and the mystical world is an artificial and fruitless approach. The discussion is marred by such overstatements as that "civilization has been given its direction by religion" and that the Decalogue can be said to be the foundation of civil law. Few of the most devoted religionists would be willing to follow the author in his conclusion in the final chapter, that religion is the master of civilization.

SCHMIDT, HANS. *Die Erzählung von Paradies und Sündenfall*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1931. 54 pages. M. 1.80.

The area covered in this popular lecture is an old battleground between Hugo Gressmann and Emil Brunner, on which are represented certain fundamental issues in present-day theological discussion. Professor Schmidt's investigation is fresh and independent. The original meaning of the ancient myth is sought. The canonical edition of the story is analyzed into its component parts. By comparison with similar myths in other religions, the primitive intent of these narrative units is made plain. The author further reconstructs the process whereby this primitive intent was metamorphosed under the influence of the god-concept of Israelitish religion, as the narrative units were intertwined in canonical form.

SIEGFRIED, THEODOR. *Grundfragen der Theologie bei Rudolf Otto* ("Marburger Theologische Studien," No. 7). Gotha: Klotz, 1931. 62 pages. M. 4.

Dr. Siegfried offers a theological commentary on Otto's writings. His little book is an essay in understanding. He succeeds in showing the theological unity of Otto's thought and thus gives good assistance to those who are concerned with it. Although the outline of his arguments is perfectly clear, his language is often so abstract that it is difficult to comprehend them.

RECENT BOOKS

313

UNGERN-STERBERG, ARTHUR v. *Freiheit und Wirklichkeit. Schleiermachers philosophischer Reiseweg durch den deutschen Idealismus.* Gotha: Klotz, 1931. viii+392 pages. M. 12.

This is the first volume of a larger work on the philosophy of Schleiermacher. The author plans to analyze Schleiermacher's philosophical thought in its historical development. In the present volume he carries the discussion to the year 1807, and he deals primarily with the "philosophical ethics" and, in connection therewith, with Schleiermacher's relationship with German idealism. His Platonism is convincingly emphasized. The work makes an excellent impression. A full discussion of it must be postponed until its completion.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

BUDD, K. G. *A Modern Pilgrimage.* New York: Scribner, 1931. ix+149 pages. \$1.50.

Donald Hankey told us that "true religion is betting your life that there is a God." This book is the story of his life. In it we learn how this unconventional saint carried out the wager in his own experience. We are introduced to one who was never easily understood—one who might be called a "rather perplexing person"—but we learn to know him as a person who renounced all cant and sought a religion which dealt with reality. From his service in the slums of London to his activities at the front, we find one who tried to combine devotion to human need with rigorous thinking in order to make religion vital.

GILKEY, JAMES GORDON. *Meeting the Challenge of Modern Doubt.* New York: Macmillan, 1931. xi+249 pages. \$2.00.

That James Gordon Gilkey is in the front rank of interpreters of Christianity to the contemporary American mind is evidenced once more by his recent book, *Meeting the Challenge of Modern Doubt*. In its twelve chapters, twelve of the intellectual perplexities of our times are examined and dissipated: the shift in values accompanying the religious revolution of today, the lost sense of authority, the apparent purposelessness of the natural world, the failure of the plan of salvation, the problem of suffering, the submergence of the individual, prayer, the seeming passivity of God, the place of Jesus, the un-Christian attitudes of society, the meaning of the new sociological-Christian technique of redemption, and the religion of the future.

Written in clear flowing English, with striking aptness of illustration and quotation, it is a popular book in the best sense of the word, and therefore by none will be more profitably read than by those whose weekly task it is to popularize, our preachers. They will find in it the forthright approach and nice turn of argument, the comely word and varied arsenal of facts utilized by one who is a master in their field. The author has not written his book for theologians nor, on the other hand, for those who crave the deep and mystical literature of devotion. It is a worthy volume of apologetic for the thoughtful American minister and his laymen, and will bring its peculiar reward to Dr. Gilkey's increasing circle of readers.

MARTIN, ALFRED W. *Consolations.* New York: Appleton, 1931. 115 pages. \$1.00.

In the first of this series of addresses delivered before the Society for Ethical Culture, the author suggests the sources of consolation for the bereaved. He cannot accept the

comfort which belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus brings to people, but he attempts to show that "ethical religion is not only good enough to live by, but also good enough to die by." The other chapters are miscellaneous addresses which find their unity in the concept of the spiritual nature of man. He draws liberally upon the philosophy of Felix Adler, as he points the way which ethical culture suggests for the realization of man's highest ends.

PICKETT, WARREN WHEELER. *Worship Services for Young People*. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1931. 58 pages. \$0.50.

This book has been prepared for those who would like to make worship an important element in the experience of religion. Nine of the fifteen services are for general use; five for special occasions; and one is a communion service. They are to be commended for their dignity, simplicity, and sincerity. As a whole, they are well above the average in excellence.

The services have the virtue also of brevity. The worshipers are led to share in three aspects only of the worship experience—the awareness of the ideal, humility, and dedication. In two or three of the services thanksgiving takes the place of humility. This shortness of the liturgy creates a difficulty. One has a feeling of abruptness in the transitions. A note of praise after the experience of humility, or a benediction of peace at the close of the service, would have added to the smoothness of the progression.

The quality of the worship material deserves attention. The compiler has been most successful in the selection of the prayers and liturgies. Many of them have years of Christian use and experience wrought into them, coupled with literary and spiritual significance. The readings from modern poetry are an admirable addition to the services, but one wishes that further search might have been undertaken before certain choices were made final. The hymns are open to criticism. Many of them are among the best, but a regrettable few are most unfortunate in musical and poetic quality and are far below the general level of the rest of the material.

WESTON, SIDNEY A. (ed.). *Sermons I Have Preached to Young People*. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1931. viii+170 pages. \$1.60.

Sixteen sermons by eminent preachers intended to answer youth's questions about religion and life. C. A. Barbour, C. R. Brown, Raymond Calkins, H. E. Fosdick, A. L. Kinsolving, H. E. Luccock, Irving Maurer, Boynton Merrill, A. W. Palmer, C. S. Patton, R. S. Smith, R. H. Stafford, J. T. Stocking, E. F. Tittle, H. H. Tweedy, and R. R. Wicks are the preachers.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

DEXTER, ALDA O.; KIEFFER, ADAH L.; and BRO, MARGUERITTE H. *Wheat Magic*. New York: Friendship Press, 1931. 138 pages. \$1.00. (Paper, \$0.75.)

A course for junior boys and girls on rural life around the world. There are eight charmingly written stories, and eight units of study intended "to lead boys and girls to become acquainted with, understand, like, and help rural boys and girls all over the world." The units of study deal with the following problems: increasing the food supply, raising better live stock, improving transportation, turning from field to factory, educating for fuller life, promoting health, working together, and searching for God. An admirable illustration of the newer, and better, method of missionary education.

RECENT BOOKS

315

LOBINGIER, JOHN L. *How Big Is Your World?* Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1931. Leader's Manual 75 pages, \$0.85; Student's Manual 71 pages, \$0.60.

This is a project type of course which has been experimented with under direction of the International Council of Religious Education and has proved of distinct interest. It is organized for the freer kind of procedure in which pupils and teachers agree on a desired line of investigation and carry it forward for as many weeks as interest and necessity for completion of the project seems to require. The leader's manual has sufficient material to guide a teacher in starting the enterprise, in finding source material, and in stimulating the group to work in a co-operative way toward some specific goal. It gives references to other information, suggestions for a number of possible investigations, and blank pages for the record of the study. The plan of procedure is excellent if a leader has creative ability, sympathy for this social point of view, and a group of high-school age with enough morale to do something that requires initiative, time, and critical thinking. It might be used in a very superficial way with little satisfaction, but it offers opportunity for developing intelligent Christian attitudes toward other races, religions, and large social interests. The author is secretary of the Department of Missionary Education for the Congregational Educational Society and has written a number of books in this field.

MUMFORD, EDITH E. READ. *Joan—A Story from Life*. New York: Longmans, 1931. 88 pages. \$1.00.

The story of a problem child, covering two and one-half critical years in early childhood, and telling how understanding was attained and what was the issue of the conflict.

O'HAKRA, MILEHAM L. *The Parables of Emiloh the Mystic*. Boston: Gorham Press, 1931. 164 pages. \$2.00.

Twenty-eight parables intended, apparently, for children. Heavily loaded with moral and religious preachments, but lacking in imagination and inspiration.

POWELL, MARIE C. *Junior Method in the Church School*. Revised and rewritten. New York: Abingdon Press, 1931. 465 pages. \$1.50.

The contrast between this revision and the first edition written eight years ago is an astonishing measure of the progress that has been made in religious education in such a short period. The author has brought her book up to date with complete re-writing, new bibliographies, new organization of material, and thorough recognition of the latest educational points of view in child psychology, curriculum, and teaching methods. The book exhibits good educational theory and at the same time reflects thorough acquaintance with juniors, their capacities, interests, and problems. Many specific illustrations help to clarify the presentation of the newer conceptions of curriculum and method as they should operate with the junior age. The author has packed the book full of good suggestions and has set a new standard for this type of manual. One great difficulty that is apparent through the book is to avoid going beyond the facts in presenting God as a dynamic personal power within the junior's experience, but the author has done well with the problem. Perhaps it is the task of a theologian to make consistent teaching more possible, but the theologian will not likely know juniors as well as Dr. Powell. The book is highly recommended to all workers with juniors in the church school.

SHAVER, ERWIN L. *The Science of Leadership*. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1931. 178 pages. \$1.00.

This book has been prepared for the International Council of Religious Education to be used in their new high-school leadership curriculum. It is not to be regarded as a textbook in the traditional sense of the term. Instead, it is a pupil's workbook. The author does not regard his purpose that of formulating principles or drawing conclusions; rather, he limits himself to reporting enterprises in which young people have engaged, recommending a technique for the development of qualities of leadership and making suggestions regarding certain projects which will provide the young people with opportunities for practice in leadership. Blank pages are left in the book for the recording of findings. It is an interesting example of the effect of newer theories of teaching method when applied to the field of the training of leaders themselves.

MISCELLANEOUS

ARNHEITER, THEODORE. *The Soul of a Christmas Tree*. Boston: Christopher Pub. House, 1932. 72 pages. \$1.50.

A book of rather bad verse about a Christmas tree.

HORNE, HERMAN HARRELL. *The Essentials of Leadership*. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931. 136 pages. \$1.00.

The author has collected several essays, previously published in popular journals, and released them under the title of the first-appearing articles. He has sought to weave together the claims of morality, religion, and education by means of the philosophic thread of a Christian and personal idealism.

MATSON, CHARLOTTE. *Books for Tired Eyes*. Chicago: American Library Assn., 1931. 58 pages. \$0.50.

This is a bibliography of books printed in large type—14-point or more. The books are classified under such general heads as fiction, biography, travel, literature, history, etc. Miss Matson, the compiler, is a public librarian in Minneapolis. The selections have been based not only upon the size of the type but upon her own good taste in literature. It is rather surprising to discover how many of the best books, both classical and modern, are now available in large type. The booklet is already in its second edition, which indicates it has met a real demand.

PACKARD, EDWARD H. *New England Essays: The Challenge of an Individualist*. Boston: The Four Seas Co., 1929. 191 pages. \$5.00.

This is a collection of essays on almost every conceivable subject, the object of the author being to point out our national moral decadence. The author is particularly opposed to cruelty to animals, and there are several essays devoted to the sufferings entailed in the trapping of fur-bearing animals. The last essay is entitled, "Churches Are Defeated."

THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

Vol. XII

CONTENTS FOR JULY 1932

No. 3

THE RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE	317
By NICOL MACNICOL, Edinburgh, Scotland	
THE ILLUSION OF RELIGION	333
By PAUL E. JOHNSON, Hamline University, St. Paul, Minn.	
THE CHURCH AND WORLD PEACE	341
By ROBERT C. STEVENSON, Southern Branch University of Idaho	
CRITICAL REVIEWS	
ESSAYS BY PROFESSOR OTTO	356
By JOHN M. MOORE, Union Theological Seminary	
STORMERS OF HEAVEN	357
By A. EUSTACE HAYDON, University of Chicago	
GANDHI, CHRIST, AND OURSELVES	358
By A. S. WOODBURN, Crozer Theological Seminary	
GANDHI'S SOCIAL RADICALISM	359
By A. S. WOODBURN, Crozer Theological Seminary	
TOWARD JEWISH-CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING	360
By SOLOMON B. FREEHOF, Chicago, Illinois	
EARLY PALESTINIAN HISTORY	361
By JAMES A. MONTGOMERY, University of Pennsylvania	
HEBREW POETRY	364
By W. C. GRAHAM, University of Chicago	
THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF HEBREW LAW	366
By JULIUS A. BEWER, Union Theological Seminary	
NEW MATERIALS ON JUDAISM	367
By SOLOMON B. FREEHOF, Chicago, Illinois	
REFLECTIONS ON MODERN JUDAISM	368
By G. GEORGE FOX, Chicago, Illinois	
A HANDBOOK FOR JEWISH YOUTH	370
By G. GEORGE FOX, Chicago, Illinois	
THE BIBLE AS LITERATURE	372
By EDGAR J. GOODSPEED, University of Chicago	
THE AMERICAN BIBLE	373
By FREDERICK C. GRANT, Western Theological Seminary	
A CRITICISM OF ARAMAIC ORIGINALS	374
By HENRY J. CADBURY, Bryn Mawr College	
A PHASE OF PAULINE THEOLOGY	375
By J. Y. CAMPBELL, Yale University	
PAULINE MYSTICISM	377
By J. T. CARLYON, Iliff School of Theology	
PAULINE VIEWS ON WOMEN AND MARRIAGE	377
By E. F. SCOTT, Union Theological Seminary	
JÜLICHER'S INTRODUCTION RE-EDITED	379
By DONALD W. RIDDLE, University of Chicago	
ORIGEN'S COMMENTARIES ON MATTHEW	381
By E. F. SCOTT, Union Theological Seminary	

[Contents continued on following page]

TEXTS IN MARTYROLOGY	
By O. R. SELLERS, Presbyterian Theological Seminary	382
BIBLICAL AND EARLY CHRISTIAN ETHICS	
By E. F. SCOTT, Union Theological Seminary	382
THE CHRISTIAN PEOPLE IN HISTORY	
By J. MINTON BATTEN, Scarritt College	384
A POPULAR CRITIQUE OF CHRISTIANITY	
By ROBERT HASTINGS NICHOLS, Auburn Theological Seminary	385
FROM PLATO TO PIUS IX	
By JOHN T. McNEILL, University of Chicago	387
THE PRINCE OF DARKNESS	
By JOHN T. McNEILL, University of Chicago	389
LOYOLA AND HIS ARMY	
By JOHN T. McNEILL, University of Chicago	391
AN ACCOUNT OF MARTIN BUCER	
By W. PAUCK, Chicago Theological Seminary	393
THE GREAT HUGUENOT SAVANT	
By QUIRINUS BREEN, Hillsdale (Michigan) College	395
A HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN CHURCH	
By MATTHEW SPINKA, Chicago Theological Seminary	396
ENGLISH MYSTICISM	
By R. E. E. HARKNESS, Crozer Theological Seminary	398
JONATHAN EDWARDS	
By HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER, Union Theological Seminary	400
NEW ENGLAND TRANSCENDENTALISM	
By CHARLES LYTTLE, Meadville Theological School	401
A STUDY OF IMMIGRANT CHURCHES	
By WILLIAM WARREN SWEET, University of Chicago	402
A LIFE OF BISHOP SLATTERY	
By WILLIAM WARREN SWEET, University of Chicago	404
THE DISCIPLES IN FRONTIER LIFE	
By ROY HAROLD JOHNSON, Thiel College	405
JOSEPH THE PROPHET	
By WILLIAM WARREN SWEET, University of Chicago	407
PROFESSOR OMAN DISCUSSES THE SUPERNATURAL	
By WALTER T. BROWN, Yale University	408
GOD AND KARL BARTH	
By HENRY N. WIEMAN, University of Chicago	410
A REVOLT AGAINST MODERNISM	
By BERNARD E. MELAND, Central College, Fayette, Missouri	412
MYSTICISM, SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHY	
By EDWIN EWART AUBREY, University of Chicago	414
THE ATTITUDE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF	
By JUSTIN WROE NIXON, Colgate-Rochester Theological Seminary	416
SCIENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF GOD	
By LAURENCE M. SEARS, Ohio Wesleyan University	417
THE RELATIONS OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE	
By MILES H. KRUMBINE, Cleveland, Ohio	418
SYNTHETIC NATURALISM	
By EDWIN EWART AUBREY, University of Chicago	419
SEEKING UNIVERSAL RELIGION	
By HENRY N. WIEMAN, University of Chicago	420
INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY	
By MERRITT HADDEN MOORE, University of Chicago	422

[Contents continued on following page]

382	THE TASK OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY By ROBERT L. SUTHERLAND, Bucknell University	423
382	THE FIRST RAUSCHENBUSCH LECTURES By MILES H. KRUMBINE, Cleveland, Ohio	425
384	CHRISTIAN FREEDOM By ROLLAND W. SCHLOERB, Chicago, Illinois	426
385	SOCIAL ETHICS By ROBERT L. SUTHERLAND, Bucknell University	427
387	ADVICE ABOUT MARRIAGE By L. FOSTER WOOD, Colgate-Rochester Seminary	428
389	THE ETHICS OF THE FAMILY By ROBERT L. SUTHERLAND, Bucknell University	429
391	CATHOLICISM AND POLITICAL EVOLUTION By CHARLES T. HOLMAN, University of Chicago	431
393	IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION By ADELAIDE CASE, Teachers College, Columbia University	432
395	A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGION By E. J. CHAVE, University of Chicago	434
396	HUMAN MOTIVATION By EDMUND S. CONKLIN, University of Oregon	437
398	EMOTION IN RELIGION By W. C. BOWER, University of Chicago	438
400	FINDING GOD IN LIFE'S REALITIES By WILLIAM H. BODDY, Chicago, Illinois	438
401	THE TASK OF THE PASTOR By DOUGLAS HORTON, Chicago, Illinois	439
402	IS PREACHING OUTMODED? By CHARLES T. HOLMAN, University of Chicago	440
404	THE CHRIST OF THE SUNDAY SCHOOL By E. J. CHAVE, University of Chicago	442
405	WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF THE MISSION COLLEGE? By CLIFFORD MANSHARDT, Bombay, India	443
407	LYRIC RELIGION By CECIL MICHENER SMITH, University of Chicago	445
408	SUGGESTIONS ON CHURCH MUSIC By CECIL MICHENER SMITH, University of Chicago	446
410	RECENT BOOKS	447

BOOKS REVIEWED IN THIS NUMBER

416	Andrews (ed.), Gandhi at Work. His Own Story Continued	359
417	Baumgarten, Protestantische Seelsorge	439
417	Beardsley, Joseph Smith and His Mormon Empire	407
418	Begner, God the Eternal Torment of Man	414
418	Beggs, The Christian Saga	387
419	Brian-Chaninov, The Russian Church	396
419	Brown, Since Calvary: An Interpretation of Christian History	385
420	Brunner, The Word and the World	412
420	Bultrick, Jesus Came Preaching	440
422	Case, Social Process and Human Progress	423
422	Chase, Supervision of Religious Education	433
422	Calwell, The Greek of the Fourth Gospel	374
422	Conger, A World of Epitomizations	419

[Contents continued on following page]

<i>Cotton</i> (ed.), <i>Has Science Discovered God?</i>	417
<i>Delling</i> , <i>Paulus Stellung zu Frau und Ehe</i>	377
<i>Dinsmore</i> , <i>The English Bible as Literature</i>	372
<i>Ells</i> , <i>Martin Bucer</i>	394
<i>Feuer and Glazer</i> , <i>The Jew and His Religion</i>	370
<i>Filson</i> , <i>St. Paul's Conception of Recompense</i>	375
<i>Foster</i> , <i>The New Dimensions of Religion</i>	418
<i>Freehof</i> , <i>Stormers of Heaven</i>	357
<i>Gabriel</i> , <i>Gandhi, Christus und wir Christen</i>	358
<i>Garnett</i> , <i>The Mind in Action: A Study of Motives and Values</i>	437
<i>Garrison</i> , <i>Religion Follows the Frontier</i>	405
<i>Gohdes</i> , <i>The Periodicals of American Transcendentalism</i>	401
<i>Goldman</i> , <i>A Rabbi Takes Stock</i>	368
<i>Goodspeed</i> , <i>The Story of Eugenia and Philip; The Epistle of Pelagia</i>	382
<i>Graf</i> , <i>The Story of the Devil</i>	389
<i>Harrington</i> , <i>Education in Church Music</i>	446
<i>Harris</i> , <i>Essays on Marriage</i>	428
<i>Hollis</i> , <i>St. Ignatius—Founder of the Jesuits</i>	391
<i>Jones</i> , <i>Mysticism and Democracy in the English Commonwealth</i>	398
<i>Jones</i> , <i>Pathways to the Reality of God</i>	414
<i>Jülicher</i> , <i>Einleitung in das Neue Testament</i>	379
<i>King</i> (ed.), <i>Social Progress and Christian Ideals</i>	427
<i>Klostermann and Benz</i> , <i>Zur Überlieferung der Matthäuseklärung der Origenes</i>	381
<i>Krumbine</i> , <i>Ways of Believing</i>	416
<i>Leys</i> , <i>The Religious Control of Emotion</i>	438
<i>McGiffert, Jr.</i> , <i>Jonathan Edwards</i>	400
<i>MacGregor</i> , <i>Christian Freedom</i>	426
<i>Macintosh</i> , <i>The Pilgrimage of Faith in the World of Modern Thought</i>	420
<i>Mann</i> , <i>Texts and Studies in Jewish History and Literature</i>	367
<i>Mater</i> , <i>Les jésuites</i>	393
<i>Nixon</i> , <i>The Moral Crisis in Christianity</i>	425
<i>Olmstead</i> , <i>History of Palestine and Syria to the Macedonian Conquest</i>	361
<i>Oman</i> , <i>The Natural and the Supernatural</i>	408
<i>Otto</i> , <i>Religious Essays</i>	356
<i>Palmer</i> , <i>Paths to the Presence of God</i>	438
<i>Parkes</i> , <i>The Jew and His Neighbour. A Study of the Causes of Anti-Semitism</i>	361
<i>Pauck</i> , <i>Karl Barth—Prophet of a New Christianity?</i>	410
<i>Popper</i> , <i>The Prophetic Poetry of Isaiah</i>	364
<i>Report of Commission on Christian Higher Education in India</i> , <i>The Christian College in India</i>	443
<i>Richardson</i> , <i>The Christ of the Classroom: How To Teach Evangelical Christianity</i>	442
<i>Robbins</i> , <i>Charles Lewis Slattery</i>	404
<i>Robinson, D. S.</i> , <i>An Introduction to Living Philosophy</i>	422
<i>Robinson, H.</i> , <i>Bayle the Sceptic</i>	395
<i>Rowe</i> , <i>History of the Christian People</i>	384
<i>Rudwin</i> , <i>The Devil in Legend and Literature</i>	390
<i>Schmiedeler</i> , <i>Readings on the Family</i>	429
<i>Schmitt, Berdyaev, Bedoyère</i> , <i>Vital Realities</i>	431
<i>Schweitzer</i> , <i>The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle</i>	377
<i>Smith, H. A.</i> , <i>Lyric Religion: The Romance of Immortal Hymns</i>	445
<i>Smith, J. M. P.</i> , <i>The Origin and History of Hebrew Law</i>	366
<i>Smith and Goodspeed</i> , <i>The Bible: An American Translation</i>	373
<i>Stephenson</i> , <i>The Religious Aspects of Swedish Immigration: A Study of Immigrant Churches</i>	402
<i>Trout</i> , <i>Religious Behavior</i>	434
<i>Wagner</i> , <i>Der Sittlichkeitsbegriff in der Heiligen Schrift und in der altchristlichen Ethik</i>	382

THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

Volume XII

JULY 1932

Number 3

THE RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE

NICOL MACNICOL
Edinburgh, Scotland

IT IS a commonplace to affirm that no living organism—the order of nature, or an individual, or a nation—can be rightly understood unless it is realized not merely as a bundle of things but as possessing a character, a personality, an ethos, beyond and behind the things, making them its own. To fail to reach through to that is to remain blind to the real quality of the object observed whether the observer be a man of science or a politician or just one man with another. Emerson by means of his mystical insight perceived this in the case of the natural order and said,

Throb thine with nature's throbbing breast,
And all is clear from east to west.

The same method must be used by our statesmen if the Indian fogs are to be scattered. India is a name that comprehends within itself almost the multiplicity of Nature, and to understand India it is unquestionably necessary at the present time that we should not only count the various elements that are mixed in her but that we should be aware of her throbbing breast and should enter into sympathy with it. Each nation has its own road—and a different one from all the others—leading to its heart. There is no standardized method of approach. But in the case of India there is one thing that we can affirm with con-

fidence, that the way to her secret is the way of religion. That, we can claim, is why the two rulers in all India's long history who came nearest to uniting the whole land under a single sovereignty were both men for whom religion was the supreme interest. Asoka gave proof of this not merely by the fact that he accepted ordination as a Buddhist priest and donned the yellow robe, but by the piety that controlled alike his private life and his public policy. Akbar, on the other hand, would have to be described as a devout skeptic, "holding no form of creed, but contemplating all." And yet, beyond question, religion dominated his thoughts scarcely less than it did Asoka's. And what India was in the third century before Christ and in the sixteenth century after Christ, India, in the roots of her racial personality and in the springs that water these deep roots, remains still in the twentieth century. The East is not any more unchanging than the West, and the secular attitudes and aspirations of multitudes in the East, the surface of their lives, have experienced in recent years an amazing transformation. But all the time certain great racial characteristics persist in their control of the essential qualities of the Indian people and bring it about that the key to the understanding of them is no different today from what it was twenty-three centuries ago when Asoka carved his edicts on the rocks. That key is still religion.

It should be evidence enough that this is so to point to the fact that the two personalities that in recent years have most deeply impressed India and won—in both cases, we may say—its reverence, are personalities that are primarily religious, Lord Irwin and Mahatma Gandhi. Of Mr. Gandhi it is unnecessary to speak. Lord Irwin's achievement was a far more difficult one because of the hostile circumstances to be overcome. And yet at a time when, as the representative of a foreign rule, he was responsible for the policy that imprisoned more than twenty thousand of the popular leaders, he was able by an uprightness and a sincerity that were discerned as rooted in religion, to obtain the respect of a people who are never blind to those qualities by

RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF INDIAN PEOPLE 319

means of which one may overcome the world. One of the extremist newspapers was speaking for the majority of the articulate people when it wrote, at the time when the "peace negotiations" between Mr. Gandhi and Lord Irwin were in progress, that it was inconceivable that "two such godfearing men" should fail to come to an agreement. Wide apart as their convictions might be there was that in common between them in their recognition of eternal values which brought them near to each other and brought them both near to India. For India still believes in the depths of her being that only the things of the spirit have reality. There is no fact in regard to India that is so essential to her comprehension as this.

If that be so it can hardly be seriously questioned that one source of serious weakness in British rule in this land is the almost uniform ignorance, and, indeed, not infrequently the contempt, of the foreign administrators for the religious ideas that through so many centuries have governed the modes of thinking of the people. When Thomas Babington Macaulay dismissed "the whole native literature of India and Arabia" as of less value than "a single shelf of a good European library" he was expressing a view that, if seldom uttered, is latent in the minds of very many of those who control the outward destiny of a land whose chief pride is that it is the land of the ancient sages. They would certainly not deduce the conclusion that Macaulay deduced that "there would not be a single idolator among the respectable classes in Bengal thirty years hence." That prophecy has proved to be singularly wide of the mark. To what land of the spirit India is journeying seems to many observers impossible to conjecture. And for those who are convinced that this is what matters most for India and who view with deep concern her present uncertainty as to where her treasure is—whether for it she is to return once more to her ancient teachers or whether she should betake herself to another and a wiser Guide—it is necessary to form some judgment of the value of those ideas that for so many generations have been reckoned

by her as precious and that have entered so deeply into her being.

The unifying element in India is indeed this heritage of ideas. This people, divided though they are by social laws and traditions, are made one by the dominion over them of certain modes of thought that seem to belong to the very fiber of their being. It is often said by those who judge only by those caste prejudices which, as regards this people's secular lives, have torn them into so many fragments, that India can never be welded into a single nation. As a matter of fact there is that in the tradition of Indian thought which forms, even in the midst of these hostilities, a deeply-rooted source of union. This can only be claimed as true in the main of the Hindu population, and yet, in so far as the Muslim community has been influenced by those Hindu ways of thinking which they breathe in the atmosphere in which they live, and in so far as their view of life and its meaning has acquired a Hindu color, it is not impossible that they also, unless hostile movements are brought to bear upon them from the Islam of the world outside, may take their place alongside of their Hindu brethren within the unity of the nation. The subtle alchemy of old Hindu dreams and old Hindu traditions may prove stronger to create sympathy and understanding than fanaticism to create suspicion and dislike, and thus by their help it may be possible even to bridge the gulf of Hindu-Muslim hate.

It is true that millions of the population of this land are incapable of reflection and that many millions more rise no higher in their thinking than is necessary to satisfy the physical cravings of today and to survey the physical necessities of tomorrow. Of those who are only able by continuous labor to win their living from a barren soil it can hardly be otherwise than that their souls for the most part cleave to the dust. Yet even they possess as by an infection of the spirit this outlook on the universe which, while it is Hindu in its principles, creates a characteristically Indian ethos, that is more than merely Hindu.

RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF INDIAN PEOPLE 321

As far as any generalizations can without error and misrepresentation be made in regard to a land so vast, one may claim that what is true of Hindu India is true of the whole population. It is the Hinduism of past ages that, as a subtle, pervasive, powerful influence, has made the India of today what it is, that has given it its color and shape and character, that forms its strength, and that to an overwhelming degree will, as far as we can judge, determine its destiny.

If we are to understand India we must realize that she issues from the vale of soul-making of her past bearing with her elements which, whether they are to be reckoned as chains holding her in bondage or as wings bearing her upward and onward, belong to her very being and have made her what she is. It will be sufficient for us to note one or two facts which are significant in regard to that heritage. It is necessary that we should always keep in mind, as we approach this people, the antiquity of their civilization and its continuity throughout, not centuries only, but millennia.

From a period at least 4,000 years away the literature of this people travels down to them with a continuous message and most of that great space of human history is marked by the commanding figures of their sages and their heroes. This spiritual inheritance to which they can look back is notable not only for its antiquity but for its uninterrupted continuity throughout all those centuries. These are facts in regard to the Indian culture that differentiate it sharply from that of the Western peoples. Midway in the course of Western history a break occurs, followed by a new beginning which is due to the irruption into Western life of the Christian religion. There is never, of course, among human events any such thing as a complete rupture of the continuity of men's thoughts and motives, but the coming of Christianity into the life of the European peoples produced a change far more radical, and a new birth in time far more completely new, than anything that we discover throughout India's long history. The entrance of Islam into India and the estab-

lishment of Muslim rule over so large an area of the land had indeed a profound influence on Hinduism and on the circumstances of the people, but the immense and immobile bulk of the Hindu system and of the influence it creates in the minds of those who adhere to it remained essentially the same in its general outline and character and continued as before to envelop the whole Indian continent. Nineveh and Tyre have passed from the scene: the intellectual supremacy of Greece has become an esoteric dominion exercised upon the minds of thinkers and of scholars alone. But the rule of the Rishis who taught in the Indian solitudes two and a half millennia ago is established still today over the minds of millions in this land, and their view of the meaning and the end of life shapes still, in large measure, the character of these men and women and provides the motives which they acknowledge "in the deep moments when they probe themselves." This marks an element of contrast between the Indian civilization and that to which the West is heir which sets them widely apart from each other and makes misunderstanding easy.

We see that constant and unfailing stream flowing down the centuries until today. We see the varied types of Indian humanity subdued to it, colored to its hue "like the dyer's hand." If we inquire further what that color is and what are the chief elements that, coming by so long a road, still fashion the Indian ethos, still give its peculiar texture to the Indian mind, it is no easy matter to select from a whole so complex those which may be viewed as most significant. We shall indicate three only out of so many and reckon them as representative of the vast variety of forces that issue from the past and shape the ends of modern India. One of these we shall choose from the body of ideas that have gone to the making both of Hinduism and of the Hindu mind: another will indicate the deep reservoir of religious passion that lies stored within the Hindu heart: while the third suggests the discipline by which their experience of life through the centuries has shaped their character to what it is today. These are only three selected from many far-journeying in-

RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF INDIAN PEOPLE 323

fluences but they may serve to suggest how long has been the process of the making of the Indian spirit and how powerful and finely-fashioned are the elements that are mingled in it.

First, then, we shall adduce as representative of the intellectual inheritance of the contemporary Hindu what we may describe as his monistic outlook on the universe. The intellect of man, when it is awake, is always and everywhere occupied in an endeavor to reach a simplification of the complex of things. The philosophical mind is the mind that aims at thinking things together. India, it appears, has been in all its history possessed in a high degree of this instinct for philosophizing and has pursued its quest for the unity of all things with an almost unparalleled resolution. The extreme form of this in India—where it has assumed various forms at different times—is a doctrine which solves the inequalities of life and the conflict of the moral and natural orders in the universe, by denying the reality of difference, affirming that only Brahman is real and all else—human individuality and the moral values with which it is bound up—is illusion. There are modified forms within the India region of thought of this doctrine of *advaita* or non-duality, but a powerful pull toward such a monism and its consequences is one of the most profoundly influential and most ancient of the elements that have gone to the making of the Hindu civilization.

It is not possible nor desirable to discuss here the value or the truth of this doctrine. Its interpretation—especially in modern times—is so varied, and the deductions that are made from it are so diverse that all we can do at this point is to recognize this diversity and point at the same time to the tendency of thought that underlies them all. That tendency, it may be claimed, is apt to weaken the convictions of human freedom and the reality and significance of moral effort and struggle. It also suggests that flight from the world and its troubles is the course of wisdom and that passivity and acceptance are the highest of virtues.

At the same time it has to be recognized that there are many

today who would deny that that is the teaching of the ancient Rishis and who find in it rather the truth that "when our self is illuminated with the light of love then the negative aspect of its separateness with others loses its finality." Dr. Rabindranath Tagore, however, who makes that statement, would hardly be accepted generally as an orthodox interpreter of the Hindu religious inheritance. Nor, indeed, would the Swamis of the Ramakrishna sect, one of whom describes the spiritual consequences from the ancient doctrine of the Atman in words that it is only fair to quote with some fulness. He says (in contrast with the West):¹

We in India always seek not so much to regulate our environments as our own self. . . . We believe that we can achieve all powers by adjusting and moulding our own mind. All is in the mind. . . . To a Westerner this extreme and almost absolute emphasis on self-control appears as self-suppression and suicide. . . . It is easy to see what happens when a Westerner or anyone with a Western viewpoint sits in judgment on Indian life and institutions. He finds only apathy, squalor, laziness and weakness everywhere. . . . He does not know that we have drawn a magic circle around us which the outer influences can scarcely penetrate. . . . It is mind that builds and mind that frees, is a constant dictum among all classes of people.

This interpretation of India's heritage of religious thought is one that it is right to recognize as finding many adherents in India at the present time. One has to remember, however, that in contemporary India there is a strong and often quite unconscious tendency to import into the old doctrines ideas that belong to the common stock of conviction of our day but which are really wholly alien to the thinking of these ancient teachers. Whether or not this process of reinterpretation of the old thought may in time have its effect, that effect is not yet, and the ancient values of the ancient message still exercise their subtle influence upon the aspect that life bears to the Indian of our own time. What those ancient values were can be better learned from a teacher of the sixteenth century than from Dr.

¹ *Prabuddha Bharata*, XXXIII, 530 f.

RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF INDIAN PEOPLE 325

Rabindranath Tagore or a Swami of the modern Ramakrishna sect. Thus we find the *Bhikshugita* of Eknath, a poem dating from that period and typical of the best religious sentiment in Hinduism, concluding with this statement: "The world, consisting of friends and neutrals and foes, which affects a man with pleasure or pain, is a phantasm of his mind, owing to ignorance and nothing but that." To the monist or to one like Eknath, who is not a consistent monist but who is deeply influenced, as so many in India are, by the monistic spirit, life becomes meaningless and the soul an empty place. To the Christian, on the other hand,

Life with all its yields of joy and woe
And hope and fear
Is just our chance of the prize of learning love,

and the soul of a man is called upon to take within itself a love which embraces the whole world of human sorrow and of natural beauty, bearing the sorrow as its own and rejoicing in the beauty. There is an essential and, as it seems, unbridgeable difference between the world-view of Advaita and that of Christ.

This monistic doctrine, then, with its uncompromising desire to unify all things even at the cost of that which gives them their chief worth, and so to be rid of multiplicity, is a primary element in the ingredients of Hindu religious thinking. A second element of a different kind that has entered powerfully into this spiritual context and that forms an important part of the Indian heritage is the sense, so deeply implanted in all human hearts, but perhaps pre-eminently in the Hindu heart, of desolation and abandonment, and the longing that accompanies it for the divine fellowship. This belongs mainly to the region of emotion, as the element which we have already noted belongs to that of the intellect. For that reason this is a more intermittent and unstable contribution to Hindu religion than the other but it is one which, when it appears, brings with it power and passion. To the *Speculum Meditantis* of the monistic philosopher the common heart of Hindu India brings as its addition the *Vox Cla-*

mantis and the *Confessio Amantis*. The cry of the heart's desire and the avowal of the love of the human heart for its unknown, but dreamed of, friend combine to create that element in the religious heritage of Hinduism which has produced its poet-saints and through them still moves mightily the common people in every province of the land.

These spokesmen of the Indian heart combine much of the intellectual outlook of monism with a passionate longing for fellowship with a personal God, incompatible as these modes of the spirit may appear to the logical understanding. Never surely has this "concreated and perpetual" thirst of the soul been more poignantly represented than in their songs. When these poets look up to the sky it is not to take note of "the moon's beauty and the moon's soft pace," but to be reminded of the lotus longing for the moon's light even as their hearts long for God. The rain-bird's cry is the very voice of their spiritual craving; the lost and frightened fawn in the wide desolate jungle is to them a picture of their soul's solitude and desolation. All nature is but a mirror in which they see their own sorrows, and its beauty is secondary to the pathos of their inward need. The thirst for the ideal may have seemed to them at times a dream, but it is a dream by which men live. Nowhere surely has the deeply implanted sense of exile and the longing to return been expressed with more simplicity and poignancy than in the lyrical cries of these Indian poets, and it echoes in them still. "It is the sorrow of separation," says Dr. Rabindranath Tagore, "that ever melts and flows in song through my poet's heart." That sorrow comes to us like the shrill cry of a lost child down the winds of the centuries bearing witness to the sincerity and the pathos of India's spiritual passion.

These two aspects of the Indian spiritual tradition which we have noted, the one intellectual and speculative, the other the product of emotion and personal longing, appear to us, perhaps, incongruous, but they are both deeply rooted in the traditional heritage of this people. The desire of the heart and the specula-

RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF INDIAN PEOPLE 327

tion of the intellect both combine, or seek somehow to combine, in the Indian religious context. These two conceptions of the Ultimate which seem to us in irreconcilable opposition do not appear to their hospitable spirits so radically opposed, but the conflict and the vacillation that their presence often creates give to their religion a certain instability, as it appears to us, and a troubled intensity. They would both have and not have: the bliss of affection and the bliss of Nirvana lure them alike. The fact of the presence of this emotional element in Indian religion insures that it possesses a spring of inextinguishable life which not all the chilling influences of an agnostic speculation can destroy.

Along with these two controlling factors in the Indian religious development there has gone a third which is less central but which has throughout its whole long course contributed, as we cannot but believe, to create certain characteristics of the Indian personality. This is the fact of physical and mental unhappiness and distress, the struggle with the cruelty of nature and of human enemies and oppressors, the shadow of fear and disease and death that throughout the centuries has hung like a pall over wide regions of India. These cannot but have affected the modes of thinking of the people and given a somber color to their outlook upon the universe. This sorrow, which lies so heavy upon India, echoes, as we have seen, in many of the religious utterances of her saints and poets and gives a sadly minor tone to their aspiration. Their prevailing music is what Kabir calls "the music of the forgetting of sorrows." Dr. Dinesh Sen describes in his *History of Bengali Literature* how the sad experience of their lives is woven even into the old myths which often form the theme of their poets. "When the Agamani songs, describing the sorrows of Menaka and of Uma, her daughter, are sung by professional singers the eyes of many a child-wife glisten behind her veil and the hearts of their mothers cry out for the daughters who have been taken away from them." The people of India, with even more painful experience of the fact than

most, when famine, fever, the robber, and the invader laid their homes waste, could say, as the Maratha poet Tukaram says, "Within thy scrip is death," and were aware, as he was, that the way of human life "is dense with dying men." These grim facts enter into their making, certainly not less powerfully than they enter into the making of other peoples.

It is true that similar experiences of sorrow and of oppression have been the lot of many other nations and have not always touched their souls to fine issues, as we claim to have been their consequence to India. But those to whom such an experience has brought nothing more than sullenness and stupor were not endowed with those great qualities of mind and heart which we have seen to be part of the heritage of the people of this land. The nearest parallel to them in this respect is to be found, perhaps, in the history of Israel, a people, like them, rich in their spiritual endowment, and, like them, bitterly experienced in human cruelty and injustice. Whether the plowers that plowed upon their backs were Assyrians or Moguls, in both cases they "made long their furrows" and drove the colter deep. In both cases the effect was an enrichment of the soul.

Such are some of the elements that, through more than two millennia, have entered into the making of India's spiritual heritage and have fashioned through it the soul of the Indian people. We shall be blind to their essential qualities today, as so many are, and incapable of realizing the character of the spiritual conflict in which they are involved in the circumstances of the present time, as well as of measuring its depth and of forming any intelligent conjecture of its possible future consequences, unless we are aware of the powerful influence upon this people of such possessions as these which have descended to them from so ancient an ancestry. They form the Divinity that has shaped the ends of this people.

Over against this fact, however, of the dominance of religion in the whole long process of India's making and of that dominance scarcely diminished today, has to be set a new fact which

RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF INDIAN PEOPLE 329

must be reckoned with in all forecasts of India's future. In the sky of India is forming a cloud, hardly bigger, as yet, than a man's hand, that portends change and may portend rapid change. The infection, if we may change the metaphor, of what is called "secularism" in the West has spread to India and is showing symptoms of virulence. The religious tradition has indeed been powerful enough hitherto to keep alive in many educated Hindus, who might have been expected to find the religion of their fathers irrational and even in some of its phases revolting, a sincere reverence for religious things and a real attachment to their religious heritage. But this precarious loyalty is now breaking down on every hand and an outspoken hostility to all religion is taking its place.

We are not considering here other rivals to religion. One of these, for example, is nationalism and another that has not, however, as yet obtained much hold in India, is communism. These often create at the present time a spirit that takes possession of the whole being of a man so powerfully that there is similar influence in its effects to the influence of religion. Nationalism has acted in this fashion in the case of many of the young people of India, taking powerful possession of them and subduing them to its will. But with this kind of substitute for religion we are not dealing here. The prevalence of secularism in India has little direct relation to the political atmosphere. What then are the forces that have produced it?

The most obvious is, of course, the western education which we have given to India. That education must certainly be shared with them by us, as we must share with them all the best that we have. But from the gift certain consequences inevitably follow. The Hindu and Muslim faiths cannot remain unaffected by "the acids of modernity." That they have resisted these disintegrating influences to the extent to which they have in the past and that many highly educated men still cling to some shadowy system which they call by the old name is surprising. India has been very loath to abandon its tradition

of "spirituality." A generation ago this was not merely due to pride in a tradition. Its leading men from Ram Mohan Roy to Rabindranath Tagore and M. K. Gandhi believed in God and prayer and the unseen world. But that is no longer true to anything like the same extent of the generation that is of middle age today.

The corroding influence of an education that is "godless" has deprived them not only of their hereditary beliefs but of all faith in the unseen. The two most popular departments of study in the Indian colleges are those of economics and of science. Except in the Christian colleges these subjects are usually taught in the spirit of economic determinism and scientific materialism. Even in the Christian colleges scientific subjects in many cases have to be taught by non-Christian professors, no others who are competent being obtainable. A Muslim principal, himself a deeply religious but liberal believer in Islam, describes as follows the position of many students of science. "When the dissatisfied intellect," he writes, "revolts against the dogma, childish attempts are made at impossible interpretations of the sacred scriptures and ridiculous efforts to reconcile them with modern science." The study of economics also is being resorted to in the belief that the only way of hope for an impoverished land is not to give it a new God but new economic resources. Similarly the desire for a reinforcement of the people's energies in the struggle of life, to put iron into the blood of people whom, they say, religion has drugged and enfeebled, dominates very many of the educated classes and makes them willing to consider dangerous methods to that end.

Reinforcement is given to this rejection of religion by the disgust that is created by the fierce communal conflicts and by the bitter realization that these are keeping India divided and so preventing her advance to political freedom. Hindu-Muslim enmity may be due in part to political jealousy and economic rivalry, but religion feeds the flame of passion and causes it to spread like a prairie fire. So also the non-Brahmans turning

RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF INDIAN PEOPLE 331

against the Brahmans in South India would throw out the baby with the bath and reject not only the Brahmans' oppression but the religion that the Brahman represents. Accordingly they declare war "against heaven and hell, against God and Satan." The spectacle of this internecine strife rendering the nation impotent in the hour when it is called to united advance fills many of the ardent youths of India with an undiscerning anger against all religions alike. One group among the younger political leaders with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru at their head have definitely set before themselves as one of their aims "to free India from the grip of religion."

This new spirit is to be found working like a fever in the young men of every province. In Western India it is perhaps most obviously present. A year or two ago some of the Hindu teachers in colleges in Bombay, becoming alarmed at the progress of atheism among their students, proposed that the principles of theistic religion should be taught in all schools and colleges. Immediately violent protests were made on every side against any such course. "It is we Indians," one of the protesters wrote, "that require more and more materialism. We have had too much of religion; that accounts for our position today as a bankrupt nation."

If one passes to North India, there also there is a rising tide of unbelief alike among Hindus and Muslims. The professors of the Muslim University at Aligarh and the Hindu leaders of the Arya Samaj in Lahore bear the same testimony, many of them with much anxiety and sorrow. In South India, the headquarters of orthodoxy, a conference of the "Self Respect League" recently denounced Mr. Gandhi as "undermining the sense of self-confidence and self-reliance in the people by his deliberate invocations of God in all his acts and utterances."

No doubt another influence that is turning the old religious reverence to scorn is the example of Russia and of Turkey across their borders. Russia appears to many of them to be in the van of progress, and is not Russia proclaiming that religion is the

enemy? Moscow bids the Russian peasant choose between God and a cream-separator. As the "intellectual unemployed" multiply in India they are ready to sell their souls, at the bidding of cruel economic forces, for any of the devices of civilization that seem to promise a more comfortable life in these days of hardship and privation. It is obvious that much in the civilization that has invaded India is hostile to the old religious ideals of the land, many of them noble—their practice of contemplation, their choice of a life of simplicity. In the midst of these questionings and the distractions produced by conflicting views as to the right way of advance, the educated and awakened Indian stands at the present time uncertain and perplexed. The long travail of the Indian spirit is not yet accomplished. What course will ultimately be chosen and followed by the spirit of India in its future journeyings cannot as yet be forecast. But when one reviews its record of spiritual adventure and aspiration through the ages, one cannot believe that it will fail to reach in the end—however long the end may be delayed—the true goal of all human seeking.

THE ILLUSION OF RELIGION

PAUL E. JOHNSON

Hamline University, St. Paul, Minn.

THERE is a growing suspicion that religion may be a mirage. Man's journey is uncertain as to whence and whither. His resources are inadequate and his desires strain longingly after some hope of deliverance as he falters along. Lost in a desert universe, hope springs immortal in the human breast, sketching visions of paradise too good to be true. Thirsting for something to satisfy and finding it not, a ready imagination holds up inviting religious illusions, whose deception his eyes are too feeble to pierce. Man is incurably religious, perhaps because he insists on fooling himself.

Such misgivings readily become vocal in psychological explanations. Religious experience, when psychoanalyzed, appears as one of the fantasies whereby the patient subjectively disposes of uncomfortable realities. Man is religious because it is an easy way out of bad situations. It is natural to avoid difficulties. Living, under human conditions, is crowded with difficulties which most of us try to escape by one turn or another. Some use intoxicants, others employ narcotics to take the dull depression or the stinging edge off of experience. Some escape by daydreaming or dwelling in play worlds of make-believe, by reading adventure stories, and assuming rôles of fictional heroes. Some take to boasting and expansive moods, or to indignant anger in cases of affronted dignity. Some fall into hysteria and chronic psychic disturbances, while all of us deal in skilful rationalizations to dress up our motives. Religion is diagnosed as one of these escape devices widely used to retreat from painful situations.

From another quarter religion is attacked by social reformers on adjacent grounds. Religion is the opiate of the people, warned Karl Marx. Religious experience drugs people into content with

things as they are, substitutes prayer for action, and protects the *status quo* against revolution. So labor creeds have mocked at religious promises of future rewards while present ills are unrequited. So radicals have set out to exterminate religious delusions which retard clear-eyed progress. So apostles of "scientific conduct" shake off religious restrictions as dumb fears holding man back from his rightful freedom. Religious indulgence for the weak, the timid; but for those who can bear it, stern pagan virtues. Man is naturally what he is, or what by his own strength and cunning he may become; let no soft dreams or radiant illusions cover his virile nakedness.

At the same time religious illusion is defended by admirers who openly avow their love for its radiant fantasies. The value of religion is aesthetic, not logical. It is betrayed at the hands of blundering devotees who mistake its revelations for common factual truth, whereas the divine gift of religion is beauty. Beauty is higher, or at least freer, than truth; it finds intrinsic worth by ignoring the quibbling exactitudes of truth-seeking literalists. Religion, as George Santayana views it, is poetry. It would do well to withdraw pretensions of dealing with fact. "Religion and poetry are identical in essence and differ merely in the way they are attached to practical affairs." "Our religion is the poetry in which we believe."¹ The method of religion, he goes on to show, is imagination. Its chief contribution has been "to offer imaginary remedies for mortal ills." "Like poetry it improves the world only by imagining it improved." "Religions will thus be better or worse, never true or false."²

Another view of religion appears in a recent criticism by T. V. Smith which characterizes the religious way as a short cut to desired success. The genius of religion consists in "manipulating one's self rather than in correcting one's environment. Argument rather than industry is the means."³ This amounts to

¹ G. Santayana, *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (1900), pp. v and 26.

² G. Santayana, *The Life of Reason: Reason in Religion* (1905), pp. 9, 11-12, 14.

³ T. V. Smith, *The Philosophic Way of Life* (1929), p. 62.

THE ILLUSION OF RELIGION

335

passive faith instead of active experiment, to resignation rather than creative effort. Religion thus appears as the easiest way out of a bad situation. When no other way is discovered to improve things, simply denounce the need to improve them, and the problem is solved. It encourages submission to things as they are and discourages bold efforts to make them better.

In these critical views we have the two attitudes noted above toward religion as illusion. The one, believing the religious solution unreal, attacks it as enemy to progress and reform; the other believing the religious ideal imaginary, embraces it as the essence of poetic beauty. With religion under this cross-fire its position appears the more difficult, but in the end may turn out to be rather strategic.

Human experience is not inherently trustworthy. In its naïve and pristine purity it is simply a succession of vagrant impressions. In refined form it progresses by careful revision, but is ever subject to imperfections and deceptions. As religion operates in this realm of human experience, it is not surprising to find it suspected of illusion. Naturally, illusions are as apt to arise from this as from any other form of experience. But on what ground is the charge of illusion brought exclusively to religion more than to other human experiences? Probably because it claims more and asks more than some other experiences. The claim to final truth through revelation raises doubts both as to method and content. If human experience claims final truth, that is a large order, larger in truth than we can verify. If human experience claims to know this truth directly and immediately with no questions asked, that method appears uncritical and, hence, untrustworthy. To this point suspicion of religion is deserved. The honest representative of religion should admit the justice of the charge and set about restoring confidence in his religious experience by making it progressive, that is, open to continuing growth by unfaltering self-criticism.

The crucial issue, however, lies deeper than this. Religion is attacked because it seeks a larger experience of reality than at

first appears. Religion desires to see the unseen, to experience what is beyond reach of the senses. Philosophy is also implicated here, and, in so far as it seeks ultimate realities, comes in for its share of the attack. Even philosophers themselves, in notable instances, despair of certainty or even knowledge at that pitch, and ask philosophy to return to sober meditation upon practical human affairs. While from other sources comes the recognition that not only religion and philosophy but all standards of conduct and value are lost to illusion. This is a natural extension of doubt to all human experiences, and the newer voices are no more eager than former ones to show the perils of delusion.

What careful analysis discloses is that there is more to experience and more required of experience than at first appears. Valid experience is not dissected sense data, per se, but connected, empirical meanings in coherent patterns. To cry illusion is not so easy as might be supposed. For illusion presupposes larger experience. To affirm this particular experience as illusory requires sufficient other experiences to see its discord in a larger setting. To know the stick, which appears bent in water, or the rails, which appear to converge, as illusions, one must have larger experience than those particular impressions. So with any illusion; to recognize its deceptive character requires some larger perspective of experience for its corrective.

To maintain that religion is false because it seeks a larger experience is an observation that is itself in need of larger experience to substantiate. For instance, to say that God is unknowable is to assert my complete knowledge of all that can be known; or, to insist that God is not real is to assume my adequate knowledge of all that is real. But the very grounds upon which God is most denied is that we cannot know reality. And how can anyone not knowing reality presume to pass universal judgments upon it? Illusions, religious or otherwise, can never be proved by less experience than the illusion in question. The only reasonable claim for illusion is an assumption of something known beyond this unreliable experience.

THE ILLUSION OF RELIGION

337

As a matter of fact, this is just what the illusionists do assume. Even while protesting we know too little to accept religion, the actual implication is that we know too much to believe religion. While asking us to limit our claims rigidly to verified particulars of experience close at hand, prophets of illusion speak with authority on the universe at large as "omnipotent matter rolling on its relentless way." By what exhaustive tests has the materialistic world-view been established more cogently than other world-views? Here is an assumption as vast as any rejected. It is not always articulate, but there evidently stands as the first premise in every argument for religious illusion the illicit assumption of a relentless reality or omnipotent matter crushing religious hopes. Where limitation does operate is in the exclusive selection of quantitative data, from which hasty generalizations are carried to cosmic finalities of hostile matter. The difficulty lies in an inconsistent use of limitation which pinches the facts of experience and takes unwarranted liberties with universal conclusions therefrom.

The validity of experience is not insured by methods of limitation. In fact, it is precisely in limited and fragmentary experiences that illusions most readily occur. Careful investigation of experience does not require timid retreat to colorless phenomena and mathematical ratios. Honest search for the whole truth demands experience courageous enough to venture more daring explorations. The physical sciences have made creditable progress in coping with quantitative relations, but it would be nothing short of dogmatic illusion to conclude those relations the only factors in the structure of reality. The methods of the sciences are rewarding when employed with these metrical factors, but they become inimical to truth when forced to exhaust other kinds of reality or crowd all being into quantitative molds.

All experience, as John Dewey suggests, may not be experimental.⁴ The method of science is not identical with the aesthetic point of view. The aesthetic method is to observe form, pattern, and design of objects studied. The scientific method is to

⁴ J. Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (1929), pp. 81 ff.

experiment with objects by manipulating them, to perform various tests to establish exact relations. It holds to the primacy of overt doing over more or less passive observation and appreciation. Both methods are empirical; but, whereas art accepts and admires, science experiments and controls. How does this apply to religious experience? From the scientific viewpoint religion appears too aesthetic; that is, it accepts the universe as it is and admires reverently. From the aesthetic point of view religion appears too scientific; that is, it experiments with the will of God and seeks to control human behavior in adjustment to that ideal. These criticisms of religion we have had from Santayana, who represents the aesthetic, and from T. V. Smith, who represents the scientific viewpoint.

This sheds no little illumination on the true character of religious experience. Bringing these cross-fires to bear upon religion reveals its many-sidedness in better perspective. Thus seen religious experience appears more comprehensive than either art or science. The implication to be gathered from these counter-attacks is that religion contains essential traits of both viewpoints. The versatility of religion is manifested in complementary experiences that offend exclusive defenders of either. These complementary experiences are historically known in religious circles as faith and works. Faith is the aesthetic attitude of acceptance and admiration; works represent the scientific ventures of overt action, experiment, and control. The aesthetic attitude of reverent acceptance is evident in the religious petition: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." The scientific viewpoint of experiment is evident in the religious emphasis on doing: "He that doeth . . . shall know"; "Not everyone that crieth Lord, Lord shall enter the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth." The illusion with regard to religion falls back on its accusers, who undergo the fallacy of mistaking the part for the whole. Religion in essential wholeness is a union of faith and works, an experience that seeks to co-operate actively with the cosmic Will (universal law) reverently accepted.

THE ILLUSION OF RELIGION

339

But what of the psychologist's charge that religion is a wish-fulfilment, and substitutes subjective fancy for positive achievement in the objective order? The implication of the "rationalizing" accusation is the assumption that all reasons or philosophies that satisfy desires are myths. Religion offers a desirable hope of salvation, therefore it is false. Again critical investigation is needed at the assumption upon which the argument is raised. Is it true that everything desirable is false? All values are desirable experiences. Shall we then refuse to believe any value when it comes, insisting doggedly that it is too good to be true, too desirable to be other than false? In scientific and philosophic inquiry what is more desirable than truth? It is the truth we desire, yet shall we call all conclusions false because the truth we seek is so desirable? Desire of course may warp calm judgment, and the merit of this caution is its warning to look out for desires when seeking truth. Desire often runs away with judgment in religion as in love, or in economic investment, or in propaganda for a pet theory in psychology or philosophy. The other half of the truth is that honest desire is necessary to truth-finding judgment, for without the former the latter would care no more for truth than for error. The remedy is not in casting out all desires as demons but rather in testing and correcting desires to hold fast the good.

The argument of illusion from desire is another instance of taking the part for the whole. A fragmentary glimpse of human experience finds this desire warping that judgment and thereupon mistakes all desires for enemies to truth. Larger insight to valid experience sees the essential place of honest desires, without which (as in the case of desire for honesty) fancy would pass for fact unaccosted. It is when desire loves some other value more than truth that deception comes in. Unfortunately, religious experience, along with various secular experiences, has been too often guilty of truthless desires with deceptive consequences. But rather than condemn all experiences and reject all conative impulses, discriminating judgment will undertake

to separate the true from the false. The hope that religious experience offers to truth rests not with external authorities or signs and miracles but with progressive exploration and persistent verification in enlarging experience. Experience becomes valid and religion trustworthy, as faith and works unite in reverence for the truest ideals discernible, ventured in courageous experiment toward their effective understanding and realization.

THE CHURCH AND WORLD PEACE

ROBERT C. STEVENSON

Southern Branch University of Idaho

IS THE Christian church opposed to war? Is it a force for peace? Many would immediately respond in the affirmative. Is not Jesus traditionally the "Prince of Peace"? Does not the ethic he preached include "Resist not," and the injunctions to turn the other cheek and to forgive even to seventy times seven? True, the injunctions of the Sermon on the Mount are capable of convenient interpretation to make way for common personal and business practices; but the very genius of Christianity, the brotherhood of God's children, it is generally assumed, is quite opposed to the unbrotherliness of war. Not alone in view of Christian principles would there be an affirmative answer. Did not 62 per cent of almost twenty thousand clergymen responding to a recent questionnaire declare their belief that the church should go on record as refusing to sanction or support any future war, while 54 per cent declared that in any case they themselves would refuse to participate? One's mind runs back over the numerous post-war declarations of religious conferences (of which one assiduous student has collected 239) in behalf of peace, of education for peace, of disarmament, of the League or a league of nations, of outlawry, of arbitration, of the Kellogg Pact, and the resolutions condemning war in such terms as "inglorious, ineffective, wasteful, and unchristian," "a colossal and ruinous sin." One thinks of the annual Armistice Day message of the Federal Council of Churches and of the thousands of sermons on the theme—It must not be again. The host of religious organizations working for peace comes to mind: The Church Peace Union, The World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches, The Women's Church Committee on International Good-Will, The Catholic Association for International Peace, The Committee on International Jus-

tice and Good-Will of the Federal Council of Churches, and similar organizations in many of the denominations. Other peace organizations, not specifically religious, are of course strongly supported by churchmen. Finally, but not least, one recalls expressions of alarm and denunciation by patriotic citizens of the pacifistic pronouncements and activity of religious leaders and organizations.

Yet the affirmative response to our question is not unanimous. A minority, perhaps, but still a considerable number, and those not the least thoughtful or well-informed, counter the query whether the church is opposed to war, with the question: "What war has been opposed by the Christian churches of either country engaged?" And not merely opposed; the question may be more penetrating: "What war has not been ardently supported by the great mass of churchmen?" Not one, of course. One thinks of the Reverend Francis W. Newman, an early proponent of a referendum on war, who, although he believed that almost all wars were unjustifiable, held that the one important war engaged in by his country in his own lifetime, the Crimean, was thoroughly just. One remembers the hearty support of the World War by the churches, when the bulk of Christians probably felt, as one minister expressed it, that the army was "the Church militant, sent, morally equipped, strengthened and encouraged, approved and blessed, by the Church at home. The army today is the Church in action." He continued: "Its worship has its vigil in the trenches, and its fasts and feasts; its prayers are in acts, and its choir is the crash of cannon and the thrilling ripple of machine guns." While the United States was still neutral, in 1915, it was the opinion of Admiral Fiske that "the Christian religion [in the United States] is at this moment being made to exert a powerful influence, not towards peace, but towards war." *War-Time Agencies of the Churches*, issued by the Federal Council, mentions thirty-one denominational and twenty-one interdenominational organizations in the United States for the support of the war. Even since the passing of the war fever in the present era of peace resolutions, the observer

of religious bodies notes a vigorous opposition to pacifism and a strong disinclination to give any footing to the charge of disloyalty. When the Standing Committee on the State of the Church voted to recommend to the Quadrennial General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in 1924 a resolution declaring that "we, as an organization, separate ourselves from war and take no part in its promotion," a minority report was submitted embodying the condition, "unless unqualifiedly in self-defense or in defense of humanity." When the resolutions were presented to the Conference both were rejected after a tumultuous debate of two hours and a new committee appointed which brought in an acceptable report denouncing war, calling upon the United States to lead in a crusade for peace, favoring disarmament and the World Court, and declaring that "the patriotism of the Methodist Church has never been challenged" and implying that it must never be. In the same year the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church resolved against war and in favor of arbitration and disarmament, but reserved to the United States "the right to control our own army and to determine whether or not and when we shall declare war." The United Presbyterians, in June, 1924, disowned "sympathy with any effort of anti-war propagandists which tends to encourage and promote disloyalty or dim the luster of national spirit and patriotism." A recommendation to the quadrennial meeting of the Federal Council of Churches in 1928, by the Commission on Social Service for "the renunciation of war and the refusal of the Church of Christ as an institution to be used as an instrument or an agency in the support of war," was after some debate referred back for report in 1932. The caution of the church in a time of reaction against war, as well as its ardent support in the time of war fever, seems to support the view of Dean Shailer Mathews of the University of Chicago Divinity School that "religions have never been interested in producing international peace."

As a matter of fact the position of the Christian church as regards war is as confused as the common opinion about it is di-

verse. The disaster and disillusion resulting from the World War has resulted in a pacifist movement strong enough to force upon the church the question of the correct attitude toward war. At almost every church convention it is a potential if not an actual subject of discussion. At every such discussion a clear-cut radical pacifism is apparent, countered by a conservative opposition, tenacious though often somewhat confused by the apparent incompatibility between the obvious evil of war and the obvious objectionability of the pacifist proposals. The result usually is the passage of sterile resolutions deploring war, commending peace, and recommending the spirit of Jesus in international affairs; resolutions denounced as inadequate by the radicals, perhaps half-heartedly accepted by the conservatives as being innocuous, and passed by the body of those more concerned with other issues, but who recognize that something must be resolved on the subject. Thus an ardent desire for the abolition of war among some and a very general, if unthought-out, desire for peace among the bulk of churchmen is frustrated and rendered sterile—because, as it seems to me, the question is approached in the wrong terms, from an impossible angle.

It is no new question that is arousing the polemics of pacifists and their opponents in the Christian church. The controversy over pacifism is almost as old as Christianity itself. In the case of a question so thoroughly discussed and uniformly resolved in the same sense, it seems improbable that a different outcome will result from a new consideration. That war violates the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," that its brutality and hatred are diametrically opposed to the Christian principles of meekness, love, and brotherliness, and that, therefore, the Christian must separate himself from it, was the belief and practice of many Christians of the early centuries. It is a view which probably has never been without adherents from that day to this. Branded as heretical when Christian doctrine was given form by the Fathers of the Catholic Church, it persisted as the tenet of small sects, appearing at the close of the Dark Ages with the

Albigenses, Waldenses, and Lollards, and continuing to the present day with the Moravians, Mennonites, Dunkers, Doukhobors, and Quakers.

The opposing view, which almost from the beginning has been the prevailing one, while admitting that war is assuredly an evil, refuses to admit that there are not greater evils, to avoid which war may be a justifiable expedient. "The courage which protects the land from the barbarians by means of war, and which defends the weak . . . is entirely just," said St. Ambrose in the fourth century. That we surely are in duty bound to defend our country from foreign aggression is the burden of conservative objection to pacifist proposals in religious conferences. "It is a fact that the Churches do not dare to teach that all and every war is sin," says a Presbyterian journal, "but the reason why they do not dare is simply because it is not true." St. Augustine, who formulated most clearly the since dominant doctrine, declared that although it is undoubtedly best to live at peace with a good neighbor, it is better for the righteous to conquer a bad neighbor than to be conquered by him; therefore, in such a case war is just. The same position was reiterated by learned churchmen throughout the Middle Ages, and when in the time of the Reformation more radical sects condemned military service, the more influential leaders reaffirmed the prevailing view. Luther wrote, in 1526, in a pamphlet entitled *Whether Soldiers Can Be Saved*,

All that is said and written about war being a great curse is true, but at the same time people ought to consider how much greater is the curse that is prevented by war. To be sure if people were good and willingly kept the peace, wars would be the greatest curse on earth. But what will you do with the fact that the world is wicked, that people will not keep the peace, but rob, steal, kill, abuse women and children, and take honor and property? This general and universal breach of the peace, which leaves no man safe, must be checked by the little breach of peace that is called war, or the sword. Thence doth God honor the sword so highly that he calls it his own ordinance, and will not have it said or thought that men invented or ordained it. For the hand that wields this sword and

slays with it is no longer the hand of man, but the hand of God, and it is not man, but God, who hangs, breaks, beheads, slays and makes war: all is His work and His decree.

For Calvin, too, war was perfectly of a kind with the repression of the criminal by police force. He said,

Whether it be a king who does it on a big scale, or a scoundrel who does it on a small scale, he is equally to be regarded and punished as a robber. It is no breach of the command, "Thou shalt not kill": the slaying of the authors of the unjust war is an execution, the judge is God, and the fighting men who defend the right are merely God's instruments.

Article 16 of the Augsburg Confession, specifically reaffirmed by the United Lutheran Church in 1924, declares that "a Christian may engage in just war and act as soldier." The Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church declares it lawful "to wage war upon just and necessary occasions." Practically identical language expresses the position of the Congregational churches. Article 37 of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England declares that "it is lawful for Christian men, at the commandment of the magistrate, to wear weapons and serve in the wars." The traditional Catholic position was reaffirmed in 1928 in a report of the Catholic Association for International Peace on the rules of right and wrong as they apply to international law which rejected the proposition that "all employment of force among nations is immoral" and asserted that "a state may make war to safeguard its rights, actually violated, or in certain or imminent danger." The report went on to stipulate two assumptions and five conditions which must be conformed to if a war is to be pronounced justifiable.

Probably most of those who sponsor radically pacifistic resolutions calling upon the church to refuse support in any future war would admit that in theory the use of armed force may be justifiable in certain cases. As it has been cogently pointed out innumerable times, the right of a state to protect itself by force against a foreign foe is theoretically indistinguishable from its right to use force in repressing criminals or in protecting life and

property from mob violence—assuming that its cause is just. Only an inconsiderable number of extreme idealists or adherents of peculiar religious sects, however, find consistency in the doctrine of complete non-violence. Most pacifists impatiently thrust aside the theory which indissolubly connects police and military force. As a matter of fact, they justly observe, there is no such thing as one party in a war being right and the other wrong. Justice in such a case is always divided, and the precise division must wait years for even approximate determination. Protestations of the righteousness of a nation's cause, even the most sincere, are utterly unreliable. Since each nation is a passionately prejudiced judge in its own case, it is absurd to justify its use of military force as being analogous to a legal "remedy" in redress of legal "rights," the form which the connection of police and military force is bound to take. Furthermore, from the point of view of the pacifist, and increasingly from that of the practical man as well, the evil of war is grossly disproportionate to the wrongs for which it has been considered the only feasible remedy. Since, then, the direct evil of a particular war, whatever the division of responsibility, will assuredly far outweigh the righting of any wrong which may have been its cause, the best course to follow, argues the pacifist, is to boycott the whole war business. In taking such a stand personally, and in recommending it to others, he is encouraged by the hope that if only a small fraction of the population (Einstein's 2 per cent) would refuse to participate, nations would not venture upon war but would be compelled to acquiesce in some other arrangement for the settlement of differences.

Even a limited acceptance of the proposition that the justice of one's country's cause in any future war can be ignored, that one can with moral safety resolve not to support it, however plausible its case may then appear, is doubtless largely the result of disillusionment as to the causes and aims and expected achievements of the World War. Men who supported it heartily from the highest motives, who believed in the justice of the

allied cause and the utter depravity of the Hun, have discovered, hosts of them, that they were deluded. Their natural reaction, often intense and bitter, is—Never again! Having gone to war once for a cause of the purest justice, and in order to achieve a world reconstruction, and having seen that justice prove illusory and the perfection to be attained fail to materialize, they jeer at any theory of a "just war." But prevalence of such a mood will no more endure than did the enthusiasm whose destruction called it forth. While those who have once been soured by the dissolution of their dreams might perhaps hold fast to their cynicism even in the face of a new war, the very fact that they were once so readily led to enthusiastic acceptance of the rightness of their own side and the wickedness of the enemy is good indication that a new generation, undisillusioned, would readily identify its nation's cause with justice and its nation's aims with righteousness. If, then, we cannot expect men in time of crisis to ignore the question of justice, the question whether it is indeed wrong for a Christian to engage in a just war cannot be dismissed by the church, as the pacifists would like. For over fifteen hundred years the answer to that question has uniformly been, as in logic it must always be, it is right for a Christian to engage in a just war. Christian conscience and principle will not unconditionally refuse force to government.

Is a particular war just? Exactly how is the responsibility divided? This is the crucial question which determines how far a Christian may with good conscience support his government. The pivotal importance of this question has been fully recognized in the prevailing church theory concerning war. It is unchristian to engage in an unjust war, all agree. But it is the magistrate, the sovereign, the lawful constituted authority which is left to decide the matter of responsibility. Catholics and Protestants agree in following Augustine's view that the private individual does no sin in obeying the lawful authority even in a cause which, in the sight of God, is unrighteous. Pacifists, however, have endeavored with some success to persuade

the church to put the question of responsibility squarely upon the conscience of the individual. For governments do become involved in war and the official view of each is always that its cause is just. If, then, the judgment of individuals is concluded by the decision of their respective governments, Christian principles will be barred from exerting any compulsion in behalf of peace. So the rejected Methodist resolution of 1924 declared "for the freedom of the individual member of the Church to follow the dictates of his own conscience whether as an individual he can support or engage in war." A National Study Conference on Churches and World Peace, in which thirty denominations were represented, resolved in 1925 that the church "should recognize the right of each individual to follow the guidance of his own conscience as to whether he shall participate in war." Gatherings of Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists, Universalists, and of the Reformed Church have resolved against the Christian conscience being concluded by the state.

Yet there are strong reasons which prevent any general departure from the time-honored presumption in favor of the constituted authority. The very complexity of the factors which lead to war (illustrated by the researches into the outbreak of the World War) make the question of responsibility too complex to be decided by each individual. Further, the volume and privacy of official relations prevents the private individual, even though he may avail himself of the services of private research agencies, from possessing an acquaintance with contemporary situations comparable to that of the officials directly charged with their conduct. If anyone can justly resolve the fine questions of responsibility (which may be doubted), it is men intimately in touch with the changing facts and circumstances rather than the outsider.

The strongest reason for recognizing the right of government to determine when the Christian, along with others, is obliged to render military service (assuming that under certain conditions such is his duty) is the same reason which justifies author-

ity generally—order is preferable to disorder, and order can be achieved among many wills confronted by a host of diverse possibilities of action only by authority. Granting that individuals possess and will use for their own ends physical force, for no purpose is authority more urgent than to control force, uniting the otherwise clashing forces of individuals into one system in order to sustain a just order protecting life and property and other legal rights. Society cannot exist so far as we know without authority, formal or informal. And except in the most rudimentary societies the informal authority of tradition and custom must be supplemented by the formal authority we call political. Although the right, or better, the power, of revolution, the capacity of individuals temporarily to dissolve an old authority in the course of setting up a new, cannot be ignored in theory and will doubtless always actually occur from time to time, individual disobedience to government is always distinctly abnormal. Individual judgment as to the justice of particular wars would substitute anarchy for government at the very time when most people feel that government must possess the most untrammelled authority.

True, it is conceivable that the church as a body might pronounce authoritatively upon the justice of wars, in which case it would become by so much the government. Considering the stand of churchmen toward past wars, however, there is no reason to believe that such a change would be a force for peace, nor does experience teach that the church would be any more tolerant of individual dissent than is the state. But such a possibility is forbidden by the multiple schism of the church and by the tendency of centuries toward increasing secularism of political power. Even in the heyday of its power, in fact, the Catholic church never presumed to take over generally from sovereigns the prerogative of the sword.

If, then, we can neither support nor expect to be successful the contemporary movement in the churches, which would unconditionally deny political authority the right to use force out-

THE CHURCH AND WORLD PEACE

351

side its borders or would devolve the determination of the legitimacy of such force upon the individual conscience, what share in the quest for world peace is there left for the church? Let it be diligent in propagating the spirit of Christ among men, runs the traditional answer. Let it influence men in public as well as private relations to act justly and to love mercy. Only by its success in influencing men's hearts will peace be realized. If this method is indeed impotent, as the radicals claim, then any other method, in spite of superficial plausibility, will be undermined by human injustice and prove equally impotent. Certainly it is true that the fostering of justice and moderation among men is a task of the greatest importance, and where those qualities are lacking in any considerable measure, peace cannot subsist, either among individuals or groups.

Few thoughtful persons, however, would assert that the diffusion of such moral qualities is in any practical sense the self-sufficient condition for peaceful relations. If all men could be made just, and if men of good will could always perceive the truth and govern their passions, it might be sufficient. But in the world of men and women as they are, moral teaching requires to be supplemented by law and government if a society of tolerable peace and justice is to be sustained. Nor, even by those who insist upon its predominantly personal mission, is it asserted that the church has no responsibility toward political institutions. The tendency which would separate the church absolutely from the world has always, since the church itself ceased to be numerically insignificant, been confined to a relatively small number. The body of the church, both before the Reformation and in its subsequent divided state, has held that the civil power is also of God. Christianity has sanctioned the state.

If civil peace requires not only a fair degree of good will and the disposition to seek and follow justice on the part of individuals, but also that those individuals be enmeshed in a net of political institutions which define and enforce law with author-

ity, can we believe that international peace can be achieved without a like double condition? Not only good will and the disposition to base relations upon justice is necessary for international peace, but also institutions which take from the individual nations, biased as they are bound to be by self-interest and self-love, the responsibility of defining what justice requires. And further, such institutions must possess authority; that is, their decisions must, by virtue of their source, command predominant support as a matter of course. If in individual relations the church must not only foster personal righteousness but also grant its sanction to the institutions of civil peace, is its duty in international affairs fulfilled by preaching international morality? Ought it not also actively to grant its sanction to international institutions?

International institutions, world government as a practically realizable thing, is a new and fearsome idea. Only just now, in historical perspective, have the technical facilities for worldwide intercourse made the relations of civilized mankind so close as to make political unification conceivable outside the poet's or utopist's dream. Such a novel possibility is opposed by many forces: first of all by that salutary inertia we call conservatism reinforced by the powerful emotion of provincial patriotism. Then there is the more rational and quite justifiable hesitancy that men always exhibit about subjecting themselves to remote authority, the fear of losing control over local conditions and institutions, the dread of lack of consideration on the part of the central authority for local interests, the specter of an increasing centralization and an enlarging burden of privileges of an inconsiderate and inefficient bureaucracy. The specter is the more fearful because it is a shadowy figure. Although prefigured by federalism and the more indefinite association of British Commonwealths, and actually emerging in strictly limited international associations, it is apt to carry the suggestion of rigidity and centralization of the highly developed governments of small and relatively homogeneous nations. Can mere men (many of

them foreigners, too) be entrusted with such great responsibilities?

Yet we cannot flee from government merely because of its imperfections and dangers without a look at the other alternative. Even in the national state as we know it, law and administration are never more than an approximation to the ideal of justice. Yet almost all of us prefer the never-ending effort to approach that unrealizable ideal through government to a condition of anarchy (which, indeed, is almost inconceivable as a continuing state). In so far as international government is lacking, nations are in the condition of anarchy—an international anarchy in which nations, while compelled to sustain complicated relations by the interdependence which applied science has wrought, are yet free, each as a sovereign power, to appeal at will to an armed force ever more dreadfully implemented by this same scientific advancement. And even apart from the disasters of war, the situation of nations is such that the breakdown of normal co-operative relations is increasingly intolerable, a possibility too serious to be left within the power of any nation arbitrarily to precipitate. Peace and order are urgent. All experience indicates that government is their essential condition. The alternative of more government is less fearful than that of not enough. Government has often become tyrannical and oppressive and its destruction has netted a gain for human freedom. But this has been the case when it has extended beyond the area of interdependence. Then particularism and fear of authority have frequently been justified. But when government is not yet commensurate with the area of interdependence, advancement lies in extending it in the best form possible. The possible abuses attendant upon more extended political institutions we must guard against as best we may. The future of civilization is indeed dark if they cannot be kept less serious than the demonstrated ills of inadequate international government.

It is true that the church is supporting international organiza-

tion. The recent survey referred to at the beginning of this article revealed that two-thirds of the ministers answering favored the entrance of the United States into the League of Nations. The Kellogg Pact, the World Court, arbitration, a league of nations, if not the League, have received recommendation in innumerable resolutions of religious bodies. The phrases "law instead of war" and "outlaw war" are stock in trade of religious considerations of the subject. Too often, however, such support of international institutions is the result of following the path of least resistance in compromise rather than of the enlightened conviction of any considerable group. Those most ardently desirous of having the church move against war, the pacifists, are often quite unsympathetic toward international organization since it involves no unqualified repudiation of the use of force. It is perhaps significant on this point that in the replies to the questionnaire referred to, support of the League was in inverse proportion to the support of pacifism in the denominations covered. Whenever the question of peace is forced upon the consideration of religious bodies by the radicals, generalities such as a Christian spirit in foreign relations and even the outlawry of war can be depended upon to receive general support in order to put the question to rest. Nor is recommendation of an anti-war declaration sponsored by an American Secretary of State and generally interpreted as sanctioning defensive war, nor of a World Court, adherence to which has been recommended by three presidents, likely to alarm those members of a convention who would oppose anything savoring of unpatriotism. In the matter of supporting the development of international government the church has been a hesitant follower rather than a definitely promoting force. In details the church must necessarily be a follower, but in principle, in the possession of a clear view of the direction whither lies progress, the church must lead if it is to render any real contribution to the cause of peace.

Merely to denounce the evil of war, and to preach the desirability of international good will and justice while uncondition-

ally sanctioning the authority of sovereign powers whenever they decide to resort to war, is futile. To praise the ideal of a world united in the fraternity of Christian love, while supporting political institutions which are fundamentally divisive, is to war with oneself and to immobilize any possible influence for peace.

The true course for the church is neither to be enticed into the untenable position of condemning force as an instrument for justice in an imperfect world, nor of devolving the determination of what the just course requires from political authority to individual conscience, but rather to add to its age-long attempt to propagate good will two things: determined advocacy of the extension of political institutions until they become commensurate with the common life of men, and, secondly, as fast as common institutions are created, the declaration that Christian duty requires their support at the expense of loyalty to the narrower institutions whose conflict is war. The church is divided and lethargic in the first of these courses. It should be united and importunate. In the second course only one notable step has been taken, namely, the resolution of the Lambeth Conference of Bishops of the Anglican and Protestant Episcopal Church in August, 1930, declaring that, "When nations have solemnly bound themselves by treaty, covenant and pact for the pacific settlement of international disputes, the Conference holds that the Christian church of every nation should refuse to countenance any war in regard to which the government of its own country has not declared its willingness to submit the matter in dispute to arbitration or conciliation." This resolution should be the text for world-wide religious discussion. When such a position is widely adopted and sincerely accepted, organized Christianity may take credit for helping the world an important step along the way to ordered relations.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

ESSAYS BY PROFESSOR OTTO

That interest in the work of Professor Rudolf Otto of Marburg continues to increase in Great Britain and America is indicated by the fact that no less than three translations of his writings have appeared in book form during the past year. The fourteen essays which make up this volume¹ have been collected especially for it. Several of them were published in early editions of *Das Heilige* but were not included in the English translation. Several others are taken from *Aufsätze das Numinose Betreffend* ("Essays Concerning the Numinous"). Three of the remaining essays have already appeared in English in the *Hibbert Journal* and other periodicals.

As its subtitle indicates, the purpose of this volume is to elaborate certain of the fundamental positions which Professor Otto set forth in his *The Idea of the Holy*. The first group of essays applies his thesis, that the basic categories of religion are to be distinguished from those of ethics, to five selected conceptions from Christian theology; viz., the conceptions of sin, flesh, and spirit, "lostness," and original guilt. The true meaning of these conceptions is to be found, not in the moralistic connotations given them by theological tradition, but in the distinctively religious sphere of the "numinous." This approach, Professor Otto contends, frees them from the odium which the traditional moralistic interpretations have brought upon them and fills them with concrete meaning derived from religious experience.

In another essay, Professor Otto presents a careful elucidation of the conception of the "Wholly Other" in religious history and theology, drawing his illustrations from fields as widely separated as early Greek religion and philosophy, Indian mysticism, and the theology of St. Augustine and the medieval scholastics. This is followed by a brief but powerful argument for the theory of "parallels and convergences" in the history of religion in opposition to the more common view of direct influence.

Several other essays of a more popular sort complete the volume. Although the essays vary as widely in depth as they do in subject matter, they are all interesting. The translation is exceptionally smooth and clear. The volume will be especially valuable to students of Professor Otto's *The Idea of the Holy*.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

JOHN M. MOORE

¹ *Religious Essays*. (A Supplement to *The Idea of the Holy*). By Rudolf Otto (trans. by Brian Lunn). New York: Oxford University Press, 1931. vii+160 pages. \$2.50.

STORMERS OF HEAVEN

In a series of stimulating addresses¹ to his congregation Rabbi Freehof has marshaled twenty-eight of the important figures in the religious history of mankind. They serve as symbols and lend themselves gracefully to inspirational treatment. The ideals of Judaism are presented in Moses, Isaiah, Hillel, Maimonides, and Mendelssohn. The five greatest Christians are Paul, Augustine, Hildebrand, St. Francis, and Luther. Atheism is represented by Comte, Bradlaugh, Haeckel, Nietzsche, and Russell. Five men stand for creative free-thinking—Socrates, Spinoza, Voltaire, Huxley, and Ingersoll. Akhnaton, Asoka, Marcus Aurelius, and Constantine illustrate the good and evil of the intimate interrelation of politics and religion. The last address, dealing with Moses, Zoroaster, Buddha, Jesus, and Mohammed as religious geniuses, is the least satisfactory both as inspirational literature and as religious interpretation. The necessary brevity of treatment is probably responsible. In every case the historic figure set in the social situation which produced him would appear different from the symbol of a historic process here presented as a religious genius.

Rabbi Freehof has been affected by the ambient Christian climate. It is discouraging to find a Jewish scholar, versed in the tradition of Israel, falling so easily into the Christian theological pattern of identifying religion with the relation of earth to heaven, of the finite to the infinite, especially since his analysis of the founders of Judaism leads him to the conclusion that "Judaism may be characterized as a tradition which aims at ethical self-discipline expressed in social law, the unceasing progress of mankind toward a warless world, the ennobling of human character in the calm pursuits of culture, the independence and the development of the mind by clear reason and systematic thinking, the eagerness to adjust life and knowledge to the new circumstances of each new age." This may be an idealization of historic Judaism but it has no more theological stress than oriental religions which stress a way of living rather than a way of believing.

In this galaxy of the great, Jesus of Nazareth is difficult to place. He does not appear as a great Jew though he belongs wholly to Judaism. He has no place among the greatest Christians since he "was not a Christian." The author exalts him as a religious genius whose personality has challenged the centuries. He "was an extraordinary man since it was his version of Jewish ethical idealism which conquered the western world and changed human history." This last is high praise but unfortunately

¹ *Stormers of Heaven*. By Solomon B. Freehof. New York: Harper, 1931. viii+225 pages. \$2.00.

is not historically true. Jesus seems to be uprooted from history, exalted as a symbol of the highest ideal, to be interpreted by every group and century according to the changing fashions in ideals. All men find it necessary to glorify him, yet Jesus remains strangely obscure. Almost the same thing could be said regarding Moses who has become the symbol of centuries of cultural achievement in Israel.

This work is inspirational literature of a high order. The preacher selects the artistic and effective phrase, not the cautious words that walk humbly with prosaic facts. In this light we must understand such extravagant statements as: "Whatever hope there is in the human heart that war will someday cease has been implanted by Isaiah." The practical pacificism of Confucianism, Hinduism, and Buddhism would seem to be more substantial than this "hope in the heart" of the war-making West. So, also, we must understand the phrases, "the old monotheism of the patriarchs" and "the monotheism of Moses," which cannot stand the test of history and fact unless monotheism is a very elastic word. For the same reason it would be unfair to make a critique of the author's understanding of the nature of religion or his theory of the function of great men in religious history. The book should be read for what it is. So read, it stirs emotion and stimulates thought.

A. EUSTACE HAYDON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

GANDHI, CHRIST, AND OURSELVES

This little brochure on Gandhi¹ is much more significant than its size and format might suggest. It is as compact as it is painstaking. The author sets for himself the task of answering three questions, growing out of popular interpretations of the great Indian: (1) Is Gandhi a Christ? Does he make any such claim for himself? (2) Is he a Christ from the standpoint of his religious world-view? (3) Is he a Christ, considered religio-ethically?

In dealing with these problems Herr Gabriel makes a careful examination of the writings of Mahatma Gandhi for relevant passages. He makes it clear that Gandhi is a Hindu with distinct leanings toward Jainism. In each connection he contrasts the views expressed by Gandhi with Christian views. For example, Gandhi's world-view is essentially monistic, and, consequent upon the unity of nature, is the characteristic Jain and Hindu view of the unity of all living creatures with its correlate, the doc-

¹ *Gandhi, Christus und wir Christen. Eine Christliche Darstellung und Wertung der Sittlichkeit und Frömmigkeit Gandhis.* By Walter Gabriel. Halle: Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1931. vii+61 pages. M. 3.60.

trine of *ahimsa* ("non-injury"). Such a philosophy involves also what Gabriel calls "theo-panism." Gandhi's view of God is quite different from the Christian—much more vague and mystical, and less personal. God differs from anything we think about him. The answer to every suggested definition is *neti, neti* ("not that, not that"). Such a view is obviously and utterly at variance with the Christian conception which regards God as personal, and, as manifested historically in Jesus, "full of grace and truth." Similarly, Gabriel points to the different conceptions of sin and salvation in Gandhi and in Christianity.

The upshot of the inquiry is to answer all three questions in the negative. The Christian view of life and the world with which Gandhi's positions are compared is the dualism of the evangelical group, an interpretation to which many Christian thinkers would decline to subscribe. The valuable part of the study, however, is the careful exposition of Gandhi's moral and religious views, with liberal references to the Mahatma's own statements.

This critical study is a rather welcome relief from the effusive writings of such men as Romain Rolland of France, J. H. Holmes in this country, and Oscar Ewald in Germany, to all of whom Gabriel refers. In order to appreciate the sincerity and moral earnestness of Gandhi, as Gabriel certainly does, it is not necessary to proceed to give him a metaphysical interpretation such as is involved in regarding him as a reincarnated Christ.

A. S. WOODBURN

CROZER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

GANDHI'S SOCIAL RADICALISM

The first volume of selections from Mahatma Gandhi's autobiography, under the title *Mahatma Gandhi: His Own Story*, was reviewed in the *Journal of Religion* in the issue of April, 1931. The present volume¹ is almost exclusively devoted to the Satyagraha struggle in the Transvaal, an episode that was omitted from the earlier volume. Those who were fascinated by Mr. Andrews' volume on *Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas*, as well as by *Mahatma Gandhi: His Own Story*, will find the same human interest in the present story.

The story narrated in this volume is of the passive resistance struggle on the part of Indians in South Africa to procure a just recognition of their rights from the governments of the Transvaal and latterly the Union of South Africa. The account goes into considerable detail as to the progress of the struggle. It is particularly interesting to observe the developing

¹ *Gandhi at Work. His Own Story Continued*. Edited by C. F. Andrews. New York: Macmillan, 1931. 407 pages. \$2.50.

conviction that soul-force is a more powerful and humane instrument for settling communal differences than police or military power. We may well study this movement as to its possibilities in offering a moral substitute for war.

Whatever our judgments of Mr. Gandhi's theoretical positions, none can gainsay his moral courage. Sometimes his statements are sweeping generalizations that call for amendment, as, for example, that "Western thinkers claim that the foundation of their civilization is the predominance of might over right." Eastern critics are more prone to pronounce such judgment, without reserve, on Western civilization. Mr. Gandhi in describing the Satyagraha principle tells us that "man-made laws are not necessarily binding." His position is closely akin to the anarchy of Tolstoy, a doctrine that is not without grave defects as a practical working principle. Doubtless, there would be no difficulty if all the members of a community were motivated by the same high moral and unselfish principles as Gandhi himself. The core of his doctrine is that real home rule (*swaraj*) is only possible where men have learned to rule themselves. We are reminded of the ancient proverb, "He that ruleth his own spirit is better than he that taketh a city."

We are grateful to Mr. C. F. Andrews for the three Gandhi books, and anticipate with pleasure his promised work on Rabindranath Tagore. He is rendering a distinguished service in interpreting the best thought of India to the West, and, let us add, by his own unselfish devotion in interpreting the best of Christian thought in the West to India.

A. S. WOODBURN

CROZER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

TOWARD JEWISH-CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING

It was once fondly believed that racial prejudice was due entirely to ignorance, and that as soon as enlightenment would penetrate the mass-consciousness, fraternity would ensue as a natural consequence. This belief has proved to be overoptimistic. The most rabid anti-Semites in Europe are not the untutored peasants but the college students. Universities are the hotbeds of prejudice.

The bitter mood prevalent in European universities thus contradicts the most cherished conviction of liberalism. If education is accompanied by an aggravation of religious and racial prejudices then it would be better for the peace of Europe if the masses remained ignorant. The International Student Service is determined to attack prejudice in its stronghold. It envisages the university "as the cultural interpreter of

CRITICAL REVIEWS

361

peoples to each other and as the expression of the essential unity of civilization." It aims "by conferences and publications . . . to overcome the hostilities which split present university life into political, religious, or racial groups."

Mr. Parkes's book *The Jew and His Neighbour*¹ has grown out of the work of the International Student Service in European universities. The book is rich in material and generally sound in its conclusions.

In order to give the proper historical background for anti-Semitism, the author begins with quite an adequate sketch of the Jewish dispersion. He then analyzes the religious, political, and economic elements in anti-Semitism. He explains the effect of the past upon the Jew himself and upon the Gentile attitude toward him.

While there may be some disagreement with the emphasis which Mr. Parkes has put upon certain historical factors, there can be no doubt of the erudition, fairness, and informational value of the book. If, in spite of the disappointing phenomenon of European university prejudice, the road to better group relationship ultimately lies along the line of deeper mutual understanding, then the book will prove to be of considerable value. At all events, it must be looked upon as a necessary historical introduction to a second book which will outline a program and point to definite principles of action.

SOLOMON B. FREEHOF

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

EARLY PALESTINIAN HISTORY

This² is a masterly work of manifold excellences. American scholarship has made its distinct contributions to biblical science in archaeology, philology, religion, and in historical essays on limited fields. But here for the first time we possess in English a work framed on large lines and composed by an author of rare historical talent. Dr. Olmstead is versed at first hand with most of the historical sources, as his many contributions to biblical study and his *History of Assyria* prove; in addition, he demonstrates in this book the flair of the true historian in the presentation of the innumerable data and their threadlike connections in an admirably constructed whole.

Prime among the excellences of the book is the setting of the history of

¹ *The Jew and His Neighbour. A Study of the Causes of Anti-Semitism.* By James W. Parkes. New York: R. R. Smith, Inc., 1931. 202 pages. \$2.00.

² *History of Palestine and Syria to the Macedonian Conquest.* By A. T. Olmstead. New York: Scribner, 1931. xxxii+664 pages. \$7.50.

Palestine, and so of the Hebrews, in relation to its neighbors and especially to Syria, of which land it is only the southern extension. Indeed a desideratum in historical science is a history of Syria north of Palestine, for which the present work gives a capital introduction.

The author writes with picturesque vividness concerning the topography of the land, with a clear memory of the year he spent at the American School in Jerusalem in 1902-3 in company with Director N. Schmidt and Messrs. Charles and Wrench; and this facility gives great charm to the book. An occasional topographical excursion, e.g., chapter iv, lightens the historical narrative and contributes the impression of authority for the context. The book, extensive as it is, is none too large for the innumerable details that may not be avoided; and the author is to be congratulated on his skill in summarizing many pockets of history in surveys that can hardly be found elsewhere. In general, as to the literary art of the book the author has gained mastery of a very attractive and readable style; as the posthumous editor of the last edition of Meyer's *Geschichte* says: "It is a book to read as well as to study."

Olmstead's critical position as to biblical historical sources is, it is interesting to observe, on the whole, distinctly conservative. I note the following examples. There was only one attack of Sennacherib's armies upon Jerusalem (pp. 176 ff.). He accepts the Exilic origin of Second Isaiah (for the first part) and the references to Cyrus, without remarking on the critical difficulties involved. He is similarly conservative with Jeremiah and Ezekiel. He makes constant use of the chronicler, of whose work he remarks that "long under the suspicion of the critics, of late this added material has often been proved correct by new archaeological or literary data" (p. 633). He accepts the general authenticity of the Aramaic official documents in Ezra; over against the fact that "scholars in recent years have almost unanimously declared these decrees to be forgeries," he states his opinion that "placed against their contemporary background, the decrees are justified" (p. 570). Even the book of Esther comes in for his critical approval as containing substantial history, which he proceeds to reconstruct, in this following the example of Hoschander (pp. 611 ff.). On the other hand, in the field of Pentateuchal criticism, as to its narratives and codes, he appears not to have moved along with recent archaeological and literary developments of criticism, which are pushing back the data of Pentateuchal tradition and laws as sources of early history. In regards to the origins of literature he holds that "David's reign marks the beginnings of Hebrew literature" (p. 330). But that epoch implies a long previous development of letters, to which the

CRITICAL REVIEWS

363

sources of Judges testify, while we know that by then the alphabet was fully available.

The work covers secular history primarily, not religious, but the author pays close attention to that remarkable religious development which culminated in the creation of the Jewish Church-State. In an admirable way he weaves extensive portions of the Prophets into the historical webbing and thus equally illuminates both them and their background. His treatment of the development and character of the Hebrew religion is, to the reviewer's mind, rather fitful and often captious. Its monotheism he would date down as far as possible and allow it only when the simon-pure product is distilled; its ethics he often pillories. The dirge over Babylon is Isaiah, chapter 14, he terms "a savage parody"; the preceding chapter is "a hymn of hate" (pp. 541, 543). But is the former a correct literary judgment, and is the modern ethical taste always fitted to value the proportions of ancient history? At times there are self-contradictions. In the beginnings of the Hebrew settlement in Canaan, we are told, "tribe fought tribe and there was no practical distinction between Hebrew and non-Hebrew," and "each tribe worshipped its own deity" (p. 270). But he denies this categorical statement with his citation at length of the Song of Deborah and his comment: "The danger of a disunited Israel had been partially averted. The list of tribes which had taken part was a roll of honor, the tribes who had refused participation felt keenly the disgrace" (p. 279). In the middle of the ninth century "Hebrew ethics were no higher than those of neighbour peoples. Religion was a matter of ritual with no ethical content. Immorality of the grossest character was practised at the shrines," etc. (p. 379). And yet excellent as was Josiah's reformation of all these abuses of religion, "the peasant had been robbed of his religion" (p. 502), "the peasant became a pagan" (p. 504). It is difficult to satisfy the modern critic of religion.

In a work so full of reference necessity requires that many categorical statements be made; there is in this book a general absence of discussion of variant views, and it may be criticized for often venturing statements without proof, this in contrast to the general extensive booking of references. For instance, the appearance in Egyptian of the full name Jacob-el does not prove its meaning to be "Jacob is God" (p. 106). The claim of David's marriage into the family of the Ammonite king Nahash (p. 304); of an insult to Solomon's Egyptian queen in his not choosing her offspring for the succession (did she have any?), which induced Shishak's revenge (p. 354); the identification of Zimri the murderer of Baasha in his invasion (p. 361)—these are speculations which might be

relegated to footnotes. In regard to the so-called Passover papyrus from Elephantine, Olmstead repeats the fallacy now unfortunately perpetuated in Cowley's edition of baldly writing "passover" into the text, a presumption fully contradicted by Arnold in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1912, 1 ff. It has recently occurred to the writer that in any case the Jerusalem priesthood could not have ordered the passover sacrifice outside of their temple; the domestic passover celebration came in only after the destruction of the temple and is, of course, only a memorial feast. Hence no deductions can be drawn from the absence of reference to the passover in conjunction with regulations for the feast of unleaven.

It is a pleasure to have a book like this, constructed on such broad lines and profound scholarship, to put in the hands of students and readers; and equally it will long remain a treasure-house of reference and historical perspective to the professional scholar. The volume is a beautiful specimen of the printer's art, and too much praise cannot be given to the splendid collection of illustrations (115 illustrations, 18 maps and plates), the origins of which are fully cited, while cross-references attach them to the text.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES A. MONTGOMERY

HEBREW POETRY¹

Most students of Hebrew metrics are familiar with the studies in parallelism published some years since by Professor Popper in collaboration with Professor Newman. They were of immense value as a help toward the use of parallelism as a criterion of criticism. The present volume will likewise be of great use for the further study of this form of Hebrew poetry in which the author is expert.

It seems advisable, however, to call attention to some features of the present work which seem of questionable value and which may militate to some extent against its usefulness. It is, of course, natural to magnify to some extent the value of one's approach to the study of a text, but when one is told (p. viii) that the parallelistic method of criticism offers the nearest approach to scientific objectivity that can be found, that statement is so one-sided as to raise doubts. These doubts are not allayed when we find that, on the basis of a very subjective argument to the effect that Isaiah's utterances must be in poetic form, the author practically asks to be allowed to reduce the amorphous parts of Isaiah, chapters 1-39, to the dominant form by a method which seems to ignore the techniques of textual and historical criticism.

¹ *The Prophetic Poetry of Isaiah*. By W. Popper. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1931. xvi+164 pages. \$2.50.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

365

For example, it is proposed (p. viii) to restore, to the text, lines which have completely vanished, through a knowledge of Isaiah's vocabulary and his literary effect upon later writers. One does not doubt that something may be done that way, but it can be done only if control of non-Isaianic matter be previously established. In view of this it is disconcerting to find Isaiah, chapters 13 and 14, which though highly poetical are not Isaianic, in this text. Indeed, the whole matter of the previous determination of authorship is neatly dodged on page x, and the term "First Isaiah" is equated with a part of a book rather than with a person who lived in a certain historical and cultural situation. One cannot, therefore, feel comfortable about these "restorations" until one knows more about the method used in arriving at control of material.

The study of a concrete case of "restoration" of a lost line does not serve to restore confidence (cf. the treatment of 1:15c and 16 a, b, c, p. 4). It would appear that the existing text exhibits adequate parallelism:

Your hands are full of blood. Wash! Be clean!

Remove the evil of your doings from before my eyes.

Here we have two 3:2 lines both of which assert evil conduct and command desistance therefrom. Professor Popper, "restoring" a line, prints this text as follows:

Your hands are full of blood.

Your lips are defiled with lies.

Wash you!

Cleanse you!

Remove from my sight your evil deeds!

Here the restored line intrudes the fresh idea of lying. Again, the rhythmic structure is now 3:3, 1:1, 3:2. It seems to be going a little too far with parallelism when it is pursued to this extent.

Equally disconcerting is the process of reducing prose to poetry in which excisions, transpositions, and additions are made without reference to textual evidence (cf. 10:24-26+10:20, pp. 46 f.). One readily admits that there are traces of parallelism in the prosy original. Yet the wisdom of making good poetry out of awkward, ungrammatical prose with a parallelistic flavor—a prose which bears many marks of non-Isaianic origin—may be seriously questioned. It is much easier to account for the existing text on the hypothesis of editorial origin than to explain how so fine a poem as Professor Popper makes of it came to degenerate so badly.

Parallelism is no panacea for the textual ills of the Hebrew poetical writings. It is a useful criterion among many others developed in the techniques of textual and historical criticism. After all, the aim of the Bible student is to understand the life of which its literature is a deposit.

One would hazard the opinion that in the pursuit of this aim it is very much wiser to treat the text with the utmost caution and hope for the illumination of our understanding of it through archaeological, anthropological, and philological research.

W. C. GRAHAM

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF HEBREW LAW¹

The story of how Hebrew law began and developed is far more interesting than one might be inclined to think, for it is bound up with the entire social, religious, and political life of the people. When law became codified, it had long passed its initial stages, for codification presupposes manners and customs that have received binding sanction. The fundamental laws regulating tribal conduct in the matter of murder, theft, adultery, for instance, are far older than Moses. If Moses, as Smith holds, formulated them and others in a decalogue, the original of which may still be recovered by omitting later additions (Exodus, chapter 20, Deuteronomy, chapter 5), he merely extended their scope so that they were now to be observed not only within the limits of the single tribe but of the whole tribal union which he had effected. When Israel entered Canaan they came under the influence of Canaanite civilization, and in the earliest code of laws, the so-called Covenant Code (Exod. 20:23—23:33; Exod. 34:17—26), the Hebrew legislators drew "more or less directly" upon the Code of Hammurabi which had long been in operation in Canaan, selecting, modifying, and adapting the laws to their needs. As time went on, this code was revised, expanded, and brought up to date in the Deuteronomic Code of the seventh century. Under the influence of the prophets the humanitarian emphasis was made still more pronounced and the need of a religious reform was brought out in laws that demanded the centralization of Yahweh worship in one place and the abolition of all other worship. This was given effect in the reform of Josiah, in 621 B.C. After the Jews had lost their national entity, they turned to religion; and the need of transforming the state into a religious community in accordance with the demands of the times dominated the Holiness Code, which followed the Deuteronomic Code, with a larger, though not exclusive, emphasis on ritualistic and ceremonial legislation. It dominated also the Ideal Code of Ezekiel, chapters 40—48, which Smith, following Hölscher, regards as not by Ezekiel but as a composite work, combined "not later than the fifth century." The climax of the priestly legislation

¹ *The Origin and History of Hebrew Law*. By J. M. Powis Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. ix+285 pages. \$3.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

367

is reached in the Priestly Code in which several previous codes (the Holiness Code being the oldest of them) were compiled in the second half of the fourth century. It is the law of a hierarchy, not of a monarchy, of a religious community, not of a political state.

The whole movement has been described with admirable clearness by Professor Smith in his handbook, which forms an excellent introduction to the study of Old Testament legislation. Special value is added to it by the new translations of the Hammurabi, the Assyrian, and the Hittite codes in the appendixes.

JULIUS A. BEWER

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

NEW MATERIALS ON JUDAISM

When Solomon Schechter, reader of Rabbinics in Cambridge, and later president of the Jewish Theological Seminary, New York, unearthed the Geniza, the hoard of Hebrew manuscripts in Cairo, he infused new life into the study of medieval history and literature. He, himself, re-discovered in the Geniza material the text of a number of ancient works hitherto lost. After his death many boxes of Geniza manuscripts remained still to be studied and edited.

Among living Jewish scholars who have made significant use of the Geniza material are Professor Ginzberg of the Jewish Theological Seminary, who developed the Talmudic material, Professor Davidson of the Jewish Theological Seminary, who published liturgical material, and Professor Jacob Mann of the Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, whose chief interest has been the history of the Jews. Jacob Mann has already produced a monumental work in this field—*The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs* (2 vols., Oxford University Press, 1920 and 1922). Since the work was based upon hitherto unpublished manuscripts, it has shed new light on medieval Jewish history, revealing persons and events hitherto misunderstood and even entirely unknown.

The present volume¹ again makes use of new material. It contains letters by and to the famous tenth-century Spanish-Jewish statesman, Hisdai, correspondence between the various presidents of the academies in Babylon (the Gaonim), letters between Palestinian leaders in the twelfth century, and similar material. In brief, the book adds greatly to our knowledge of Jewry in Europe, Egypt, Babylon, and even in Mosul and Kurdistan.

Professor Mann gives the Hebrew of the various letters and provides

¹ *Texts and Studies in Jewish History and Literature*. By Jacob Mann. Vol. I with 27 facsimiles. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1931. xvi+728 pages. \$10.00.

a great deal of introductory explanatory text. There are also twenty-seven manuscript facsimiles.

Books of such scholarly nature cannot sell widely and must necessarily be aided by those who are willing to assist scientific research. The Abraham and Hannah Oppenheim Memorial Fund is therefore to be congratulated for helping this profound scholar publish a creative and original work.

SOLOMON B. FREEHOF

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

REFLECTIONS ON MODERN JUDAISM

This book¹ takes its name from the first essay, and contains ten others. It is an analysis of present-day Judaism in America, largely, though the conditions which prevail here obtain also in Europe, in so far as their occidentalizing and assimilating tendencies are concerned.

I doubt whether the book can be fully appreciated by any except those who have more than a superficial knowledge of the Jewish world. The thought movements, historical forces, and social attitudes, that are making—or perhaps unmaking—the Jewish life, are dwelt upon with a good deal of detail, and a note of pessimism is sounded unless the challenge of the author is accepted and his remedy applied.

The book is a soul-stirring plea for Jewish nationalism and for Palestine, its locale. In the enthusiasm for the objective which the author advocates, there is a partisanship which borders on the blind. We forgive that; nay more. Enthusiasm nearly always begets fanaticism—and this work is not devoid of that intensity which justifies the criticism that, in its desire to present the view of the author, it does violence to the facts that would weaken his point of view.

The author is a vigorous, courageous, and valiant protagonist for what he considers the solution of the baffling Jewish problem. He speaks out of the fulness of a heart embittered by the apparent uselessness and futility of the profession and practice of a large portion of modern Jewry; he is provoked by the smugness of many of the present-day leaders and their inability to see things as he sees them; he cries out with the bitterness of a soul that has been seared by the frustrations that ignorance, conceit, injustice, and malice have forced upon it; he utters his complaints against an unlistening world that offers jibes as answers to the sorrows of a people that has lived and sacrificed for the gifts it gave to an inimical world; and then is jeered at, lampooned, boycotted and quartered be-

¹ *A Rabbi Takes Stock*. By Solomon Goldman. New York: Harper, 1931. viii+247 pages. \$2.50.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

369

cause it asks for the consideration that human beings have a right to have from other beings, apparently human. And what Goldman says, he says with vigor, emphasis, courage, and conviction. Here and there the high plane of the book is marred by pedantry—but this does not occur often enough to harm the work.

I believe that the author is greatly in error when he says that "European Jewry has remained impervious to the influence of Reform Judaism, while its flamboyant 'success' in America is limited to bricks and mortar. In spite of social position, wealth, and pulpit eloquence it has nowhere gained ardent disciples." This is one of the examples of the book that overlooks totally both facts in the case and authorities. Incidentally Rabbi Goldman has a clearly partisan penchant for bolstering his own views up by citing the authorities with whom he agrees, while he neglects almost entirely those with whom he disagrees.

The whole period of American Judaism, from the time of the peak of the influx of the Jews from Germany in 1848-50 to that of the period of the peak of the immigration of Eastern Jewry to, say, 1905, was sustained by that type of Judaism known as Reform. I don't want to convey the impression that every Jew in that half-century period was a Reform Jew. I don't want to be guilty of the same fault that Goldman exhibits in his work—partisan exaggeration. What I mean to say is that the American Jews of the period I mention—the American Jews—were saved to Judaism largely by reform. There are literally thousands of American-born Jews or those who were brought here in earliest infancy, who would have severed themselves from the Jewish household, had it not been for the saving elements in the philosophy of reform. Of course, the Jews who came from Eastern Europe after 1880 were orthodox Jews. Certainly the orthodox, or so-called orthodox, Jews were in the great majority, but Rabbi Goldman says of Orthodoxy: "The end of almost a century of religious conflict in Jewry finds neither orthodoxy nor Reform worth any victory to record." To what force does the rabbi attribute the survival of the Jews of today? Surely not to Herzlian neo-nationalism! Had there been a Reform Judaism at the time of Moses Mendelssohn it is very probable that some of the best Jewish minds that found themselves unable to maintain their Jewish ritualistic and social exclusiveness would not have deserted to the dominant religion.

Dr. Goldman who is classed as a member of the conservative wing of Judaism, but does not classify himself as among any of the three, offers no solution to the theology that causes the confusion, and offers the suggestion "that if he wishes to continue the memories of the past and his Jewish personality, the Jew must assume the obligations incumbent upon

the members of the national group. He must learn its language and literature, interest himself in the upbuilding of its home, and seek to adjust its traditions and folkways, and its religious concepts to the progress of human thought. Only in this way can the Jew maintain and perpetuate the Jewish personality." I know of no leader of Reform Jewry who would take issue on this with Rabbi Goldman—except a few of the die-hard older generation of anti-Zionists. Reform, too, has developed and evolved; and in his plea for a revaluation and readjustment and reinterpretation of our traditions and folkways, Rabbi Goldman stands on thoroughly historical reform ground.

The two other outstanding essays of the book are the "Two Jankiels" in which the author draws impressive distinction between the older attitude of the Gentile Pole to the Polish Jew and the very terrible and brutal attitude of today. It is a crushing condemnation of the attitude of the so-called Christian nations toward the Jew and a magnificent plea for justice.

The book concludes with the essay "Where the Jew Feels at Home." This is a misnomer. It should have been named "Where the Nationalist Jew Feels at Home." But here again Rabbi Goldman assumes that what is true for some is true also for all—just as he assumes in other parts of the book that, what is true for many is true for all.

I regard Rabbi Goldman's book as one of the outstanding contributions to the literature of the Jew. It is an extraordinarily fine piece of work. Its philosophic approach, its historical breadth, its poetic expressions, its intense Jewishness, and its flaming justice entitles it to a place in the bookshelf of every student of religion, and every man who thinks in terms of present-day social and religious problems.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

G. GEORGE FOX

A HANDBOOK FOR JEWISH YOUTH

This is a manual¹ for the confirmation of Jewish children who are reared in the faith of Reform Judaism. Its aim is to fulfil the need of a manual of instruction for children fifteen or sixteen years of age. It is one of the better textbooks on the market, but it needs revision in a number of instances.

Pesach (Passover), Shabuoth (Pentecost), and Succoth (Tabernacles) were originally festivals of agriculture. If one cares to go back earlier, one could say that they were probably festivals to the goddess of fertility.

¹ *The Jew and His Religion*. By Leon I. Feuer and B. B. Glazer. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1931. 158 pages. \$1.25.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

371

But as a matter of fact, in the modern observance of these feasts, with the exception of Succoth, the agricultural element is not present. One misses in this section an adequate explanation of the evolution of these festivals, from the early nature or agricultural feasts to their present historical significance. Passover is now par excellence the festival of liberty for the whole Jewish people, while Shabuoth is indissolubly connected with the giving of the Ten Commandments at Sinai.

The Feast of Weeks, if one is to be historically consistent, though biblically observed only one day, is observed by traditional Jewry for two days. Reform has gone back to the one-day observance; but since the great majority of Jews still observe two days, it ought to be so stated. The same holds true for the New Year Day, or Rosh Hashanah.

The festival of Succoth does not fall five days after Atonement Day. The latter occurs on the tenth of Tishri, while the former falls on the fifteenth. This error is probably an oversight as both of the authors must know the passages on which these facts are based. Succoth according to Lev. 23:27-36 is celebrated seven days, the first and the eighth days being days of holy convocation with no servile work thereon. In verses 36 and 39 we find the statement that "on the first day there shall be a solemn rest" and on the "eighth day there shall be a solemn rest." But the festival is ordained to last only seven days. Feuer and Glazer (p. 83) state that the festival "lasts eight days with the first and eighth as days of religious assemblage and worship." The expression in verse 36, that the eighth day shall be "a day of solemn assembly, ye shall do no manner of servile work," was interpreted as being the first day of an additional feast—called "Shemini Azereth," the Feast of the Solemn Assembly. It is known thus in the Jewish calendar. The second day of this couplet, or the ninth day of Succoth, is known as Simchat Torah, and is almost universally observed. Even many reform congregations take cognizance of it. It is not quite correct to speak of eight days of Succoth without mentioning the fact that the eighth day is Shemini Azereth. Nor does one see any objection to the mention of Simchat Torah.

We are told that Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, occurs ten days after Rosh Hashanah. It does not. It occurs on the tenth day after the New Year.

On page 119 Samson Raphael Hirsch is classed among the reformers. As a matter of fact Samson Raphael Hirsch was the founder of neo-orthodoxy in Germany. It is probable that Samuel Hirsch was the reformer meant.

One misses here an adequate treatment of prophecy and the prophets,

and their influence upon Jewish life, especially since Reform Judaism stresses prophetic Judaism.

The manual in many respects is a good one, far better, I think, than most of those that are being used. The deficiencies pointed out here and a few others are not so serious that they mar to any great extent the usefulness of the book. But the manual suffers because of them. It contains some 150 pages devoted to the exposition of religion in general, the religion of Israel, and the meaning and responsibilities of confirmation and of Judaism.

G. GEORGE FOX

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

THE BIBLE AS LITERATURE

It is the contention of this book¹ that "the English Bible in the standard versions is a finer and nobler literature than the scriptures in their original tongues." This is a bold claim, for in order to make it seriously one must have first read the whole Hebrew Old Testament and the whole Greek New Testament and found them wanting. The author goes on to declare that the Authorized English Old Testament is also superior to the Septuagint and to the Latin Vulgate.

One is reminded of a woman who filled her house with copies of the old masters, and explained that, while she had never seen the originals, people who had seen them told her that her copies were better than the originals themselves. Or of those enthusiasts who tell us that the modern German versions of Shakespeare are really better than Shakespeare himself. But a translation that is "better" than its original by that very fact becomes a different thing from its original.

Of course, this attitude is not novel. In just this way Roman Catholics for centuries exalted the Latin Vulgate version over the original Greek and Hebrew. If the Greek or Hebrew differed from the Latin version, so much the worse for them. Any concern for the true meaning of the original or any effort to express it more exactly—in fact, any difference of the original from the English—becomes from this point of view a mere impertinence. The evangelists were careful to distinguish between the action of Jesus at the tomb of Lazarus and that of Peter outside the judgment hall. But any attempt to show this difference in English drives Dr. Dinsmore to ridicule. This is quite logical, for he expressly holds Tyndale to have been a better writer than the author of the Fourth Gospel, so that it does not really matter what John meant, for he was merely supplying

¹ *The English Bible as Literature*. By Charles A. Dinsmore. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1931. Pp. xii+316. \$2.50.

the raw materials for Tyndale and the King James translators to shape up in their superior way.

Blind imitations of Greek idioms, alien to English usage, are pictured by Dr. Dinsmore as matchless beauties of English style; for example, the ordinary Greek prolepsis "Consider the lilies, how they grow," which has never become English usage, "introduces a clear image," we are told, "the definite image of lilies." It is perhaps a pity that the more definite it is the more mistaken it is, since modern learning is pretty well agreed that the word means simply "flowers." Dr. Dinsmore's quotations of special versions—Tyndale, Douai, King James—are often inexact. Tyndale's rendering of John 11:35 was not "Jesus wept," nor did he say "which was made" in John 1:3. The Rheims-Douai does not read "just men made perfect," p. 87. It does not say, "What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder," nor "the rich he hath sent empty away." These details seriously affect the author's argument.

The most fatal consequences of Dr. Dinsmore's approach to the Bible are in his judgments upon its authors. We are condescendingly told that Matthew "has no feeling for sentence structure," and that his "vocabulary is limited" (p. 267). This of the man who gave us the Beatitudes, and the Lord's Prayer, in short, the Sermon on the Mount—the author of what Renan called the "Greatest Book in the World." James is "a plain matter of fact man," who places "his solid sentences side by side without much organization." "The Epistle of Peter (!) is like the letter of an old man to his children. It is simple, practical, without imagination, . . ." The writer of the epistles of John "is not a master of words, and his vocabulary is limited." Much of the Revelation "consists of grotesque imagery constructed without a particle of inspiration."

This is the impression of these great books which Dr. Dinsmore's English Bible has given him! Could any indictment of it be more severe? What his book really demonstrates is the literary failure of the standard versions, and the proof is all the more convincing because the author is seeking to prove the exact opposite.

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE AMERICAN BIBLE

The *American Translation of the Old Testament*¹ and Professor Goodspeed's *New Testament—An American Translation* have both been before

¹ *The Bible: An American Translation*. The Old Testament translated by a group of scholars under the editorship of J. M. Powis Smith; the New Testament translated by Edgar J. Goodspeed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. xvii+1619, iv+418 pages. \$3.50.

the public for a long enough time now to demonstrate their merit and permanent value. It is a very great convenience to have the two volumes bound as one, and it is a great advantage to be able to purchase the volume for \$3.50. This will appeal to students.

One feature which adds enormously to the readable qualities of the Old Testament is to be found in the page-captions and subheads. The ordinary reader thumbing over the pages will gain some idea of what the Bible is all about; and the student will have a convenient guide to its contents. These captions are very well selected and well phrased.

There is only one complaint to make about the new volume, and that is the quality of the paper used, which is not opaque enough.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

A CRITICISM OF ARAMAIC ORIGINALS

The whole subject of Aramaisms in the New Testament has been discussed in a general way for some time by grammarians, providing an interesting successor to the controversy between purists and Hebraists of an earlier day. It has been, however, until lately, universally supposed that the Greek New Testament was written originally in Greek. Recently the claim has been made that parts of it were written first in Hebrew or Aramaic or even in Latin, and then translated. Colwell's book,¹ deals with that example of these translation theories which has received the most varied support, or at least is best known. That the Gospel of John is based upon an Aramaic source was made the thesis of a work by the late C. F. Burney of Oxford ten years ago, and has been independently supported by a few Americans—Torrey, Montgomery, and Burrows. Neither this nor other theories like it won much interest from German scholars, while others who have discussed it in English unfavorably have given it no systematic treatment.

This lack is now supplied in a patient and complete study by a young Chicago Ph.D. He lists the principal examples of "Aramaisms" in sentence structure, in parts of speech, and in Greek mistranslation as offered by the four scholars above named, and he subjects each example to analysis. How shall we decide whether they are really Aramaisms? It is possible sometimes to quote the opinions of other authorities, and this Colwell has done extensively, perhaps too extensively. In most cases the proponents of the theory do not agree among themselves. But a still more objective criterion is desirable. After all, the first question to be asked

¹ *The Greek of the Fourth Gospel*. By Ernest C. Colwell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. 143 pages. \$2.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

375

about a possible Aramaism is, Does it really differ from ordinary Greek usage? This is a "control" that the proponents have almost entirely ignored. Their attention being fixed on Semitic idiom on the one hand and on the Greek of John on the other, the likenesses between the two seemed sufficient evidence of a real Aramaic descent. This easy fallacy is challenged now by the obvious control of comparing some other popular Greek of the early Roman empire. Colwell selected the discourses of Epictetus and a large number of papyri. For nearly every alleged example of Aramaism he found that these writings with no Semitic influence behind them provide more or less numerous examples. To the present writer the confutation seems complete and the conclusion not overstated: "There is here nothing to justify the claim that the author of the Fourth Gospel thought in Aramaic or wrote in Aramaic."

That is not to say that the theory of Aramaic origin will not still find supporters. Experience suggests that the demonstration of a sound technique like that of Colwell is a somewhat thankless service. What is left for the Aramaists to stand on? They will use the same examples with no new evidence or argument. They will, in Proteus fashion, produce a new collection of Aramaisms from John, no more significant and no better tested. They will declare that without expert knowledge of Semitic languages no one has a right to doubt their examples, no matter how commonplace these may seem to the Hellenist. They will assert in a general way and without statistics the greater frequency of the given idiom in John, even though they admit that it is possible Greek. They will continue to trust a kind of subjective assurance as to the "Aramaic coloring of style." And they will regard the adding together of many weak items as a strong cumulative argument. But even if they do so in the future, it is well that the fallacy of method in their efforts of the past should have been well exposed to the scrutiny of impartial judges who may come upon this book. So a brilliant but ill-founded hypothesis may be prevented from becoming, as so often in the past, an authoritative position of New Testament criticism.

HENRY J. CADBURY

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

A PHASE OF PAULINE THEOLOGY

The main contention of this book¹ is that Paul as a Christian did not give up the belief which he had held as a Pharisee, that God holds man responsible for his conduct, and recompenses him according as it is good

¹ *St. Paul's Conception of Recompense*. By Floyd V. Filson. (*Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament*, herausgegeben von H. Windisch, Heft 21). Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1931. 152 pages. Unbound M. 9.00; bound M. 11.50.

or bad. In a thorough and careful discussion of the relevant passages in the letters of the apostle, Professor Filson conclusively refutes the view maintained by G. P. Wetter (*Der Vergeltungsgedanke bei Paulus*, 1912) that the recompense principle had no real importance in his Christian thinking. About the fate of those who have never heard the gospel message Paul does not speculate; all that can be gathered from his meager statements on this matter is that he thought that some of them would be saved, so that he evidently did not think that their fate was determined solely by the recompense principle. For those who have heard the gospel and have rejected it, the principle operates strictly; they are punished for their sin in this life and at the last judgment are finally and irrevocably condemned. Even for Christians the principle is still operative; while Paul encourages an attitude of assurance he nevertheless recognizes that no Christian is beyond the possibility of final rejection. Moreover, the apostle teaches that in the life to come each individual Christian will receive a reward based upon his life-record; this phase of the principle of recompense is clearly and persistently asserted.

What place, then, is left in the thought of the apostle for the operation of the contrary principle of free grace in God's dealings with men? This is the real problem. Professor Filson recognizes that unquestionably "the Apostle was overwhelmed by a sense of the undeserved goodness of God to him and to all Christians," and promises to "attempt the difficult task of stating as clearly as may be possible the relation of the two seemingly inconsistent thought groups to one another." But he has really nothing more to say than that "Paul held the two lines of thought together at the same time and without any feeling of inconsistency." This is merely to state the problem, not to solve it. And to say that "Paul felt that the grace offered to him at conversion was not given in violation of the recompense principle" is surely to attribute to him a flagrant contradiction in terms. It would seem that Professor Filson himself does not feel the difficulty keenly, for he can say that believers are saved "only by a special application of the recompense principle, which spent its force on Jesus the guiltless instead of on those whose guilt really made them liable to punishment." How a "recompense principle" can be so applied that the guiltless is punished while the guilty escape, he does not think it necessary to explain. He is evidently still satisfied with an interpretation of the atonement which sets the rules of logic at defiance. And so, while his book is useful as a clear statement of the Pauline teaching about recompense, it contributes nothing to the solution of the problem of the relation of the principle of recompense to the still more fundamentally Pauline principle of grace.

YALE UNIVERSITY

J. Y. CAMPBELL

CRITICAL REVIEWS

377

PAULINE MYSTICISM¹

A quarter of a century of continuous study and criticism has further entrenched Dr. Schweitzer in the position that Paul as well as Jesus can be understood only on the assumption of a thoroughgoing eschatology. The book sets forth this thesis and shows its implications.

Paul is presented as a man of deep mystical experience and as the author of a completely logical system of mystical thought (p. 139). He is unique in that he "is the only Christian thinker who knows only 'Christ-mysticism'" (p. 5). The Fourth Gospel and Ignatius teach "God-mysticism" and have bequeathed it to the church. This distinction is fundamental since Jewish transcendentalism would have made God-mysticism impossible. Paul defines the Christian life as "being-in-Christ" (p. 3). He never once mentions the gentile notion of "rebirth" but consistently writes of "a dying and rising again" in Christ. Thus he is Jewish throughout and needs no Hellenistic explanation of his doctrine. Resemblances with Hellenism there may be, but no dependence.

The apostle serves as a bridge from the primitive Jewish phase to the later Hellenistic character of Christianity. Until he added the two doctrines of the mystical union with Christ and of the sacramental character of the Baptism and Supper, early Christianity was not Hellenizable. That change may have been necessary for the time. But to Paul the church must return. He was the truest interpreter of Jesus, whose message he has not changed, but included within his own. He added only that which the facts of the death, resurrection, and mystical Christian experience made necessary for the completing of the gospel. In Paul are united the two essential elements of the Christian religion: personal redemption and loyalty to the Kingdom of God (pp. 394-96).

For this picture Dr. Schweitzer uses only seven letters as genuinely Pauline. One is surprised to find that even II Thessalonians has to go, along with Colossians, Ephesians, and the Pastorals. The book is readable and suggestive. Finally, we are given a full presentation of the eschatological doctrine.

J. T. CARLYON

LIFF SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

PAULINE VIEWS ON WOMAN AND MARRIAGE²

Paul has much to say on the function of women in the Christian community, and his opinions have always aroused sharp discussion. This,

¹ *The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle*. By Albert Schweitzer. Translated from the German by William Montgomery. New York: Holt, 1931. xv+411 pages. \$3.00.

² *Paulus Stellung zu Frau und Ehe*. By Gerhard Delling. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1931. x+166 pages. M. 7.50.

however, is the first book in which his attitude to women and marriage has been taken as a subject by itself and thoroughly investigated. In the earlier part of his work the author deals at length with the place of women in ancient society, Pagan and Jewish. He collects a large amount of interesting material, often from out-of-the-way sources, and arrives at some unexpected conclusions. He makes it clear that in the Hellenistic world, from the time of Alexander onward, a much greater respect was paid to women than is commonly supposed. Pagan thought never attained to a truly ethical conception of marriage, yet in spite of the general laxity in sexual relations the Pagan estimate of women was on a higher level than the Jewish. In actual Jewish practice, women were accorded an honorable place, but religion, as formulated by the Rabbis, always treated them as inferior. Almost all references to women in the rabbinical maxims are of a slighting and sometimes of a brutal character. No attempt was made to invest the relations of men and women with a moral and spiritual value. In the main part of the book the attitude of Paul himself comes under review. Dr. Delling takes up one by one all the relevant passages, and examines particularly the problems connected with mixed marriages, the wearing of the veil, spiritual betrothals, divorce and re-marriage, religious danger in the sexual life. He concludes that on all this side of his thinking Paul was influenced to the end by his rabbinical education. In all the Epistles his attitude to women is one of aversion; the marriage union is permitted grudgingly, by way of a concession to human weakness. Not only does Paul take over the current Jewish ideas, but he is confirmed in them by his peculiar doctrine of the opposition of flesh and spirit. The sexual life, as he regards it, belongs pre-eminently to the sphere of the flesh, and can therefore be nothing but a hindrance to the union of the believer with Christ. Even when he appears to look favorably on marriage, Paul does not value it for its own sake. He writes as a Christian missionary and judges this relation, like others, from the point of view of its usefulness to the mission. His regulations all have as their object not so much the ennobling of the sexual side of life as the reconciling of a very disturbing factor with the needs of the brotherhood. A chapter is devoted to the question as to whether personal as well as theological motives may have contributed to Paul's dislike of women. Had he himself been married? Had he passed through some experience which left him hostile to all relations of a purely emotional kind? Like most excursions into psychology this chapter is unsatisfactory. It has to be acknowledged frankly that we know nothing of Paul's earlier life and that all theories based on imaginary history are utterly worthless. We are doubtful whether some of the conclusions of the book are entirely sound

CRITICAL REVIEWS

379

even when they are based on fact. The passages adduced to prove that Paul had an aversion to women and marriage may well be interpreted in a different sense. That he regarded some women as among his best helpers is certain; that he wrote some noble passages about the marriage union is no less so. Admitting with our author that he never shook himself free of certain rags of Jewish prejudice, it may yet be claimed for Paul that he did more than any other man to lift the relations of men and women to a higher plane. Dr. Delling, however, has given us a highly interesting book, which is perhaps the more useful because it is sometimes provocative. Perhaps the most valuable part of it is the opening section on the position of women in the ancient world. The student will here find a mass of material which has never before been so succinctly put together, and in the light of it he may form his own judgment as to whether, and in what directions, Paul made an advance on the ideas of his time.

E. F. SCOTT

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

JÜLICHER'S *INTRODUCTION* RE-EDITED

Why is a standard handbook on *New Testament Introduction* permitted to pass out of date? It is twelve years since Moffatt's has been even slightly retouched, and no less than twenty-five years elapsed between the "sixth" and the current editions of Jülicher's excellent work. One, therefore, anticipates a great deal in the present form of what has been a very useful text.¹

In spite of his blindness, Jülicher has rewritten the sections on Paul (not including the Pastorals), canon, and text. The treatment of the Pastorals, Catholics, Apocalyptic, Gospels, and Acts is by Professor Erich Fascher, who is chiefly known by his critical study of *Formgeschichte*. Since the new edition is forty-eight pages longer than the former, the work has been rewritten and published by new plates. However, since new materials are largely by way of addition, the change is not radical. Interestingly enough, some of the most thorough rewriting is done in the sections revised by Professor Jülicher: he now doubts the authenticity of II Thessalonians, he has a new judgment of the conflict in Galatia, he decisively rejects the popular hypothesis of an Ephesian imprisonment. Naturally, not much alteration appears in the section on the canon, but the study of the text takes account of the most recent studies.

It is to be expected that a current edition of a standard work will in

¹ *Einleitung in das Neue Testament*. By Adolf Jülicher. (Siebente Auflage; neubearbeitet in Verbindung mit Erich Fascher.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1931. xvi+630 pages Bound M. 22; unbound M. 20.

general maintain the point of view which was achieved originally. This follows even when an older work is revised by a new hand, as is so frequently the case in Germany. One does, however, expect that the 1931 edition of a work already twenty-five years old will give clear-cut evidence of the taking into account of new views. This may the more be expected when the work deals with the Gospels and Acts, in which fields so much that is new has appeared since 1906. Doubtless it is because of Fascher's generally negative attitude toward *Formgeschichte* that the treatment of the Gospels departs so slightly from the older standard. Curiously enough, Fascher passes directly from the discussion of the two-document hypothesis to form-criticism, taking no account of the multiple-document hypothesis which was developed by the late Professor Burton (in 1906) and Canon Streeter (in 1921-24). This is not because the current Jülicher does not notice English and American work. But it is odd that Burton's work is known only from the sketch of it in his *Teaching of Jesus* and not from his important *Essay* and the Burton and Goodspeed *Harmonies*, and that the dissertation of Perry is known, while those of Parsons and Wickes are not.

It is impossible to escape the impression that the personal bias of Fascher is the determining force. Such a judgment comes from the reading of his treatment of the Pastorals or, for example, the Epistle of James. Fascher apparently is unaware of or hostile to Weidinger's *Die Haustafeln*, although this work may be expected profoundly to affect the study of the Pastorals. The work of Dibelius on James is mentioned (although Dibelius' name does not occur in the Index), but it can hardly be said that it is taken with due seriousness; the literary fabrication of Arnold Meyer is fully discussed, and the conclusion reached that a literary reconstruction of the primitive Jewish source solves the problem of James. In the Gospels section, again, the well-known works on form-criticism are mentioned, but they are not objectively presented. Bultmann is much more adequately reported than are Dibelius and Schmidt. Professor Case's articulation of social history is not known.

The general point of view of the 1906 edition on the Fourth Gospel and Acts is maintained, that is, a fairly negative attitude toward the traditions. The recently popular theory of Semitic sources in these books is noted in the bibliographies only.

On the whole, it is regrettable that the advance made by the original Jülicher is not maintained in the seventh edition. To be sure, the work is of great value. But to be fully up to date the New Testament student

CRITICAL REVIEWS

381

must go to special studies. Especially to be regretted is that he cannot find in the current Jülicher a unified point of view from which he can survey the rise of New Testament literature in its evolution.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

DONALD W. RIDDLE

ORIGEN'S COMMENTARIES ON MATTHEW

The study in this number of "Texte und Untersuchungen"¹ is preparatory to the volume of Origen which will appear in the Berlin edition under the supervision of the authors. Their aim is not only to expound the principles on which they are reconstructing the text but to enlist the co-operation of scholars who may be able to set them on the track of further material. Origen's *Commentaries on Matthew* present a textual problem of peculiar interest and difficulty. Of the twenty-five "tomoi" into which the work was divided only eight (x-xvii) are now preserved in Greek. It is certain, however, that until the end of the tenth century the *Commentaries* were known in their complete form, and that they were twice translated into Latin and were largely employed by the Latin patristic writers. Klostermann and Benz have set themselves to recover as much as possible of the missing text, both from quotations in Greek writings and from Latin commentaries in which Origen is often plundered without acknowledgment. The book is a marvel of patient research and of ingenious yet thoroughly sound criticism. By their skilful methods the editors have undoubtedly succeeded in restoring large portions of the mutilated work. Not only so, but they make it pretty certain that the eight books which survive in Greek were in the nature of an abridgment, which can be filled up in some measure from the use of the complete work by Latin writers. There is much in the inquiry which will appeal only to patristic specialists, but all New Testament students will be interested in the reconstruction of such a passage as that which contains the famous quotation of the story of the rich young ruler from the Gospel of the Hebrews. Apart, too, from its positive results the book is well worth studying as an object lesson in the restoration, by modern critical methods, of an ancient text.

E. F. SCOTT

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

¹ *Zur Überlieferung der Matthäuserklärung der Origenes*. By E. Klostermann and E. Benz. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1931. viii+168 pages. M. 13.80.

TEXTS IN MARTYROLOGY

As parts of "Historical and Linguistic Studies in Literature Related to the New Testament" these two small books¹ make available important documents in the martyrology of the early church. The Ethiopic text is printed with a comprehensive critical apparatus showing the variations in the different manuscripts, and there follows an accurate translation into good English. In each case there is also a concise, yet comprehensive, Introduction. Thus these documents will be useful to many students of church history who know no Ethiopic.

The story of Eugenia and Philip concerns a beautiful girl and her father, the governor of Alexandria in the time of Commodus. The girl by donning a monk's garb was accepted as a man and became abbot of a monastery. Later she revealed herself to her father, who thereby was converted to Christianity, and eventually became a patriarch. Finally Philip and then Eugenia were victims of persecution.

Paul, rather than Pelagia, is the chief character of the other story, which concerns also a lion which Paul had converted. When Paul was put into the theater and a lion sent in to devour him the animal proved to be his old friend. After mutual recognition they were allowed to depart together. Pelagia was a pious woman who renounced the world, including her husband. When she remained steadfast and met the threats of persecution bravely, her husband fell on his sword and died.

O. R. SELLERS

PRESBYTERIAN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

BIBLICAL AND EARLY CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Some of the most valuable work in recent German theology² is by Catholic scholars, and for this reason is the more welcome. One cannot but feel that in Germany as elsewhere the Protestant ideas have been pressed too far by many of our modern teachers. We need to be reminded that the older views have still something to say for themselves. They help us to a better perspective when they are upheld, as in the present instance, by a writer whose learning and competence are beyond dispute. Professor Wagner's earlier work on the moral conception in ancient ethic is well

¹ *The Story of Eugenia and Philip* (Part III: *Ethiopic Martyrdoms*). By Edgar J. Goodspeed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. 21 pages. \$1.00; *The Epistle of Pelagia* (Part III: *Ethiopic Martyrdoms*). By Edgar J. Goodspeed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. 14 pages. \$1.00.

² *Der Sittlichkeitsbegriff in der Heiligen Schrift und in der altchristlichen Ethik*. By Friedrich Wagner. Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlag, 1931. vii+280 pages. M. 14.40.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

383

known, and he has followed it by this more definite study of the ethical teaching of the Old and New Testaments and of the Fathers down to Augustine. His aim is to bring out the changes involved in ethical thinking when morality is inseparably linked with religion. He shows how in the Old Testament, even in the early documents and in the apparently secular Wisdom literature, the moral and religious motives were bound up with each other. In the great Prophets they were deepened and purified, but the unity of ethic and religion was still more strongly asserted. For Jesus himself moral action had its one spring in obedience to the will of God, and the later Christian teachers, while presenting their thought in varying forms, are faithful in this respect to the ethic of Jesus. Dr. Wagner insists, in a number of very suggestive passages, that between the religious motive and the impulse to do right for its own sake there is no real conflict. Conscience and religion both act most powerfully when they recognize their common ground and work hand in hand. On critical and historical questions Dr. Wagner has little to say. His thought is nowhere inconsistent with the critical outlook, but apparently he feels himself constrained, as a good Catholic, to keep within the bounds prescribed by his church. He never discusses the relation of Jesus to the Law and the apocalyptic hope or the mingling of Jewish and Hellenistic elements in the ethic of Paul. His treatment would have gained by some attempt to place the Christian conceptions in their historical framework; but it is refreshing to have them examined for once as they are in themselves, without the constant reference to alien ideas which often have little to do with them. In the second part of his book, where he deals with the ethical teaching of the Fathers, the author can allow himself a fuller liberty. He is thoroughly at home with his material, and has done a real service by the emphasis he lays on the ethical interest which underlies the whole patristic literature. So much attention has been concentrated on the theology of the Fathers that their effort to formulate a new ethic on the basis of the new religion is usually left out of sight. In this part of the book there is nothing to which the Protestant reader can take exception. It is indeed surprising and not a little gratifying to discover, all through the book, that the Catholic bias hardly disturbs the fundamental ideas. The author's position is the broadly Christian one, and without the information on the title page one would seldom guess to which side of the church he belongs.

E. F. SCOTT

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE CHRISTIAN PEOPLE IN HISTORY

Authors of manuals in the field of church history have manifested only slight contacts with the changing interests which demand the attention of present-day historians. With marked uniformity they have been content to write and label their productions as church history or the history of Christianity. The appearance of a history of the Christian people is welcome evidence of a changing viewpoint.¹ In contrast to the customary procedure of making ecclesiastical institutions and formal doctrines the central themes of church history, Professor Rowe has succeeded in making institutional and doctrinal developments more real by focusing interest upon the life, thought, and activities of Christian people who have lived in successive ages amidst an ever changing social environment. His work manifests a familiarity with the findings of technical research in church history and related fields, a conscious effort at objectivity which results in fairness and reserve in the statement of most diverse opinions and practices of groups of Christian people, and skill in selecting from the mass of materials those developments which are of most significance. Certain features make this book especially suitable for use as a textbook for brief courses in church history such as the carefully planned topical division of each of the thirty chapters, the improved periodization, the inclusion of aids to study which will serve to lead students into larger fields of inquiry, and the reading lists which are admirably adapted to the needs of students who are beginning study in this field. More than one-third of the volume is devoted to post-Reformation history. The history of Christian people in the Continental, English, and American areas is blended in an effective manner. For the first time a manual of church history is available which gives a record of essential facts with a balanced and undistorted emphasis upon genetic relationships, environmental influences, creative personalities, the principle of development, and the continuity of Christian history.

The marks of the pruning hook inevitably appear in a work of this type. Here they are evidenced most seriously in sections dealing with missions among the early Germanic invaders of the Roman Empire, Christian mysticism, conciliarism in the medieval Church, seventeenth-century Anglicanism, and recent Roman Catholicism. Perhaps the history of the Christian people could have been made more real by passing mention of such personalities as Clovis, Peter the Lombard, and Thomas à Kempis. Certainly William Laud should receive attention in any ac-

¹ *History of the Christian People*. By Henry K. Rowe. New York: Macmillan, 1931. vi+534 pages. \$4.00.

count of the Christian people in England in the seventeenth century. Whether friends or foes they were forced to deal with Laud and the memory of his program. The presentation of bibliographical suggestions and references to source materials in footnotes or at the end of each topical discussion would have made the way somewhat easier for the student with an inquiring mind. A more generous distribution of dates would have given a clearer conception of time-sequence. The sketch of St. Francis, for instance, leaves the reader in doubt as to when St. Francis lived. The Index is defective and this diminishes the value of the book for reference purposes. For example, the ideas of Immanuel Kant are presented in an excellent summary in the text, but his name does not appear in the Index. Despite minor defects this book deserves rank as the most satisfactory single-volume textbook in English on church history. It is also well adapted to the needs of the general reader who will be attracted by the clear narrative style. It will prove very helpful as a book which pastors and directors of religious education may use in the needed service of acquainting their people with the Christian people of the past.

J. MINTON BATTEN

SCARRITT COLLEGE

A POPULAR CRITIQUE OF CHRISTIANITY

To judge by reviews, Mr. Browne's version of the history of Christianity has gained some acceptance among the "intellectuals" as substantially the truth on the subject. Thus his book¹ has more than its intrinsic significance. Mr. Browne's only indication of his preparation for his subject is found in footnotes designed "for the lay reader." If we may infer from these, he has read in authorities of merit and of various tendencies. Out of his reading he has come to a high degree of certainty about most things, including some which really are still *sub judice*. His general attitude toward Christianity is suggested in the book's motto, Lord Morley's sentence "It is only when men have ceased to dispute whether Christianity was a revelation, that they have eyes to see what service it has rendered as a system." His tone is not generally sympathetic, because of considerable subdued irony and disposition to play up small occasions of derision, nor is it unfriendly. The most satisfactory method of review will be to state briefly his views about a few principal matters.

At the outset he says, "No one can say now just who Jesus was, or what he taught," but a little later "it is quite clear that he taught some

¹ *Since Calvary: An Interpretation of Christian History*. By Lewis Browne. New York: Macmillan, 1931. xiii+441 pages. \$3.50.

such perfectionist code of ethics as this first [Jerusalem] congregation of his followers tried to practice." "In the faith of the early church" there were three elements: "an apocalyptic hope that Christ would soon return, a conviction that the practice of Christ's ethical teachings would hasten the return, and a belief that the observance of certain sacraments would assure one of salvation in the hour of that return." On this last element Mr. Browne dilates somewhat, but without any citations from Christian writings in support. The sacraments were not primitive, because "the disciples at Jerusalem knew nothing of these or any other sacraments." They came in at Antioch, where the religion centering in Jesus met and was assimilated to the religion of mystery cults. "It is certain" that Paul—whom Mr. Browne highly admires—encouraged this development. He wrought out a sacramental religion centering not in Jesus but in "Kyrios Christos." On page 42 we are told that Paul's only requirement was belief that Jesus was Lord, and on page 44 that "one thing seemed to him absolutely obligatory: to be saved one must observe the sacraments."

Luther, Mr. Browne grievously underestimates, both as a person and as a force. He is depicted as having started a revolution which he did not understand and which went too fast for him, and as being used by the princes who wanted church property. The Lutheran Reformation was mainly a political affair motivated by princely ambition and greed. But "Calvin was the most influential figure in the whole Reformation movement"; and Calvinism was one of the forces making the modern world, because it appealed to and influenced the most progressive peoples, and "helped to bring into being this whole capitalistic civilization we live in today."

Concerning Christianity since the Reformation, Mr. Browne seems uncertain as to whether Roman Catholicism or Protestantism has more faults. Protestantism's main characteristics are sectarian "disintegration," opposition to intellectual progress, and extravagant emotionalism. "Frenetic" is a favorite word with Mr. Browne. Throughout his book he emphasizes manifestations in Christianity to which this might be applied, but this is especially true regarding modern history. Of Wesley he says: "Swept up in his own holy frenzy, the people would begin to shout and scream hysterically. They would fall to the ground in seizures, etc." Such things of course occurred under Wesley's early preaching; but these sentences are offered as a description of the effect of his work, and as such they are a gross misrepresentation. Mr. Browne gives two pages to the Irvingites and the Plymouth Brethren, and refers to the Oxford movement in a very short footnote. The modern history of Christianity is a

difficult subject, and it has been too difficult for Mr. Browne. It is easier to pick out extravagant phenomena and things eliciting smiles than to interpret the spiritual life of nations. Mr. Browne writes thus of the eighteenth century in America: "Men like Jonathan Edwards, George Whitefield and Herbert (*sic*) Asbury had kept the colonists in a state of almost uninterrupted religious excitement until the outbreak of the American Revolution gave the populace a new vent for its overwrought nerves"—which is merely ridiculous. He has made a remarkable discovery about recent events in America. The Russian hostility to religion has caused "a revolution against all forms of free-thought" in the Protestant denominations, which appears as "either a crypto-Catholic sacramentalism or a vituperatively evangelistic obscurantism." Mr. Browne's last page is about fundamentalism, which seems to him the main issue of Protestant Christianity to date. What Christianity has done in the last two centuries in missions, education, and social reform he thinks of subordinate importance. His treatment of recent Christian history forces on the mind a criticism applicable to the whole book; it is not recognized that since church history began there has been in the world what may be called the Christian spirit, and that this has had effect.

ROBERT HASTINGS NICHOLS

AUBURN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

FROM PLATO TO PIUS IX

Mr. Norman Towar Boggs has written a two-volume work of some distinction on the history of Christianity.¹ The point of view is that Christianity and the "Christendom" that through history has been its vehicle have fulfilled their cycle and must pass away. This is associated with the idea that Christianity is essentially European. It is, therefore, studied almost exclusively in its European environment—a defect which appears in some degree in many writers who, unlike Mr. Boggs, would gladly avoid it if they could. This unjustifiable limitation of viewpoint may explain the lack of attention, except in easy generalizations, to the phenomena of Christianity in the last two generations, during which this moribund or dead religion has been exhibiting strange symptoms of vitality in most non-European lands. Even on that continent some impressive data of its recent history might have been discovered.

The method of the book can be largely dissociated, however, from the favorite opinions of the author. In most paragraphs Mr. Boggs writes as

¹ *The Christian Saga*. By Norman Towar Boggs. New York: Macmillan, 1931. Vol. I, 571 pages; Vol. II, 575-1082 pages. Both volumes \$9.00.

a dispassionate student of social and cultural history, and with evidence of extensive research and thoughtful reflection. A more logically or chronologically developed history would have lost much of the charm of this rather unsystematic work. The author is enabled, by the omission or casual treatment of much that is stressed by the average professional historian, to feature aspects of the development of Christianity which are frequently ignored. In particular, his apt use of illustration, from the varied expressions in popular literature of men's reactions to the official religion of the West, are of the highest value; as are also his selections from many little-known works of ecclesiastics.

The book is in no sense one for beginners, either in general history or in church history. It is neither pictorial nor simple enough to keep up the interest of other than toughened students. There are probably few books more uneven in style. Almost always grave, Mr. Boggs is sometimes eloquent, sometimes almost sublime. At other times, and all too frequently, he lapses into unpardonable banalities. Surely Princeton never taught him to write such sentences as: "Unfortunately the answer to these questions is neither of them easy" (I, 290). What is meant by "the appraisal of the lives of the average Christian"? (I, 166). Writing of this stylistic level should have no place in a work enriched by noble passages reminiscent of the more distinguished of the older historians. The proof-reader, too, has left for our amusement a large number of choice "slips that pass in the night," e.g., "Erasmuc," "Vallo," "Canasius," "sholastic."

Among prominent defects may be mentioned the failure to present any adequate conception of the evolution of church organization, a subject to which Mr. Boggs makes only a clumsy approach, and the casual and unconvincing treatment of church worship, art, and architecture. In some instances, where weighty matters are omitted, this is evidently due to the author's deliberate decision to avoid trodden ground. But sometimes we are obliged to suppose a lack of information or of clear perception of the facts. It is regrettable, for instance, that the scant references to the Irish church and its influence should include the astonishing confusion of Columba of Iona with Columban of Luxeuil (I, 345).

The Graeco-Roman background of Christianity is treated by Mr. Boggs with unusual care and fulness. Among the best sections of the work are the chapters on the Renaissance and Reformation (II, 575 ff.) which contain fresh illustrative material and many brilliant and penetrating judgments. Unlike most writers who profess to treat the whole era of Christianity, Mr. Boggs bestows due attention on the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and here he skilfully selects the important

issues in thought and social conditions in which Christianity and civilization can be seen in interplay or in entanglement, besides bringing the central personalities clearly into view. But the latest events to which attention is directed are those of 1871. This seems an unjustifiable avoidance of any historical approach to the issue of the present status and future survival of Christianity, concerning which the author's opinions are pronounced but rather unimpressive.

With qualifications, then, this work is sincerely recommended to all who would enlarge their familiarity with the phenomena that must be considered in any evaluation of European Christianity, or, more accurately, of European culture from Plato to Pius IX.

JOHN T. MCNEILL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE PRINCE OF DARKNESS

Although the Devil as a supernatural personage appears before Christianity, he holds a function so important and peculiar in the history of Christian belief that some surprise is justified at the neglect of the subject by the historians of theology. Even the doctrinal writers of the devil-ridden ages of the church seldom devoted treatises to the Devil. Yet they accorded him and his innumerable cohorts ample incidental notice; and the popular literature of the whole Christian era is full of materials from which enlightened moderns, whose opportunities of personal acquaintance with his Satanic Majesty are relatively slight, may obtain the fullest particulars concerning his person, aids, sphere and methods of activity, and how he may be combatted. Investigation of the field has been made by a series of non-theological writers, with fruitful results. One of the better class of such works is that by Arturo Graf, the Italian poet and scholar, written in 1889 and now first translated into English by Edward Noble Stone, with annotations by the translator.¹ The book is in fifteen chapters arranged topically. Except for the chapters on "Magic" and "Hell," in which the theme broadens out, Graf sticks as closely to his subject as possible in view of the great elusiveness of the latter. His materials are mainly medieval.

Graf holds that the Devil was believed in before any powerful gods. Neither the Greeks nor the Romans deified the spirit of evil; but the concept of Satan is seen evolving in the Old Testament, and was taken up by Christianity in which Satan attained the fulness of his being. His gigantic figure in Christianity is in part a reflection of the Christian reaction to the

¹ *The Story of the Devil*. By Arturo Graf (trans. by Edward Noble Stone). New York: Macmillan, 1931. xiv+296 pages. \$3.00.

incurable corruption of paganism. He is, too, the symbol of the fear and torment by which men's minds were dominated in the Middle Ages. The discussion of "the person of the Devil" is taken up with the numberless fascinating or bestial metamorphoses assumed by the fiend; the result is aptly described as "diabolic zoölogy" (p. 36). The plurality of diabolic persons imports great complexity into any attempt to characterize the Devil, a fact suggested by the estimate of one theologian that there were ten thousand billions of devils all differing in their talents and functions. The Devil as tempter, his frauds, and his loves are treated in sufficient detail, and there is a somewhat sketchy chapter on "pacts with the Devil." Two chapters are given to the exploration of Hell, and two to the defeats of the Devil, showing, in a manner that an earlier generation would have known how to prize examples of the ways by which he has at various times been foiled. In popular thought the Devil was often droll and sometimes pious and honorable. The book closes with a chapter on the "end" or passing of the Devil, in which the author perhaps overstates the neglect with which he is treated by moderns and taunts the contemporary Pope Leo XIII for his naïve belief in the Adversary. To many today it is not quite so clear as to Signor Graf in 1889 that "civilization has conquered hell and has, forever, redeemed us from the Devil."

This sublime assurance of a human triumph over the powers of darkness is not a feature of the recent historical study of the Devil by Maximilian Rudwin, who is the author of six other books on phases of the subject which he now presents as a whole.¹ The devil is here the personification of fundamental Evil, which in all religions is in conflict with the Good. Having made the Devil a life-study, Rudwin writes as an expert, and his book is both highly informing and of unfailing interest. In the arrangement of topics there is considerable resemblance to Graf's book, but materials are selected from a wide field, and the point of view owes nothing to the earlier writer. The Bible, church fathers, scholastics, reformers, romanticists, rationalists, and numerous contemporary investigators bring grist to Rudwin's mill. He employs a whimsical style, which entirely dissolves the element of horror. Indeed, with this book in hand it becomes possible to spend a very pleasant and profitable evening with the Devil. There are, it must be added, a few slips in sentence structure, though these may perhaps be charged to the proofreader who has let by some rather striking printer's errors.

Of the twenty-two chapters I find those of greatest informational value to be "The Legend of Lucifer" (i), "The Devil-Compact in Legend and

¹ *The Devil in Legend and Literature*. By Maximilian Rudwin. Chicago: Open Court, 1931. 354 pages. \$3.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

391

Literature" (xvi and xvii), and "The Salvation of Satan in Modern Poetry" (xiii). In the last-mentioned chapter we are told that Burns's sympathy for "auld Nickie-Ben" was piously anticipated by St. Thomas Aquinas who spent a night praying: "O God, have mercy upon Thy servant the devil." Better known, of course, is Origen's optimistic view of Satan's prospects, based upon Luke 10:7. But perhaps the most thought-provoking pages of the book are found in chapter x on "The Belief in the Devil." Such belief, says the author, "forms a part of every religion. . . . Disbelief in the Devil cannot be reconciled with faith in God." This apparently is not simply, as we might suspect, the author's way of rejecting religion. His own view seems expressed in a quotation from Stanton Coit: "We may not believe in a personal Devil, but we believe in a devil who acts very much like a person" (p. 109). Another point stressed by Mr. Rudwin is that "anti-theism leads to Satanism." Dissatisfaction with the government of the universe leads to enthusiastic support of the opposition. Numerous atheists and anti-theists have been staunch believers in the Devil (pp. 117 ff.). Some have been his frank devotees (p. 306), and that not only when the Devil was thought of as the Promethean representative of human progress but when he remained simply the prompter of the seven deadly sins. The book is popular and descriptive rather than philosophic, but it is well worth reading by every student of religion. It forces consideration of the question whether we need a personification of evil in order to unify the concept. Historically the Devil has had both unity and multiplicity. If we acquiesce in the dissolution of his personality, shall we think of evil only in terms of evils, such as streptococci, unemployment, or our political adversaries? With the Devil consigned to the museum, there remains a large and embarrassing vacant chair in the house of theology. In any case, apparently, the historians of religion and the church have not been giving the Devil his due.

JOHN T. McNEILL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

LOYOLA AND HIS ARMY

The little, limping saint who renewed the religious energies of the Roman church and led the counter-attack against Protestantism and humanism was not distinguished for intellectual brilliancy; but he has received the homage of a series of brilliant pens. The latest of his hagiographers is Christopher Hollis, a young English popularizer of history, whose book¹ is marked by the combination of credulity and sophistica-

¹ *St. Ignatius—Founder of the Jesuits*. By Christopher Hollis. New York: Harper, 1931. 287 pages. \$2.50.

tion that is characteristic of a group of English Roman Catholic writers. His sophistication appears in his belief that most men who claim to see visions are deceivers or deceived; his credulity, in his declining to think such deception possible in the case of Ignatius, because the church has declared him a saint and his life achievement appears to have been "accomplished by direct supernatural aid." To the rational mind of Mr. Hollis, miracles of levitation seem "among the most pointless." "Who," he asks, "is the better for floating?" Yet to his piety it is impudent, and even unscientific, to wish to "dictate to God" in this matter. In fact, because a boy declared that looking through a chink in a door he beheld Ignatius, while in prayer, lifted up two feet from the ground, our author feels it necessary to reproach himself for his failure to see the value of such a phenomenon. "If I cannot see, so much the worse for me."

Apart from such confusions of faith and reason, Mr. Hollis is to be congratulated on a well-ordered and well-worded treatment of the biographical facts. He has no sympathy for the inquisitors and other church officials who made Ignatius' early efforts in saintly labor the occasion of petty persecution. Several of the popes, too, are dealt with rather unsparingly for their unsympathetic treatment of the reformer. Paul IV is excoriated as an agent of disaster to the church and to Christendom. The friendliness of Contarini to Ignatius is featured in contrast to the indifference or hostility of other prominent officials. Yet Ignatius is not the hero of all the numerous incidents related. He makes a few mistakes, and is accused of needless interference, on occasion, with the pleasures of the common people. In particular, at Azpetia he brought about the prohibition of betting and gambling, amusements which the Roman church teaches are "not in themselves sinful."

Perhaps the most outstanding point of historical interpretation stressed in the book is the view that "the combat with Protestantism was not at first intended to be, and in fact never was, the main work" of the Society of Jesus. The author cites the fact that at the time of his conversion Ignatius had probably never spoken to a Protestant and had none but the vaguest ideas of the existence of Protestantism. There is a value in this emphasis; and the attitudes of Ignatius and his immediate associates to Protestantism call for fresh investigation. But in his supposition that the saint was not made aware of the Protestant ferment at the University of Paris, Hollis is probably in error. That he "spoke only Spanish" is poor evidence on the point. He had every opportunity to learn the essentials of the controversy by reading Latin books.

Readers of the standard biographies of Ignatius will learn little of new fact from this book, but all readers will obtain vivid impressions of the

CRITICAL REVIEWS

393

meek but masterful Basque, who won a game of billiards in order to win a soul; flogged himself mercilessly and habitually but declined a flogging by others for an act of academic insubordination; and was opposed and hindered in his work by the officials of the church he had come to save.

We are offered at the same time a summary of the history of the Jesuits¹ by A. Mater, author of a number of books on Roman Catholicism in France. M. Mater treats briefly and succinctly in twenty-five short chapters the principal aspects of Jesuit activity and thought. Some chapters are necessarily commonplace recitals of the facts to be found in all histories of the subject. Others give penetrating analyses of special topics such as Jesuit government, morals and casuistry, instruction, poverty, politics, internationalism. He defends the Jesuits from the charges of immoral teaching, but regards their religion as, in the words of Voltaire, "a religion for the *canaille*," in view of their encouragement of popular cults. The book is well balanced and well informed, and, as a whole, constitutes a useful critical introduction to Jesuitism.

JOHN T. MCNEILL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

 AN ACCOUNT OF MARTIN BUCER

Recent studies in reformation history have recognized more than before the significant place of the Strasbourg reformer, Martin Bucer, in the general political and ecclesiastical life of sixteenth-century Europe. Up to this day, an adequate biography was lacking, because the source material relating to his manifold activities is too widely scattered and particularly because the collection of his many works—books, reports, pamphlets, letters—although begun by his faithful secretary, Hubert, in the publication of his *Scripta Anglicana*, was never accomplished. Furthermore, he was one of those men who, not endowed with that striking originality of mind which makes the historical hero and assures him of a place in the annals of history, impress with their direct influence and power primarily their contemporaries rather than later generations. Thus it happened that Bucer was chiefly remembered for his participation in certain major events which affect even present-day life, particularly for his work for the establishment of concord in the Lord's supper controversy, his co-operation with the Landgrave of Hesse, and his activities at the politico-theological discussions during the second period of the Reformation. But his amazingly extensive activities for the spread of Protestantism both by word and deed were largely overlooked.

¹ *Les jésuites*. By André Mater. Paris: Les Éditions Rieder, 1932. 195 pages.

Mr. Eells has the distinction of having written the first complete biography of this leader.¹ Baum's book did not deal with the phases of his later life, and Anrich's admirable work was intended to fill a gap. The first duty of the reviewer of this long-needed biography is therefore an expression of satisfaction at its appearance. In the present case, it is necessary to add thereto a remark stating a sense of admiration of the profound, industrious, and diligent scholarship of the author. Professor Eells shows a full acquaintance with the literature relating to Bucer, and his copious footnotes give evidence of the tremendous labor with far extended sources that was required of him. He had the added advantage of access to the manuscript collection of Buceriana, resting in Strasbourg as the *Thesaurus Baumianus*.

The result of his work may be characterized as follows: he has chosen to write Bucer's biography by studying his activities in chronological order rather than by offering a relief of his hero set against the general historical milieu of his time. Thereby I do not mean to say, of course, that Professor Eells fails to see Bucer in his historical setting, but I wish to indicate that he does not offer a general historical interpretation of his hero. The reader is invited to follow the course of Bucer's life from event to event, as a matter of fact, almost from day to day. Indeed, the most conspicuous aspect of this work is its meticulous attention to dates. It is hardly necessary to emphasize the importance of such a method, for it is good that the first complete biography of Bucer has been written in such fashion. Furthermore, such a procedure brings out what is perhaps the most significant trait of Bucer's life, namely, his incessant, indefatigable, restless activities for the cause of Protestantism as he saw it. For he was truly "the knight errant of the Reformation" as Eells once calls him. However, it is also natural that such a method as Professor Eells has employed does not permit him to pay as much attention to Bucer's thoughts and ideals as the church historian wishes he might have done. The absence of a full discussion on Bucer, the Christian theologian, is the one shortcoming of the book. For there is no doubt that Bucer followed a definite program. When he, "the writer of many books," more often impelled by the need of occasions than by the desire of making a "scientific" contribution, made use of his pen, he outlined theological, ecclesiastical, political courses of action. If Professor Eells had dealt with this aspect of Bucer's activities in a more extensive way, he would, of course, have been forced to make all sorts of comparisons with Bucer's theological

¹ *Martin Bucer*. By Hastings Eells. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931. 539 pages. \$5.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

395

ancestors and contemporaries, and he could also not have avoided offering a general historical appreciation from all of which his method of study and writing has bidden him to refrain.

In conclusion, may it be said that the book which at first impresses the reader as being rather dry and overloaded with a mass of detail finally exercises a genuine fascination upon the serious student, for the author's apparent love of his ever busy hero proves to be contagious. He has succeeded in writing a "human" biography. And this, after all, is the test of the historian.

W. PAUCK

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE GREAT HUGUENOT SAVANT¹

This book is the despair of the reviewer who would peruse it rapidly between thumb and forefinger. Perhaps the first reason for this is that the subject is one of unusual interest. Pierre Bayle was the author of the *Dictionnaire historique et critique* which almost every student of history and philosophy has frequently consulted. No reader can help being struck by the modern tone of the dictionary, but it is surprising how few know much if anything, about its author. One cannot but suspect that a seventeenth-century writer of so enlightened a work must have had a significance greater than historians of literature and philosophy have in general accorded him. Professor Robinson has succeeded in making the reader feel that a real treasure is being dug up for him.

The life of Bayle proves to be another link in the chain of evidence that the Protestant Reformation has been, in a sense, the mother of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. There are, of course, basal ideas in Calvinism that are incompatible with some of Shaftesbury's Frederick the Great's, Voltaire's, the Encyclopedists'—and Bayle's. But, after all, Bayle was brought up in a Huguenot parsonage. He was for years associated with Jurieu, champion of Huguenot orthodoxy. In Rotterdam he was member of the Dutch Reformed church, in communion with which he also died. More than once he claimed to be a Calvinist. His heavy armor of irony and equivocation makes it difficult to determine how sincere his professions of loyalty were, but it is safe to say that emotionally he would have been incapable of severing connection with the church of his fathers. (As a student he had been converted to Roman Catholicism, though for a few months only.)

¹ *Bayle the Sceptic*. By Howard Robinson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931. x+334 pages. \$4.25.

Bayle the Sceptic is called the father of modern rationalism. He is also the foremost defender of absolute toleration in his century. Closely related, it is difficult to tell which has logical priority, skepticism or tolerance. Surely, one might say that tolerance was learned by his disgust with the high-handedness of Louis XIV and the French church toward the Huguenots, particularly Bayle's own family in Sedan, while the exclusivism of Jurieu was equally distasteful to him. Thus grew the conviction that men of the most varying creeds could, if they would, live together, for the matters that separated them were at least socially inconsequential. On the other hand, his skepticism was more than a derivative from tolerance. His study of Manichaeism leads him to prefer its solution of the problem of the origin of evil to the Christian. The vices of the French church and the intolerance of Jurieu, *et al.*, lead him to think that morality and religion are at best very loosely joined. Such reflections induce in him a respect for the thinkers of all ages, past and present.

The atrophied seventeenth-century Calvinism which had all but expired under the reign of the swashbuckling Descartes could not but fail to appreciate that Bayle's rationalism was not unrelated to the thought of John Calvin. Bayle might have recalled them to the rock whence they were hewn, predicating appropriate qualifications. Calvin roots largely in the Italian Renaissance, and certainly makes no apologies when he invokes Valla in his reply to the Council of Trent. His consuming desire to establish the Genevan theocracy sublimated the disinterested scholar in him, but not in all of his posterity. Witness Pierre Bayle.

QUITRINUS BREEN

HILLSDALE (MICHIGAN) COLLEGE

A HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN CHURCH

At first sight, one is inclined to welcome enthusiastically any book dealing with the history of Russian Christianity, especially by an author who is able to draw upon the rich Russian literature devoted to the subject. A good, reliable history of the Russian church in English is still a *desideratum* devoutly wished for.

This favorable predisposition, however, pales considerably before one finishes reading the latest treatment of the subject in Brian-Chaninov's book.¹ The cause of the disappointment is the patent Roman Catholic bias exhibited throughout the book. As the Preface openly avows, the study was conceived in the spirit of furthering unionistic policies of the

¹ *The Russian Church*. By Nicholas Brian-Chaninov. Translated from the French by Warre B. Wells. New York: Macmillan, 1931. xi+210 pages. \$2.50.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

397

Roman church, and the text bears abundant witness to the same *leit-motif*. In fact, the title of the book could with justice be changed to something like *Relations between the Holy See and the Church of Russia*. On any other basis one could justly criticize the work as giving too much space and prominence to this relatively unimportant aspect of Russian church history.

Aside from this general bias, attention must be called to a number of dubious assertions. Hitherto, the placing of Vladimir's conversion after the Chersonese campaign was usually conditioned by the author's lack of acquaintance with critical Russian treatment of the subject. That cannot be said of Brian-Chaninov. He knows such an author as Golubinsky, who in his *Istoriya Russkoi Tserkvi*, Vol. I, Part I, may be said to have exhausted the subject to prove the conversion of Vladimir before the Chersonese expedition; and yet in spite of it Brian-Chaninov ignores the whole evidence (p. 19). Why? Does he have better sources for his statement than Golubinsky? His interpretation of the figure of Patriarch Nikon also raises a query as to its legitimacy. The author permits the reader to believe that the title *Veliky Gosudar* was for the first time conferred upon Nikon. It has been used by the patriarchs since the time of Philaret, father of the first Romanov tsar, Michael. In view of the fact that in the days of Patriarch Philaret and Tsar Michael there existed a virtual diarchy in the government, it is certainly an overstatement to say that till the time of Nikon the church "had no external activity except through it [the state]." To depict the character of Nikon as a noble defender of the church and a reformer who had the interest of the church at heart, above all other things, is hardly borne out by the facts in the case (pp. 119-21). The last patriarch of the pre-Petrine period was Hadrian, not Andrew (p. 128).

Undoubtedly the poorest part of the book is the last chapter (viii), dealing with the post-revolutionary period. It was appended to the English translation, and does not form a part of the French original. The author often seriously misstates facts rather easily ascertainable. For instance, the reasons why Tikhon was elected patriarch in 1917 instead of Anthony are certainly not "still unknown" (p. 157). The statement that Tikhon "continued to govern the faithful" after he was deposed by the Council of 1923 (p. 158) could be understood only on the supposition that the author did not know that the patriarch had been then in prison, and for over a year had not exercised the functions of his office. And worst of all, the clear language of the second paragraph of page 159 cannot be understood any other way but that the author actually supposed that the so-called "reformist" parties had not originated till after the Council of

1923, although what his idea was as to the personnel of that Council certainly is puzzling. It is furthermore not true that the advice offered by the ecumenical patriarch to Tikhon could be construed as an act of deposition of Tikhon (p. 162). One is puzzled as to what the author means by the "Reds" when he applies that term to a supposedly existent church party in Russia. Does he mean the Synodal (or Obnovlyentsy) party or the "Living Church"? The reference to it on page 166 is confusing.

It is likewise to be regretted that the translator has not taken the trouble to transliterate the Russian words and titles into some standard method of English transliteration. Sergius of Radonezh is referred to on page 93 as of "Radonje" and on page 101 as of "Radojene." Neither of course is correct. The name of the *staretz* of the monastery at Pskov referred to on page 114 should be Theophilus instead of Philotheus. Moreover, the author certainly could not be guilty of such verbal horrors as the double plural endings, one Russian and the other English, which occur on page 125 in "*raskolnikis*," "*popovtzis*," and "*iedinonoviertzis*." That blame must most likely be assumed by the translator.

MATTHEW SPINKA

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

ENGLISH MYSTICISM

The English Reformation holds perennial interest for the student not alone because of its influence upon the religious world but also because of its long course through history, from the middle of the fourteenth century to the close of the seventeenth, the complexity of its causes, and the tangled skein of its fashioning. And perhaps the period most perplexing, most difficult of precise and clear analysis, is that of the Commonwealth, coming toward the close of the reform movement.

It is with this period that Dr. Jones deals in a little book of one hundred and seventy-five pages.¹ In his usually lucid style the author helps the reader to see the evolution in English religious thought and practice from Roman Catholicism through Anglicanism, Puritanism, Separatism to Baptist, Seeker, and Quaker position. This, in the main, is the line of progress, and the development of religious organization had its influence upon the political. Democracy in the church created democracy in the state. The spiritual right of the individual, the recognition on the part of the believer of the authority of Christ alone, resulted in the recognition

¹ *Mysticism and Democracy in the English Commonwealth*. By Rufus M. Jones. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932. 184 pages. \$2.00.

and establishment of the "common man" in all government. It was this religious conception, according to Dr. Jones, that has determined the form of democracy in England and America.

This will be accepted as true, but it is a question if the research goes deep enough. The view of man's rights, worth, and inner authority does not begin in a religious conviction. It was found in human experience and then sought sanction in religious assurances.

It is most probable that this sense of individual independence was born out of the isolation of England's insular position to the Continent. It came to consciousness in the little trade groups, the merchant adventurers, who, with their royal charters granting monopoly of trade with the people of the Continental countries, were self-governing groups. Authority was within their own body. Then through their deeply religious temperament and their study of the New Testament this was recognized as a divine right, a religious security. Common people might conduct themselves similarly in religious and political matters. Actual experience precedes a religious tenet.

Again in tracing the chronological steps in the development from Separatist to Quaker it is a question if the author does not draw his lines too sharply. It may be that the Baptists, Seekers, and Quakers are set off a little too clearly. It was an age of perplexity, doubt, and conflict but of heroism and faith in the greatness, nobility, and ability of the ordinary man. Society was teeming with these revolutionary ideas, and it is difficult to say to which of these groups some exponents of them might belong. They all have a common origin though they may not have gone the same distance. A religious conviction held in general by all was the authority of Christ alone, the need of an inner spiritual experience for salvation, and the inefficacy of the ordinances of the church.

Dr. Jones also seems to indicate that the contribution of the Baptists to religious thinking was the organization of a democratic form of church government. The contribution of the Quaker was the rejection of the church as unnecessary because of his reliance upon the present guidance of the Spirit. This is not quite correct. The Quaker originally rejected the church because of its corruption, but he believed that Jesus had given authority only to his immediate disciples to organize the church, and corrupt as it had become, no other had a right to form a new church outside that apostolic order. The Baptist was the one who so firmly insisted upon the leadership of the spirit as to believe that any group of disciples had an equal right with the first apostles to form a church of Christ.

The book as a whole is an excellent presentation of the complexity of

religious views held by Englishmen in those stormy days of the revolutionary period and the influence of religion in establishing the new national order.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

CROZER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

JONATHAN EDWARDS¹

This full-length portrait of Jonathan Edwards is excellent, though it may not be full-depth. It does not pretend to penetrate into the hidden corners and inner recesses of Edwards' extraordinary mind and baffling character, but it is decidedly more than a bare biographical narrative. As a narrative it is entertaining and, so far as the reviewer can judge, scrupulously accurate. For Dr. McGiffert has made extensive and critical use of the source materials, and, though his references to them are not as explicit as might be useful for scholars, his biography is more engaging for readers than it would be if he had made a display of his scholarly apparatus. As a portrait, the book is a work of art, for it selects a few dominant traits to which the events of Edwards' career serve as background. Of these dominant themes the one which is most distinctive and valuable as a fresh interpretation of Edwards' genius is the author's emphasis on Edwards' psychological analysis of religious experience. Dr. McGiffert makes out a good case for the permanent value and empirical honesty of the various approaches which Edwards made to this central problem: first, the introspective analysis of his own intense experience; then, the dispassionate narrative of "surprising conversions"; then, the critical examination of the varieties of religious affections exhibited during the Great Awakening; then, the acute refutation of Arminian theories of moral agency and responsibility; and, lastly, the superb exposition of holy love or disinterested benevolence toward Being. By these approaches Edwards succeeded in throwing light from various angles on the nature of holiness or "true virtue," and though his language is unhappily antiquated, his discoveries are being verified today more than ever.

Especially interesting is the author's presentation of the contrast between Edwards' interest in reforming the manners and morals of his Northampton congregation and Whitefield's sentimental and itinerant appeals to the "religious affections." On the practical side, Edward was an unrelenting, cool critic of the morals of his community, by whom he was finally ostracized. On the theological side, Edwards was a passionate

¹ *Jonathan Edwards*. By Arthur Cushman McGiffert, Jr. New York: Harper, 1932. 225 pages. \$2.50.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

401

lover of God. In his person and in his preaching an overpowering enjoyment of God's glory was supplemented by a severe moral discipline; and these two traits were seldom confused or combined by him. This duality in his mind and character seems to be the key to an understanding of both his genius and his failure. He refused to follow the fashion of subordinating the love of God to the love of fellow-men and of regarding God's chief aim in creation to be the promotion of human happiness. In one sense, therefore, Dr. McGiffert is right in treating Edwards as a forerunner of the romantic awakening in religion, but in another, he makes it clear that both as a theologian and as a moralist Edwards fought a consistent, though losing, fight against the romantic tendencies of his time. He insisted with platonic precision that God's holiness, not his fatherliness, must be the prime object of true virtue and that morality ought to be merely a reflection of the love of holiness, not an exhibition of brotherliness. Apparently Edwards realized the unpopular implications of this contrast to the full. I am not sure that he would be pleased to see Dr. McGiffert translating his love for God's glory and sovereignty into the modern terms of an "intuition of personality and activity as the fundamental features of reality" (p. 214); for Edwards treated theology as a very exact science. Otherwise this biography is an exceptionally keen portrayal of a keen mind and leaves the reader with the impression that Jonathan Edwards was probably right when he said that he was "fit for no other business but study."

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

NEW ENGLAND TRANSCENDENTALISM

Although this Columbia doctoral dissertation¹ is concerned primarily with the literary organs of that intellectual ferment called "transcendentalism," admittedly the most important influence upon American literature thus far, historians of religion in this country will regard it as an important contribution to their field because of the exceedingly close relation between what is known as "Channing Unitarianism" and the New England leaders of transcendental thought. From 1830 to 1845 the relation practically amounts to identity; from 1856 to 1885, coincidence. These aspects are illuminated in a graceful and scholarly way by Dr. Gohdes, as he examines, article by article, the contents of the apparently ephemeral, yet profoundly significant, organs of transcendentalism, pioneer phenomena of the radical press of this country: the *Western Mes-*

¹ *The Periodicals of American Transcendentalism*. By Clarence L. F. Gohdes. Durham: Duke University Press, 1931. vii+264 pages. \$3.50.

senger (1835-41); the *Boston Quarterly Review* (1838-42); the *Dial* (1840-44); the *Present* (1843-44); the *Harbinger* (1845-49); the *Spirit of the Age* (1849-50); *Aesthetic Papers* (1849); the *Mass Quarterly Review* (1847-50); the *Dial* (Cincinnati, 1860); the *Radical* (1865-72); the *Index* (1870-86).

The work is so thoroughly done, and so interestingly presented, that it is final. On but two points is the study inadequate. Did Dr. Gohdes read Channing carefully? Not European romanticism and idealism but Channing is the primary source of New England transcendentalism. The second conclusion to which exception may be taken is the picturesque description of the patricide of transcendentalism by Abbott, the evolutionist materialist. The genius of his alleged victim had long since superseded into the immanentist evolutionism of the Minot J. Savage type. Immanentist theism was ably assimilated with evolution; and intuition and mysticism again supported the elder humanism of Channing, Emerson, and Parker.

With these exceptions, Dr. Gohdes' presentation of his subject is admirable, lucid, sympathetic.

CHARLES LYTTLE

MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL

A STUDY OF IMMIGRANT CHURCHES¹

This review may well begin with the statement that here is an important book. Its importance lies, first, in the fact that it deals with a mass of materials hitherto unavailable to the student of American social and religious history; and, second, because this study may well serve as a model, and, let us hope, as an incentive for future investigations of other immigrant churches.

The first ten chapters deal with religious conditions in Sweden in the first half of the last century, tracing the rise of the Läsare movement, or Swedish pietism within the state church; of the Swedish Baptists; the Mission Friends; the Methodists and the Mormons, together with an account of recent religious movements, and the struggle for religious freedom. Of great importance to all these mid-eighteenth-century movements away from the state church was the work of George Scott, an English Wesleyan missionary to Sweden in the thirties and forties. His connection with the English and foreign Bible societies and his effective preaching and temperance agitation soon won for him a wide influence. In fact, he

¹ *The Religious Aspects of Swedish Immigration: A Study of Immigrant Churches.* By George M. Stephenson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1932. viii+542 pages. \$4.50.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

403

strongly affected the total religious situation in Sweden, and all the early sectarian movements were closely connected with temperance agitation. These schismatic movements have a large significance also in the early Swedish immigration to America in that almost all the early Swedish pastors who came to America were free churchmen.

The last two-thirds of this bulky volume—twenty chapters—recounts the history of the several Swedish denominations in America, together with excellent chapters on "Community Life"; "The Process of Americanization"; "Sweden and Her American Children"; and "The Problem of Language." Chief attention is given the Augustana Synod, and rightly so, since it is the largest and most influential Swedish church in America. The author points out, however, that the Augustana Synod is not the daughter of the Church of Sweden, as many no doubt think (p. 19), though it was founded by men educated, ordained, and trained in the state church (p. 265). Hasselquist, the most influential of the early Swedish Lutheran pastors in America, so fully adapted himself to American conditions and "placed the stamp of pietism and low-church form so securely on the Augustana Synod" that it has come to occupy a unique place among American Lutheran synods (p. 169).

Ranking next to the Augustana Synod in point of numbers are the Mission Friends, with thirty-three thousand members in 1930. They constitute the extreme puritanical group among the Swedish people both in Sweden and in America. In Sweden the Mission Friends formed a lay movement within the state church; in America they soon seceded from the Augustana Synod, and under their greatest leader, E. A. Skogsbergh, won a relatively large following in strong Swedish centers. Episcopalians and Methodists, though their proselyting began with the coming of the first Swedish immigrants, have failed to win large followings. The Baptists, however, with their tradition of religious liberty and their minimum of organization, have appealed more largely to the Swedish people, and rank after the Mission Friends as the strongest competitor of the Augustana Synod.

The church has played a large part in the life of Swedish American communities, although perhaps not more than 20 per cent of the Swedish immigrants have connected themselves with any church. But even those who have held aloof from its membership use the church for social intercourse. No large immigrant group have more quickly become Americanized than have the Swedes, nor have any of the immigrant churches more successfully or rapidly accommodated themselves to the peculiar American environment than have the several Swedish churches.

Professor Stephenson has collected the sources for this study on both

sides of the Atlantic, having spent a year on a Guggenheim Fellowship in Sweden in 1927-28 for this purpose. The Bibliography of more than forty pages lists many newspapers and other periodicals published both in Sweden and in America, while the author has availed himself of much rich manuscript material.

WILLIAM WARREN SWEET

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A LIFE OF BISHOP SLATTERY

In this straightforward account of the busy life of Charles L. Slattery,¹ who held two of the highest offices in the gift of the Protestant Episcopal church, that of rector of Grace Church, New York, and bishop of Massachusetts, we have the story of a cultured, able, broad-minded, and aggressive twentieth-century American clergyman. The son of a New England clergyman, Slattery inherited all that New England had to offer in education and gentle background. He was a graduate of Harvard and Cambridge Theological Seminary, but he spent ten years of his early ministry as dean of the Cathedral at Faribault, Minnesota, where he learned to love and appreciate the great Middle West. In 1907 he accepted a call to Christ Church, Springfield, Massachusetts, from whence he was summoned three years later to Grace Church, New York. For twelve years he was the successful and happy leader in this greatest of Protestant Episcopal parishes, delighting to describe himself "a happy parson." His able ministry reached its logical culmination in his election, first, as bishop coadjutor and, after 1925, bishop of the diocese of Massachusetts where his all too brief leadership was ended by his death five years later.

Bishop Slattery did many things well; he was a successful church administrator, first, of the Cathedral at Faribault; then, of his great New York parish; and, finally, of the diocese of Massachusetts. He was an effective and helpful preacher, with a rare gift at consolation. He was the author of more than two-score volumes, excelling in presenting great spiritual truths and in creating a devotional feeling and attitude. But he "fell short of the ultimate greatness, that which defies compromise and concessions and is ready like the first disciples to turn the world upside down for the sake of the Kingdom of God." But how could a minister achieve such greatness and remain rector of the richest parish in the world? He was, however, "the best type of minister below this arduous level of militant sanctity." He was a low-churchman with broad sym-

¹ *Charles Lewis Slattery*. By Howard C. Robbins. New York: Harper, 1931. 341 pages. \$2.50.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

405

pathies and came nearer reaching the level of true greatness, in his latter years, as a fearless apostle of church unity.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

WILLIAM WARREN SWEET

THE DISCIPLES IN FRONTIER LIFE

In contrast to the usual practice of beginning the story of the Disciples of Christ at nine o'clock in the morning on the day of Pentecost, this account¹ states that "the most important discovery that one makes about primitive Christianity is that it never existed." The restoration movements were real enough, however, and Alexander Campbell, as Dr. Garrison points out, made his distinctive contribution, the idea of Christian union. Whereas his predecessors were interested in a complete biblical theology or an authoritative form of government, he raised the question, "What did the apostles require as conditions for admission to membership in the church?"

Two questions that come to the mind of even the most casual observer must be answered by a historian of the Disciples of Christ. How did a movement pledged "to restore unity, peace, and purity to the whole church of God" come to develop a strong denominational consciousness? When and why was the principle of the independence of each local church replaced by a complex organization? The author ably answers these questions. The need for a common interpretation of the New Testament, the hostility of establishment denominations, the persistent problems of open communion and immersion as prerequisites to membership, and the publication of A. Campbell's *Christian System* tended to emphasize doctrinal conformity. Gatherings for preaching and worship, a survival of the camp-meeting tradition, led to periodic district meetings and the sending out of evangelists. Dr. Garrison compares the recognition of the need for organization for increased efficiency and permanency to what happened to the early church when it ceased to believe in an imminent second coming. Before 1850, a Bible society, a national convention, and a missionary society were organized.

The book is valuable for its excellent summaries and recapitulations showing at each stage the problems to be faced. For example, the author gives the eight steps taken in deriving the immersionist position, an itemized statement of differences between reformers and Baptists, an extended study of open and closed communion, the positive and negative forces that led to organization as a denomination, the sixteen fundamental

¹ *Religion Follows the Frontier*. By Winfred Ernest Garrison. New York: Harper, 1931. xiv+317 pages. \$2.50.

principles of the Disciples of Christ, the tendencies toward open membership, and the denominational attitude on social questions. The idea of incorporating the references in the text is excellent, for it makes unnecessary an essay on bibliography. Unfortunately, there is a lack of consistency; some citations are given specifically; for others, the page numbers are missing.

Lack of space and the necessity for giving a clear conception of denominational change and progress lead the author to stress the influence of ideas rather than to follow the implications of the title and discuss social conditions as factors in shaping the new movement. The refusal of A. Campbell to take pay for his preaching, and the aversion of groups of Disciples to salaried workers and subsidized missions are explained as matters of New Testament interpretation alone, rather than as frontier prejudices common to many denominations. The life of the farmer-preacher, the zealous work of itinerant Disciple evangelists (often placing rural communities in a "state of siege"), and the disciplining of individual members, barely mentioned in this volume, must be fully considered to gain a complete picture of the religious life of the time.

Dr. Garrison gives a remarkably fine sketch of the response of the Disciples of Christ to the increased emphasis on efficiency and large-scale organization that characterized the "Age of Big Business." By 1865 there was a general plea for fewer but better endowed colleges. Journalistic influence came to be consolidated in the hands of the editors of the *Christian Evangelist* and the *Christian Standard*. The adoption of a budget system, the every-member canvass, the creation of a permanent revolving fund, the various organizations of business men, and the founding of the Board of Church Extension show the same trend. As the author well states: "The Disciples were an integral part of that total body of population whose ideals were moving from simplicity toward elegance." Hence, in spite of the protests of conservatives, organs were installed in churches, and trained ministers, attached to single congregations, replaced the part-time preacher. The term "Reverend," not without strenuous protests, came into common usage. The part that journalism plays in the development of the congregational type of denomination is clearly demonstrated. The *Christian Baptist* aroused a denominational consciousness in lieu of a central organization. There are interesting tables of statistics showing the high mortality and frequent changes of name and editorial control of denominational journals.

THIEL COLLEGE

ROY HAROLD JOHNSON

CRITICAL REVIEWS

407

JOSEPH THE PROPHET

This is the first adequate life of Joseph Smith,¹ the founder of Mormonism, to be written by a non-Mormon, and is a fascinating portrayal of one of the strangest careers on record. The author is a newspaper man, and his book is strongly tinged with the newspaper flavor, but on the other hand his story is based on a solid foundation of fact, and the tendency to play up the dramatic is not greatly overdone. The fact that a creditable piece of investigation has been performed by Mr. Beardsley becomes increasingly evident as the narrative proceeds.

What the peculiar social, economic, and religious conditions in western New York were, in the eighteen thirties and forties, which produced such unusual children as Mormonism, Adventism, and Spiritualism, has never been satisfactorily explained. All of these movements sprang from a New England background and came to fruition in a rude and rough frontier society. In spite of the quite natural attempts of Mormon writers to improve the economic and social position of the Smith family, it seems to be well authenticated that their Prophet Joseph was the son of shiftless and ignorant parents, who lived as squatters on land which belonged to others, and gained a precarious livelihood, largely by playing upon the superstitions of the people about them. Mormonism, according to Mr. Beardsley, came into being simply as one of numerous schemes devised by Joseph Smith to live without physical exertion. Such a contention, would of course, be indignantly rejected by faithful Mormons.

In the author's account of the origin of the Book of Mormon, Sidney Rigdon has a place of chief importance. In fact, he is called its actual author, and this ex-Baptist, ex-"Campbellite" preacher is pictured as a man of brilliant oratorical gifts and large scholarly attainment. That he had a glib tongue and a gift for plausible argument is probably true, but his scholarly attainment is certainly the product of the author's imagination. As a matter of fact, just what was the relationship, in the early years, between Joseph Smith and Sidney Rigdon no one knows, nor is it probable that the exact facts regarding the production of the Book of Mormon will ever be fully revealed.

The story of the beginning and early development of Mormonism, in western New York, then in the Western Reserve of Ohio and in northwestern Missouri, is passed over somewhat hurriedly, while the larger part of the book is devoted to the founding and development of the Mormon New Jerusalem of Nauvoo. In 1839 the Mormons were driven from Mis-

¹ *Joseph Smith and His Mormon Empire*. By Harry M. Beardsley. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1931. 421 pages. \$4.00.

souri and began to build a new center on the Mississippi River, near the present city of Quincy in the state of Illinois, and almost overnight it became the largest city in the state, and Joseph Smith, an important figure in Illinois politics. Due to the peculiar political situation in Illinois at the time, the Mormons were courted by both political parties, which enabled Smith to secure a charter for the city of Nauvoo, making it practically independent of state authority. This undoubtedly worked eventually to the undoing of Joseph Smith and his Mormons. He thought himself too secure and imagined that his power was greater than he actually possessed.

The tragic end of the Prophet—murdered by his enemies under the guise of state militiamen—the Mormon war which followed, together with the terrible sufferings patiently endured on the long trek to Utah, arouses both sympathy and admiration.

The career of Joseph Smith is certainly stranger than fiction and whether prophet or knave he is always interesting. The author states that, in his long study of Joseph Smith, familiarity has not bred contempt, and, while he believes that his followers are mistaken in reverencing him as a prophet, his detractors have erred in the other direction, in their unwarranted denunciations, for he holds that Joseph Smith was simply a product of his time and his environment.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

WILLIAM WARREN SWÉET

PROFESSOR OMAN DISCUSSES THE SUPERNATURAL

The earlier books of Principal Oman, *Vision and Authority*, *The Problem of Faith and Freedom*, and *Grace and Personality* have led us to expect from him a combination of religious insight and scholarly treatment, and this book¹ lives up to expectations. It is a broad survey of the field of philosophy of religion, and in its five hundred pages there is packed a great deal of careful reasoning and vigorous statement. The book falls into four main parts.

The first part, which is the introduction, seeks to define the nature of religion by an examination of other theories. I pass over this critical study and come directly to the author's own position. He sees religion on its subjective side bound up "with a sense of the holy and a judgment of the sacred." The former means much more to him than to Otto, who regarded the holy as related to the vague feeling of the numinous, for Oman realizes that the sense of the holy has called out from man something more

¹ *The Natural and the Supernatural*. By John W. Oman. New York: Macmillan, 1931. 506 pages. \$3.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

409

than awe or dread. It is important for religion because it has been the parent of reverence, and hence Oman sees a moral and a rational element connected with the sense of the holy from early times. His judgment of the sacred is founded upon the belief in absolute value, and these personal sides of religion rest upon the objective reality of the supernatural. He sums up his position as follows:

But, while the Supernatural would have no meaning were there only sensations and values of physical pleasure and pain, in the end the validity of religion depends neither upon the feeling of holiness nor upon the judgment of sacredness, but upon the reality to which these belong—the existence of the Supernatural. The Supernatural is the special concern of religion, and nothing else is concerned with it in the same way as religion.

As here used, the Supernatural means the world which manifests more than natural values, the world which has values which stir the sense of the holy and demand to be esteemed as sacred [p. 71].

In the second section of the book the author treats of the problem of knowledge with respect both to the natural and the supernatural, and to me this section is the least satisfactory. He clearly sees that any solution of the problem of knowledge involves a synthesis of the belief in an active intelligent mind and in a world existing independent of the act of knowing. He has many excellent insights, and there is an exceptionally fine account of the awareness and apprehension of the mind of Shakespeare, but I am unable to see that he has done much to clarify the theory of knowledge problem.

In the third section he treats of the problem of freedom and necessity, and deals with those issues which arise in the attempt to relate the natural and the supernatural. He has an interesting comparison of positivistic doctrine and the Hindoo law of Karma, and on the whole develops a metaphysics in which personality has a dominant place. But here I feel that in his opposition to naturalism he has given us too abstract a doctrine of personality and is unable to do justice to religion as a constructive factor in our social civilization.

In the last section of the book on the evanescent and the eternal the author gives his account of the development of religion. He classifies religion into the primitive, the polytheistic, the mystical, the ceremonial-legal, and the prophetic, and, in accordance with the philosophy developed in the third section, regards the prophetic as the highest type of faith.

This book is worthy of the attention of the serious student, and is undoubtedly one of the most significant books that have appeared in recent years in the field of the philosophy of religion.

WALTER T. BROWN

YALE UNIVERSITY

GOD AND KARL BARTH

Professor Pauck¹ starts out as an ardent disciple of Karl Barth. Barth has the truth and he gives himself to Barth. Thus he is able to understand Barth from the inside. But after he has done this, he comes forth and looks at Barth from the outside. He did this not by deliberate intent, as a trick of exposition. Rather it represents a development and transition in his own thinking. Thus his exposition takes on added value.

The central teaching of Barth is that God is absolutely other or transcendent to human thought and experience. That does not mean that God is outside the world, as the deists taught. Brunner, a disciple and expounder of Barth, is quoted by Pauck as saying that this transcendence of God is "epistemological but not cosmological." God must not be identified with our ideas about God and God is not a human experience. The greatest wrong we can do, according to Barth, is to represent God as reduced to the forms and boundaries of our ideas and experiences.

True religion is not easy, comfortable, peaceful. Rather it is the torment of a love and aspiration which is forever baffled because its object cannot be attained. God forever evades our thoughts and our emotional states. Here, of course, we have the great ambiguity of the word "experience." If our experiences refer to God, it can be said that we experience God in the same sense we experience most objects; for almost all objects which concern us in everyday life transcend our immediate experience and are never compassed in the data and emotions of consciousness. But that is another question and misses the point of Barth's attack. Barth is fighting the prevalent custom in modernistic religion which represents God as peculiarly an object of inner experience or intuition. This to Barth is sacrilege, idolatry, sin against the Holy Spirit, and worthy of every other hard name you can give to it.

Barth's treatment of death and Christ help to show the significance of his insistence on the transcendence and objectivity of God.

Death is the revelation of God. Death is the mark of our futility. Our life comes to naught. We are frustrated, thrown down, hemmed in. This experience of our limitation, this beating of our heads against a stone wall, is a revelation. It is the revelation of the stone wall. The stone wall is the reality that shapes us, determines destiny, to which we must conform but cannot. To change the figure of speech, when we strike against the bars of a cage, we become aware of a sky from which we are excluded and did not notice until the cage barred the way. God is the sky. We are caged behind the bars of death. But Barth is not here defending personal

¹ *Karl Barth—Prophet of a New Christianity?* By Wilhelm Pauck. New York: Harper, 1931. 228 pages. \$2.50.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

411

immortality. To continue as a human person after death would be to miss God still.

The historical man Jesus is not the revelation of God. The cross is the revelation, which means that the most sublime figure in human history demonstrated that the utmost reach of human life as exemplified in Jesus is contrary to the nature and goodness of God and must be destroyed on the cross. God's ways are not our ways, his thoughts, not ours. They are so immeasurably and sublimely greater than ours that the utmost perfection of human life can only beat itself against the iron bars until it is released by death from the mode of existence called human, which mode is so different from the form of existence which is God that man can only love and adore a majesty and goodness so great that he cannot participate in it and still be man.

But man can love and adore God and live for God. Not that human services are of any importance to God, but they can be offered up as expression, and hence as experience, of this love and adoration. Right here, I should judge, is the utmost triumph and glory of man, although neither Pauck nor Barth seem to make it explicit. It is utmost triumph and glory to be able to adore what is of such far transcendent worth beyond our best that we cannot know it or experience it. To be able to adore such sublimity, enables us to rise above human life, not in the sense that we escape any of its limitations, but solely in the sense that we can adore that which is so far beyond us. Thus Barth's pessimism and condemnation of human life is only the obverse side of a triumphant soaring that reaches dizzy heights beyond the reach of imagination.

But Barth's theology has one fatal weakness and because of this weakness collapses. He condemns human reason. It seems to the reviewer he does so because of a misapprehension of the scientific use of reason. He seems to think that if he approves the exercise of reason in approach to God he must admit that God can be identified with some particular theological or philosophical system. But the right use of reason does not so issue. Rather it means the constant and ruthless rational criticism of every idea and project to the end of correcting and reconstructing it toward the truth about God, even though the perfect truth might never be attained.

This scientific approach is the only possible way in which we can hold before our minds any reality and at the same time recognize that it is essentially other than, and transcendent to, all our ideas about, and experiences referent to, it.

Since Barth rejects this rational approach, all the subjectivism that he drove out the front door comes trooping back through the rear. The

house, swept and garnished, now has in it more devils of subjectivism than ever before. Barth is driven to uphold a kind of faith which is certainly a subjective experience and yet says it is a peculiar way of access to God. He accepts uncritically that system of theology which happens to appeal to him because of his early training and present environment, and declares it to be the truth about God. Certain philosophic presuppositions he uncritically, almost unconsciously, accepts. To accept them, and the traditional theology, as mere working propositions, held constantly subject to criticism and reconstruction, and used merely as intellectual tools to be discarded as soon as he could get better, would save him from the subjectivism and historism against which he has so desperately struggled. But as it is, his struggle is vain. Subjectivism, traditionalism, and dogmatism have swallowed him up. His noble undertaking becomes a fiasco.

We are with you, Barth, but you have failed. That is the note on which Pauck ends his book. But Professor Pauck should not be held responsible for what has been written in this review about critical reason as a corrective and sustainer to accomplish what Barth tried to do but failed to accomplish.

HENRY N. WIEMAN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A REVOLT AGAINST MODERNISM¹

These five lectures, delivered by Emil Brunner at the Universities of London, Glasgow, and Edinburgh during the past year, are easily the most concise and clear-cut presentation of the issues maintained by the new German theology, commonly known as the "theology of crisis," that has appeared in English print. The issues dealt with are: "The Word of God and Reason"; "The Word of Christ and History"; "The Word of the Spirit and Psychology"; "The Word of the Bible and Science"; and "The Word of the Church and Society." The conclusions reached concerning these issues are: that the Word of God is not known through reason but through revelation; that Jesus, the Christ, not the Jesus of history, is relevant and essential to faith; that faith, which "re-integrates personality in its unity, lies above the categories with which psychology apprehends its objects"; that because "the message of Revelation" transcends the biblical world-view, as it transcends all world-views, its "vision of God" . . . no science will ever touch"; and finally, that the church, in its Christian sense, opposes society, in its modern sense, on the same grounds that Christianity opposes modernism: the one espouses organic community; the other, individual (atomistic) self-sufficiency.

¹ *The Word and the World*. By Emil Brunner. New York: Scribner, 1931. 127 pages. \$1.50.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

413

From a reading of this book, the "theology of crisis" appears more than ever to be a back-to-the-reformers movement, particularly in its conception of Jesus Christ and in the character of its dependence upon the Bible. It is, on the one hand, a decisive reaction against Protestant orthodoxy on the grounds that it reduced Christian faith to an impossible religion of blind authority to Scripture. On the other hand, it is a vigorous protest against modernism, which, in reacting against the rigid authoritarianism of orthodoxy, has abandoned all sense of responsibility to an objective order.

This doctrine of self-sufficiency, which Brunner terms the "core of modernism," is the central object of attack throughout the book. Briefly stated, the underlying thesis is that man is "not self-sufficient," but is related to and dependent upon an objective order, wholly apart from the realm of historical and evolutionary events. Consequently, man, of himself, has no capacity to co-ordinate his being with this world of the absolute, for reason, morals, and ethics have nothing to do with absolute good. Salvation cannot be achieved; it can only be received when brought to humanity from that Absolute realm. Thus, while history and human culture, as such, are irrelevant to salvation, one event in history is pertinent, namely, the coming of Jesus Christ into human society.

The method and criteria whereby Brunner achieves his theological synthesis are not unfamiliar. Clearly it recalls the combined labors of Luther and Calvin. His constructive theologizing would not be difficult to criticize, particularly by one who shares no sympathy with the supernatural absolutism so prominent in Brunner's theology. But the insight that impels his constructive efforts, and which he points to as "the core of the conflict" between Christianity and modern culture, is of immense importance, namely, the question whether man can insist upon his "self-sufficiency" or must acknowledge his dependence upon an objective order. This is by all means the crucial question in modern theology, and must be answered in terms of some new synthesis of thought. That it must take the course of a retreat to a traditional absolutism, however, as Brunner insists, is a conviction many will not share in. And certainly a synthesis that turns with such indifference upon the realm of human history and human culture, rendering them not only impotent but irrelevant to the concerns of man's destiny, can serve only to frustrate the present quest and plunge us deeper into a bewildering obscurantism.

BERNARD E. MELAND

CENTRAL COLLEGE
FAYETTE, MISSOURI

MYSTICISM, SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHY

Two books, written by an American professor and a French pastor, respectively,¹ present almost identical views of the claims of mystical experience in the light of modern science and philosophy. Because of the close similarity of their views, their differences of approach and emphasis furnish an interesting commentary in comparison of liberal Protestantism in France and the United States.

The volume by America's leading mystic, Professor Rufus Jones, is a group of eleven essays and touches on more phases of the problem in hand; Pastor Boegner's little book is a series of six radio lectures. These conditions should be borne in mind; though, interestingly enough, M. Boegner's work has more footnote apparatus than the professor's essays.

It is clear that the two men are kindred spirits. Both are protesting against the new rationalism of dogmatic naturalists. Both feel that in the last analysis the major concern of philosophy is with the depths of the mystic's experience of God. Both insist on the validity of that sort of revelation which, freed from the older artificial connotations of verbal inspiration, comes through intuitive grasp of the divine presence immanent in the human soul. For both, God is within and beyond us, the only adequate explanation of the profound dissatisfactions that continually drive us on beyond our present selves to higher reaches of achievement and insight. For both, Jesus is the supreme expression of this immanent transcendence of the divine in human life. If Dr. Jones has added chapters on "The Immanence of God," on "Prayer as a Pathway to God," and on the great philosophic tradition of the idealist quest for God, these are by way of elaborating the implications of his general theses. The chapter on "The Testimony of History" is a more general survey of a problem touched upon by M. Boegner in his discussion of "Across the World of the Gods," but also offers a philosophy of history not offered in the French lectures.

In view of these resemblances—which would be striking, did they not represent a familiar liberal Christian position—the differences between the two books are instructive.

One feels the atmosphere of the Pauline episode on Mars' Hill in the French radio lectures. The preacher is conscious of having his back to the wall and being at bay before an unseen audience of free-thinkers (who seem to make French Protestants so anxious) with the believers also

¹ *Pathways to the Reality of God*. By Rufus M. Jones. New York: Macmillan, 1931. xiii+253 pages. \$2.00.

God the Eternal Torment of Man. By Marc Boegner (trans. M. S. Enslin). New York: Harper, 1931. xii+165 pages. \$2.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

415

watching his every move. M. Boegner is never vindictive, but he is clearly engaged in controversy: the frequent use of the opponents' arguments against themselves, the references to the conversions of atheists, and the analysis of their contentions into a series of logical impossibilities are indicative.

If Protestant religion is under fire from free thought in France, so is idealist philosophy under criticism in America. And at times Professor Jones shows the strain of this barrage. But he has companions in philosophy outside the field of Protestant religion who share his philosophic views and he need not get excited yet. This assurance lends to his writing an air of quietness. But perhaps the demands of a philosophic essay to be read by the learned are not so exacting of fervor as a radio lecture heard by the untrained.

But the starting points are different, too. The French preacher is forging the hot metal of struggling souls profoundly conscious of moral failure; the American philosopher is molding the moist clay of sophisticated minds having some concern for intellectual clarity. Consequently, there is a sense of urgency in the one, that can scarcely brook the deliberation of the other. But it must not be supposed from this that there is any lack of intellectual keenness in the former. On the contrary, there is some acute reasoning and every evidence of good stiff thinking.

Perhaps the outstanding difference is the range of the references cited in the American work which shows up by contrast the provinciality of the other. If M. Boegner dips back into history it is to quote Pascal, or Calvin, or Baudelaire—all Frenchmen. If he discusses contemporary philosophy it is in terms of Bergson, Le Roy, Chevalier, Renouvier, and Boutroux—all Frenchmen. If he is speaking of sociology and history of religion it is with reference to Durkheim, Reinach, Grandmaison, and (to be sure) Morris Jastrow—three of them Frenchmen. Professor Jones, on the other hand, draws upon Arnold and Henri Bremond; Grandmaison and Bosanquet; Eckhart and Pascal; Wordsworth, Goethe, and Coleridge; Pringle-Pattison and Bergson; Von Hügel and Boutroux; and Poincaré. It may be that French radio addresses cannot take their hearers too far from home in such discussions.

At the same time, M. Boegner's book will be of great value to thoughtful Americans, for they will want to know the currents of contemporary thought to which he introduces them. Professor Enslin is to be thanked for an excellent translation.

EDWIN EWART AUBREY

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE ATTITUDE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

This volume¹ is a defense of "the right to believe." The argument is presented not in a closely connected form but as a series of reflections by an acute mind on current religion.

The author finds "the need to believe" rooted in the ultra-rational factors of experience. Religion grows out of the will to live rather than the will to know. Add to this crude will to will, man's hunger for completion, his interest in finding the world one in which he can be at home, and you have the elements out of which belief is formed. Non-intellectual factors are also significant as sources of religious doubt. The doubter might well psychoanalyze himself to discover why his gorge rises in the presence of an unsophisticated faith. If the skeptic, moreover, were to be critical of his skepticism he might discover that his negative views are based on naïve assumptions, of the influence of which he has been unaware. After the doubters and the skeptics have taken their own medicine for a while, they may discover that man cannot live by spiritual disinfectants alone. Religion lives by assumptions which are on the side of life. "Religion claims no more for its beliefs than the willingness to let them be true if they can be."

Skepticism has attacked the dignity of man, the authority of Jesus, and the attraction of the spiritual. It also maintains that the church has lost her sense of mission. The author fights back with keen-edged weapons. One likes his hopeful attitude toward the church and his insistence on the ethical drive in early Christianity. It was not all a matter of sacramentalism and a despairing escape from the world. First-century Christianity meant a terrific conflict within the souls of men for a life superior to the prevailing moral standards. Later on, Christianity funded its ethics and went in for respectability and power.

An adequate religion for these times, the author says, must be morally strenuous, humanly hopeful, and intellectually skeptical. This is a popular combination of virtues, but the reviewer doubts their compatibility. Man is not so compartmentalized that a robust hope and moral strenuousity find congenial associations in a mind dominated by a thoroughgoing intellectual skepticism. Some of our philosophical élite profess to get away with it, but one wonders how much of this is a pose. The same struggle to unite incompatibles is apparent in the author's discussion of the religion of Jesus. "Devotion to it," he says, "as if it were practical may be the only source of regeneration for our shriveling life." But to

¹ *Ways of Believing*. By Miles H. Krumbine. New York: Harper, 1931. 156 pages. \$2.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

417

Jesus himself his religion was certainly not a matter of *als ob*. At best such a philosophy is a makeshift for those struggling between two worlds.

You may open this book and begin to read almost anywhere and find something rewarding. It is packed with choice insights neatly expressed. Here is one. "Religion is very like some people; you have to get used to its faults before you begin to see its virtues and beauties." Everywhere you have evidence of wide reading and informed scholarship.

JUSTIN WROE NIXON

COLGATE-ROCHESTER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

SCIENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF GOD

As the title suggests,¹ this volume is concerned with the religious implications of modern science. Of the fifteen contributions, a number are reprinted from other sources. There is part of Professor Einstein's article which originally appeared in *The Forum*; there are sections from Sir Arthur Eddington's *Science and the Unseen World* and Sir James Jeans' *The Mysterious Universe*. Among the other contributors are Robert Millikan, E. G. Conklin, William McDougall, George T. Patrick, Sir Arthur Thomson, and Sir Oliver Lodge.

The only generalization which can be made of the book as a whole is that every possible viewpoint is represented. Here is Einstein's lofty Spinozism side by side with a defense of psychical research, Eddington's mysticism next to Julian Huxley's outspoken humanism.

A number of the writers seem to feel that they have discovered God, but the question arises as to the extent to which their science has been of any assistance in this undertaking. Professor Conklin is emphatic in his statement that: "If there is no purpose in the universe, then, indeed there is no God, and no good." When we turn, however, to find his scientific evidence for this purpose, we are met with the statement that: "Science cannot solve the great mysteries of our existence." "Faith alone assures us that there is definite purpose in all experience." Is this science discovering God?

There is little apparent realization of certain of the basic philosophical problems involved. There is a frequent assumption that though a thoroughgoing empiricism is involved in all valid scientific procedure, there is some other method of gaining religious knowledge, which is, perhaps, another illustration of the separation of science and religion.

Professor Millikan argues for religion largely on the basis of authority

¹ *Has Science Discovered God?* A symposium. Edited by Edward H. Cotton. New York: Crowell, 1931. 308 pages. \$3.50.

plus an indefinite pragmatism. Religion seems to be identified in large measure with the church, and to clinch the argument he asserts that "the Christian church controls *ninety-five per cent of the world's altruism*." One is tempted to ask Professor Millikan for the experimental data back of so interesting and sweeping a generalization.

The previous criticisms cannot by any means apply to all the contributors. Professor Einstein analyzes what he calls the three types of religion, and concludes that science does give us the possibility of a cosmic religion which will meet the needs of men. Professor Julian Huxley, though an avowed humanist, is by no means blind to the emotional problems involved in the passing of an older faith. He recognizes that men still need salvation: "a sense of harmony and peace, a conviction of the value of existence, a feeling that their relation with the world at large is no longer confused and meaningless, but right and significant."

LAURENCE M. SEARS

OHIO WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

THE RELATIONS OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE

One of our most distinguished professors of philosophy has said, recently, that no sort of thinking in our time is so full of evasion as religious thinking. Generally speaking, he is, undoubtedly, right. Karl Barth was literally pushed into his "Crisis Theology" by an unevasive consideration of Feuerbach. Whatever one may think of the Barthian theology, no one will call it evasive, timid, or tentative. Surely, the most significant book in our time, for the religious thinker, is Krutch's *The Modern Temper*; it has met with universal and complete neglect. Religion has not yet produced a thinker as honest as Barth who faces the argument of Krutch. Certainly, Krutch is not a Feuerbach. If we continue to evade Krutch, will we be able to face Feuerbach when he comes?

This is by way of expressing my complete satisfaction with the obvious honesty of Allyn Foster's thinking in *The New Dimensions of Religion*.¹ In one way, the book can be dismissed as just another one of those books which try to reconcile science and religion (of which we have had entirely too many already), on the untenable assumption that the faith that underlies science is similar to or exactly like the faith that underlies religion. Such a dismissal would be unfair. Foster is striving for the sort of faith that has always distinguished any religion that was vital, namely, categorical faith, intuitive conviction. The value of this book is not in

¹ *The New Dimensions of Religion*. By Allyn K. Foster. New York: Macmillan, 1931. 291 pages. \$2.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

419

what it says but in the indirect testimony that it bears to the glowing vitality of the writer's religion which persists not only in undiminished but actually in increasing vigor the more he knows about the findings of science. The feeling is significant because Foster knows so very much about those findings. His specific conclusions may leave something to be desired. That which he set out to do he has accomplished. There are chapters on God, prayer, conscience, Jesus, evolution. The book will appeal especially to preachers.

MILES H. KRUMBINE

CLEVELAND, OHIO

SYNTHETIC NATURALISM

Professor Conger¹ of the University of Minnesota describes the metaphysical conclusions which he reaches from an exhaustive survey of the data of the sciences as "a philosophy of synthetic naturalism." It might also be described as a reversal of mechanism from a reductive theory to a synthetic view (p. 341). The author promises us another book to develop the implications of his system for theism, and contents himself with saying in this volume that

Since the cosmic process comes to its epitome and focus in mind in society, God, even if "He" is not a Mind and not a Person "in and by Himself," is at least to be approached by us in ways that are intelligent, personal, and therefore social. Since the cosmic process culminates in such adjustments, the object of religion, although not an individuate person like one of us, nor a corporate person like one of our organizations, may be called a "culminate person" (p. 586).

The volume falls into two major divisions, the first dealing with natural and social sciences and the second with their substructure in the realms of logic, number, and geometry-kinetics. This arrangement is from the standpoint of experience rather than metaphysical succession, which would require logic to be placed first. The term "epitomizations" is used throughout to indicate that "(1) all the monads of the various levels and realms exhibit significant resemblances in their characteristic structures and processes" (p. 5). These processes are individuations, appropriations and rejections, productions or reproductions, and segregations by disintegration and integration into monads of different levels; and they appear in logical propositions as truly as in biology or neuro-psychology or chemistry. These processes appear, however, at different levels in an orderly series, and each realm "comes to include a monad which serves as a milieu for the organization of new monads belonging to the initial level

¹ *A World of Epitomizations*. By George P. Conger. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1931. xiv+605 pages. \$5.00.

of a new realm epitomizing the first, but developing in ways that are parallel to it" (p. 350). The term "epitomizations" includes also, then, (2) the notion that each successive level epitomizes, or sums up in itself, the characteristics of preceding, or subordinate, levels (p. 19 f.).

The similarity of this view to those of C. Lloyd Morgan and S. Alexander is recognized; but it is distinguished from both in its details. It is offered, furthermore, as a medium for adjusting the differences between vitalism and mechanism in biology, and between animism and behaviorism in psychology (pp. 340 f.). We shall await with eagerness the developments of its religious implications.

EDWIN EWART AUBREY

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

SEEKING UNIVERSAL RELIGION

In the Stephanos Nirmalendu Chosh Lectures¹ Professor Macintosh endeavors to formulate some of the basic principles which, although presented by one who is avowedly a Christian, might be accepted by adherents of other religions. In seeking the lineaments of a universal religion he does not hope, nor would he desire, to have all adopt the same ritual, institutions, names, and historical and literary associations. But he does think that all might achieve or find some "experiential element" which would characterize all worthy religion. In explaining what he means by this experiential element he mentions first the mystical. He finds a remarkable unanimity among all mystics in certain of their affirmations. Some of these affirmations he thinks would have to be rejected. But some might be tested by consistency and workability and so be made a part of the universal religion.

Another phase of this experimental element that he thinks might be a part of the universal religion is workability. It should be "good for humanity." Also there is an ethical content that might well be common to all religion. Still again some of the great religious personalities might well be accepted by all. He mentions Mohammed, Gautama Buddha, and Jesus as examples. Many Christians today, he says, recognize Mohammed as a great prophet of the one true God, and also Buddha.

He makes a critique of Christianity with a view to bringing to light in it what might be universal and accepted as a precious heritage by all faiths. His method is to examine Christianity in the light of the prevalent philosophies, such as empiricism, critical agnosticism, idealism, pragma-

¹ *The Pilgrimage of Faith in the World of Modern Thought*. By Douglas Clyde Macintosh. New York: Longmans, 1931. 299 pages. \$3.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

421

tism, and the distinctive philosophy he himself advocates which is called "critical monism."

Here as elsewhere in his discussions of religion Professor Macintosh distinguishes between that in religion which can be scientifically established and that which can be justifiably believed because it is not inconsistent with what has been scientifically established and is, furthermore, required to provide moral optimism. By scientifically established he does not mean established by the several natural sciences, but rather by observation, reason, and experiment when these are applied to the making of religious adjustments.

Professor Macintosh, here and elsewhere, finds it difficult, at times, to reconcile these two requirements of religion, namely, the requirements of what can be established by observation and reason, and that which is required for moral optimism. In his last chapter, for example, he raises the question whether the God that provides salvation, and is found by observation and reason applied to religious adjustments, can be identified with that kind of cosmic power which is needed for moral optimism. He thinks the identification can be made, but it always requires a great deal of explanation to answer a number of bothersome questions.

The reviewer has never been satisfied with the beliefs which Mr. Macintosh always insists must be added to those "scientifically" established in order to provide moral optimism. In order to protect these beliefs Mr. Macintosh must always make an elaborate explanation of evil. He is always forced to show that evil is somehow not so bad as it seems. While this is not, perhaps, the best of all possible worlds, at any rate it is the best kind of a world. That is to say, the best possible world would have to be something of this sort. All evil is somehow required, directly or indirectly, in order that the most precious goods may exist or be brought forth. He ends by demonstrating that evil would be just what it is, even if the perfectly good and almighty God did exist, which moral optimism requires. The fact that such a God would not make evil any less than what it is, enables the believer to have faith in the God of moral optimism without denying any of the facts of evil. This does not seem to be a very inspiring way to uphold moral optimism, but it does satisfy many people. If the purpose of it is to make people feel optimistic, no matter what the evil we must face, presumably its purpose is accomplished. But this interpretation of religion, universal or otherwise, always requires a very elaborate piece of apologetics. It always will.

HENRY N. WIEMAN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

The only possible excuse for new introductory books on philosophy is that they be exceptional in every respect. This book¹ has the required character only in its plan. Robinson has done something unique in arranging his material in such a way that the book may serve as a basis for the study of philosophy by either the typical or the problematic approach. This makes it unusually flexible, a point heavily in its favor.

There is no question that the book represents a wide acquaintance with philosophic literature. But the task of editing this matter for the consumption of introduction students was too much for the author. The book is designed primarily for the uninitiated. Yet apparently he could not forget that it would be judged by his peers. It needs a lucid commentary, which is not always available, especially to students working outside of organized classes. To some extent this need is met by the author's *Anthology to Recent Philosophy*. The plan of the books is identical and the material is complementary. But an introduction to philosophy should be on its own; it is both expensive and rather cumbersome to be introduced by twins.

The difficulties with the book are many. Only a few will be noted. First of all, Robinson has made a poor job of the rôle of impartial expositor. The book reeks with idealism to the extent that it more than once states that when idealism dies then dies philosophy. That is partisanship, not exposition; oratory, not argument. We are warned that one's position cannot be wholly canceled out. Quite right; but the more reason to be on one's guard against overemphasizing it, let alone flouting it as the very essence of philosophizing. Second, there is far too much cataloguing and classifying without any attempt to tell what the terrifying terms used mean, or what the distinctive problems of the different branches are. This may impress the beginner; it does not instruct him. Third, what are presented as important points in regard to various questions are stated without any attempt at elucidation.² Fourth, too much space is given to the discussion of polemic problems upon which philosophers are not agreed (e.g., whether or not William James was a realist; *the method of intensive concretization* with its *concrete universals* or *implicative systems*). Problems of this sort are not commensurate with the ability and training of students to whom the book is directed. Beginners find enough to baffle them in philosophy without being introduced to any family quarrels. The final

¹ *An Introduction to Living Philosophy*. By D. S. Robinson. New York: Crowell, 1932. xiv+381 pages. \$3.00.

² Cf., e.g., pp. 100-103, 156, 166.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

423

criticism leads back to the first; it is the treatment of the problems of knowledge and existence together. This alone gives away the camp to which the author belongs.

At first sight the book is impressive. After using it as a text this opinion results: If you know philosophy it may help as a summary or a catalogue of names and types; if you do not know philosophy you will acquire no love for it here.

MERRITT HADDEN MOORE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE TASK OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Striking vigorously at the present tendency of sociologists "... to shrug their academic shoulders when any one grows eloquent for a better social order . . ." (p. 98), Professor Clarence M. Case willingly assumes the burden of proving that social progress can be achieved through societal self-direction if social scientists and religious leaders face the problem and assume the responsibilities involved. In his carefully prepared essay *Social Process and Human Progress*¹ Professor Case makes a valuable contribution both to social science and to religion. He holds before the sociologist the responsibility of not merely collecting, measuring, and tabulating data but of seeing its ethical implications—of not merely analyzing objectively the ills of society, but also of serving as guides in social reconstruction. Furthermore, the book is itself a contribution to social theory in its careful analysis of certain social processes. The religionist will benefit from a study of this essay because of Professor Case's unusual ability to bring social philosophy to grips with specific problems of the present day. With a masterful comprehensiveness, the modern scene is surveyed for the social philosopher and reformer.

Professor Case approaches the problem in a logical manner by asking a series of basic questions: Is there such a thing as social progress? If it does take place, what are the criteria for recognizing it? What sociological processes does it involve? How can mere social change be converted into social progress?

In answer to these questions he asserts first of all that "... 'progress' means a going toward the better, and the better means simply more of the good" (p. 49). He avoids an a priori definition of the "good" by calling upon social psychology to tell us what men actually do consider as values in life, on the assumption that the "good" . . . means anything, material or immaterial, which satisfies human desires in a normal

¹ *Social Process and Human Progress*. By Clarence Marsh Case. New York: Harcourt, 1931. 336 pages. \$2.25.

way and thus increases welfare" (p. 69). (The author's standard for judging a "normal way" is not mentioned.) Playing the rôle of social psychologist Professor Case concludes that all persons have three types of desires. They desire to utilize their physical environment. This process he calls "utilization." Second, they desire "a fair distribution of the duties, opportunities, enjoyments, and honors coincident to the processes of production" (p. 64). This is called "equalization." "In the third place growth in appreciation is an essential element in our present conception of progress" (p. 65). He believes, therefore, that, "Whatever else it may imply, our conception of social progress must contain the three ideas of an increasing utilization, equitable distribution, and adequate appreciation of the good life, and that may be counted good which contributes to any or all of these ends" (p. 65).

Having thus formulated a working conception of progress, the author investigates what agencies or forces are available which will enable society to achieve these ends. In turn he analyzes eugenic selection, political regulation, educational development, and religious transformation as means of social control.

The author concludes that, although these means have not in the past achieved extensive social control, and, although the task for the future is tremendous and baffling, yet our environment is amenable to human purposes and "the intelligent direction of society by deliberate social action is not theoretically impossible" (p. 321). He turns especially to the contribution that religion can make and affirms that "the supreme task of the present century will have to be the construction of a spiritual view of life" (p. 249).

Professor Case is to be commended upon the breadth of his survey of current tendencies in society and upon his careful review of countless other writings in the field. Scarcely a page passes without some allusion to or direct quotation from an authority in sociology, psychology, philosophy, or religion. The names of Perry, Ward, Cooley, Comte, Sumner, and Thomas are constantly before us.

This breadth of view is an antidote to the narrow concentration of the specialists, but it also involves possible difficulties. The reader may be slightly confused by the many tangent discussions which engross the author's attention. His consideration of the fallacies of the pseudo-eugenicists, or the artificiality of Hollywood movies, or the democratic ideals of our nation, or the defense of theistic religion, may lead one into so many interesting fields of thought that one forgets the main purpose of the essay. Covering such a broad subject matter almost inevitably involves some superficiality. This is especially evident when the author dis-

CRITICAL REVIEWS

425

misses the most baffling philosophical implications of his theory of progress by positing a series of assumptions, and when he evaluates present-day tendencies in many realms, notably political, educational, and religious, without fully explaining the assumptions underlying his criticism.

Although these characteristics may detract from the book as a carefully unified presentation of sociological and ethical theory, they add greatly to its interest for the reader by calling to his attention the many fields of modern life that need more thorough investigation. Possibly at this point, the slow, objective research of the social scientist may perform a service, which will compensate in part for his apparent lack of interest in social welfare.

ROBERT L. SUTHERLAND

BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY

THE FIRST RAUSCHENBUSCH LECTURES

*The Moral Crisis in Christianity*¹ is the first series of lectures on the Walter Rauschenbusch Memorial Lectureship Foundation, established in the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School. The lectures were delivered in 1930-31 by Dr. Nixon who is the minister of the Brick Presbyterian Church of Rochester, and who was first a pupil and later a colleague of Walter Rauschenbusch. There are six chapters in all under the specific titles, "The Social Gospel since the War," "Christianity and Experimental Morality," "The Struggle of Christianity with the Social Order," "The Christian Type of Personality," "The Strategy of Progress in Organized Religion," and "Shadows of the Future." The book in its various chapters preserves the form of the spoken addresses.

The argument in the various chapters turns on the following assumptions: that the object of man's life is to spend himself to the utmost in the service of the best that he knows; that morality is the continuous process of adjustment by which men seek to achieve the highest values implicit in human relationships; that religion is the process by which man seeks to adjust his life to the supreme power and goodness revealed in the universe, and therefore is a phase of all of his conduct. Religion is not an independent department of life so much as it is its central and ultimate experience. The moral adequacy of a specific religion, therefore, resolves itself into the question whether the supreme power and goodness which it reveals is adequate to release the energies of men in their fulness and whether it can impart to these energies an adequate sense of direction

¹ *The Moral Crisis in Christianity*. By Justin Wroe Nixon. New York: Harper, 1931. 197 pages. \$2.00.

in their expression. Power and direction are the two fundamental moral values of a religion. The author's conclusion rests on the recapture by Christian people of the secret of a saintly life, the saint being that person who reacts to a menacing situation with enthusiasm, love, and courage, as over against anger, fear, and despair.

MILES H. KRUMBINE

CLEVELAND, OHIO

CHRISTIAN FREEDOM

Not many pre-war books deserve to be reprinted. However, any reader of the Baird Lecture of 1913, delivered by the principal of Trinity College, Glasgow, cannot but be grateful that the publishers have made it again available to the public.¹ The book appeared at a time immediately preceding the war when the people could not give it the attention which it merited. There are two reasons why this book is of lasting interest. It treats of a great theme. "That religion is an individual concern at first-hand, and that the ministry must ultimately be based, not on ecclesiastical formalities but on the direct call of Christ"—this is the position of the writer. He is not unaware of the dangers of individualism in religion. Ecstatic mysticism may take the place of sober thought. Religious anarchy may result. Those who emphasize the ineffable experience may have little to communicate. In spite of these and many other difficulties, the author shares the views of those who find the validity of religion in the experience of the individual.

The company of thinkers into whose presence the writer ushers us gives further evidence of the value of this book. Foremost among them is Paul. The whole book might be called a discussion of Paul's letter to the Galatians, which Ramsay has characterized as "the most remarkable letter that ever was written." In Paul's defense of his freedom are found the arguments which are still valid for us. Throughout the book, the thought is illuminated by quotations and illustrations from countless other thinkers—ancient and modern, Christian and non-Christian.

It is hardly necessary to point out the importance of a discussion of this theme in our day. In civil life the problem of the relation of the individual to the laws of his land is a vital one. The church is divided upon its theory of the place of organization in the life of the individual. "High churchmen" fear a state of anarchy if each individual is allowed to follow the vagaries of his own experience, and "free churchmen" are fearful lest

¹ *Christian Freedom*. By William Malcolm MacGregor. New York: Harper, 1931. 392 pages. \$3.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

427

a finished formalism quench the voice of the spirit within the solitary soul. Principal MacGregor clarifies the issues involved with insight and charm.

ROLLAND W. SCHLOERB

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

 SOCIAL ETHICS

A recent symposium, edited by William P. King,¹ contains, in addition to a section by the editor, contributions from three other social ethicists: James Myers, industrial secretary of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America; Howard E. Jensen, professor of sociology at Duke University; and Alva W. Taylor, professor of social ethics at Vanderbilt University.

Frankly critical of a social system which produces the fabulously rich while it impoverishes countless others—a system which relentlessly moves on without plan or purpose, leaving in its wake by-products of human misery—the authors challenge the reader with the demand for renewed interest, especially on the part of church people, in the ethical aspects of social and economic relationships. They do not discourage interest in theological and philosophical questions, but insist that the implications of such quests be applied in attacking problems which are so urgent in their cry for solution.

The movement toward industrial democracy, problems of distribution of wealth, technological unemployment, “laissez faire” versus co-operation in industry, wage systems, hours and conditions of work, and child welfare are some of the problems discussed with insight and candor by these four reporters on modern life.

The treatment which the authors give will especially please those who are weary of hearing society's ills described and analyzed by those who fail to formulate a plan of solution. These writers give definite suggestions as well as general principles which will guide those who are working toward a reconstructed social order. Especially helpful are the suggestions made by Mr. King in Part III, entitled “Conditions of Social Progress.” He does not deal in fanciful utopias, but rather states principles which he thinks are compatible with the social philosophy of Jesus and which, at the same time, can be achieved in accordance with scientific principles. In outlining further the philosophy of such a quest, Mr. Jensen, in Part IV, contends that social science must “complete itself in ethics,” that ethically

¹ *Social Progress and Christian Ideals*. By William P. King (ed.). Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931. 360 pages. \$2.25.

irresponsible research is often inaccurate and socially dangerous, and that only as knowledge and ethical purpose are united can social progress be achieved.

ROBERT L. SUTHERLAND

BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY

ADVICE ABOUT MARRIAGE¹

The late Frederick M. Harris, after a wide and rich human experience, gave the latter years of his life largely to the task of counseling individuals and couples in their efforts to achieve happiness in marriage. Whatever may be said about marriage as an institution, or the changes which it has to meet at the present time, it is centrally a matter of the adjustment of the lives of the individuals who are married. Since the possibilities of happiness are so great and the tragedies are so deep, all the wisdom that we can achieve with reference to happy marriage is desirable. Since this book grows out of close contact with life and mature reflection, and is broadened by wide reading and by acquaintance with experts in the various aspects of the subject, it has much practical value and might well be read by great numbers of married people and by students in the field of the family.

While monogamy has had a long testing, and has driven out polygamy and promiscuity, at least in the more advanced nations, yet the problem is not primarily one of the form of marriage, nor of mere perpetuity of relationship. Within a perfectly regular monogamous union there may be an almost complete failure to achieve the happiness which is possible. While we have rather definite ideas as to what constitutes Christian marriage, as a matter of fact, there is much divergence both in history and in different groups of the present; also, there are wide individual variations.

Hitherto the purely personal factors in marriage have been given second place. Now they are coming to the forefront, and this is true especially in the case of woman whose individuality has often been sacrificed. The improvement of the personal relationships both for men and for women is now seen as the primary need. It is evident that many couples do not achieve that mutual enrichment of life and happy sharing of experience which ideal marriage permits. The most successful relationship is only to be achieved through creative effort, and maintained through the exercise of wisdom and care. Some elements, such as sex relationships, economic fairness within the family, and agreement as to children, are

¹ *Essays on Marriage*. By Frederick M. Harris. New York: Association Press, 1931. 208 pages. \$2.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

429

of central importance. Conjugal love is not a specific thing existing without reference to other factors, and yet it may make its contribution to every other element in life. Very important is the question whether sexual happiness is achieved as a mutual experience.

This relationship receives its character not merely by some dictum of biology but by the total life experience, of which it is an important part. This is to be recognized not in an apologetic spirit, but with frankness and joy. As a means of enriching and beautifying family experience it aids the artistry of life. Some perils to perfect union, such as frigidity and morbidity of point of view, may be overcome. Wisely used in the beautiful relationships of married life, the sex interest and the ardent freshness of love may last throughout the years.

The transcendent importance of marriage at its best requires the imparting of more knowledge to youth, and even to more mature persons, thus aiding as many as possible to find the best in marriage. Merely making the bond more difficult to take on or to escape from, or modifying the outward features such as laws and customs, has little to do with the central problems. Not uniformity nor permanency merely, but the achieving of that happiness which exists in beautiful form in some families, and is presumably a possibility in many others which are not now achieving it, is the highest goal. The outstanding characteristic of this book is that it sees the marriage problem from the inside as a relationship of persons, and sees it with genuine human sympathy and insight. It is not inappropriate to notice the clarity of thought and quality of style which add to the enjoyment of the book.

L. FOSTER WOOD

COLGATE-ROCHESTER SEMINARY

THE ETHICS OF THE FAMILY

Readings on the Family,¹ a symposium of forty-three articles edited by Father Edgar Schmiedeler, head of the department of sociology at St. Benedict's College, Atchison, Kansas, is another evidence of the significant trend in Catholic education toward an expansion of the curricula to include, along with the more traditional disciplines, the newer studies in social science. This volume is designed to provide collateral readings for college courses on "The Family," and will be used in connection with some standard text, such as the one recently prepared by the same author, entitled, *An Introductory Study of the Family*. The organization of the *Readings* is based on the chapter headings of this text.

¹ *Readings on the Family*. By Edgar Schmiedeler. New York: Century, 1931. xii+525 pages. \$2.75.

The value of the book does not consist in its original contribution, for all of the materials have been previously published, but rather in the convenient organization of articles gathered from widely scattered sources, which might be inaccessible to many college students, depending upon the library facilities. Although the names of Catholic contributors recur frequently, and the volume even includes pronouncements by Pope Leo XIII, yet one is impressed, when he sees such names as Chao Hsi-Lin, Willystine Goodsell, Ernest R. Groves, William F. Ogburn, A. J. Muste, John A. Ryan, Paul H. Douglas, Ernest R. Mowrer, and Ernest W. Burgess, by the representative character of the selections and by the desire of the author to include the results of scientific research.

The non-Catholic reader is interested to notice how Father Schmiedeler has combined this scientific interest with a definitely religious point of view. He avoids a conflict between the two interests by a rather rigid selection of the materials whenever modern theory and Catholic dogma are likely to come in conflict. Notably, with regard to such questions as birth control, marriage, and divorce, only the Catholic point of view is presented and this is supported by an ingenuous mixture of subtle reasoning from dogmatic premises and carefully selected scientific principles. One who is looking for an unbiased analysis of these questions may be disappointed when reading the apologies for the Catholic position as set forth by John M. Cooper or Herbert Thurston, S.J. Even in articles dealing with less controversial topics, the reader may be surprised to find the author taking pains to stress the compatibility between scientific knowledge and supernatural ordination. For example, an article by Hester Clare Dignan, in advising the college girl about marriage, reasons that "God would not have put within her easy reach a vast amount of scientific knowledge . . . if He did not expect her to avail herself of it to the utmost" (p. 253). In a selection by Raymond A. McGowan, the author gives a valid analysis of the factors in modern industrial life which are undermining traditional morality, but as if to avoid the impression that man is impotent in his new environment, includes the assertion, "It is, of course, a question solely of temptations which can be resisted by strength of will and the grace of God" (p. 204). In spite of these apologetic tendencies in certain articles, many readers will admire the editor's frank attempt to combine scientific and religious interests, and may be more surprised at evidences of liberalism than of orthodoxy.

In reviewing this collection of readings, one naturally tends to draw comparisons between it and a similar volume also of recent date, *The Family*, by Edward B. Reuter and Jessie R. Runner. Father Schmiedeler's work is especially appropriate for Catholic institutions; its excellent

CRITICAL REVIEWS

431

collection of writings on certain topics, particularly, "Family Disintegration," will make it a valuable source book in any college and seminary; but because of the inclusion of more than twice as many selections and because of its freedom from a doctrinarian point of view, the Reuter and Runner collection will likely receive wider circulation among non-Catholic institutions.

ROBERT L. SUTHERLAND

BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY

CATHOLICISM AND POLITICAL EVOLUTION

This series of "Essays in Order" (5, 6, 7)¹ undertakes to deal in forthright fashion with certain social and political problems from the Catholic point of view—problems which the Catholic "apologist by profession" usually hesitates to discuss, but which are felt to be particularly urgent in view of impending social change.

The first essay is contributed by Carl Schmitt, professor of political theory in the University of Berlin, and is entitled "The Necessity of Politics." In this essay the author examines the Catholic claim to social authority which, he contends, to the average Protestant with his strongly individualistic tendency in matters of religion appears as a monstrous perversion of the religious ideal. But, according to Professor Schmitt, the Catholic church's unceasing claim to sovereign power rests upon her representative capacity. "She represents Christ regnant and victorious." The church, therefore, as the representative of Christ, is at liberty to conclude any political alliance she chooses, with royalists or republicans, with the established order or with a revolutionary group; and the adoption of such a course is not "boundless opportunism," but is, rather, "the outcome and concomitant of political universalism." Professor Schmitt's argument, however, while ably presented, will convince few Protestants that the Catholic church's policy is anything else than political opportunism in the interest of institutional survival.

While the second essay is not written by a Roman Catholic, but by a Russian Orthodox scholar, Nicholas Berdyaev, the purpose which it serves for the Catholic position is developed in an Introduction written by the translator. Berdyaev writes of "The Russian Revolution," and points out that the dynamic of Marxism in Russia derives from the union of Marxian economics with Russian apocalyptic psychology. The communist revolt is a Last Judgment, and represents a catastrophic overthrow of capitalist society. To the proletariat is assigned a messianic

¹ *Vital Realities* ("Essays in Order": 5, 6, 7). By Carl Schmitt, Nicholas Berdyaev, Michael de la Bedoyère. New York: Macmillan, 1932. 273 pages. \$2.00.

vocation. And communism, while professedly anti-religious, is essentially a new religion. But it sacrifices personal to economic values and is essentially self-defeating. "The position of Catholics in this situation," the translator asserts, "is a peculiarly responsible one, for they, almost alone, stand for the principle of spiritual order. They cannot acquiesce in any solution which places the salvation of society in economics alone." The Protestant, of course, will question if the Catholic church is the sole sponsor of the rights of human personality as against "the Communist attempt to subordinate the whole of life to economic ends"—if, indeed, that is a fair characterization of the communistic objective.

The third essay, "The Drift of Democracy," is by an English scholar, Michael de la Bedoyère. In it he essays the difficult task of demonstrating that the Catholic faith alone is able to sustain the democratic purpose and make possible the achievement of the democratic ideal, despite the fact that "democracy arose from the Protestant revolt against the old Catholic ideal of a spiritual and temporal commonwealth of all Christians under the authority of God and his appointed servants, ecclesiastical and secular." His argument runs about as follows: The democratic ideal "at least retained the essentially Christian belief in the value and dignity of every human being. It asserted that no man may be made a mere instrument for the purposes of other men, however powerful and rich." Men, as men, are ends, not means, in the democratic as in the Christian view of life. But that such a humanistic ideal can be achieved without the inspiration of religion, our author questions. "And among the religions of the West who can doubt that Catholicism alone is capable of obtaining the allegiance and sympathy of modern man?" The answer, of course, is that most non-Catholics will doubt it.

These essays represent a combination of intellectual vigor and irenic spirit which characterizes apologetic literature at its best. One feels, however, in reading this book, that the arguments, while very ably presented, are actually rationalizations of positions taken on quite other grounds than their logical validity. Catholicism is by no means as impregnable, nor Protestantism as impotent, as the essays represent these two great expressions of Christian faith to be.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHARLES T. HOLMAN

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Critics of the so-called "renaissance of religious education"—sincere well-wishers as well as those who have always thought that the "educationalists" were on the wrong track—have been giving considerable atten-

CRITICAL REVIEWS

433

tion in the last year or so to the lack of apparent effectiveness in the movement. Where are the results that we were led to expect? Great things were promised. Very little has been accomplished.

There is a growing conviction that one of the causes for this distressing lag lies in the fact that emphasis has very generally been placed upon buildings and organization, upon the multiplication of materials and machinery, rather than upon the process of religious growth itself. Dr. Chave's recent book, *Supervision of Religious Education*,¹ marks a wholesome change in direction. Optimists may well look upon it as the forerunner of a new day. Dr. Chave is primarily interested in what happens when the Christian religion operates to control and enrich personality, to transform society, and to refine and redirect itself. He keeps himself resolutely to primary considerations. At the same time he is thoroughly at home in the field of practical detail and draws extensively from his own experience and that of his students.

The book is full of records and reports giving verbatim accounts of religion as it is taught in American Protestantism (very sorry pictures for the most part!). It furnishes the worker with schedules for directed study of objectives, religious values, teaching methods, classroom management, services of worship, recreational programs; and also presents a rather complete and well-classified list of tests and measurements that are available. Procedures are discussed for classroom visitation and individual and group conferences. Some very helpful suggestions are offered for the work of district and denominational secretaries and for field workers in the student Christian movement. The supervision of public worship receives careful and adequate attention.

Among all the necessary details of supervisory procedures, the importance of religious education's being religious is never lost sight of. The most interesting chapter in the volume deals with "Raising Religious Education to a Religious Level" and seeks to analyze the religious elements of a teaching situation from a functional basis. "Too much religious thinking," says Dr. Chave, "has been words, pious platitudes, meaningless repetitions; and the supervisor's task is to cause more careful thinking and exact speaking" (p. 145). The influences of Ames and Wierman can be easily discovered. Religion is thought of as creative, adventurous, intelligent, capable of specific expression in concrete social situations. It is a fine thing. Whether it is identical with the Christian religion (that shocking and stupendous ferment!) is another question and one that

¹ *Supervision of Religious Education*. By Ernest John Chave. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. 352 pages. \$2.50.

this reviewer feels quite inadequate to answer. Certainly it is true, however, that one of the major contributions of this book is that here practical problems are discussed not on the basis of pious sentiment, doctrinal conformity, educational efficiency, nor on the basis, so popular now, of "character values" (whatever that may mean!) but frankly from a religious point of view.

Some of the limitations of the book are no doubt due to the fact that it is pioneering in its field. Its tone is hortatory rather than historical. Instead of being an account of supervisory practices over a broad area, it gives a convincing picture of the need of supervision and adds a great deal of excellent advice, most of it apparently untested by experience. Techniques and suggestions are taken almost exclusively from recognized public-school practice, and the less stabilized fields of mental hygiene and family social work are almost entirely disregarded in spite of their wealth of suggestion for religious workers. It is also to be regretted that the form of the book is so unattractive, comparing unfavorably with books on public-school supervision. Only an intrepid reader will continue through page after page of such small and pale type!

Just because this is the sort of book that is sorely needed in religious education it should be in a form to encourage wide reading. Combining as it does a primary interest in the processes of growth, an attention to specific religious values in experience, and much practical help, it will be very generally useful to ministers who have responsibility for religious education in their parishes and to directors and supervisors. It is the best available textbook for those colleges, seminaries, and normal schools where much-needed courses in the supervision of religious education are now being offered.

TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

ADELAIDE CASE

A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGION

The well-selected bibliography of 310 titles in the Appendix of this new psychology of religion¹ is a good index of the background of this writer. He has read widely and carefully documents statements throughout his book. In his Preface he states that he has been working with his students at Hillsdale College, Michigan, for ten years to get the facts and techniques which he uses. It is not the production of an armchair philosopher.

¹ *Religious Behavior*. By David M. Trout. New York: Macmillan, 1931. 528 pages. \$4.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

435

There are three main parts to the book. The first is a review of various forms of religious behavior, and the presentation of his thesis that religion is describable as organismic behavior. The third part is a review of the rise and development of psychological studies of religion, with a final chapter on types of study and methods of investigation. The second part is the main discussion, portraying religious forms of behavior in terms of organismic patterns. There is no attempt to imitate others in the organization of a psychology of religion. The writer has chosen to break away from the traditional lines and approaches this study from the angle of physiological psychology. He takes as his hypothesis that "all religious movements are *accurately and completely* described as modes of organismic behavior." While he states that he does not assume any monistic position over against a dualistic, he practically has accepted the monistic position, and that assumption colors many of his statements. He describes the organism as "a point of regard in the universal continuum of movement. Light waves, sound waves, and other physical vibrations are constantly passing through the neuro-muscular-glandular integrations, the energies from which, in turn, pass to other objects as impingements of organismic behavior" (p. 173).

This point of view will be of distinct interest to persons of the behavioristic and physiological schools of psychology. But to many the terms used throughout will be found to be highly technical. The regular inconsistencies of all those who attempt to explain human behavior in physiological and mechanistic language appear on every page. While trying to be independent of such concepts as personality and consciousness, there is constant use of such terms as experience, conception, satisfaction, goals envisaged by organisms, and introspective apprehension, which are ordinarily taken as characteristics of persons.

An interesting attempt to get an all-inclusive concept for religion is evident in the opening chapter when the author takes over a revised form of the Pauline trilogy, "faith, hope, and love," as the criterion of religious behavior. With this ingenious a priori test, he assumes ability to describe characteristic neuro-muscular-glandular patterns. Departing entirely from the use of exact scientific statements, he posits theories as facts and draws conclusions accordingly. His homiletic use of hope, faith, and love as descriptive of religion is fascinating, especially in the chapter on "Persistence of Religious Behavior." But perhaps few persons would understand this sentence: "From the standpoint of organismic behavior hope is an experience of increasing redintegrative facility when the response is temporarily disrupted or somewhat inhibited by competing responses! Faith is the experience of facilitation of the response as it absorbs

competing patterns and thereby is reinforced; *and* love is the experience of intensification of a response through glandular secretions, neuromuscular facilitation, and the contemporaneous incidence of prepotent stimuli."

While anyone acquainted with biology will admit that the lines of demarcation between animals and humans are not universally accepted, yet few persons fail to recognize that humans have attained differentiating characteristics which do separate them in capacities and functioning powers from the lower animals. Though animals may have certain forms of telic behavior, the judgments and consequent behavior of humans is in a range of complexity never reached by lower organisms. Dr. Trout has done well to show that many forms of commonly assumed religious behavior may be closely related to sub-human actions, but the cases described are the abnormal types rather than the normal and hardly warrant his general conclusions given in such statements as "it begins to appear that all organisms, human and infra-human alike, to the extent that they respond with intensified facility to goals, are behaving religiously," or "it seems highly probable, indeed inevitable, that religious behavior will persist on the planet while there are men or even sub-human animals with segmented nervous systems, upon the distance receptors of which stimuli impinge." Perhaps those working in the field of religion will ask whether the author has not forgotten the central qualities of religion in his interest in some of its marginal forms.

If the author had not attempted to be so all-inclusive in his statements, trying to describe completely religious phenomena in terms of organismic behavior, and if he had stated the theories of physiological psychology as theories rather than facts, perhaps a much larger contribution would have been made to the interpretation of religion and religious experience. Even with such faults and such a multiplication of technical words there are a good number of interesting reports of experiments and many stimulating suggestions for the understanding and interpretation of different forms of religious behavior. The theory of reintegration may be found a fruitful lead for other investigations. Dr. Trout has done a large amount of experimental work and gathered a lot of fine illustrative cases, and his reports are significant even to those who will not draw like conclusions. The method of orienting college students into the psychology of religion seems especially suggestive, and the possibilities of directing their observations and investigations in this field are much beyond the ordinary procedure.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

E. J. CHAVE

CRITICAL REVIEWS

437

HUMAN MOTIVATION

In his Preface the author¹ says that he started out to review all the more important theories upon the topics ordinarily discussed under human motivation but soon found himself more and more limited to the presentation of his own point of view. This very well characterizes the book. It is a very personal product. It is an outline with some defense of the author's own thinking about instincts and appetites and sentiments and how they function in human behavior. And as the author draws so heavily upon James and McDougall, especially the latter, the book may well be looked upon as a sort of sequel to their efforts. There is a thought-provoking distinction presented between instinct and appetite. An instinct is said to be aroused always by something in the external situation; and, correspondingly, an appetite is said to be aroused by sensations from within the body itself. This places, of course, a heavy emphasis upon the cognitive factor in all instinctive behaviors; and the author prefers to use the cognitive factor, especially the knowledge of that end-experience which will satisfy, as a means of differentiating one instinct from another. In this there is a recognized difference from McDougall who placed more emphasis for differentiation upon the emotional accompaniment. The list of instincts arrived at by this procedure is much like that of McDougall, although the author is forced by his criteria to present the possibility of food-seeking and sex and sleep operating both in the manner of an appetite and also as an instinct. The Shand-McDougall concept of sentiment is taken over and used in the explanation of moral motivation. There is the development within each personality of a sentiment for some moral principle. But this sentiment is not a very powerful motivating factor. It is reinforced by social pressures and by religion, which is treated as an effort of finite man to live in harmony with the infinite reality. Those whose psychological thinking is largely in terms of McDougall will doubtless find this volume a very satisfying expansion; but those who are at all inclined to support their psychological thinking by reference to experimental studies will not be so well pleased. The James-Lange theory, for example, is discussed without mention of the many experimental studies which it has provoked. Theoretical sources appear in general to be preferred to experimental investigations.

EDMUND S. CONKLIN

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

¹ *The Mind in Action: A Study of Motives and Values*. By A. Campbell Garnett. New York: Appleton, 1932. 226 pages. \$2.00.

EMOTION IN RELIGION

The purpose of the author¹ is to bring together the more or less fragmentary knowledge of the psychology of religious behavior into a consistent system of ideas and to formulate a procedure by which those who are responsible for the practical religious operation as carried on by the churches may bridge the gap between our present scientific knowledge of religion and current practice. The author's thesis is that "religion is and has been the art, often unconscious and uncriticized, of responding to no-response situations . . . the art of controlling the organic processes when they become disorganized into what we call emotion." The author analyzes the conflict situations in which the human person is baffled and for which the person finds no ready-to-hand mode of response. Without proper organization these emotions tend to have a disintegrating effect upon personality. He proceeds to suggest ways in which religion may be utilized functionally to organize the emotions constructively in such situations. Assuming that religion as a valuational type of experience arises within the interval of delay between situations and their responses, the author's assumed definition of religion as identified with the no-response situation is open to review. The data of religious experience seem to point more definitely in the direction of conceiving religion as the integration of all values into a fundamental and comprehending meaning and worth of life. The author's method, which is probably justified by the present state of our experimental knowledge of religion, is limited to the analysis of religion and behavior. The present discussion is valuable in pointing out the fruitfulness of a functional approach to religion in relation to human behavior and as suggesting the need for carrying a study of this relationship beyond the a priori and analytical stages to an experimental level.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

W. C. BOWER

FINDING GOD IN LIFE'S REALITIES

To this series of lectures² President Palmer brings a happy blend of argument and anthem. They carry inspiration no less than conviction. Gladly recognizing modern thought trends, the author explores nature, science, humanity, worship, and Jesus, and finds in them all lights that lead to the presence of God. Perhaps the argument which is used with

¹ *The Religious Control of Emotion*. By Wayne Leys. New York: Long & Smith, 1932. x+229 pages. \$2.00.

² *Paths to the Presence of God*. By Albert W. Palmer. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1931. 105 pages. \$1.00.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

439

most telling effect and which is found in several of the addresses is that man is part of the universe and the universe cannot be interpreted apart from him; moreover, personality being the highest product of the universe, reality cannot be less than personal. Man being part of the universe all the human protest against sorrow and injustice is the voice of God crying out against wrong and woe. "The universe produced Christ; therefore at its heart the universe must be Christlike."

This insistence upon interpreting reality in terms of the highest products of the cosmic process is seen in the selection of data from which Doctor Palmer reasons to his conclusion. It is the beautiful in nature; the beneficent qualities discovered by science; the esthetic and moral nature of man which assure us of the existence and goodness of God. The author does not ignore the facts of pain and sorrow and, indeed, gives some helpful suggestions concerning their possible meaning and their creative influence. But the fact that John Muir finds an earthquake beautiful will hardly help a mother who loses her son because of it. And surely her experience of tragedy is as valid and as deep as John Muir's ecstasy. In a striking and helpful picture Christ is likened in one aspect of his personality to a Gothic cathedral with all its agonizing aspiration and its infinite outreach.

The author does not affirm that man *must* find a path to the presence of God in the fields he traverses but he points out triumphantly that even the modern-minded man *may* find such paths there, if he has eyes to see.

WILLIAM H. BODDY

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

THE TASK OF THE PASTOR¹

This volume of 288 pages is the distillation of the lectures on pastoral care which the author has been delivering every second year for thirty-two years. They richly reflect the wisdom of the past, especially as it inheres in the German tradition, but exhibit also a contemporaneousness almost as up to date as the last study in psychoanalysis. The new contribution to practical theology which the book offers is its description of the cure of souls as the psychology of ministering the values of the religious society to its individuals as individuals.

The first part, entitled "The Protestant Conception of Pastoral Care," reviews the biblical, Catholic, Lutheran, Reformed, and Pietistic ideas on the general subject, together with those of the Enlightenment and the

¹ *Protestantische Seelsorge*. By Otto Baumgarten. Tübingen: Mohr, 1931. 288 pages. Bound M. 9.60; unbound M. 8.00.

modern missionary movement, and against this background sketches the standard for Protestantism.

The second part, embodying all that is implied in its title, "The Personal Qualifications of the Pastor," takes up not only the matter of the pastor's cultural, theological, and sociological education but also that of his necessary training in psychological diagnosis and therapeutics.

The third part, on "The Authority of the Pastor," is an essay of no little insight into the ways whereby the influence of the minister over his people rises out of his own personality.

One of the most interesting sections of the book is the fourth part, "The Parish," which describes the typical German church communities of the day, in village, small town, and city, in terms of Christian sociology.

In the fifth part, on "The Principal Areas of Pastoral Care," specific suggestions are given for the work of parish evangelism and the ministries to the doubting, the suffering, and the sinning.

The sixth part, "The Chief Means for the Cure of Souls, and the Literature of Edification," begins with a warning against the attempt by any average minister to use the methods of psychoanalysis and goes on to mention the best general means of diagnosing and healing the ills of the soul. Follows also a brief list of the best devotional and apologetic literature for German readers.

Dr. Baumgarten's book is one which will have to be read and used by all experts in his field. It will be welcomed especially by those who have been casting about for better means of linking pastoral work with public worship, for Baumgarten, like Zezschwitz, holds that the purpose of pastoral work is to maintain the people at the heights to which they have been brought in the worship of the church. He sends the book out with the wish that his readers "may be led by his testimony to know the depth and sheer reality of the obligation, Protestant and free but inward and binding, which they have towards other human souls."

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

DOUGLAS HORTON

IS PREACHING OUTMODED?¹

For at least a generation we have been hearing the assertion that the pulpit is outmoded. Strident voices on the lecture platform, in books and magazines, and in the daily press have proclaimed its doom. Today new forces militate against it. But here comes a preacher to break a gallant lance for the pulpit. For him, no substitutes are adequate. "The direct

¹ *Jesus Came Preaching*. By George A. Buttrick. New York: Scribner, 1931. xii+239 pages. \$2.50.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

441

impact of life on life, the flash of the eye, the bodily nearness, the touch of the hand—these are not optional to full human intercourse. Without these preaching may be possible—but such preaching will always be partly deformed: it can never be life.” Preaching, then, to a physically present congregation, is built on a deep need of human nature, and is not likely to pass.

There are chapters on “Preaching Christ to the Mind of Today,”—a mind in revolt, a scientific mind, a skeptical mind, but a mind whose higher needs the gospel will meet and whose aberrations it will correct; “Preaching to the Social Order,”—a social order which deeply needs the sharp challenge of the Christian ethic; and “Preaching to the Individual” who needs “the bequeathing of the sense of God.” There are also chapters on the personality and the craftsmanship of the preacher, which give a revealing and refreshing insight into the mind and method of the author of these lectures.

But the most important chapters are the second and the eighth, in one of which the author asks “Is Christ Still the Preacher’s Authority?” and in the other inquires whether “the Preaching of the Cross” is still the preacher’s message.

To this reviewer the author seems to have found a much more satisfactory answer to the question of Christ’s authority than is usually achieved even by liberal preachers. He has steered a clear course between the Scylla of attributing to Christ an authority which must be uncritically accepted and the Charybdis of so robbing Christ of authority as to make him a futile and vacuous figure. His own words will best set forth his position.

There is no thwarting of human freedom. “And why, even of yourselves, judge ye not what is right?”—So he speaks when others offer their careful maxims or dead rules. His authority is grandly proven in the fact that he claims no authority except that which we are freely minded to bestow. . . . We must find our own answer to the vexed issues of our time. Yet—not of ourselves. We are not alone. His Spirit persists. We have no thundered command, but we have a “still, small voice”. . . . We do not accurately know His words, but we know His abiding Word.

And Christian preaching, which arose in an apostolic fervor of preaching “Christ *crucified*,” will vindicate itself by keeping that accent. But it is the Cross, not as a theological dogma, but as the redemptive outpouring of life which Christ’s disciples may share with their Master, that our author would have preached. It is nothing “short of tragic that the church should have lifted the Cross out of life to set it in the midst of a strife of theological tongues to make it a fiction.”

The Religious Book Club made no mistake in selecting this volume. It will prove a tonic to preachers and, no less, to those laymen who may read it—may they be many! It is a notable addition, both as to style and content, to the already distinguished series of "Yale Lectures on Preaching."

CHARLES T. HOLMAN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE CHRIST OF THE SUNDAY SCHOOL

This book¹ is a spirited defense of a mystical appreciation and interpretation of Jesus Christ as the center of religious education. In a decidedly polemical manner the author attacks those who he believes have given over true religion for a secularized and naturalistic substitute without power to meet human needs. This note rises to a climax in his concluding chapter, "Whither Bound, Religious Education?" which was his inaugural address, September, 1930, when he was inducted as professor of religious education in the Presbyterian Theological Seminary, Chicago.

The first part of the book is an attempt to impose upon the character of the teaching of Jesus a fivefold pattern of competent teaching. Proof texts are quoted at every turn to give biblical coloring to his arguments, and even Jesus doing the will of God has indorsement from Ps. 40:8. The author has felt the need for better sanctions and has taken the authoritarian method of making Jesus "central and normative in the program of Christian education." He acknowledges that he is not professionally skilled in "scriptural exegesis," but the reader will recognize that in his passionate earnestness for the spirit of evangelical Christianity he has often failed to give due recognition to the original setting of the statements he quotes.

Many religious educators are feeling the need for better religious sanctions than are commonly used in modern religious education. Dr. Richardson has struck at a weak point in the developing trends but many will question whether he has given a satisfactory answer. To those who are mystically set in their religious thinking, Dr. Richardson's approach may be appealing, but for others a feeling may persist that he has made many pietistic and platitudinous statements with few concrete illustrations of what he means or how his goals are to be reached. For example, he speaks repeatedly of the righteousness of God and the righteousness of Jesus Christ without suggesting anywhere how the righteousness of either God or Jesus is exemplified. He speaks of Jesus as a creative teacher, but the

¹ *The Christ of the Classroom: How To Teach Evangelical Christianity*. By Norman E. Richardson. New York: Macmillan, 1931. 372 pages. \$1.75.

method he enjoins is that his disciples should tell others what they have learned from him. He emphasizes the fact that Jesus left no list of trait actions but taught to "first make the tree good," and yet how this can be done is not at all considered. The last few pages of the book lift out the kind of problems that one might feel the book should have answered, e.g., "How may the righteousness of God by faith in Jesus Christ be taught effectively?" "Let the pupils in our church schools learn how the righteousness of Christ may become their own, and the demonstrated superiority of Christian education over humanistic or atheistic forms of religious education will be seen." He sets over against "behavioristic righteousness with its never-ending list of externally determined standards and requirements" the "dynamic righteousness" of a true disciple of Jesus Christ whose motives are sanctified and in whom the love of God and his fellow-men is supreme, yet does not seem to perceive the problem of causing persons to put the love of God and their fellow-men supreme in their lives. Throughout the book there is an assumption of a mystical relationship to God through Jesus Christ which somehow or other having been achieved all forms of righteous conduct may be expected to ensue.

Perhaps the most unfortunate fact about the whole book is the failure of the author to perceive that he has forced sanctions into the words of Jesus without revealing the power in the life of the Master Teacher. It may be that the sanctions for moral conduct are not in mystical settings but in the experience of values that are inherent in life itself when lived in its largest social relations. The significance of the character of God, of Jesus Christ, and of the Christian way of life may not be revealed in apologetic arguments but shown plainly in concrete manifestations of their beauty and power. Multiplying adjectives about Jesus and reading into the teachings of Jesus abstract principles of truth may be far less cogent than the Gospel narratives which show him in action. And perhaps others besides the Christ, both before and since his birth, may have exemplified the true ways of life. They ought to be discernible without a halo wherever and whenever and however they appear.

E. J. CHAVE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF THE MISSION COLLEGE?

This book¹ is the report of the Commission on Christian Higher Education in India and Burma, constituted by the International Missionary Council in 1929. The members of the Commission were chosen from Great

¹ *The Christian College in India: The Report of the Commission on Christian Higher Education in India*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1931. xiii+388 pages. \$2.00.

Britain, India, and America and toured India during the cold-weather season of 1930-31. So many reviews of the contents of this volume have already appeared that I propose here simply to examine a few of its fundamental assumptions.

The Commission assumes that the purpose of the Christian college in India is that of *praeparatio evangelica*. This assumption I question. I believe that the purpose of the mission college in India is first and foremost an educational one. The mission college has no reason for existence outside of the fact that it should be a superior educational institution. Backed by foreign funds, and manned largely by foreign personnel, it should be a better school, giving intellectual leadership to the nation. There is no excuse for a second-rate mission college seeking to justify itself as an evangelistic agency. That is not its function. The college should place emphasis upon character, but character should be developed through the activities of the college. Religion is not a compartment apart.

In fact, the question might well arise whether it is fair for mission colleges, receiving a large part of their income from government grants, which in turn represent taxes received largely from the Great Hindu and Muslim majorities, to be Christian propagandists. How long would the Christian taxpayers in America allow public funds to be spent for the propagation of Hinduism or Islam?

The Commission feels the difficulty that comes from the government university-examination connection. It contemplated a possible divorce from the university system but the idea was rejected. Instead, the Commission seeks to vitalize the college through the creation of the new departments of research and extension. It is believed that as the college professors do more first-hand work their teaching will be more vital, and that through varied extension contacts the colleges will come closer to the thinking of the people. This assumption is undoubtedly correct, but I question whether it will present much relief under the present system. As long as the college student thinks only in terms of examinations to be passed, and as long as the college is rated by its percentage of passes, there is little hope for creativity. In the early days the mission colleges led. Today they follow. Somewhere within the mission scheme of higher education there must be a place for free experimentation, for it is only thus that the mission college can hope to recover its lost leadership.

Hedged about by its fundamental assumptions, the Commission makes the most of its situation, and its recommendations, though thus limited, are both keen and logical. Committees are now at work in India seeking to utilize the Commission recommendations as a basis for strengthening the mission colleges. Whether the Indian committees will be more courageous than the international commission remains to be seen.

BOMBAY, INDIA

CLIFFORD MANSHARDT

CRITICAL REVIEWS

445

LYRIC RELIGION

It is only fair to say at the outset of this review that those who are in search of a scholarly work on hymnology will not find it in Professor Smith's new publication.¹ *Lyric Religion* is aimed exclusively at a popular audience, untrained in the technicalities either of music or of religious literature. The author's intention evidently is to vitalize and make picturesque many of the hymns in common use among Protestant congregations. To this end he has gathered together and arranged, in alphabetical order, stories, personal glimpses, and remarks about 150 hymns.

The measure of the success of a popular writer is, of course, the taste he exercises in serving as mediator between the scholar and the layman. If he does violence neither to the facts nor to the critical standards of the scholar, and yet presents his material appealingly to the layman, he has done his task well. That *Lyric Religion* is attractively and readably written, none can deny. Considerably more open to question, however, are Professor Smith's musical and literary judgments, and sometimes even his facts. There is no use, for example, in prolonging the sentimental life of *Day Is Dying in the West*, simply because a picturesque story can be written about its composition and use at Chautauqua. Nor is one justified in thinking the mock-heroics of *Christian, Dost Thou See Them* really beautiful or stirring. Many other similar examples might be cited to show that the fundamental fault in this book is to be found in the author's reverent attitude toward a large body of material not sufficiently genuine, according to modern standards, to deserve reverence.

A further complaint might be lodged against the author's manner of sandwiching in between the discussions of the various hymns a great many rather meaningless lists, such as "Hymns by College Presidents," "Teen-Age Poets in the Hymn Book," and "Names of Deity in Hymns." Of greater value are the services of worship and dramatizations centering upon various hymns in the collection. These services may prove an asset to many churches, and form altogether the most constructive feature of the book.

The book as a whole thus remains an uneven production, yet, withal, one which may be useful after a considerable sediment of deleterious foreign matter has been filtered out.

CECIL MICHENER SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

¹ *Lyric Religion: The Romance of Immortal Hymns*. By H. Augustine Smith. New York: Century, 1931. xv+517 pages. \$4.00.

SUGGESTIONS ON CHURCH MUSIC¹

Professor Harrington, widely known as the editor of *The Methodist Hymnal*, has prepared an extraordinarily comprehensive volume on church music, in the very scope of which lie both its unusual merits and its several defects. From a consideration of the inadequacies of religious music of the popular and gospel types, the author proceeds to a sound, if somewhat insecure, expression of the need for a more substantial sort of music in our churches. "It must be postulated as a first principle of church music that nothing is too good for young or old in the church." In the hope of educating young and old to a higher type of church music, Professor Harrington follows the introductory chapter with such practical and non-technical discussions as "Choirs and Congregation," "Reading Music," and "Musical Theory and Ideals." Not wholly satisfied with this approach, he pursues the history of religious music in a single sketchy and rather ill-balanced chapter, and then turns to an extensive cataloguing of what he considers to be the best hymn-tunes, anthems, solos, responses, choral works, and the like.

This latter portion of the book is less successful than the opening chapters. The author attempts to make his lists, both of historical figures in the development of church music and of musical compositions suitable for use, far too inclusive. The very discrimination, for which in the first chapter he so effectively pleads, seems to elude him as he compiles his lists. Many of the anthems and hymns in the list should, on their musical merits, never in the world be sung. How shall the layman, for whom the book is written, know the true pearl from its imitation? And as for suggesting, with an air of discovery, that Stainer's *Crucifixion* and Dubois' *Seven Last Words* ought to be sung more frequently than they are . . . !

The material is presented in attractive outward form and is made concrete by the reproduction of a miscellany of hymns, to all of which the author gives uncritical approval, from the plates of H. Augustine Smith's *New Hymnal for American Youth*. Useful bibliographical lists are appended to each chapter. The book as a whole is to be accepted more as a declaration of faith in an improved standard of religious music than as a convincing demonstration of unassailable musical taste.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CECIL MICHENER SMITH

¹ *Education in Church Music*. By Karl P. Harrington. New York: Century, 1931. 167 pages. \$2.00.

RECENT BOOKS

RELIGIONS IN GENERAL

BANERJI, G. C. *Keshab Chandra and Ramkrishna*. Allahabad: Indian Press, Ltd., 1931. x+402 pages. Rs. 2/8.

Members of the Navavidhan, the New Dispensation Samaj, founded by Keshab Chandra Sen have resented the tendency of Indian and European writers to detract from the originality and fame of Keshab by overemphasizing his dependence upon Ramkrishna. This book is written to establish the priority and independence of the teaching of the founder of the Navavidhan. To the outsider, who is not likely to grow excited over this controversy, it is important as a personal narrative recalling an age that is, even now, remote.

BELL, SIR CHARLES. *The Religion of Tibet*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1931. xv+235 pages. \$6.00.

In this work Sir Charles Bell completes the picture of Tibet presented in his earlier works—*Tibet Past and Present* and *The People of Tibet*. The author has lived on intimate terms over a long stretch of years with the important personages of Tibet. He is a master of the written sources and has had the unusual privilege of access to materials not hitherto available to Western scholars. He understands the people and through his official position has been able to see the political-religious machinery of the Tibetan state at work. This sympathetic appreciation of the social background gives to his interpretation of the influence of Buddhism on Tibet an added importance.

Religion in Tibet is a blend of the ancient native cult, the Pön, with the various forms of Buddhism imported from neighboring lands. The work pictures the early religion, traces the checkered career of Buddhism in its first efforts to win the land, describes its various forms and the peculiar individualistic saintly types of Lamaism, the spread to Mongolia, and the modern priestly state. The work is divided into two parts, dealing, respectively, with how Buddhism came to Tibet and how it rules. The latter section is of especial importance since it is the report of a sympathetic eyewitness. A final section gives a critical evaluation of the various sources available for the study of religion in Tibet.

There are some seventy beautiful illustrations and three maps. The Table of Contents is detailed and the Index excellent.

This is a choice work for book-lovers as well as a welcome contribution to the history of religion in Tibet.

BENVENISTE, EMILE. *The Persian Religion According to the Chief Greek Texts*. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1929. 119 pages. Fr. 20.

Four lectures delivered at the Sorbonne in 1926 under the auspices of the Ratanbai Katrak Foundation by Professor Benveniste are here published in English translation. It is impossible not to agree with the author that the Greeks were familiar with several forms of Persian religion and, moreover, that they did not possess a clear conception of the chronological sequence of the various movements. A study of the Greek authors to

be fruitful must be accompanied by a careful study of all we know from and about the Avesta and the Persian inscriptions. Professor Benveniste's work is a convenient summary and survey of all controversial questions. Unfortunately, the English translation seems to have been prepared somewhat carelessly, as the numerous misprints and passages the meaning of which is not quite clear suggest.

BOAS, FRANZ. *The Religion of the Kwakiutl Indians*. "Columbia University Contributions to Anthropology," Vol. X. New York: Columbia University Press, 1930. Part I: *Texts*, xviii+284 pages; Part II: *Translations*, vii+288 pages. \$10.

Professor Boas of Columbia University has maintained an interest in the Kwakiutl Indians of British Columbia since his first visit to them in 1886, when some of the texts reproduced in the present volume were collected. In 1900, as a member of the Jesup Expedition to the North Pacific, he had further opportunity to study the Kwakiutl language, and again in 1923 and 1927 his studies were continued. Mr. Boas has leaned heavily upon Mr. George Hunt, a half-blood, brought up among the Kwakiutl Indians, whose language is his native tongue.

The material in these volumes is listed under five main heads: "The Winter Ceremonial"; "Mythological Concepts"; "Prayers"; and "Personal Experiences," with an Addenda of miscellaneous matter. About half the space is devoted to the prayers, beginning with various prayers to the sun, and followed by prayers to migratory birds; to fish running in the rivers; to the black bear; to the squirrel; of a mother for her dead child, etc.

GUNKEL, HERMANN, and ZSCHARNACK, LEOPOLD (eds.). *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. 2. Aufl., Band V. Bogen 13-68 (98.-115. Lieferung), cols. 385-2158. Tübingen: Mohr, 1931. M. 33.60.

The second edition of this important work, the parts of which have been appearing at regular intervals during the last four years, is now complete in five large volumes. From the very start the task of revision has been taken so seriously and pursued so consistently that the new edition is in every essential respect a new publication that renders the first edition quite obsolete except as a historical record of work done by German theologians when it was issued (1908-13). In breadth of subject matter, proportion in treatment, attention to detail, and accuracy of statement the entire production is a model of its kind. Naturally, more detailed attention is given to the history of the Hebrew and Christian religion than to other faiths; but all religions are, for general purposes, adequately represented.

The fifth volume (Saadja-Zwingli) includes numerous entries of first-rate interest over a wide field. Many of these articles might well serve a student as an introductory monograph on the different subjects, with carefully selected bibliographical references to guide him in further reading. In an encyclopedia prepared primarily for German readers, reference books in that language are quite properly cited most extensively, but the more important treatises in French, Dutch, English, and other languages are sometimes listed, especially when suitable books in German are not available. Although the bibliographies are intended to be practically useful rather than exhaustive, on the whole one finds them surprisingly extensive.

A new feature of the second edition, which will add much to one's convenience in

RECENT BOOKS

449

using this mine of information, is to be a supplementary volume of indexes. This will include (1) a systematic index of articles, (2) an index of authors and their subjects, (3) an alphabetical list of important words, and (4) a list of corrections. This index volume will, it is expected, appear in the summer of 1932. When thus completed, the work will serve admirably the needs of all students who wish to have at hand an up-to-date, dependable guide for the entire field of religious history and interests.

HAUER, JAKOB WILHELM. *Ein monotheistischer Traktat Altindiens*. "Marburger theologische Studien," No. 6. Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1931. 29 pages. M. 1.50.

The present work appeared as part of the volume presented to Rudolf Otto on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. Professor Hauer on this occasion furnishes an exhaustive examination of the contents of the important Svetasvatara Upanishad. It is his opinion that in that text is found an exposition of a monotheistic belief in the supreme god Rudra-Siva. This doctrine is diametrically opposed to the Vedanta principles and ideas of the Brhadaranyaka and Chandogya Upanishads, to mention only the two most important texts of the Upanishadic group. These views of Professor Hauer are interesting and stimulating and deserve careful examination, especially since they contradict radically the longtime accepted opinions of Deussen, Hillebrand, and others. The reviewer feels inclined to disagree with the author on another point, however. Professor Hauer thinks that the Rudra-Siva cult was of altogether Aryan origin. Many Indologists have during the last two decades or so come to hold an opposite view. Recent excavations at Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa have produced a considerable mass of material which seems to indicate that most of the characteristic elements of the Rudra-Siva cult existed in India long before the Aryan invasion.

KIRFEL, W. "*Bhāratavarṣa*" (Indien): *Textgeschichtliche Darstellung zweier geographischen Purāṇa-Texte nebst Übersetzung*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1931. vi+71 pages. M. 10.

An interesting attempt to establish the textual history of two geographical texts, describing the Bhāratavarṣa (land of the Bharatas), versions of which occur in many of the existing Purāṇas.

LOMMEL, HERMAN. *Die Yāšt's des Avesta*. "Quellen der Religionsgeschichte," Vol. XV. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1927. xii+211 pages. M. 17.

A very careful and useful translation of the Yasts of the Avesta.

MEARS, I. and L. E. *Creative Energy*. New York: Dutton, 1932. xxiii+239 pages. \$2.00.

This book will entertain all who like to play with metaphysical symbolism. It is the latest effort to impose a theory upon the Chinese classic, the Yih King. Originally a primitive system of divination, the Yih King grew by successive elaborations through the centuries. Even Confucius turned to it in his old age. The present authors find in it truth which agrees with the Bible and modern science. They say, "The theory [of the Yih King] thus reveals something of Divine Immanence and Divine Transcendence. It provides a reasonable explanation of the Divine Purpose in the creation and in the perfecting of the life of man upon the earth." Confucian scholars will be surprised.

NYBERG, H. S. *Questions de cosmogonie et de cosmologie mazdéennes*. Extrait du *Journal asiatique* (avril-juin 1929). Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1929. 310 pages. Fr. 25.

An important contribution to the study of Iranian cosmogony and cosmology.

SCHACHT, JOSEPH. *Der Islām mit Ausschluss des Qor'āns*. "Religionsgeschichtliches Lesebuch," ed. Alfred Bertholet, No. 16. Tübingen: Mohr, 1931. xii+196 pages. Bound M. 9.30; unbound M. 8.40.

This excellent "reading-book" is what we would call a source book for use in classes. The volume for Islam, which is hereby announced, corresponds in every respect to the general excellency of the series. It is probably a wise thing to exclude the Koran, since translations into nearly all the languages of Europe can be had easily and cheaply; none of these translations, however, is all it should be, and so we cannot but regret the restriction which the translator put upon himself or which the publishers placed upon him in this regard. A few examples really well translated would be better than many complete translations nonextant. With this proviso the selection is excellent and gives a good survey of the literary development of the Mohammedan religion in all its important aspects. Especially praiseworthy is the selection of living modernists: Ali Abderraziq and Taha Husain of Cairo, both of whom have formed the subject of dissertations in the Arabic department of this university; and Ziya Goek Alp of Turkey. Translation and annotation are guaranteed by the name of Joseph Schacht. For our own students we can only wish that we might have such a book to offer them in English.

SWANTON, JOHN R. *Source Material for the Social and Ceremonial Life of the Choctaw Indians*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931. vii+282 pages. \$0.60.

The Smithsonian Institution publishes this work as Bulletin 103 of the Bureau of American Ethnology. It is a collection of source material, critically evaluated and arranged to cover the social life of the Choctaws, including origins and religion. An Appendix reproduces the original French of some of the important early sources. There are a Bibliography and an Index. This is one source book that will make interesting reading for the layman.

OLD TESTAMENT AND JUDAISM

FELDMAN, ABRAHAM J. *The Faith of a Liberal Jew*. Hartford: Beth Israel Pulpit, 1931. 96 pages. \$1.00.

Four sermons delivered by Rabbi Feldman during the high holy days, 1931. Their titles are "Digging Wells," "Religion, Opiate or Adventure," and "My Creed, Parts I and II." They are not intended as an exhaustive expression or a technical presentation of liberal or reform Judaism. They are thoughts that are incidental to the holy-day season, and are appropriate statements regarding the deeper implications of Israel's faith. There is a unity of thought running through them, and they represent to a fine degree the sentiments that sway Israel at that time of the year.

American Judaism is poor in the production of sermonic literature and Rabbi Feldman's little volume is a happy addition. Those who read it will find a stimulating, educational, and inspiring exposition of the religious ideals of the liberal school of American Judaism. I recommend the volume heartily.

RECENT BOOKS

451

KOHLER, K. *Studies, Addresses, and Personal Papers*. New York: Alumni Association of the Hebrew Union College; Bloch Publishing Co., Agent, 1931. 600 pages. \$4.00.

Dr. Kaufmann Kohler, the late president of the Hebrew Union College, was an extraordinary scholar. In an age when competence in scholarship requires stern specialization, he was at home in many different fields of study. He has contributed greatly to our knowledge of Jewish sects, of the influence of Persia and Hellenism upon Jewish thought, the evolution of the Jewish liturgy, folk lore, the development of Jewish religious ideas. His *Jewish Theology* is still the outstanding book on the subject.

The Alumni Association of the Hebrew Union College has given itself the task of editing and printing a large amount of unpublished materials left by Dr. Kohler. *Studies, Addresses, and Personal Papers* is the second volume published by them. It contains a variety of material: strictly scientific essays such as "Hellenism and Judaism," "The Essenes and the Apocalyptic Literature," "The Tetragrammaton and Its Uses"; addresses of a popular scientific nature such as "The Mission of Israel," "The Synagogue and the Church in Their Mutual Relations," "The Faith of Reform Judaism"; and personal papers such as "Personal Reminiscences," "Inaugural Address," and others.

Aside from the permanent value of the material itself, the very miscellaneous character of the book is a revelation of the many-sided scholar and teacher to whose erudition and energy reform Judaism in America is so greatly indebted.

LEVY, ABRAHAM J. *Rashi's Commentary on Ezekiel 40-48*. Philadelphia: Dropsie College, 1931. ii+122 pages. \$2.00.

This Doctor's dissertation is another of those accurate, comprehensive studies which we associate with the name and guidance of Max L. Margolis. Sixty-four pages on "Sources of Error in Printed Texts"; "Grouping of Manuscripts: External Evidence; . . . : Internal Evidence"; and "A Description of Manuscripts" give a clear account of the material from which, and the methods by which, results were arrived at. The results themselves are presented on fifty-one pages of text, with a good apparatus in footnotes. The reviewer is particularly glad to have this bit of thoroughly reliable Rashi text, as he himself is just starting one of his students on a bit of research in medieval Bible-interpretation among Jews and Christians of the East, in which Rashi will have to be carefully considered.

MIELZINER, ELLA M. F. *Moses Mielziner, 1828-1903*. New York: Published by author, 47 Washington Square, S., 1931. 254 pages. \$3.50.

The life of Dr. Moses Mielziner is a valuable addition to the records and achievements of the first generation of the great reform Jewish teachers in America. They are the ones who laid the foundation for the educational institutions that made possible the preservation of American Judaism. To the greatest among these pioneers Mielziner belonged.

Mielziner was a great Talmudist, and sought to give the world at large an insight into the "sea of the Talmud." He gave himself up to the task of Talmud inquiry and research and the result was his *Introduction to the Talmud*, which remains to this day one of the best works of its kind. The present biography includes also a number of important reprints which are either out of print or inaccessible. Among these is the important piece of research, "Slavery among the Hebrews," which was extensively quoted

in subsequent works on the subject. Another important contribution of his included in our volume is "Legal Maxims and Fundamental Laws of the Civil and Criminal Codes of the Talmud." Besides these reprints there are a number of his papers and learned addresses such as "Moses Miamonides"; "On the Translations of the Talmud"; "Pedagogics in the Sabbath School"; "The Rabbinical Law on the Right of Water Courses"; "The Jewish Law on Post-mortem Dissection"; "The Beginning and the End of the Book of Isaiah"; "Address on the Death of Isaac M. Wise"; "The Rabbinical Law of Hereditary Succession"; and "Paper on the Jewish Almanac." There is also a Bibliography of his works and a list of references to him. Besides, there are appendixes containing documents relative to the "American Jewish Pulpit and the American Slavery Agitation," and to a court decision dealing with the right of a congregation to change its ritual.

The volume is a handy reference for those who are interested in the development of American Judaism, and in various Talmudic problems touching on the religious life of Jewry.

RAHLFS, A. *Septuaginta*. "Societatis Scientiarum Göttingensis," Vol. X, Bogen 12-23, "Psalmi cum Odis," 2. Hälfte. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1931. 177-365 pages. M. 16.80.

This (second) part of the Psalms concludes ten of the sixteen sections of the Göttingen Septuagint. It is most gratifying that the work goes steadily forward, for even though the text does not differ notably from that printed by Swete, it is very useful to have the apparatus which Rahlfs supplies. Further, it is commendable that the Göttingen edition of the Psalms includes also the liturgical materials which are found in so many Greek manuscripts. To be sure, part of these materials are of the New Testament text (the Magnificat, the Benedictus, the Nunc Dimittus) and one is even mediæval (the fourteenth "ode," which is an early morning canticle), but they appear in many manuscripts—in some Bibles they stand with the Psalms and are also repeated in the New Testament Psalter. The Göttingen scholars deserve the thanks of many scholars for the exacting task which they are so excellently executing.

NEW TESTAMENT

ALLEN, FRANK E. *The Acts of the Apostles*. Boston: Christopher Pub. House, 1931. xxxii+828 pages. \$3.50.

A "devotional" commentary, for purely practical purpose. Of no critical or scientific value.

BALLARD, FRANK H. *The Spiritual Pilgrimage of St. Paul*. New York: Harper, 1932. 158 pages. \$1.50.

Helpful homilies from the pen of an English Congregational minister who delivered the material as addresses at summer conferences. The author is more interested in furnishing religious guidance for modern life than in understanding Paul. There is little effort to wrestle with any of the major problems in the life of the great apostle. He uses Scripture very much in the traditional Protestant fashion, seeking authority for the points of view with which the preacher has come to his text. He speaks of Paul as "a shining example of a man made mighty in thought, feeling, will, and action through Jesus Christ" (p. 15). Such a study is profitable, though the title suggests something more scholarly.

RECENT BOOKS

453

Uncritical treatment of the New Testament detracts from the high value expected. Quotations are made from the traditional epistles of Paul and from the Book of Acts without discrimination. Even the speeches of the Acts are taken at their face value as representing the words of Paul. In the Preface it is suggested that one interest of the book is to popularize the material of "large and scholarly books." References are very often made to writers who themselves have done this sort of thing, so that the reader feels that much of the time he is twice removed from first-rate scholarly work.

The book is adapted for use in the church school or for devotional reading. The style is clear and simple and the whole not lacking in inspiration and helpful suggestions.

BARNIKOL, ERNST. *Forschungen zur Entstehung des Urchristentums, des neuen Testaments und der Kirche*. III. *Personenprobleme; Die Apostelgeschichte; Johannes Markus, Silas und Titus*. 32 pages. M. 1.50. IV. *Romer 15; Letzte Reiseziele des Paulus: Jerusalem, Rom und Antiochien, eine Voruntersuchung zur Entstehung des sogenannten Römerbriefes*. 23 pages. M. 1.20. V. *Der nicht-Paulinische Ursprung des Parallelismus der Apostel Petrus und Paulus (Galater 2:7-8)*. 31 pages. M. 1.60. Kiel: Walter G. Mührlau, 1931.

These studies represent further essays by Professor Barnikol, who is distinguishing himself as the advocate of positions on early Christian literature and history which are radical to the point of being bizarre. For example, John Mark was not a native of Jerusalem, but came under the influence of Barnabas and Paul in Cyprus. The Silas of Acts 15:40-18:5 is to be distinguished from the Silas of Acts 15:22-34 and from the Pauline Silvanus; he is, moreover, the author of the "we sections" of Acts, and is to be identified with Titus. Paul had no idea of a journey to Spain; the journey contemplated in Romans, chapter 15 (although it must not be supposed that Paul wrote a letter to the Romans), was from Antioch to Italy. Again, the original references of Paul in Galatians were exclusively to Cephas, who is to be distinguished from Peter. They were made into references to Peter by some anti-Marcionite.

It is apparent that these judgments are pure abstractions. They will not carry conviction to anyone disciplined in the historical study of Christianity.

DOUGLAS, CLAUDE C. *Overstatement in the New Testament*. New York: Holt, 1931. xxv+252 pages. \$1.75.

The author, who is professor of Greek in the University of Southern California, treats hyperbole in the Old Testament and the various books of the New Testament in almost too-inclusive fashion. This is partly because he is actually describing the use of all figurative language in the Bible; metaphor, simile, etc., are discussed as well as hyperbole. Yet even this can hardly justify the explanation of the great age claimed for the patriarchs as due to hyperbole. These features, however, are minor defects in a work of real value that reminds the Bible-reader that he must not take poetic imagery as statistical enumeration of facts. The assembling of all overstatements of a given kind makes more possible their sound evaluation. The book is equipped with an index of the biblical passages discussed.

FOAKES-JACKSON, F. J. *The Acts of the Apostles*. "The Moffatt New Testament Commentary." New York: Long & Smith, 1931. xx+236 pages. \$3.50.

Writing not for specialists but for the general reader and student of the Acts, Dr. Foakes-Jackson has produced a useful and spirited account of the book, with an appreciation of its high qualities now unfortunately rare. We should have welcomed a little

fuller statement of the leading traits of the book in the Introduction, but within the limits set by the series the author has done us a real service, bringing to bear his great learning and fresh and vivid way of putting things, upon one of the most important and most debated books in the New Testament.

GEERLINGS, JACOB, and NEW, SILVA. *Chrysostom's Text of the Gospel of Mark*. Reprinted from *Harvard Theological Review*, XXIII, No. 2 (1931), 121-42.

This brief but important essay, undertaken because its subject is essential to the history of the New Testament text, is a part of the work projected by Professor Kirsopp Lake and his associates. It is an attempt to supplement the judgments of Hort and von Soden. Hort recognized that Chrysostom's texts were Syrian, and von Soden in his sketch of the later history of the text found two types used by the great Antiochian, but was unable to characterize the text of Mark which was used.

Mr. Geerlings and Mrs. New, while they are unable to point to any known manuscript or text-type which is similar to the variants which they find, observe that Chrysostom's text differs as much from the TR as from the neutral text. It was peculiar to him, and full of variants for which no attestation can be found, a combination of neutral, Western, and Caesarean readings otherwise unknown.

One may fairly ask why the essay was attempted with so poor a basis as Migne's reprint of Montfaucon. Even though it is a task of major difficulty, a critical text of Chrysostom is essential before the task here undertaken can be successful. One wonders if there is not present a polemical attitude toward the judgment of Hort; it is interesting that what is refuted is a meaning which is clearly read into his statement. Nor is it clear that von Soden is supplemented in any important way. This essay opens an important question, but it does not give the final answer.

LLWYD, J. P. D. *Son of Thunder*. New York: Long & Smith, 1932. 170 pages. \$1.50.

The dean of All Saints Cathedral in Halifax presents a very good handbook for the Bible classes. He avoids the question of authorship and all critical problems. The "Son of Thunder" of the Synoptic Gospels wrote both the Gospel of John and the Revelation. The author uses his imagination to good effect in composing a letter in which John reports his emotions during the last hours of Jesus' life (p. 26). Likewise he pictures the meeting of John and Paul at the apostolic conference (p. 82). The best feature of the book is its emphasis on the personality of John and its picture of the Christian religion as bound up not so much with doctrine as with personal leadership.

RAVEN, CHARLES E. *Jesus and the Gospel of Love*. New York: Holt, 1931. 452 pages. \$3.00.

This volume of the Alexander Robertson Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow contains an excellent proposition worked out with great care. The Christian gospel is not a creed or a theology, not philosophy or metaphysics, but is a way of life. It is a process rather than a message. It is the building of a complete and integrated character through service. Part I states the proposition; Part II applies it to Jesus; Part III applies it to Paul and later leaders.

But the method of the book is hardly modern. It is frankly an apology in the old sense of the word. The exaltation of Jesus rests upon too many foundations that are not easy to defend. The apology includes even the tradition that the Fourth Gospel was written by the son of Zebedee. Raven says quite truly that the interest of the fourth

RECENT BOOKS

455

evangelist is not primarily "intellectual and doctrinal." "His concern is with religion, with personal and moral relationships, with love" (p. 183). He continues, however: "The synoptists indicate that Zebedee was a man of some means, and that Salome was the sister of the Virgin" (p. 221). "Jesus as he was to his friend; Jesus as he essentially is; that is, I believe, what we have in the Fourth Gospel" (p. 228). His "memory does thus select certain scenes, of which every detail is vividly recalled." The idea is well stated that the evangelist might be considered a "great artist." But the thought is vigorously repudiated.

RUSSELL, ELBERT. *The Message of the Fourth Gospel*. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1932. 200 pages. \$1.50.

Professor Russell of Duke University has written this work as a companion volume to Professor Branscomb's *The Message of Jesus*. Its purpose is to put into "popular, brief form for church members the teaching of the Fourth Gospel in the light of modern scholarship." While omitting any discussion of authorship, the book is excellent in its presentation of the philosophical and religious background of the Ephesian Gospel.

One of the best features of the volume is the author's skill in paraphrase and translation. John 1:3 is paraphrased: "There is no creator of the world inferior to God or even distinct from him as some teach; but from the very beginning the Logos worked together with God, even in the creation—there was nothing whatever created apart from him" (p. 49). The expression "only begotten" could "very well be translated simply by 'beloved'" (p. 184). Faith is "a generic, inclusive term for man's acceptance of Jesus as savior and his coming into a new divine life and fellowship through him" (p. 104).

HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY

BAYNES, NORMAN H. *Constantine the Great and the Christian Church*. "Proceedings of the British Academy," Vol. XV. London: Humphrey Milford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1931. 107 pages. \$2.00.

This monograph has a value quite out of proportion to its size. It contains the Raleigh Lecture on History delivered on March 12, 1930, to which are added seventy-four pages of footnotes embodying a critical estimate of the problems and literature relating to the subject. These notes contain a wealth of information in compact form, every sentence of which deserves careful reading. The text of the lecture itself is also worthy of serious consideration. It has the great merit of allowing Constantine to be a religious man, according to his lights, in the specific setting where he lived and in accordance with ways of feeling and thinking integral to that ancient environment. The reader will find it very refreshing not to be told that he must visualize this first imperial patron of Christianity either as an ideal Christian theologian or as a sophisticated and scheming practical politician—two types of interpretation that have long been in vogue. All future research in this field might well begin with this essay; although one ought, perhaps, to make a larger place for a preliminary consideration of the characteristic religious psychology of Roman imperialism in Constantine's heritage.

BROSNAN, CORNELIUS J. *Jason Lee, Prophet of the New Oregon*. New York: Macmillan, 1932. 348 pages. \$3.00.

This is the second book within two years devoted to an account of the career of Jason Lee, the first missionary, either Protestant or Catholic, to enter the Oregon coun-

try. Lee, a New Englander with a typical New England religious and educational background, responded to the call of the Methodist Missionary Society in 1833 to lead a missionary enterprise to the Nez Percé and Flathead Indians to the Far Northwest. He and his party arrived in Oregon in September, 1834, and founded the first permanent settlement in the Willamette Valley. The mission stations that he established were placed at strategic points, and all became centers of American influence, and in this sense Lee laid the foundations of an American state. While Lee was first of all a missionary, yet he fully comprehended the important political and economic development that was to come. In his several trips to the East, primarily in the interest of his mission, and in his correspondence, he was a large factor in creating widespread interest in the Oregon country, and eventually helped to gain the great Northwest region for the United States.

Mr. Brosnan has based his study entirely on primary materials, and in fact much of the book is little more than a collection of sources.

CASEY, ROBERT PIERCE. *Serapion of Thmuis: Against the Manichees*. "Harvard Theological Studies," XV. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931. 80 pages. \$1.50.

A critical edition of the Greek text, with a brief Introduction describing the manuscripts employed, what is known of Serapion and the nature of his treatise against the Manichees. The author has been able to improve upon earlier editions largely by using a manuscript of which he and Professor K. Lake obtained photographs from the monastery of Vatopedi on Mount Athos in the year 1924.

GERKE, FRIEDRICH. *Die Stellung des ersten Clemensbriefes innerhalb der Entwicklung der altchristlichen Gemeindeverfassung und des Kirchenrechts*. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1931. v+136 pages. M. 11.25.

This monograph presents a fresh study of I Clement as it bears upon our knowledge of the organization and law of the early church. Feeling that the subject has heretofore been approached too much in the interest of supporting one or another theory regarding early church polity, the present writer aims at a more objective treatment with a view to ascertaining (1) the actual conditions disclosed in the document respecting the organization of the church both at Rome and at Corinth, and (2) the Roman theory of the church as it was brought out by the crisis at Corinth. Each of these topics is investigated with exemplary thoroughness and keen insight. Then follows a concluding chapter evaluating the position of I Clement in the evolution of the early Christian institution. The result is an unfavorable judgment upon the well-known theory of Sohm and a slightly modified reiteration of the equally well-known counterposition of Harnack.

GEYER, B., and ZELLINGER, J. (eds.). *Florilegium Patristicum tam veteris quam mediæ ævi auctores complectens*, Fasc. XXIX: *S. Anselmi cantuariensis archiepiscopi liber proslogion*. Ed. F. S. SCHMITT. Bonn: Peter Hanstein, 1931. 40 pages. M. 1.80.

Handy edition of the Latin text with an introduction describing the manuscript tradition and listing recent books on the interpretation and translation of this treatise of Anselm.

RECENT BOOKS

457

GOOSSENS, WERNER. *Les Origines de l'eucharistie sacrament et sacrifice*. Gembloux: Duculot; Paris: Beauchesne, 1931. xxiii+390 pages. Fr. 50.

This Master's dissertation from the Catholic University of Louvain is a very scholarly examination of recent literature and original sources of information dealing with the early history of the Christian Eucharist. The first part of the work surveys recent writings that have tended to trace to non-Christian sources the notions of sacrament and sacrifice connected with the rite. The second section of the volume expounds at length the New Testament teaching on the subject, and the third discusses more definitely the specifically Christian source of the idea of the "real and substantial presence" in the Eucharist. This teaching is traced directly to Christ himself. Christ promised his uninterrupted presence in the church and thus the Eucharist is "the sacrament par excellence, the commemorative sacrifice of the passion, the soul's food unto eternal life, the continued and unceasing presence of the Saviour among his followers."

HANNSENS, JOANNES MICHAEL. *Institutiones liturgicae de ritibus orientalibus*, Tomus II et III et Appendix. Romae: Pont. Universitatis Gregoriana, 1930-32. xl+514, xl+646, Appendix, 120 pages. II, L. 25; III, L. 35; Appendix, L. 5.

The projected work, of which only Volumes II and III with the Appendix have hitherto appeared, is planned to comprise five volumes. The first of these is to deal with the Eastern rites in general, about their divisions and diffusion, their origin and development, and about times and liturgical paraphernalia; the second and third volumes comprise a detailed treatment of the mass; the fourth and fifth volumes are devoted to the sacraments.

The volumes under review are written with scholarly thoroughness and exhaustiveness that leaves little to be desired. Each one of the various orthodox, uniate, as well as other Eastern rites is analyzed, its history is traced, and its present usage and peculiarities are pointed out. The array of authorities quoted makes the work unusually valuable. Even from this partial scope of the work it is evident that Father Hannsens' work will take its place among the most authoritative treatments of the subject, and that for a thorough student of the field it will prove indispensable.

HEIGL, BARTHOL. *Antike Mysterienreligionen und Urchristentum*. Münster i. W.: Aschendorff, 1932. 112 pages. M. 2.45.

The writer surveys and evaluates, from the Roman Catholic point of view, the German and French literature dealing with early Christianity's debt to the gentile mystery religions; apparently he is not acquainted with books in English on the subject. While recognizing that the mystery cults constituted an important religious phenomenon in the Graeco-Roman world, he is entirely skeptical about the alleged dependence of Christianity upon this source. His method of treatment follows the lines laid down by Clemen, Heinrici, and other Protestant apologists who have similarly maintained that the influence of the mysteries on early Christianity was at most only very slight and in the area of purely peripheral matters.

HOWARD, RANDOLPH L. *Baptists in Burma*. Philadelphia: Judson Press, 1931. 168 pages. \$1.00.

The writer of this little book has been remarkably successful in crowding within relatively narrow limits a great abundance of well-documented information, while at the

same time the story is told with a vivacity that makes every page interesting reading. The book is not a piece of missionary "propaganda," in the ordinary sense of that term, nor does it attempt to exhibit a play of psychological undercurrents such as is depicted in Mrs. Morrow's *Splendor of God*; yet it presents without sectarian bias a factual statement of work accomplished and tasks still to be performed that will elicit the most substantial type of response. One does not need to be told that the author had lived for many years among the people and scenes described, and that since leaving Burma in 1924 he has kept in close touch with developments in that country. The book is admirably suited to the needs of study groups even though they may possess no previous acquaintance with the subject, while those more experienced in the subject will appreciate the fund of information assembled and the valuable analyses and interpretations that frequently appear.

INGRAM, KENNETH. *The Church of Tomorrow*. New York: Macmillan, 1932. 239 pages. \$2.00.

This book deserves the attention of all who are interested in the English religious situation and in the prospects of Christianity in the changing society of today. It is a challenge by an Anglo-Catholic who is also a vigorous liberal to others of his party, as well as to all Christians, to adopt the liberal and tolerant attitude that no party is the possessor of absolute truth, to cultivate free inquiry, to break away from antiquated and superstitious views of sex, to form a corporate liberal Catholicism, and to seek an interdenominational basis of comity resembling that of the League of Nations.

KRÜGER, GUSTAV. *Augustin—der Mann und sein Werk*. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1930. 32 pages. M. 1.40.

This sympathetic, simple but scholarly, description of Augustine's life and thought is highly recommended.

MACDONALD, A. J. *The Evangelical Doctrine of Holy Communion*. Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 1930. 330 pages. 7s. 6d. net.

The attempt to show a line of spiritual descent from the early church to the Reformation has often been made. Something of the kind is the purpose of this work prepared under the editorship of a distinguished writer on medieval theological subjects. "It is the deep conviction of all the contributors," writes Dr. MacDonald, "that one interpretation was implied by the Lord in the words recorded in the Gospels and by S. Paul, and that this is contained in the evangelical exegesis." And he disapproves of the application to this doctrine of the idea of development. Yet the treatment offered by the seven authors in the nine chapters of the book is less rigid than this forbidding statement from the Preface would suggest. As a history of the exegesis of the appropriate passages by the more scriptural theologians of all ages, the work is done in a spirit of fair and frank inquiry. Highly informing are the two chapters by the editor in which he shows the divergence of "Augustinian Symbolism" and "Ambrosian Realism and Metabolism," and traces the history of the former. "The Carolines to Berengar," chapter v, by Harold Smith, summarizes admirably the teaching of the Continental and English Reformers. Chapters vi-ix deal with modern Anglican and Free Church treatments of the subject. Each chapter is provided with a short bibliography. The book is packed with information, much of which is nowhere else readily available, and despite its limitations is a highly useful contribution to the history of Christian teaching and belief.

RECENT BOOKS

459

MACKENZIE, KENNETH D. *Anglo-Catholic Ideals*. New York: Macmillan, 1932. 127 pages.

This is a persuasive popular apologetic of Anglo-Catholicism, by an author who is not overconfident of the future of his party in the Anglican church. He has no leanings toward Romanism, which presents for him an "almost impenetrable barrier," and he fears Anglican reunion with non-Episcopalians as likely to "dilute" the church's "newly discovered Catholicism." Dr. Mackenzie does not push his arguments to the point of being controversial, but briefly presents the essentials of Anglo-Catholic piety and teaching and leaves these to make their own impression. While he claims that "it is an immemorial custom of the Church that Holy Communion is to be received before any other food," he nevertheless recognizes that such was not the primitive custom. "The first Communion of all was made after supper and the original custom of the Church was to celebrate the Holy Mysteries at the conclusion of the fellowship meal. But immediately it was seen that this was undesirable." Hence the now "immemorial custom" of fasting before communion was introduced, and its antiquity now gives it such authority that Anglo-Catholics are shocked by a reversion to the more primitive way of the "first communion." His treatment of the ministry is vulnerable at many points from the standpoint of history. Disposing summarily of the view that the ministry was "evolved out of the church," he lays emphasis on "continuity" with the apostles as the prime requisite for the ministry. He then sweeps away the high Presbyterian point of view by saying simply: "There is no other ministry in Christendom (except episcopacy) that can plausibly claim to be the continuation of that original group of Apostles and Elders, etc." The book can be commended as a moderate and gracious presentation of Anglo-Catholic views; but it makes the reader who is initiated in the history of Christianity wish that the beautiful religious practices of Anglo-Catholicism were advocated on their merits rather than on the unsatisfactory historical basis on which they are made to rest.

MESSINGER, ERNEST C. *Evolution and Theology*. New York: Macmillan, 1932. xxiv+313 pages. \$2.50.

This book, while it attempts to solve practical problems for Roman Catholics of today, will prove of interest to students of the history of scholastic thought. It begins with the assertion that "the authentic exponent of the Christian Revelation is the Catholic Church sent by Christ to teach all nations and endowed by him with infallible authority." Its main sections are entitled "The Origin of Living Beings," "The Origin of Man," and "The Formation of Eve." These topics are treated with reference to the teaching of theologians from Augustine to the present day. The authority of Genesis and of the theologians is gravely vindicated, yet the author is able to offer a qualified hospitality to the evolution doctrine, "as a working hypothesis, or better still as an inference." The inference is solely from scientific facts; Scripture and tradition do not give specific evidence. On the formation of Eve *ex Adamo*, judgment is suspended. Scripture and tradition are favorable; but the church has not declared infallibly on the subject. God could have done this; but did he? The writer prefers to end his inquiry with this question.

PFEIFFER, RUDOLF. *Humanitas Erasmi*. "Studien der Bibliothek Warburg," No. 22. Leipzig: Teubner, 1931. 24 pages. M. 1.60.

The author presents in a few pages a fascinating and profound analysis of the fundamental attitude of Erasmus. Following the arguments of the early book against the

Barbari, he shows that the lifelong interest of Erasmus was devoted to the development of *humanitas*. This ethical cultural ideal to which the writers of the Italian Renaissance had devoted their chief interest, recognizing it as the heritage of Roman antiquity and using it as an incentive to the cultivation of a new cultural nationalism, was accepted by Erasmus as the theme of all his endeavors for a Christian education.

The value of this little book lies not only in its forceful analysis of Erasmus' thought, but also in its proof that the great humanist was primarily a member of the Renaissance and only secondarily a Christian reformer.

PREISENDANZ, KARL. *Papyri graecae magicae: Die griechischen Zauberpapyri*, Vol. II. Leipzig: Teubner, 1931. xv+216 pages. M. 20.

The first volume of this very useful collection of Greek magical papyri appeared four years ago (see *Journal of Religion*, IX [1929], 153 f.). The work is now complete. Its scope, as announced in the first volume, has in the main been adhered to, and the collection presents in the Greek originals with German translations an essentially full array of the known and accessible non-Christian formulas and data relating to the magical practices among pagans. No attempt has been made to include a full list of the Christian materials of this type, but a representative body of these has been added at the end of the second volume—enough to provide one with sufficient illustrative matter to constitute an adequate basis for comparison. The large place occupied by magic in the religion of the common man, both pagan and Christian, in the ancient world is not readily appreciated nowadays, and this collection of texts, bringing together as it does a wealth of data not easily accessible to the average student, will be found exceedingly useful and informing for the study of early Christianity as well as of its pagan antecedents and environment. The world of the demons was very real to the ancients, and it is significant that the new religion was able to function so effectively in this area of human experience. Formulas that may seem to be mere nonsense to moderns were once thought to constitute the divinest sort of protective potency, and it meant much for the triumph of Christianity when its advocates were able to substitute the names of the Father, the Holy Spirit, the Virgin Mary, Christ, or the Holy Trinity for the heathen names that had previously been so widely employed to safeguard the well-being of needy and fearful mortals.

SICKENBERGER, JOSEPH. *Leben Jesu nach den vier Evangelien*. VI. *Der Abschluss*. Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1931. vi+202 pages. M. 4.55.

This popular Roman Catholic "Life of Jesus," the earlier parts of which have been appearing from time to time during the last decade, has now reached completion. It is a harmonistic blending of gospel materials which takes account of the various problems that have been raised in connection with critical study of the gospels, while the author's solution of these problems is such that one may still hold in full traditional orthodox views about the life and person of Jesus.

SOIRON, THADDEUS. *S. Bonaventurae Prolegomena ad sacram theologiam (ex operibus eius collecta)*. "Florilegium Patristicum," ed. Bernh. Geyer et Joh. Zellinger, Fasc. 30. Bonn: Hanstein, 1932. iv+32 pages. M. 1.40.

A collection of excerpts from the works of Bonaventura, relating to the nature and methods of theology. Good material for seminar courses.

RECENT BOOKS

461

STEPHAN, HORST, and LEUBE, HANS. *Die Neuzeit (Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte)*. 2. Auflage. Tübingen: Mohr, 1931. 457 pages, with *Personenverzeichnis*, 12 pages. Unbound M. 17; bound M. 19.

This second edition improves on the first by (1) offering a convenient, detailed review of the last twenty-two years of church history throughout the world, and (2) revising the earlier period (1689-1910), together with many additions to the Bibliography for the same. Dr. Leube is responsible, with assistance from Rudolf Günther, Hans Koch, Hilding Pleijel, and W. W. Rockwell, for the specifically historical information; Professor Stephan (Marburg) for the theological-philosophical introductions. The editors have sought strenuously to avoid "the Scylla of a purely subjective choice of material and of viewpoints, as well as the Charybdis of a mere assemblage of data." The lack of a subject index is explained by reference to that of the first edition (1913), which is still valid.

In general, this is a useful and scholarly book, though the unusually condensed treatment of innumerable subjects, with bewildering abbreviations, all in very fine black-face type, renders extended reading in it fatiguing. Pre-eminently, of course, it is a reference work, although specialists will find it useful chiefly to bring their German bibliography on any subject up to date. Surprising deficiencies, both of information and of interpretation, occur even in those fields in which Dr. Stephan has given us excellent monographs (e.g., *Aufklärung*, *Deism*, *Neologie*, *Theophilanthropy*, etc.).

STROTHMAN, R. *Die koptische Kirche in der Neuzeit*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1932. vi+160 pages. Unbound M. 9.60; bound M. 11.40.

History of the Coptic church falls into three large divisions: the first is the period of its glory, when it ranked as the first patriarchate of the East, and when it could boast of leaders like Clement, Origen, and Cyril. This period ended with the gaining of hegemony in the Eastern Empire by the patriarchate of Constantinople at the Council of Chalcedon. The second period is the one of adoption of monophysitism as the national creed, and later of the cruel domination of the Mohammedan conquerors. This period lasted until the opening of the nineteenth century, and the Coptic church scarcely managed to survive its rigor. The modern period, from the opening of the nineteenth century to the present time, has been one of contact with the churches of Western Christendom, of some inner reforms, and especially of the problems born of the awakened Egyptian nationalism.

Dr. Strothmann's book, although it makes numerous references to the earlier periods, confines its treatment primarily to the modern. After presenting short sketches of the patriarchs of the nineteenth century, the author describes with greater detail the struggle carried on by the more enlightened lay-groups with the patriarchate for the introduction of various reforms into the government and program of the church. Not the least useful is the section dealing with the numerous other Christian organizations of Egypt.

The present work is doubtless the most authoritative and reliable of the modern developments in the Coptic church. The topical arrangement adopted by the author necessitated a certain amount of redundancy which chronological treatment would doubtless have lessened or avoided. But that is a minor defect, which only in a small way detracts from the value of the work.

VOGEL, CLAUDE L. *Psychology and the Franciscan School*. New York: Bruce Publishing Co., 1932. 168 pages. \$3.00.

Of the nine essays contained in this symposium by Franciscan scholars, that by Ephrem Longpré on "The Psychology of Duns Scotus and Its Modernity" is the most outstanding contribution to scholarship. The author is engaged in the task of editing the works of Scotus and writes as a finished expert to whom the "Subtle Doctor" has no unresolved subtleties. The importance given to the Franciscan tradition from Hales to Scotus by Longpré and his associates in this volume may well invite the disciples of Aquinas to look to their master's laurels. The effort to show the applicability of Scotist principles to the modern advance of psychology leads a number of the writers to the discussion of present-day phases of psychoanalysis and the guidance of souls. Thus the book has a double interest, historical and practical.

ZEITLIN, SOLOMON. *Josephus on Jesus*. Philadelphia: Dropsie College, 1931. 118 pages. \$2.00.

The fragments of a Slavonic version of Josephus in the state library of Leningrad and the historical museum of Moscow have long attracted interest both scholarly and popular because of passages concerning Jesus. Josephus, at the beginning of his *Jewish War*, states that he first wrote in his own tongue, Aramaic. The theory has been held by many that the Slavonic passages are translations of this early first draft of Josephus.

Zeitlin has carefully examined the Slavonic manuscripts and reproduced facsimiles to prove his decision that the Slavonic Josephus is not a translation from Aramaic or from a Greek translation of Aramaic. His proof is mainly on the basis of the names of months and festivals, which are Christian rather than Hebrew. He shows relationship to the "Acts of Pilate" and indicates that the compiler of Slavonic Josephus used Hegesippus and the Hebrew Josippon (which he dates in the fifth century A.D.).

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE AND ETHICS

BENCKERT, HEINRICH. *Ernst Troeltsch und das ethische Problem*. "Studien zur systematischen Theologie," No. 10. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1932. 111 pages. M. 5.20.

The author undertakes to examine Troeltsch's thought from the viewpoint of his contribution to the solution of the ethical problem. On the basis of some fragmentary essays on ethics and of some unpublished student lecture-notes, he proves that Troeltsch was vitally concerned about the question: How is an absolute ethical decision, an absolute ethical value, possible or thinkable? The chief result of the study is that it brings to light that also in the field of ethics Troeltsch's thought was primarily controlled by his awareness of the stream of historical life and development. The absolute value is therefore never directly attainable; its objective content as well as the subjective decision for it is always determined by a historical situation.

The interesting little book lacks persuasive force. It seems that the author found it difficult to master the material which was at his disposal. At any rate, his arguments are often vague and wordy.

BOETTNER, LORAIN. *The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1932. 431 pages, \$3.00.

This is a surprising book. It offers a complete and careful analysis of the teaching of Calvinism, but is written from a highly conservative point of view in confessed antagon-

RECENT BOOKS

463

ism to "Arminianism in general." The author, it is true, finds it possible to represent the Calvinist teaching on predestination in a somewhat liberal way. "Much the larger portion of the human race has been elected to life," and "all those dying in infancy are among the elect." But whereas most Calvinists today would be content to find inspiration in Calvin, this writer defends his entire system and upholds the Westminster standards with a tenacity and a conviction unaffected by modern relativism. The Scripture is treated as if the past century of criticism had never been, and the Calvinist system of thought is held up to be "nothing more or less than the hope of the world." The author is an American Presbyterian who "was not reared in a Calvinistic church," but became a convert on reading some works of Charles Hodge. With all praise for Mr. Boettner's sincerity, industry, and scholarly knowledge of his subject, we can only conclude that the book will lead nowhere except to a revival of controversies better left to slumber.

GARDNER, PERCY. *The Interpretation of Religious Experience*. Nashville: Cokesbury, n.d. 231 pages. \$2.00.

Those who have followed the earlier publications of Professor Gardner will no doubt read this collection of comments and rejoinders and incidental thoughts with interest. Others are likely to find it rather too casual and incomplete to be convincing. The author stoutly reaffirms his preference for a religion of activity. There is much psychologizing in which the large influence of William James and William McDougall is evident and properly acknowledged. Through his discussion on the nature of man and the sources of his religious inspiration the author is led to an uncritical acceptance of certain contemporary notions of telepathy. Hypnotism is accepted as a "striking example" of the "dominant influence of 'brain waves.'" For Professor Gardner this means a scientific support for his belief in a supernatural factor in religious experience. Had the experimental investigations of telepathy and of hypnotism been carefully considered, different conclusions concerning their nature and their indications would have been inevitable. It is unfortunate that so good a doctrine should be entangled with such pseudo-scientific notions.

GRAY, A. H. *Finding God*. New York: Long & Smith, 1932. 153 pages. \$1.50.

Fifty thousand copies of this book have been sold in England. Only one who reads the book can understand the reason for its popularity. The title and the Table of Contents reveal a conventional subject of current interest. Eight paths are suggested by which to "find God." Reason, beauty, defeat, service, Christ, love, suffering, fellowship—these are avenues to God. But the way in which these subjects are treated makes the book a great help to people of today. The author wrote to fifty persons, asking them for their personal testimony concerning their religious experience. Through his contemporaries he approaches the question of finding God. Few books on this subject equal this one in lucidity of expression, honesty, and penetration to the heart of religion.

HALSEY, DON P. *The Evidence for Immortality*. New York: Macmillan, 1931. viii+175 pages. \$2.00.

This is a clear statement of the various arguments for immortality. The author states his views clearly, and reveals a wide familiarity with the literature in the field. His primary concern is with an evaluation of the traditional views rather than with any fresh statement.

His premise is that there must be an infinite and eternal first cause which it is certain is endowed with intelligence and will. But such a God would not create man only

for the purpose of making him suffer the ills that all mankind is heir to, and then destroy him forever.

It is unfortunate that the author did not grapple more strenuously with the relationship of the brain to the immortal soul. He quotes from numerous scientists who insist that there is no necessary connection, but there is no thoroughgoing analysis.

The last part of the book is concerned with a historical survey of those philosophies which have had a bearing on the question.

HELDER, J. (ed.). *Greatest Thoughts on Immortality*. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1930. xxv+183 pages. \$2.00.

These personal letters are from Protestant and Roman Catholic clergymen, representatives of Judaism, theologians, philosophers, psychologists, scientists, educators, and others. They represent both sides of the question, as do the quotations from printed sources. Most of the theologians quoted are fairly represented by the words of the late William Sunday, "When once we have got the belief in God, the belief in immortality is soon seen to follow." An interesting position taken by several writers is fairly well presented by these words of Professor Lloyd Morgan, "I have sufficient faith in the underlying cause, whom I still call God, to leave the matter confidently in His hands." Among those who agree essentially with this position are the late Andrew D. White, E. D. Starbuck, J. H. Tufts, Edward Dowden, J. H. Muirhead, J. P. Mahaffy. Among those who express disbelief in a future life we find Clarence Darrow, Elbert Hubbard, Henry L. Mencken, Santayana, and Bertrand Russell. An eminent surgeon indorses the position of the late Dr. William Osler, who gave as his *confessio fidei* the opinion of Cicero, who would rather be mistaken with Plato than in the right with those who deny the life after death.

SCHMIECHEN, ERNST. *Schleiermacher's Glaubensgedanken in Theologie und Predigt*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1932. 120 pages. M. 5.80.

This well-written, instructive book is an important contribution to the understanding of Schleiermacher. The author compares the statements and theological opinions of the *Glaubenslehre* and of the *Ethics* with the corresponding sections of the *Sermons*, thus testing the teachings of the theologian Schleiermacher at the convictions and admonitions of the preacher Schleiermacher. The results are the following: (1) There is abundant proof that—in contrast to a belief sometimes expressed by hyperskeptical theological historians—Schleiermacher's preaching essentially corresponded with his theology. (2) The sermon permitted him greater freedom than the scientific theological discussion to describe the variety, individuality, and vitality of the religious experience, for the sermon does not need to orient itself to a dogmatic norm or a scientific "scheme," but to actual life-situations. (3) The sermons of Schleiermacher clearly show, what is less evident in his *Glaubenslehre*, that the historical Jesus and his gospel of love were the center and foundation of his belief.

It should be added that the author follows the descriptive-analytical rather than the critical-analytical method throughout his work.

SNOWDEN, JAMES H. *The Discovery of God*. New York: Macmillan, 1932. 230 pages. \$2.00.

"Discovery" as a figure of speech and a pattern of logic affords the key to this book. The author opens his work with a few chapters on the place of discovery in experience

RECENT BOOKS

465

and then proceeds to a discussion of the ways in which God may be discovered. The philosophical background of the approach is personal idealism. The God of theism is first accepted as a probability, and then by the ways open to persons is discovered as a reality of experience.

VIDLER, ALEC R. *Sex, Marriage and Religion*. New York: Macmillan, 1932. vii+148 pages. \$1.25.

An unmarried churchman, who asserts that "one who is unmarried may start with a certain advantage when he attempts to form a dispassionate judgment about the problems which are associated with marriage," gives his views on marriage, divorce, birth control, and other problems of sex. Divorce, which implies that a marriage can be dissolved otherwise than by death, is held to be contrary to the explicit teaching of Christ. When the conditions of married life become intolerable, separation is the only legitimate remedy. Sex equality is affirmed. Contraception, while not inconsistent with traditional Christian morality, is not the ideal.

WEATHERHEAD, LESLIE D., assisted by GREAVES, DR. MARION. *The Mastery of Sex through Psychology and Religion*. New York: Macmillan, 1932. xxv+246 pages. \$2.00.

An excellent book covering practically all the problems of men and women in connection with sex. Without being offensive, it is exceedingly frank and direct. Believing that sex is responsible for a large percentage of the moral temptations of youth, the author attacks the view that there is something unclean about sex and also about the "conspiracy of silence" that has grown up around these problems. All the facts which should be known by men and women are presented, and such topics as comradeship, flirting, birth control, the mishandled sex life, etc., are discussed. In two appendixes the physical facts of sex and the physical factors in married happiness are presented.

WHITLEY, W. T. (ed.). *The Doctrine of Grace*. New York: Macmillan, 1932. xi+396 pages. \$4.50.

In the Introduction by Archbishop Temple, chairman of the Continuation Committee of the World Conference on Faith and Order, held at Lausanne in 1927, it is explained that the sixteen essays gathered into this volume were written to clear up misunderstanding with regard to one of the most fundamental of Christian doctrines and thus, it was hoped, ultimately to promote Christian reunion. The essays, which cover the history of the doctrine of grace from the New Testament period to our own day, are by such well-known scholars as Professors William Manson, J. Nørregard, H. Hermelink, J. E. Choisy, G. Wobbermin, H. L. Goudge, E. D. Soper, W. A. Brown, J. V. Bartlet, and Bishop Headlam. The Orthodox Eastern church is represented by three scholars, and the essays on the history of the doctrine in the Latin church are written by Professors E. W. Watson and Frank Gavin, non-(Roman) Catholics. There is an interesting report by the Theological Committee, followed by a set of conclusions (on "The Meaning of Grace," "Justification and Sanctification," "Predestination and Free-will," "Grace in the Sacraments," "The Church and Grace," and "*Sola Gratia*") signed by most of the writers of the essays. The book is a valuable one, not only for ecclesiastics interested in church union, but for students of historical and comparative Christianity.

CHRISTIAN WORK

BIGLER, M. K. *A Lantern to Our Children*. Milwaukee: Morehouse, 1932. 68 pages. Leader's Manual \$1.50; record-book and leaflets extra.

The idea behind this book is excellent. It is intended to help parents with the development of the spiritual life of the preschool child. The book is a worker's manual made up of the monthly suggestions which are available in leaflet form for distribution to the parents. The style of materials, the brevity and character of the leaflets, are very suggestive. It is primarily intended for Episcopalians, and the duties of a good church member relative to baptism, godparents, and conceptions of the church are included among the other practical suggestions for building character. Though the prayers and many ideas are of traditional types, the attractive, wholesome cards distributed monthly for the four preschool years are symbols of a much-needed closer relationship between church and home.

CAMERON, W. A. *The Clinic of a Cleric*. New York: Long & Smith, 1931. 249 pages. \$2.00.

For many years the author has been conducting a clinic for troubled souls, and multitudes of baffled, tempted, and sorrowing folk have found their way to his study seeking counsel and help. In this book, written from the point of view of a pastor rather than that of a psychologist, Dr. Cameron speaks out of this experience to other ministers who would render a like service. A quotation will do more than many words of description to reveal its spirit and content: "A confessional of some sort there will always be," the author says. "There will always be souls, bound by anxiety and fear and guilty secrets, who feel that they must turn somewhere for guidance and hope. There is an awful loneliness in moral struggle. That struggle is pitiless when man refuses to speak of it. He seeks to fight it out in the secret places and fails because he knows not where to unburden his heart. Let a minister give himself to this priestly task and he will be convinced anew of the reality of religion, of the presence of God in his own life, near and forgiving. Let his vestry be open to those who are seeking help, and he will soon discover that few will take the trouble to come unless they have some serious purpose in doing so. In these face to face and heart to heart conversations he will establish personal relations of a sacred character and will realize the blessing of God more obviously than in any other aspect of his calling."

FAUNCE, W. H. P. *Facing Life*. New York: Macmillan, 1932. 210 pages. \$1.00.

A one-dollar reprint of the late President Faunce's Brown University chapel addresses, first published in 1928. There are fifty of these brief but stimulating messages suitable not only for college undergraduates, but for all young people seeking to make a success of the perplexing business of facing life bravely and living it well.

FRYBERGER, HARRISON E. *The Abolition of Poverty*. New York: Advance Pub. Co., 1931. 152 pages. \$1.50.

"Statistics show that 96% of the people of America own only 20% of the wealth"; consequently there is widespread poverty. The book proposes various plans by which, while maintaining the capitalistic system, great fortunes may be broken up and more equitably distributed. Chain stores, corporation mergers, and great inheritances are especial objects of attack.

RECENT BOOKS

467

GAVIN, FRANK. *Selfhood and Sacrifice*. Milwaukee: Morehouse, 1932. 85 pages. \$1.00.

"The Seven Last Words from the Cross" furnish the basis for the seven essays of this book. In these utterances the writer finds a clue to the solution of contemporary problems. The problem of evil, of forgiveness, of self-fulfilment, and the relation of sacrifice to the development of the self are dealt with in these devotional addresses. In a stimulating way the author combines the traditional Catholic viewpoint with the thinking of our own day.

HOOKE, ELIZABETH R. *Hinterlands of the Church*. New York: Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1931. xvi+314 pages. \$2.50.

This exceedingly valuable study is the result of an investigation begun in 1928 of six kinds of territory in the United States where the rural church is the most ineffective. These areas are the Old Hilly areas, comprising the Green and White mountains of New Hampshire and Vermont, with a part of the state of Maine, northeastern New York, and western Massachusetts; the Old Level areas, comprising sections of Ohio and the middle-western states; grazing regions in the Rocky Mountain states; mountain sections in the West; cut-over districts as in northern Michigan; and dry-farming regions. Each of these areas was found to have peculiar problems and impediments to church activities. There were certain common characteristics, however. In the four new areas there were sparsity of population, isolation, and poverty; in the older areas the abandonment of country churches was proceeding rapidly, while in such old communities as Vermont it was found that the proportion of families adhering to churches had declined one-third in fifty years.

The author has not been content with merely pointing out the discouraging facts, but has written an excellent chapter on "Attempted Remedies" in which she has gathered the various and sundry methods and programs which have been used, and with what result, in meeting the problems of the Hinterlands.

JENNESS, MARY. *Men Who Stood Alone*. New York: Long & Smith, 1932. 114 pages. \$1.00.

This is a collection of eleven hero stories. The characters are from the Old Testament with the addition of Judas Maccabeus and John the Baptist. In dealing with Elijah and Elisha the writer is at the disadvantage of having to retell stories already exquisitely told in the Scripture narratives. More valuable for her educational purpose are the chapters presenting Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and other inspirers of Hebrew religious life, in which the author's historic imagination aids the interpretation of the personality. Attractive titles for the chapters are employed. Miracle is not excluded; but the whole emphasis is on moral heroism. Interest is aroused by the descriptive element which reveals the social customs and gives body to the outlines. The book is historical fiction rather than history, but has been written with respect for historical data. It should serve a useful purpose for home reading for juniors.

KUHN, LE P. BERNARD. *Les Prêcheurs*. Juvisy, France: Les Editions du Cerf, 1931. 227 pages. Fr. 12.

Father Kuhn, a Dominican preacher well known in Paris, addresses these 227 pages to young priests beginning their pulpit ministry. The style is that of an experienced speaker to congregations—clear, flowing, mildly hortatory, and not lacking in humor.

The first chapter (entitled "What Is Preaching?") is full of practical counsel for beginners based on the thought that all homiletical technique derives ultimately from the personal character of the preacher. Chapter ii is an interesting study of the place of preaching in the church. The next, concerned chiefly with the content of the sermon, emphasizes the need for each priest to know his Thomas Aquinas; and the following one suggests definite themes to be used during Lent, "the feast of preaching." The last half of the book contains enlightening historical material regarding the preaching of Chrysostom, Dominic, the Dominicans, and Jesus. Though the book presupposes the authority and manner of the Roman Catholic church and is therefore too narrow for Protestants generally, many parts of it may be read with delight and profit by preachers of any faith whatever.

LAIDLER, HARRY W. *The Road Ahead: A Primer of Capitalism and Socialism*. New York: Crowell, 1932. ix+86 pages. \$1.00.

This little book is, as the subtitle says, a primer of capitalism and socialism, written by the executive director of the League for Industrial Democracy, "for the intelligent boy and girl just beginning to ask questions about the unemployed, the rich and the poor, about political parties, about our machine and electrical age, and what can be done to make life happier for all." It is an admirable statement of the Socialist point of view, written in simple, straightforward language, but one doubts if it is written in such form as greatly to interest the readers for whom it is intended—rather young boys and girls.

MABRY, GREGORY. *The Priest and His Interior Life*. Milwaukee: Morehouse, 1932. x+177 pages. \$1.75.

A practical guide written for "seminarists, young priests, and those who, for one reason or another, have not grasped the importance of an ordered interior life lived in Christ." It is written from the Anglo-Catholic viewpoint and indicates "not only *what* the interior life of the priest should include, but also gives very practical exercises and directions indicating *how* to attain the desired objectives." Many avowed Protestant ministers would greatly benefit by a reading of this book, and by giving earnest consideration to the emphasis which the Catholic lays upon the necessity of following a carefully formulated rule, in order to achieve a rich inner spiritual experience.

MACKINTOSH, H. R. *The Highway of God*. New York: Scribner, 1932. 253 pages. \$2.75.

The author of this book is the honored and beloved moderator of the Church of Scotland. It is a volume of sermons, one of a series published under the title, "The Scholar as Preacher." They are in the Scottish manner, expository rather than topical, pithy and substantial rather than descriptive. Some of them are not for the more diffuse culture of America, where the language of Christian theology has lost its command of the emotions; but all of them, once the reader penetrates beyond the language to the meaning, reveal the author as the gracious, wise, and catholic thinker that he is.

MOTT, JOHN R. *Liberating the Lay Forces of Christianity*. New York: Macmillan, 1932. xi+175 pages. \$2.00.

The Ayer Lectures for 1931 of the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School. The forty years' experience of this great Christian lay leader in liberating the lay forces of the church in five continents issues in a volume in which the author stresses the urgent need of greater lay activity in the life and work of the church, analyzes the influences which

RECENT BOOKS

469

militate against lay participation, and proposes detailed methods by which a great lay force may be set to work. Dr. Mott's preponderant interest in, and lifelong association with, men's work results in a book which one might read entirely through without ever suspecting that women constitute any part of the lay forces of Christianity.

ORTON, HAZEL V. *Out in the Country*. New York: Friendship Press, 1931. 136 pages. Cloth \$1.00; paper \$0.75.

This Junior course for rural boys and girls is written by the secretary of elementary work of the Missionary Education Movement. Eight units are selected from the experiences and problems common to many farm families, each unit being developed in one or more sessions of the Sunday school or vacation church school as time and interest seem to warrant. A description of the situation in which the course was first developed is given and the whole project is clearly set forth. Workers in rural districts will welcome the book as suggestive of materials and methods that can be used to advantage by ordinary Junior teachers. While it is quite uneven in its values, it is a good contribution to a field in which far too little has been written.

PALMER, LEON C. *The New Religious Education*. Milwaukee: Morehouse, 1932. xii+130 pages. \$1.50.

A popular, well-written interpretation of the newer trends in religious education. The audience for which he writes is obviously the pastors, supervisors, and teachers in the church school. Against the background of the historical development of educational theory the author presents the more vital conception of the function and procedure of education in the general field of educational theory and in the field of religious education in particular. He accepts the theory that religious education is a guided experience in dealing with the actual situations which life presents to the growing person in the light of the religious values that the race has achieved. It is not, therefore, the mere transmission of subject matter or the imposition of adult-predetermined traits. It is an organized and systematic attempt to assist the growing person to understand the situations that he faces and to bring them through to Christian outcomes in conduct. In a book designed to serve the purpose which this one does, one does not expect to find a critical treatment of the educational issues involved. Its treatment throughout is appreciative, constructive, and stimulating to the lay reader. Pastors, supervisors, and church-school teachers will find in it an excellent summary presentation of the most significant trends that are remaking current religious education.

RICHARDS, JAMES A. *Windows in Matthew*. New York: Long & Smith, 1932. 164 pages. \$1.50.

This is the first book in a series on "Windows in the New Testament," edited by Paul Hutchinson. The writer, who is the pastor of the First Congregational Church of Oberlin, evidently underscored phrases and sentences as he read the Gospel of Matthew. This book gives us running comments and current applications on these words, written in a popular vein. It will prove useful to those who desire a book that can be turned to for a few moments each day as devotional literature. Ministers who look through these windows will discover the possibility of a sermon on more than one page.

STUBBS, ANSEL HARTLEY (comp. and ed.). *Financial and Social Success in Welfare Plans*. Kansas City: Intercollegiate Press, 1932. 267 pages. \$1.50.

A compilation of methods, such as bazaars and fairs, food sales, festivals, etc., used by welfare organizations in financing their projects, and described in the words of

leaders who used them successfully. Prepared especially for the use of women's organizations.

WARNER, GERTRUDE CHANDLER, and HARRIS, ELIZABETH. *The Friendly Farmers*. New York: Friendship Press, 1931. 154 pages. \$1.00.

One of the newer and better courses for primary boys and girls on rural life in all parts of the world. There are nine charmingly written stories, programs for eleven sessions, a Bibliography, and a discussion with the teacher of the purposes and plans of the study.

YEAXLEE, BASIL A. *The Approach to Religious Education*. New York: Macmillan, 1932. 144 pages. \$1.25.

The author of this recent English book is principal of Westhill Training College and secretary of the British Adult Education Movement. He has attempted to give a foundation for a theory of religious education in a review of the findings of biology, psychology, and philosophy, and in the light of the modern interpretations of the Bible and theology. He believes every religious educator should have a good working philosophy of life and be able to appreciate all human interests. The book is the outcome of a sane, well-balanced attitude and shows a wide acquaintance with both English and American writers. While the author takes a progressive point of view throughout, there is a tendency to be rather apologetic in presentation and pietistically academic in style. Several typographical errors were noted, such as the initials of T. G. Soares and the spelling of the name of Dr. Horne.

MISCELLANEOUS

BOWIE, WALTER RUSSELL, *On Being Alive*. New York: Scribner, 1931. viii+252 pages. \$2.00.

Here is a good antidote to current cynical realism. This book asserts a man's right to be happy, and that, not by way of wish-thinking, but by being responsive to all that is interesting and meaningful about him. To be alive to the beauty of the earth, people, truth, poetry, God, and the eternal mysteries is to find life worth living.

HUNTER, ALLAN A. *Social Perplexities*. New York: Long & Smith, 1932. 176 pages. \$1.50.

A simple discussion of some of the major conflicts in modern life with an attempt to suggest a way out. Today we live in a world that is out of focus. Our problem is to learn how to get along with our own selves and with one another. As nations we are confused by two ideals, one placing faith in battleships and nationalism, the other relying upon good will and co-operation. As economic groups and as races we clash. Our lives are a medley of tensions affecting the marriage relationship, the contact of youth with age, and religious outlooks. Our greatest need is for an integrated world, and the hope of this is seen in the lives of great personalities who may yet show us the way. "Gandhi, Schweitzer and Kagawa are perhaps the most dynamic or at least conscience-stirring unifiers living. They are radiantly at one with themselves because they have become one with the integrating spirit of the universe."

MACIVER, R. M. *Society: Its Structure and Changes*. New York: Long & Smith, 1931. xvi+569 pages. \$5.00.

In *Society: Its Structure and Changes*, Professor R. M. MacIver systematizes sociological theory in a clearly defined, consistent treatment. It is a conceptual presentation

RECENT BOOKS

471

similar in type but not in content to the sociological writings of Cooley and Dewey. Although one accustomed to reading the reports of scientific research contained in such writings as those of Ogburn, Shaw, and Thrasher will notice a dearth of concrete data in this book, he must acknowledge the service Professor MacIver renders in defining concepts which constitute the hypotheses for scientific investigation. Of special interest are his discussions of social change and his justification of the concept of social evolution.

The publishers announce the appearance in June of a study guide to be used in conjunction with Professor MacIver's book. This will prove especially useful for college departments that are using this book as a text.

NORWOOD, ROBERT. *Issa—a Poem*. New York: Scribner, 1931. xiv+95 pages. \$2.50.

Charles G. D. Roberts should know good poetry when he sees it, and in a charming Introduction to this poem, in which he acquaints us with the personality of the author, he calls Norwood "a great religious poet" who has here reached the height of his expression. Dr. Norwood in seven cantos shows a keen observation of life's common things; but it is the observation of one who sees material objects in a mystic glamor and makes them symbols for the expression of spiritual love, joy, and inspiration. Scenes of Cape Breton fishing villages, rural skies and landscapes, familiar farm operations and beloved farm animals, are charmingly described as background for the author's spiritual autobiography. The main point of the latter is the attainment of a believing mind. This faith is achieved by a process which involves some crises, and some poignant sorrows but apparently no descent into tragic abysses of struggle, and is such as to repudiate dogmatism and all that is unloving. The poem is bound together by a thread of Jesus-mysticism, which justifies the title. Comparison with Robert Bridges would not be out of place; both have a refined sense of beauty and both have the art of giving vent to quiet humor, with no suggestion of absurdity, in the midst of passages of tenderness and sublimity. The whole poem is finely wrought; many stanzas achieve exceptional beauty of diction and imagination.

SILLS, MILTON, and HOLMES, ERNEST S. *Values: A Philosophy of Human Needs*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932. vi+136 pages. \$1.00.

This book is composed of a group of dialogues and is designed to meet the supposed need of knowing what the beliefs of the great "movie" star were concerning the meaning of life. Usually such "last words" are nonsensical.

In this case there may be more justification for the posthumous publication of opinions of this sort. On the one hand, Mr. Sills did have an academic training in the fields of philosophy and psychology, which makes his opinions of something more than passing value. In the second place, the contents are stated to be a record of stenographic reports of actual conversations between the two men. The only exception to this is the dialogue on immortality. Nicety of sensitivity would seem to suggest that this portion be left out because as it is it assumes a certain specious authenticity, without Mr. Sills's actual assent to the position he is made to assume. Mr. Sills takes the attitude of the pragmatic relativist against an absolute theistic idealist. Human life is lived and values are achieved through the device of a tentative experimental method.

WESEEN, MAURICE H. *Words Confused and Misused*. New York: Crowell, 1932. 310 pages. \$2.00.

This volume is intended as a help to the "careful writer and speaker." It resembles somewhat the *Dictionary of Modern English Usage*, by H. W. Fowler, which was published by the Clarendon Press in 1926. Weseen's volume contains an alphabetical list of pairs and groups of words which are commonly confused because they look alike, but which have different meanings. The pronunciation of these words is not given and therefore the volume will not be as great a help to the speaker as to the writer. The words are defined and their differences explained. A cross-reference system adds to the value of the book.



Stati

Completed
1999-2000

